Mackie’s moral “error theory” seems committed to a view of objectivity that takes ‘objective’ as coeval with ‘intelligible apart from human sensibility’. That's certainly one way of cashing out 'objective'. But isn’t McDowell’s description of objectivity as “there to be experienced” (i.e., regardless of whether the experience is actually instantiated by any given agent) at least equally coherent? If not, why? And are there still other ways to cash out the notion of objectivity in moral judgment (perhaps in the case of evolutionary utility to sentient beings, such as we are)?
A good answer may be found in; G. Agamben, "Infancy and history", Verso 1993, pp. 13-24. I keep on thinkin that the central concept is "experience", and our answer depends on its meaning.
There is a difference between recognizing and creating a value... I cannot recognize the existence of a place (Australia , for example), even though this place really exists!
Please, pay attention to this distinction: the importance of the subject in developing a system of thought doesn't ground the subjectivity of the system itself!
I'm referring to the distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in moral theories.
I feel the same Luca Valera. You're assuming the theme of "phenomenal experience of objectivity" as a presupposition of moral judgments ....
An approach to "People, rationality and time" Parfit in chapter "Rationality and reason" would be nice. Although if your preocupaación is indeed by demarcate the issue of objectivity of moral judgments, the recommendation is "The idea of Justice" A.Sen 2nd part. "Forms of reasoning"
You are indeed correct. I am implicitly assuming the felt sense of objectivity that attends a what we take to be direct moral obligations to be a defining characteristic of them (Mandelbaum). The effort here is to give a non-error-theoretic accounting of it.
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