MacIntyre and Boghossian on Relativism and Justification

H.G. Callaway

Draft of 30 January 2024

(1,260ww +notes)

The contrast between Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Boghossian on epistemic justification and relativism of justification illuminates the background issue of normative pluralism at stake in their distinctive rejections of relativism. In a significant sense, MacIntyre’s views on relativism and epistemic justification are closer to Putnam’s (and those of Dewey and Hook). Both Putnam and MacIntyre contest elements of epistemology found in Boghossian’s, and other more analytic approaches. The following passage comes from the “Postscript” included in the second edition (1984) of MacIntyre’s widely read study, After Virtue. “Morality,” MacIntyre argues, “which is no particular society’s morality is to be found nowhere.”

... the subject matters of moral philosophy at least—the evaluative and normative concepts, maxims, arguments and judgments about which the moral philosopher enquires—are nowhere to be found except as embodied in the historical lives of particular social groups and so possessing the distinctive characteristics of historical existence: both identity and change through time, expression in institutional practice as well as in discourse, interaction and interrelationship with a variety of forms of activity.[1]

Otherwise put, the point is that morality (and normative standards generally) exist only in social traditions; and, moreover, that the morality and standards of different times (and places) factually differ from each other. This is not to claim, however, that any normative standards factually in use are as good or valid as any others.

Though MacIntyre is an advocate and defender of a version of Aristotelian virtue ethics, he employs an epistemology which is alien to Aristotle. He disputes the claims, often found in analytic philosophy (and in its rejection of relativism), of timeless, universal standards of ration­ality above and beyond all variations of time and locality. MacIntyre’s position depends on a realist conception of truth (akin to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of truth as adequatio rei et intellectus) combined with cultural and historical variability of normative standards of justifi­ca­tion.[2]It follows, then, on MacIntyre’s account of moral and normative traditions, and the Aristo­telian-Thomistic tradition in particular, that normative traditions are capable of and open to rational development or transformation—even into incompatible forms. This is to endorse a kind of pluralism while rejecting relativism;[3]and such development or transformation of a tradition is only plausible, if newly proposed normative standards can be shown capable of solving problems which could not be solved in accordance with pre-existing normative standards. Notice that this is very close to claiming that superior normative standards emerge in the course of successful inquiry.

The approach exemplified in MacIntyre’s writings with its recognition of a cultural pluralism of normative standards, contrasts with the approach of Boghossian and other prominent represen­tatives of analytic philosophy—which treat of justification and normative standards abstractly and with claims on universal validity. The specific philosophical character of Boghossian’s criti­cism of the relativism of justification is fairly evident in his general account of the objectivity of reasons:

... the thesis of the objectivity of reasons can be stated as the claim that there is an objective fact of the matter which epistemic principles are true, which set of rules a thinker ought to employ to shape his beliefs, if he is to arrive at beliefs that are genuinely justified.

We certainly act as though we believe in the objectivity of reasons. We don’t behave as though anything goes in the way of belief, suggesting that we operate with a specific set of epistemic rules. And we don’t hold that others are at liberty to operate with whatever epistemic rules they like.[4]

On this and similar accounts of justification, the “objective fact” about “which epistemic princi­ples are true” is available via analytical reflection; and the implicit assumption seems to be that cultural and historical variations and divergences from the true principles are in some fashion false or illusory. (Notice that this concept is not inconsistent with holding that a factual pluralism of different standards of judgment or sets of epistemic rules exist in different groups or historical periods.) It will prove important to ask, though, whether on this and similar accounts,[5]the epistemic principles supposed true are available to analytical reflection all at once. If we assume that they are, then we must wonder why the problems of epistemic justification have not been long ago settled—or settled over the past century of analytic philosophy. Surely, there has been some development and change in epistemology in analytic philosophy. The other horn of the dilemma is that if the true principles are not all-at-once available to analytic reflection, then the account of the true principles seems to be variable and subject to historical development.

In Boghossian’s critical discussion of relativisms of justification, the central point is that “the relativist thinks that we can only cogently talk about [proposition] P’s being justified rela­tive to a communal epistemic practice C, for variable C”; and “... the core idea is this: whether, under the appropriate circumstances, a given body of information supports a particular belief isn’t some absolute relation between the information and the belief but is rather to be understood as obtaining only relative to some further parameter—the epistemic principles accepted by a community”[6]

The conflict between abstract, “universal” objections to the relativism of justification and views such as those of Dewey, Hook, Putnam—and Macintyre—may be fairly viewed in terms of the contextual character of epistemic justification. Insisting on the contextual character of justification, part of the point is to avoid a form of anachronism which consists of projecting current standards of justification into past evaluative judgments—ignoring the actual standards people had available to work with.

For example, consider whether nineteenth century physicists were at the time justified in their confident acceptance and esteem for Newto­nian gravity and Newtonian mechanics. After all, Newtonian physics was well confirmed by any number of tests and the success of numerous predictions. There seems to be little sense in claiming that they were not justified, given the evidence then available, merely on the basis of their not knowing what only later came to light in Einstein’s physics. To suppose that nineteenth-century physicists were not justified in accepting Newtonian physics implies that they ought to have known of or should have considered, say, extreme accelerations and environments of extremely intensive gravity. But as the actual history of physics shows, the general relevancy of extremes of acceleration and gravity to the evaluation of Newtonian physics only became plausible in the context of Einstein’s theoretical proposals. Since the distinctive predictions of Einstein’s new physics have been born out, we have a good example of the emergence of revised standards of judgment in the course of further research and inquiry—including the normative standard of looking to new results of high-energy physics.

Regarding moral and normative, political claims and proposals, a similar point holds. Because of the development of knowledge and technology, human beings become able to do things which they could not have done earlier. In consequence novel activities and situations arise and new moral and political problems are encountered which had not been encountered before; and these new problems and question may overtax pre-existing and established means of resolution. In cases of moral and/or political conflicts, involving factually different standards of judgment and claims, the prospect is that new standards of judgment may arise from those cases where the conflicts can actually be resolved. But on the supposition of a single, true set of rules and standards for conflict resolution, it is more difficult to understand how it is that some conflicts can be resolved while many others persist with no plausible resolution in sight.

Notes:

[1]. Alasdair MacIntyre 1984, After Virtue, A Study in Moral Theory, second ed. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 265-266.

[2]. Alasdair MacIntyre 1988, Whose Justice, Which Rationality? Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. See p. 18. Cf. the helpful discussion of related points in Christopher W. Gowans 2011, “Virtue Ethics and Moral Relativism,” in Steven D. Hales ed. 2011, A Companion to Relativism. Oxford; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. See pp. 398-402.

[3]. See Alasdair MacIntyre 1999, “Moral Pluralism without Moral Relativism,” in K. Brinkman, ed. 1999, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy vol. I. Ethics. Bowling Green, OH: Philosophical Documentation Center, pp. 1-8.

[4]. Boghossian 2008, Content and Justification, Philosophical Papers. New York; Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 236.

[5]. Of particular interest are the Oxford University philosophers, defending virtue ethics and an apparent Oxford-orthodoxy on moral objectivity—including Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001) Philippa Foot (1920-2010) and the English-born and Oxford educated, New Zealand philoso­pher, Rosalind Hursthouse.

[6]. Boghossian 2008, Content and Justification, p. 248.