Virtue is concerned with choice, Aristotle says. So to understand what virtue involves, we need to understand choice. But before we can do that, we need to understand the distinction between what is voluntary and what is involuntary, because we praise and blame what is voluntary, but not what is involuntary.

Aristotle discusses these issues in the first half of Bk 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics.

There are two things that render our actions involuntary – force and ignorance.

When we act voluntarily, by contrast, we know what we are doing, and we bring it about ourselves. Contrast three cases of standing on a train and stepping on

someone’s foot:

1. The train lurches, you lose your balance, and accidentally step on someone’s foot. Stepping on their foot is involuntary, caused by force.

2. You shuffle your feet to get comfortable, and put your foot down on someone’s foot without looking. Although moving your feet is voluntary, stepping on someone’s foot is involuntary, caused by ignorance (that their foot was there).

3. You deliberately and knowingly bring your foot down on top of someone else’s.

This is voluntary.

Force We can be forced to act not only by physical forces but also by psychological pressure (such as threat of pain). Where no one could withstand such pressure, we don’t blame someone for what they do. This shows it is involuntary. However, we don’t think of the prospect of something good or pleasant as ‘forcing’ us to act.

When we act involuntarily, we do so with pain and regret.

Now, some actions that we do, we don’t want to do. These might be called voluntary and involuntary. Aristotle gives the example of sailors throwing goods overboard in a storm. They want to save the boat, but they don’t want to lose the goods. Such actions should be called voluntary. First, actions which we do to avoid a greater evil or in order to secure some good end are the right actions to choose.

Second, we praise people for such actions, and we noted above that praise and blame attaches to what is voluntary.

So, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions relates to the

moment of action in the particular circumstances one is in, not whether the action is generally desirable.

Desire is the predecessor of any action.

Our choices are with us and we bear their brunts. All persons who act voluntarily are in most cases driven by their desires which are part of their lived code, thus having control to resist or not.

To be sure, many people act voluntarily

Virtue is concerned with choice, Aristotle says. So to understand what virtue involves, we need to understand choice. But before we can do that, we need to understand the distinction between what is voluntary and what is involuntary, because we praise and blame what is voluntary, but not what is involuntary.

Aristotle discusses these issues in the first half of Bk 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics.

There are two things that render our actions involuntary – force and ignorance.

When we act voluntarily, by contrast, we know what we are doing, and we bring it about ourselves. Contrast three cases of standing on a train and stepping on

someone’s foot:

1. The train lurches, you lose your balance, and accidentally step on someone’s foot. Stepping on their foot is involuntary, caused by force.

2. You shuffle your feet to get comfortable, and put your foot down on someone’s foot without looking. Although moving your feet is voluntary, stepping on someone’s foot is involuntary, caused by ignorance (that their foot was there).

3. You deliberately and knowingly bring your foot down on top of someone else’s.

This is voluntary.

Force We can be forced to act not only by physical forces but also by psychological pressure (such as threat of pain). Where no one could withstand such pressure, we don’t blame someone for what they do. This shows it is involuntary. However, we don’t think of the prospect of something good or pleasant as ‘forcing’ us to act.

When we act involuntarily, we do so with pain and regret.

Now, some actions that we do, we don’t want to do. These might be called voluntary and involuntary. Aristotle gives the example of sailors throwing goods overboard in a storm. They want to save the boat, but they don’t want to lose the goods. Such actions should be called voluntary. First, actions which we do to avoid a greater evil or in order to secure some good end are the right actions to choose.

Second, we praise people for such actions, and we noted above that praise and blame attaches to what is voluntary.

So, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions relates to the

moment of action in the particular circumstances one is in, not whether the action is generally desirable.

Yes, it's highly possible. In my opinion, there are five sources encourage someone to do something voluntarily, namely (1) love, (2) hobby, (3) doctrine, (4) inspiration, and (5) desire. For the case of love, I remember one side of the philosophy of Indian culture: "Love is not asking or possessing but integral in sense".

Agree with dr Sokhi Huda

I am walking swiftly along the sidewalk, going over in my mind how to write up the report that I have due tomorrow, and a kid throws a ball at chest-level across the path in front of me. Without breaking stride or interrupting my thoughts, I catch it with one hand and toss it to the side in his general direction. It is a voluntary act, not a reflex like blinking or sneezing, but I just did it; there was no deliberation. To say I acted out of desire seems too strong; sometimes just letting an impulse proceed unimpeded is enough.

Dear All,

The thesis that our desirer causes our actions is a core assumption of mainstream economic theory. One way to spell this out is by preference relations. A preference relation orders a list of possible choices by preference (the desirer to have it). This allows then to predict the action by assuming that the individual will always chose the option with the highest ranking. Now, there is a problem: If we assume a concrete preference relation for a concrete situation, then up until the choice is made, it is always possible to make a different choice. Assuming that actions reveal preference, we must then say that the individual has a differently ordered preference relation. So, up to the point of action, we can never be certain that an assumed preference is the one that is revealed by an action. Say, one hates oranges and loves apples and one is offered either an apple or an orange. Up to the point when one actually takes the apple, it is always possible to take the orange . This might be an explanation for the limited predictive power of economic theory (how many crashes have been predicted?). If there is causality involved, it is a rather interesting notion of causality, because it does seem to be identifiable only after the fact.

Consider another example. Noam Chomsky often talks about the creative aspect of language use. (See, for example On Nature and Language; Cambridge; 2002 or Cartesian Linguistic ; Cambridge; 2009) An observation that he traces back to Descartes and his followers. We can use language appropriate to a given situation, but there is nothing that causes us to respond in that way. We could always chose to use language differently. By 'cause' Chomsky means something physically identifiable within the brain or the environment of the individual:

“[The] creative aspect of language use [is] the fact that human language [is] free from control by identifiable external stimuli or internal physiological states […].” Chomsky; Cartesian Linguistics; p. 64

If this is correct, then language use might not fall within the range of things that are determined, i.e. caused. On the other hand, language use is not random, we use language appropriate to circumstances. Chomsky speculates that there might be something in between determined and random in nature.

Given these problems, it might be the case that something else is at play when we act voluntarily that explains why we act. What this could be, I don't know.

Best,

Sven Beecken

This is simply, neither more nor less, the eternal philosophical question of whether freedom of the will exists. I insist that "compatibilism" is a desperate attempt to square the circle, one introduced by philosophers unwilling to face such consequences as that determinism (in this case, of actions by programmed desires) logically entails the death of any notion of what one "should" do, either epistemically (what one should believe based on grounds/evidence) or axiologically (what one should do either prudentially or morally). My advice, then, is this: Do not expect the right answer in THIS puny forum. :-)

Philadelphia, PA

Dear MacGregor,

The more generally held version of the thesis here under discussion is that our actions are caused by our beliefs and desires.

That we can sometimes do what we want belongs to any viable concept of human freedom. Of course, there are always limitations to what we are able to do. More difficult, but still possible, is that we can sometimes change our desires. This task is directly involved in the cultivation of the virtues. With the growth of knowledge and character, we become able to do things we could not heretofore do. In this way freedom grows.

In some sense, we must be the cause of our actions, if they are to be our own. That our actions are caused by our beliefs and desires is a plausible way of filling in this requirement.

H.G. Callaway

I believe that our actions and desires are also influenced by our social environment in the broadest sense of the word and also by the diverse socialization we receive. Voluntarism may also be attributed to the individual's interpretation of the rewards vs the cost of volunteering.

It all depends on what metaphysical theory of action and free will you subscribe to. So you need defintions of 'action', 'intention', 'desire' (maybe 'belief' or 'will') plus an account of intentionality, a theory of causation (events) plus a basic model (such as the desire plus belief equals action) to connect these components in some way.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Santos-Caballero & readers,

"Virtue" will strike many, I think, as a very ornate or formal term, without much common-sense meaning? So, I wonder if you might be encouraged to continue your discussion, beyond the topic of choice somewhat --where I chiefly agree with what you've had to say so far.

I'm inclined to say, roughly at least, that Aristotelian moral virtue, is a kind of human power or ability to act. (As, in Greek, the virtue of a knife, say, is its sharpness, or facility for cutting; the virtue of the horse, is "swiftness in the race," etc. ) With the cultivation of the virtues, one becomes better able to act in humanly appropriate ways in appropriate circumstances--avoiding the extremes of excess or defect which pull to either side. Without desires, of course, we would have no motivation to act, but on the other hand, without appropriate knowledge, we will very often, at least, not know how best to act. In a sense, I am suggesting some augmentation of Aristotle with Bacon: knowledge is power.

We hope, of course, that the knowledge which is power will be brought into action with all appropriate self-restraint. This enters in with the cultivation of the virtues, since the cultivation of the virtues requires us, in the first place, to avoid the extreme to which we are most inclined. (This, in turn depends on some self-knowledge.) In consequence, since the cultivation of the virtues requires self-restraint and self-knowledge, it is an attitude and practice suited to restrain the pure exercise of power. What results from the combination of knowledge and virtue are new facilities for action--and that is a new, or emergent human power. We become able to do things which we could not do before.

What do you think?

H.G. Callaway

you wrote:

Virtue is concerned with choice, Aristotle says. So to understand what virtue involves, we need to understand choice. But before we can do that, we need to understand the distinction between what is voluntary and what is involuntary, because we praise and blame what is voluntary, but not what is involuntary.

---end quotation

Desire motivates us to act accordingly, however there are actions that we voluntarily commit because of pressure, when one is left with no option but to do it. The end justifies the means.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Sancon & readers,

No doubt, people do sometimes act as you have it, on the premise that "the end justifies the means." Some people will no doubt do whatever they think they can get away with doing--if they sense a personal benefit or advantage.

The point would seem to be that this is neither intellectually nor morally respectable. Instead it is a sign of a lack or character and moral fiber.

Unfortunately, we all know of established practices which encourage the lack of self-restraint. Its essentially an abuse of personal power. When this has political and governmental sources, there are actually laws against it, prohibiting "official oppression."

H.G.Callaway

You wrote:

Desire motivates us to act accordingly, however there are actions that we voluntarily commit because of pressure, when one is left with no option but to do it. The end justifies the means.

Hello,

Volunteerism is one of the ways human beings use to get up and do something. According to Barack Obama, America's ex-president, the desire to do voluntary work for a good cause is the " best way to not feel hopeless" because we shouldn't wait for good things to happen to us ,for out there in the world, many good things are awaiting us . That is why by desiring to do voluntary works , we not only fill ourselves with hope, but we also fill the world with it. However, in performing voluntary actions , one's contemplation of the outcome triggered by it, is at least from a moral viewpoint very important . When the outcome of the voluntary work is against one's moral standards, the desire has a periphery position and the choice , as you rightly observe, may simply cause us to act as unmoved movers.

Best regards,

R. Biria

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Biria & readers,

There is much to agree with in your comment. I would only add that not everyone is suited to be an activist --whether a political activist or an activist of some other sort. President Obama is highly inclined to activism, but this is less suitable in many non-political professions.

Academia is traditionally described as a matter of an "ivory tower," and not, I think, without some good reason. There is some need to insulate academic research against the many immediate pushes and pulls of everyday life and against political pressures to tell "just so" stories which many a politician might like to hear told. Notice that policy think-tanks are often even more insulated.

Open discussion of academic topics is very much an experiment.

H.G. Callaway

Accidentally I have found this discussion with many good ideas and answers. I have read them for my own learning and remembering process. Thank you very much. So was my first desire to have a look in Aristotle's Nikomachos ethics since long time. This was voluntary, desire, motivated - but in my feeling it has been absolutely unimportant wether this was caused mainly by a special inner movement or not. My thoughts are with those who don't have much options of choice, living with a lower level of chances, they have so many desires, so little choices and no chance of fulfillment of their wishes. So I think freedom of acting has its conditions.

Strong desires are the result of hormon release, it has to do with instinct based behavior, voluntary acting needs the condition of free will and responsible decision.

Research a few years ago indicated that actions preceded thought (by a tiny portion of time) and that thought (desire in this instance) was, or appeared, merely the embellishment to other stimuli. I feel that the ideas on fixed perceptions and stimuli here perhaps require breaking down and maybe critiquing more deeply. Desire as a single phenomenon seems unlikely, surely?

I may desire ice-cream-prior to action or what appears to be prior to any action, but that desire may be conditioned by prior associations (my mother who I loved (this notion again needs to be broken down or examined) first brought me ice-cream; when first eating it I was in a pleasant environment, etc-so the desire would be intermingled with other 'desires' or 'contentments' that also require breaking down. Action tends to convince us the operations are simple and straightforward, when the action is the result of further complex phenomenon and conditions. Aristotle tended to examine his understandings of human behaviour and conditions in communal settings, so they were equated with such settings and the 'desires' (see above) of such settings.