John -

I think it a shame that it takes something so blatantly obvious as results in a war for people to recognize competence as a criterion for leadership. After WWII, W. Edwards Deming tried to improve competence of industrial leadership in the US, failed to get their attention, went to Japan, and soon it became more obvious that competence matters.

It is my understanding that in WWII, officers like Eisenhower quickly rose in rank, because the generals at the beginning of the US involvement, like most of those in positions of authority of any kind, any where, at any time, likely got there for all the wrong reasons. They were swept away when actual results mattered.

So in answer to your question, I suppose there must be a few books on Eisenhower that would be relevant to your question.

Jim 

Gar Alperovitz and Robert Maddox search with enough emphasis on this topic.

My short answer has to be long. To understand command failure, it may be good to understand command. To understand military command in war, it probably helps to understand civilian direction of war. And to understand war as such, familiarity with something more than a contemporary or recent situation may be enlightening. The basic principles do not change that much.

To be current with the literature on war, I warmly recommend the Journal of Military History, published quarterly by the Society of Military History. The reviews are both plentiful and hard-hitting. For American military leadership in WW2, which was how the question was asked, there is Russell F Weigel, Eisenhower's Lieutenants (Indiana 1981). Parallel studies for other combatants include: John Keegan (ed) Churchill's Generals, Weidenfeld 1991, and Corelli Barnett (ed) Hitler's Generals, Weidenfeld 1989. I know of no Japanese parallel, but there is a detailed record from one loser: Donald M Goldstein (et al ed), Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941-1945. A parallel on the German side is Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, 1955, tr Presidio 1958, more analytical but of course also more apologetic. After Pearl Harbor (and of course Midway, Yamamoto's other negative masterpiece), Japan's major mistake in WW2 was  Guadalcanal, and studies of that protracted battle abound. They are chiefly narrative rather than analytical, and few writers are equally good on the air, ground, and sea aspects, but some of them are insightful; among them General Samuel B Griffith (USMC), The Battle for Guadalcanal, Lippincott 1963 (he was there), and Richard B Frank, Guadalcanal, Random House 1990 (he wasn't, but this is probably the definitive account).The Japanese pattern of demoting their best admirals and generals is worth study as a prime case of systematic high command failure. 

For failure in general, I would include Kenneth Macksey, Military Errors of World War Two, Stoddart 1987 (Eisenhower is included), and more generally, Robert Pois et al, Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership, Indiana 2004, and Alan F Wilt, War From The Top: German and British Military Decision Making During World War II, Indiana 1990. For a slightly wider range of errors, most of them very familiar, Barry S Strauss and Josiah Ober, The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists, St Martin's 1990.  Dare I mention that the classic to end all war classics, the ancient Chinese Sundz, also has a section on leadership failures, and how they can be exploited by the opposing general? And that my forthcoming study of the Sundz (titled Arts of War, due in 2016, in competition with Sam Griffith and others) will also include the second of these classics, the Wudz, which takes up aspects of war (and aspects of victory!) not covered in the Sundz?

Ultimately, as the Sundz itself makes clear, leadership in war rests with the political authority, whose mistakes may also be profitably examined. I know of no study of Roosevelt as a military leader (a reference would be appreciated), but will mention Richard Lamb, Churchill as War Leader (Carroll & Graf 1991) and of course the brief but useful study by Ronald Lewin, Hitler's Mistakes (Morrow 1984). On the TP of my copy, I have written, "Continually ignores or misreads Hitler's psychology." However that may be, I think that the ultimate benefit of reading is to have acquired the capacity to judge what one reads, in order to make best use of what it gets right.

The literature on Hitler's mistakes is of course enormous, There is also John Strawson, Hitler as Military Commander (G1971; Barnes and Noble 1995). Getting into counterfactual, we have Kenneth Macksey (ed), The Hitler Options: Alternate Decisions of World War II, Stoddart 1995, and Bevin Alexander, How Hitler Could Have Won World War II, Konecky 2000. This is not mere romancing, it asks the question, Do mistakes really matter? The consensus seems to be that they do; that different outcomes might have resulted from not making the mistakes. My personal sense is that Hitler came awfully near to winning it.

Beyond generals' mistakes and civilian leaders' mistakes, there are also mistakes made by the cultures in which these leaders and generals are embedded. All the combatants, the US included, had racial contempt for their opponents, resulting in massive ignorance of the capacity and intentions of the other side, a tradition which seems to continue unabated in the US State Department at this moment.

Hope this may help.

Taeko

John,

I'm sorry I don't remember the exact title and author but recently (w/in the past two years) I read a review of a recent book that deals with your query.  Focusing on General Marshall it describes how he mercilessly fired incompetent and inadequate generals and promoted the more able ones during WW2.  Both the review and the book contrasted this with the contemporary tendency to tolerate and even reward mediocrity and deviate from following Marshall's example.

Tony

Groom, Winston. “The Generals: Patton, MacArthur, Marshall, and the Winning of World War II.” Washington: National Geographic Partners. (2015).

I just picked this book up for a research paper I am writing about Patton. It may be useful to you.

John Sneed

There was some interesting work done and arrive range of areas. During World War II, and after looking at leadership and leadership capabilities. As was stated earlier, the great expansion of the military forces around the world by the nations that were involved in the conflict with a significant commitment personnel led to wartime promotions, some of which proved very successful and some of which did not. The Navy found that many of its submarine commanders who held those positions at the beginning of the war fell short on their capabilities and much of this was attributed to the type of training regimen that they had experienced in peacetime, a regimen that was constructed on a faulty attack philosophy that is primarily one of caution. The Army found similar lessons that many of their career officers with trained in the 1920s and 30s fell short as tactfully combat leaders the conflict erupted and were often replaced with a new generation of officers, some of the most significant were James Gavin,Matthew Ridgway, and more senior Gen. Bradley and Eisenhower, all of whom were advanced quickly. The Army Air Corps benefited from the advancement of young officers at the least of which was Curtis LeMay. Finally, the United States Marine Corps also recognized that combat leaders were those that were able to adapt quickly and function under extreme conditions. The if you look at some of the biographies that came out of conflict. Most hardened those leaders who emerged and succeeded under these difficult circumstances, they also give you an insight into the challenges they faced. One of the best biographies. I have read dealt with General 0P Smith of the United States Marine Corps, who commanded the First Marine Division in the difficult drive to North Korea. His leadership capability prevented the division from being destroyed by the Chinese in November and December 1950.