The categories are the attribution of a predicate to a subject. They are specifically supreme classes of every possible predicate, with which it is possible to order the whole reality.
For Aristotle, the categories are groups or primary genres which collect all the properties that may be the explanation of ‘being’. They are the predicaments of ‘being’, which refer to primary qualities (the immutable essences of objects), or secondary (the mishaps that may change).
The categories of Aristotle have an objective value, because they refer to concrete entities. Our judgments use them not only according to a relationship purely logical, typical of syllogism, but assembling them owing to the intuitive capacity to effectively grasp the relationship between the real objects. But beyond that, to each of the categories it relates a part of those semantic constructs of the discourse that have to do with the real world: for example, a name or a noun refers to the category of substance; the adjectives to quality, those indefinite to quantity, or to the relationship etc. It is therefore assumed that for Aristotle categories are a classification of the components which make a discourse.
Starting from the distinction between the objective level and the semantic one, that was not missed in Aristotle, who, however, would not know what to attribute to one and what to the other, Immanuel Kant admits that to judge, source of all objective discourse, is a 'multifaceted activity, which arises from the application of different categories or pure concepts, through which the intellect unifies multiple data from sensitive intuition.
These concepts, however, are transcendental, namely that they need starting data in order to activate, without which they would be empty: it's because of the sense organs that an object is "given," to us becoming a phenomenon; with categories then it is "thought".
Then, unlike Aristotle, for whom categories belonged to the ontological reality of ‘being’, the Kantian categories fit in to the intellect; that is, they become the ‘a priori’ functions, or means of working of our thought that frame reality according to its own preconceived scheme. They do not apply to reality in itself, but only to the phenomenon.
As in Aristotle the categories needed judgment to be used, then in Kant they require a supreme activity, of a thought in the process of being created, to exercise their unifying function of the manifold. The categories are the multiple facets of a prism which is called thought; they are unifying acts, but not yet active, only potentially activated.
This opens the question of the deduction of the categories, that is, how to justify the use we make of them: for example, is it legitimate to assign different categories to the same object?
This is the problem faced by Kant in the Transcendental Deduction of Critique of Pure Reason, to unify categories, finding a principle from which they can all derive. This principle will be found in the ‘I think’ or transcendental apperception.
Kant will be accused of having locked himself up in a subjectivism with no way out, given that his categories do not serve to know the reality as it is in itself, but only as it appears to us.
With Fichte they assume a different role: while Kant had intended to unify the multiple, for Fichte they assume the inverse aim of multiplying the uniqueness of the ‘I’, bringing it to divide and produce unconsciously the ‘non-I’. Thus the categories of the intellect have also a real or ontological value, albeit unconscious. The ‘thinking’ is to create, but only at the level of intellectual intuition.
In Hegel, instead, it is the same logic that becomes creative. The cognitive categories of Kant, which were merely "formal", become together "form and content": they are logical-ontological categories, determinations of the Idea as it proceeds dialectically. An object exists to the extent that it is rational, that is, only if it falls within a logical category.
For Nietzsche, finally, categories become the result of the evolution of the breed: their effectiveness would be given not by the ability to reflect what is true, but by the utility in aiding survival. Concepts taken and endorsed by ethological-philosophical studies of Konrad Lorenz, who defined the categories the 'apparatus image of the world. "
The Aristotelian doctrine of the categories aimed to remedy the indeterminacy with which Parmenides, of the Eleatic school, had stated the truth of ‘Being’, leaving it without a predicate: Parmenides had said only that ‘Being’ is, and cannot not be, but He had not said what it would be. The result was a fleeting concept, which was likely to be confused with ‘non-being’. Aristotle, therefore, aims to show that ‘Being’ is determined in a plurality of attributes, and then is multilateral despite its unity. Against Plato then, who led back the fundamentals of ‘Being’ to the logical ideal forms, Aristotle asserts the need to distinguish logical concepts from the empirical ones.
Then, I wish to point out that the various judgments which we form of reality, according to a traditional classification, are gathered under four groups, each comprising three parts:
1. amount of judgments: universal, particular, singular
2. quality: affirmative, negative, infinite
3. relation: categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive
4. mode: problematic, advocates, dogmatic
Each of these judgments results from the application of respective category. Thus, with the '' transcendental analysis " we can get the twelve categories: unity, plurality, totality, reality, negation, limitation, inertia and subsistence, cause and effect, reciprocity, possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity and contingency.
Principles of justice and fairness are also central to procedural, retributive, and restorative justice. Such principles are supposed to ensure procedures that generate unbiased, consistent, and reliable decisions. Here the focus is on carrying out set rules in a fair manner so that a just outcome might be reached. Fair procedures are central to the legitimacy of decisions reached and individuals' acceptance of those decisions.
To ensure fair procedures, both in the context of legal proceedings, as well as in negotiation and mediation, the third party carrying out those procedures must be impartial. This means they must make an honest, unbiased decision based on appropriate information. For example, judges should be impartial, and facilitators should not exhibit any prejudice that gives one party unfair advantages. The rules themselves should also be impartial so that they do not favor some people over others from the outset.
An unbiased, universally applied procedure, whether it serves to distribute wealth or deliver decisions, can ensure impartiality as well as consistency. The principle of consistency proposes that "the distinction of some versus others should reflect genuine aspects of personal identity rather than extraneous features of the differentiating mechanism itself." In other words, the institutional mechanism in question should treat like cases alike and ensure a level playing field for all parties.
The principle of standing suggests that people value their membership in a group and that societal institutions and decision-making procedures should affirm their status as members. For example, it might follow from this principle that all stakeholders should have a voice in the decision-making process. In particular, disadvantaged members of a group or society should be empowered and given an opportunity to be heard. When decision-making procedures treat people with respect and dignity, they feel affirmed. A central premise of restorative justice, for example, is that those directly affected by the offense should have a voice and representation in the decision-making process regarding the aftermath of the offense--be it punishment and/or restitution.
Related to issues of respect and dignity is the principle of trust. One measure of fairness is whether society members believe that authorities are concerned with their well being and needs. People's judgments of procedural fairness result from perceptions that they have been treated "honestly, openly, and with consideration." If they believe that the authority took their viewpoints into account and tried to treat them fairly, they are more likely to support and engage in the broader social system.
Dear Constantine,
I quite agree with the content of your excellent intervention (as an example, your last sentence). Going through the vast literature on fairness, I came across a paper which I believe is quite in tune with the essence of your thought. It is by Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications, December 23, 2000. I wish to quote a passage:” much progress and fascinating new insights into the nature of fairness preferences have been made in the past decade. While there is still much to be done, this research clearly shows that it is possible to discriminate between theories based on different preference assumptions. Therefore, in view of the facts, the new theoretical developments, the importance of fairness concerns in many economic domains, and in view of the existence of rigorous experimental techniques that allow us to examine hitherto unsolvable problems in a scientific manner, we believe that it is time to recognize that a substantial fraction of the people is also motivated by fairness concerns”.
Fairness is one of my favorite subject and I sincerely hope to read one of your contributions in Researchgate.
All the best, Gianrocco
Dear Gianrocco,
i feel honored by your kind words
Fairness is addressed in the Philosophy of Law ( Del Vechio)
best wishes Constantine
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/philosophy_of_law/
a link which could interest you Professor
I'd like to refer on my reactions as a result of the wide range of suggestions received and the literature inspired by Constantine Jeannacopoulos.
As an example of a collateral theme that came to my mind, there is the study of the "evolution of life" which focuses in particular on the idea of "transformation," a concept that evolution brings along with it —in this case, the process of transformation of simple, primordial elements into complex and organized structures. As far as evolution is concerned, its notion always implies a time dimension. We speak for instance of the evolution of a dynamical system, indicating by this the study of the transformation undergone by a given material system according to the physical laws governing it.
Evolution was endowed in the last two centuries with a remarkable philosophical meaning, one that it lacked at the beginning. By evolution, in fact, we come to express today also a global and all-encompassing philosophical view of nature, understood as an "evolving world," a continuously developing dynamic system. Such a view inherits the classical contents associated with the philosophical idea of "becoming" as opposed to being, taken as a philosophical perspective valid for reality as a whole,
The philosophical notion of evolution was crucially influenced by modern and contemporary science as the latter put forward the idea that the concept of "becoming" included not only growth and, but also and foremost the deep transformation with unpredictable consequences. From a philosophical point of view, the dialectics between being and becoming has been revived in modern times in terms of a comparison between creation and evolution, leading to new synthesis built either on theistic or materialistic basis. The term "evolutionism" came to indicate mainly a "philosophical system". Syntheses on a theistic basis, which accepted transcendence of spirit over matter, gradually interpreted -after due clarifications- the idea of evolution, both cosmic and biological.
In relation to evolution a further clarification concerns the use of the term "theory" and its meanings. In the scientific field, whenever the expression "theory of evolution" is employed, it usually refers to a framework capable of providing a reliable historical-scientific reconstruction. In such a framework further analysis is still certainly possible, but it is definitely more than a mere hypothesis, because it matches a remarkable and well-established picture.
To sum up, we should remind that Darwin's theory on natural selection was based on the following assumptions: on one side, actualism connected to gradualism, holding that evolution occurs through the accumulation of slight modifications originating major changes —e.g. the great diversification of living beings— over a long period; on the other side, the importance of the mechanism concerning the competition for resources and the selection of the fittest.
[Some Bibliography: P.J.Richerson, R. Boyd, 'The evolution of human ultrasociality' in I. Eibl-Eibisfeldt and F. Salter (eds.) Ideology, warfare and indoctrinability, 1996; A.J.Robson, 'The biological basis of economic behavior', JEL, 39,1,2001and several works by David Sloan Wilson, University of Binghamton, USA.]
Thank you, Constantine, and best regards. Gianrocco
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