There are several meanings and philosophical systems of the term idealism. The most common is that - according to Wikipedia - equates life to a dream even if this statement is not intended to reduce confusion. Idealism, in fact stands in radical contrast with respect to common sense, that would not let us realize to live in a world of fiction; paradoxically, then, just common sense would be the real "sleeper" for the illusion about the existence of a real world outside us.
In making of the Idea, that is, of thought, or the subject, the principle ‘prime’ from which the reality arises and is deduced (the being or object), idealism is opposed in particular to:
dogmatism, that, contrary to idealism, the subject derives its existence from the object and not vice versa. However, it deals of two perspectives in short complementary, based on the same immediate unity of subject and object; to realism, according to which reality exists independently of the subject.
For the idealists, this view would be still at a stage of unawareness, unable to recognize that reality is a production of the human mind. Some idealists, however, did not want to destroy the scientific-ontological system of realism, to materialism, to mechanicism, and to all those theories that are based on a reductionist or utilitarian approach to reality; to them idealism contrasts the unconscious and interior dimension of the individual, emphasizing the dream, the fantasy, the imagination, the moral and artistic sentiment as the main ways that can lead to the truth.
Then there is the case of an empiricist idealism, headed by George Berkeley, that could be considered one of the most radical idealists: his empiricism is opposed to the rationalist conception that the ideas of reason had a basis in the objective reality.
Leibniz (1646-1716) used the term ‘idealism’ to indicate the philosophy of Plato. Although in the history of philosophy the term "idealism" usually indicates a period from the late eighteenth century to the early decades of the next century, the idealist philosophy has actually an extension historically much larger. While recognizing that the German idealism of Hegel, Fichte and Schelling perhaps represents its maximum theoretical consistency, this philosophical movement can not be confined only in this period, being an epistemological vision that runs across all the history of Western philosophical thought, albeit with different nuances.
If the above is now common ‘baggage’, it is still discussed Plato's position in favor of the reality of mathematical entities. In that part of Metaphysics dedicated to the Platonic doctrine of causes, Aristotle (384-322 BC) states, after having recalled among other things that it is both like and unlike the Pythagorean theory, that for Plato, "in addition to sensitive forms and real objects exist as something in between, mathematical entities, which differ from sensible things because they are eternal and differ from the ideal forms because there is a plurality of mathematical entities that are similar, while each ideal shape is in itself unique, individual, "(Metaphysics, I, 6, 987b). For Aristotle, then, Plato admits the existence of "archetypal ideas" of numbers from which, in a similar way to other ideas, derive mathematical numbers. Indeed, in various works of Plato, the Philebus, the Republic, the Letter VII, we find an allusion to the existence of ideal numbers that are archetypes of the numbers used by mathematicians.
In Plato one can therefore assume the existence of the numbers, but with caution to remember that he speaks only as archetypal ideas, a concept of the number very different from mathematical reality that results.
The absolute idealism developed even in a period still dominated by the thought of Kant, through a discussion of his criticism: the idealists, in fact, denied the existence of the noumenon (that was for Kant the reality outside the subject, located beyond its limits to knowledge), and affirmed the existence of the sole phenomenon (reality as we know it), drawing the consequence that there can be only what is in our conscience. This primacy of knowledge of conscience became one of the most significant elements of absolute idealism.
The problem of the Kantian noumenon was due to the fact that, if it is stated that it is unknowable, there is no logical reason to postulate its existence. Admitting the presence of the thing itself independently of the subject who knows it, for example, was for Fichte a dogmatic and irrational position, leading to an inconsistent dualism between subject and object, or between the noumenon and the so-called ‘I think’. Kant considered the ‘I think’ as the summit of critical conscience that was the formal condition without which we could not even think.
It has to be considered that in opposition to materialism, realism and similar ideas, idealism considers the matter as something ontologically secondary against the Idea, as somewhat derivative and with no independent reality, that only from the Idea - that is, the spiritual substance - receives its apparent and impoverished part of reality. Obviously, the sense of idealism is not univocal, but extremely complex because, in the history of thought, it is configured in different ways according to the concept of ideas or spiritual substance dominant in different periods and in different thinkers; a preliminary distinction is necessary between an epistemological idealism, which makes of the thinking subject, understood as a spiritual entity, the focus and starting point of philosophical thought - as in Descartes - without operating a resolution of the entire external reality to thought, and a metaphysical idealism, which on the contrary operates radically unlike that resolution, up to argue that the very act of thought is the act of the creation of the outside world, thus solving the reality of the latter in the activity of thinking, or identifying the absolutely ' being and thinking’, as in the classical German idealism.
Fichte recognized to Kant the merit of having approached the idealistic conception with the doctrine of '"I think," or "transcendental apperception", which remained, however, a formal principle of reality.
Transcendental is the act by which the ego creates the world. This act can not be demonstrated by rational, but that assumption beginning with an intuitive-intellectual act in this transcendental sense: form and content, transcendent and immanent, before the creation of reality (self-consciousness) and simultaneously coincident with it.
In the system of transcendental idealism (Opera (1800) by Schelling the complete system of idealism is exposed, with the complement of the writings on Nature presents the first phase of the thought of Schelling. Philosophy itself and its parts are exposed to according to a gradual continuity within a unified design in which self-consciousness rises to the absolute, caught by an intellectual intuition. Intellectual intuition is "the means of transcendental philosophy," which moves from consciousness to consciousness, by overcoming the conflict between 'nature' and 'I' without recourse to the Kantian 'thing in itself'. Nature in its various stages of development It is but the unconscious manifestation of the spirit (it is "consciousness petrified' ), which is composed, according to a polarity, with the conscious activity exemplified by the representative thought and the demonstrative sciences.
Understanding the unity of absolute knowledge is possible only by an act of intuition universally valid, which Schelling identified with the aesthetic intuition . Absolute is revealed gradually in history. Nature and consciousness progress along a parallel development and following a mutual involvement (though unconscious) described as 'polarity' in which the occurrence of ever higher and complex forms of consciousness matches the progress of nature, by dynamic developing, toward forms ever more complex. By the impulse that pervades it, nature it is revealed as the shape and organization that exceeds the need and reveals itself as freedom, i.e. as spirit. It represents "the odyssey of the spirit" that - while seeking - "escapes himself."
"dogmatism, that, contrary to idealism, the subject derives its existence from the object and not vice versa."
From an imaginary object or a real one? I am not so sure where to set 'object' here. F.e. if someone is tought a dogma who/what is the object then? The teacher or the object they are talking about?
I’ll try to give an answer by saying that like all human formulations of truth, dogma has a analogic character that translates imperfectly the divine truth, which does not give up, however, to be its expression.
A proper dogma, i.e. the divine mystery, "which exceed by its nature insomuch the created intellect, that also taught by revelation and received by faith, remains, however, covered by the veil of faith itself and enveloped in a haze" (Conc. Vat., sess. III, c. 2).
The knowledge of a dogma is therefore necessarily analogic and imperfect, given the transcendence of its object, but not therefore false, nor merely subjective; because according to Catholic doctrine, to that knowledge corresponds a well-determined truth, that is the object of revelation, of which the human mind perceives the terms and their relationship, although it does not see the intrinsic reason. In other words, while framing a truth of faith, dogma remains characterized by a certain openness and incompleteness. Consequently, human reason has the task of constantly deepen the perception of its object.
Wonderful summary of the Kantian and post-Kantian issues Gianrocco!
Nonetheless, the answer your other-mind provides strikes my mind as metaphysical in an overly dogmatic and restrictive sense as if the objectivity of well-determined truth was truly a problem that can best be resolved by an adequate examination in good faith of consciousness apart from the apriori of the sign systems interpreted by the communication community.
In any case, it always made sense to me to think of the deep perception implicated in Kant's noumena notion more like that of atomic realism. Analogical objectivity and dialectical intersubjectivity might productively understand the material phenomenon of an atom as vacuous, but not "empty" since evidence of consciousness is both energetic and charged, and only partially representative.
Astonishingly Kant's dialectical metaphysics of nature embeds apriori thinking--ie without the neutrino and sub-atomic representations we know today thanks to the electron microscope and applied philosophy experimentation--in a deeply perceptive and rich dialectical forethought about the object: the phenomena of nature.
I suggest to distinguish between several types of objects and their "mapping" in our conscience. The following proposal is based on a stratified ontology.
If somebody talks about a stone in front of her eyes, obviously this proposition relates to a different object than another one about psychological states of living beings, or social facts (e.g. the result of a polling) or even abstractions (e.g. mathematical or logical notions).
I mean, the question: "What is the real thing?" will not be answerable, if we don't take these differences into account. Of course, the above mentioned strata of the universal structure of the world are not neatly separated from each other. But they seem to form layers or levels of reality. Each one evolves with its spedific types of objects and events. So they are at least distinguishable
Now, recognizing these differences it does not make much sense to say that the stone in front of my eyes is something different than as what it appears to me, nor to say "it exists only in my conscience", neither in the Platonian, the Kantian or one of the modern phenomenological meaning of "existence" (perceptional errors reserved, of course). How could we ever handle such a uncertainty in daily life? It is the common sense, which renders all such speculations to the absurd.
But things change when we talk about psychological or social facts, and they change again when talking about abstract objects. The crucial difference seems to be not the classic one between "outer" and "inner" domains of the real, but the amount of necessary normative presuppositions and ad-hoc-interpretations of any appearance in order to create the very object. Clearly, a stone has to be "deciphered", too. In order to appear to our imagination, it has to be transformed into neural information. But this is "only" a kind of translation of an elsewhere determined inner appearance, which may fail, by the way. On the contrary, social facts are exclusively what human beings make out of a pile of loosely related physical facts, adding a lot of normative stuff and interpretative methodology on the way.
Curiously, things return to the objective realm when entering the abstract layer of what I call the "universal structure" of the world. Nobody will seriously doubt the meaning of the notion "triangle" (be it an Euclidian or a non-Euclidian one). That means that although abstract objects are pure collective constructions of cognitively gifted beings, they are as real as physical objects - on their level of reality.
Maybe this approach is able to open a new path In order to overcome the old an thorny dichotomy of idealism ./. dogmatism/materialism (or whatever you call it).
The thing is this: Talking about objects in metaphysics it seems to me that objectivication is always set as a basic. Noone would assume in sciences that something does not come from reality but was rather illusion. Philosophy has pretty little to offer when it comes to illusion. Debates in the 60s and 70s were mostly always ended by either calling something a fraud or too absurd, sometimes esoteric. So we almost know nothing about 'illusion' which makes it kinda impossible to distinguish if something and then what components are reality or illusion. We assume that it is enough to carefully choose methods, follow rules, rationalize. Because it sometimes worked out pretty well to disappoint ourself when hypothesis and theories go wrong. We guess (if not to say believe) by time all what is absurd or fraud might be discovered. But as you said, Wolfgang: Mind is very creative and able to construct. We might sometimes keep up illusions by conformism and yet not be able to say which are illusions. Is an intersubjective hold illusion real just because many believe it to be real?
Well, what I mean is, in order to overcome the old "inner/outer" reality dichotomy, we may acknowledge that the world (synonymously for everything that is given) is one and the same consistent and coherent structure of objects and events.
Given this, plus the structural stratification of the world in a way of rather homogenous layers, it opens the way against solipsism as well as against sprawling relativism. Objects of all kinds are being created and annihilated on the way of this unfolding universal structure, including things like subjective facts (i.e. emotions), abstract notions and social institutions. The social layer of human cultures, too, presents its specific objects and events. Moreover, it is the underlying substrate (in German: "Trägerschicht") of the layer of the abstract objects and their interplay, which I call, herin following Robert B. Brandom, meaning (in German: "Bedeutung"): The abstract layer relies on the existence of a social sphere with the capability of symbolic interaction.
Now to your question: An intersubjective belief may be illusory, especially if it chokes with the structural prerequesites of the underlying layers of reality. However, because of evolutionary reasons, this seems to me the exception. Usually, our abstract notions fit quite well into the world as a whole, and if not, they will be corrected over time. And what appears to be mere opinion, be they aesthetical or political ones or whatever, they are often tolerated, because they not even have to be very precise as long as they don't cross the border to their precursor layers. Up to a point, reality on all its levels is rather tolerant. So, actually, if many people believe that for instance there is a legal rule called law, then of course there is such a law. It exists as real as the screen in front of my eyes. If not, how could a law ever come into effect, how could we only talk about it?
"An intersubjective belief may be illusory, especially if it chokes with the structural prerequesites of the underlying layers of reality. However, because of evolutionary reasons, this seems to me the exception. Usually, our abstract notions fit quite well into the world as a whole, and if not, they will be corrected over time."
Popper had a few quite good arguments why conventionalism is pretty hard to critisize and for that to correct.So you call it "tolerated" saying that something doesn't fail because reality is "tolerant" while I would call it "immunized". What you call tolerance is than nothing but a lack of actions on consequences.
Let's f.e. assume there is a rule. And this rule is set up to create a better society. But as long as we do not use it as a rule we do not know anything about the social impact. Now we use it and we see the consequences. Let's assume the consequences are for some people not as good as we thought. Maybe we were not even able to see bad outcomes. And the result is that certain people now suffer.
The trouble with conventionalism is this: It is in a way anyway anti-realistic because it tells us it is about us to set the guidlines. We might now be bad and simply put another rule up to the rule we created and say: "Well... we realize that some people suffer. But you know what? It is still in a range of tolerance.". What is "tolerated" here? Who sets the range of tolerance? Reality? Or again conventionalism?
Here the consequences are simply blended out. Stick with the idea that the rule is good and blend suffer out. Which leads to an exclusion of a certain truth. Moreover you will not even be able to use it as an argument against the rule. Because you decided that there is a range of tolerance.
I think here we reach indeed a point where idealism becomes dogmatism and where we find ourself trapped in a sphere between truth and lie. Who sticks with the conventions of the liguistic community sais the truth, namely that there is a "tolerance of reality" when this tolerance is in fact convention and nothing but comfortable for those who don't want to see the consequences. It is a social response to lie that suffer is something one has to tolerate.
Carmen, I don't think that I'm embracing conventionalism with what I said. Instead, I presented an ontological framework (OF). OF's by definition cannot be proved, but are the necessary tools to set up proofs at all. If these proofs lead to nothing, the underlying OF is not true nor false, but is self-contradictory or simply useless. Thus my only claim is that this approach up to now has not been shown to be self-contradictory or useless. To the contrary, I, for my part, take it as a good starting point for a new way of thinking about a unified world, where cognitive objects are not any longer a kind of contradiction to non-cognitive objects.
Conventional and ultimate reality seem to contradict when in fact they do not. Karen Barad wrote an awesome book called Meeting the Universe Halfway.
As part of the answer to the questions above she answers in the following way; that it depends on the “observer” and “observed (time)” as two systems intra-acting to produce reality, it further means that things do not pre-exist , nor does it imply thingness as “things-in-themselves” , except through a word-thing correspondence which births phenomena/experience. Time is an intra-actively produced phenomena distributed across space and ultimately not existing as an external parameter of measurement , except through the developmental sense of temporality .
She goes on to say; we can think of phenomena from a basic perspective as a tri-axial wave function (process) of the way our perception and experience co-births in a wave-particle duality , entailing space-time-matter-in-the-making . This phenomena is constitutive of the real and the possible , through the mind from moment to moment, in an intra-relationship of experience/perception . This is a proposition of Buddhism viewing time in a similar manner, a simultaneously inclusional/exclusional process treating all phenomena and form as perceptive-reflective lacking any fixed center or centers , thus constitutive of the dynamic interplay of determinacy and indeterminacy . In simple words, a human perceives time (whether cyclical or linear) through language and the meaning we impute (attribute) through words, whereas ultimately, reality is timeless emptiness.
Dear Alana Greta,
quite an interesting intellectual contribution! Everything seems to fade in its opposite.
By chance, I was taking note of some reflections on aesthetic intuition. Alas!, I wish I had English as my second mother language!
With my compliments and best wishes, Gianrocco Tucci
Dear Gianrocco Tucci, Thank you for your comment :) ... so it is very appreciated as I am just a student :)
I just wanted to add that I had read somewhere the following text - "I was brought up not only by my mother, but also by the colors registered by my eyes, by the noises that prompted reactions of alertness or of calm, by the smell of fragrance and danger, by the habit of distinguishing good and bad more through sampling than by opinion, through the variants of touch, born out of wishes or prompted by desire" - and one day it made me realize the incredible complexity that unfolds like the most beautiful and melodious symphony orchestra, this which we call existence - it has such a profound effect, which left me in awe and reverence for the rest of my life - :-) -
I admit I like an intellectual exchange and especially if I read something that seems to come from the heart (as your posting did above) - so it prompts me to say - even if it is only in our conscious, isn't it magnificent enough - this experience of life - for us to be indeed reverent and in awe?
G. E. Moore defines idealism as the principle that "all reality is mental, mind-dependent, or spiritual." The thesis of idealism initially goes back as far as Parmenides. Idealism but it is also supported by metaphysical dualism, e. g., Plato and Descartes. Kant is considered a subjective idealist whereas Hegel is regarded as an objective idealist. But one must not confuse idealism with phenomenalism (in turn not to be confused with phenomenology, e. g., Husserl), which holds that all reality, including the "self" and the "external world" is a construction of mental sense data (Hume).
G. E. Moore defines idealism as the principle that "All reality is mental, mind-dependent, or spiritual." Idealism begins with the Pre-Socratic philosopher, Parmenides (see Plato's dialogue, Parmenides). Dualists argue that the mind or soul is both immaterial and active unlike matter which is material and inert, inactive; in effect there are two incompatible substances. Kant is classified as a subjective idealist while Hegel is regarded as an objective idealist. By contrast, phenomenalism, a species of empiricism (Hume), not be confused with phenomenology (Husserl), claims that all "reality," including the "self" and the "external world" is a construction of passively given mental sensations=impressions and ideas.
Idealism, for me, is not a philosophical subject for intellectual debate, but definitely 'the odyssey of the spirit' mentioned by Gianrocco: a way of life, even more than a way of thinking. Are 'idealists' born idealists, I wonder? Platonism seemed like a 'coming home' to me, when I discovered it [along with Socratic questioning] in my mid-teens at high school.
Wilfrid Sellars held, rightly I think, that "being red is logically prior, is a logically simpler notion, than looking red" (Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, section 12), such that describing a thing as an appearance is not noticing some immediate domain that would in itself be infallible. Rather, it is a situation where, being aware of collateral information (like that one is on drugs, has a less than optimal vantage, etc.), one considers a content while withholding commitment -- which explains the infallibility, since you can't be wrong about x is you never really claimed x.
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