I think that we went beyond initial question in our discussion. Probably we have to address the following theoretical question: Is there a possibility of peaceful coexistence of several empires?

Europe before 1914 was a collection of few empires and had much less number of states than before and after. On the other hand, there was no ideological contradictions (all have been capitalists) and many of kings (well, a monarchy does not mean feudal economy) of that time were relatives to each other. Was it possible (in principle) to have some peaceful agreement? The third world was already divided, there were no empty spaces. But there was a possibility of peaceful economic growth for all. Note, that between 1945 and 1990 the world was bi-polar, with ideological confrontation - and still there were no big wars.

I agree that the 1st World War (as well as the 2nd) were horrific mistakes. From the perspective of social welfare.

I agree that corresponding changes in many global areas after the war were mostly negative. Clearly for Europe.

But probably there are (bad) forces who can drive the world in the direction different from socially optimal. I do not see these events as random mistakes of mis-coordination in games.

If not for the wars many European social developments would probably not have occurred, with, in the UK the upper classes ruling more and longer than they have done and decline would have been slower. The kaiser and his offspring would have continued ruling German. The Romanovs would have hindered social change in Russia.The UK would have held on to its Empire longer.

But what of the lost talent? Many dead writers, others badly shell-shocked. Many dead scientists, including Schwarzschild (Black Holes), artists and academics. Many women becoming spinsters. What great things could they have done? Was Europe then intellectually impoverished.

Oh, I agree. And that step, with all members of a population combatants, remains with us.

The communists came to power in Russia because of the war. Germany financed the Bolsheviks to apparently an enormous sum. Effectively, Lenin was a German mole, a very successful one.

Although the economy had improved under the Romanovs politically, social stagnation would or might have stalled the economy-had war not occurred.

USA overtook Britain industrially before WW1. By the 20s it would have been dominant. (The war or not).

Rise of Asia already obvious in Japan which was attempting hegemony in East. (Japan, with USA, funded the more recent Chinese economic miracle).

Without war-Europe would not have declined swiftly, Britain would not have suddenly lost its empire, but the cost of keeping it might have encouraged devolution-just less rapid. Nevertheless, Europe was in decline.

I see Hitler's adventures as the last attempt by Europe to keep its prime position in the world. If he had pulled it off..................

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Wilkin & readers,

I'm inclined to say that the horrible mistake was the failure to prevent WWI.

How might that have been done? It would have depended on a facility to see or better understand the rise of European nationalisms in the 19th-century--in order to prevent or avoid their extreme expressions; and a related need was to understand the indirect competitions of European nationalisms expressed in the building up of monopoly trading systems within the various European international empires.

Once these developments reached a certain point ( a point very difficult to quantify, of course), avoiding a general European war became progressively more difficult--as I see it. The conflicts and supporting attitudes of the European international system were built up over decades and were an expression of the idea that national economic strength was the best route to national military, and diplomatic influence. In the U.S. we call the period of expanding industrialization and expanding international trading relations the "Gilded Age." Virtually everyone of any influence in the West was riding an economic rollercoaster to riches and power with little thought of the unintended consequences.

You may recall that the U.S. launched itself as a world power by building a deep-water navy and then taking on Spain in the Spanish-American War. Once it was over, and the former Spanish colonies under American control, it was widely thought it had been a "splendid little war." Theodore Roosevelt famously gave up his position as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in order to go off and fight with the "rough riders" in Cuba. He pined for the Congressional medal of Honor (finally granted him, posthumously by President Clinton). Equally symptomatic was the British experience in the Boer War in S. Africa.

The international economic expansion was plausibly too much of a good thing. The intensification of international competitions --over decades-- prepared the way for the "Great War."

H.G. Callaway

As theologian Karl Barth argued in Der Romerbrief (The Epistle to the Romans) in 1919, WWI was a horrific mistake out of which no good came. In his lectures of 1932, philosophical theologian Paul Tillich argued that Nazism would never have come into being had it not been for WWI. I have no doubt that WWI was the domino without which WWII or any functionally equivalent war involving nuclear weapons would never have happened.

Thanks for your answer. I agree that there was a logic to it. If you read the UK literature in the early days of the war young intelligent men (Rupert Brooke) were offering themselves up as sacrificial victims not just for patriotic reasons but in order to 'clean' the nation from civilisations corrupting influence. A bit of barbarity was somehow enobling! Many such men believed in war (Futurism).

1.During the first world war period, more people died due to Flu (influenza) than in war itself.

2.War can never by justified. Super powers are still present in the present world, and conflict among them is not desirable.

3.War can not solve any problem, instead produce much more.

Zbigniew MotykaEurope declined from its supreme position, one it had held since the 18th century (give or take) based on knowledge (Enlightenment)-of weaponry certainly-and colonialism. The continent was structured on colonialism and as this was chipped away as a dominant drive and economic facility, certainly new ideologies needed to appear.

European leaders recognised USA's greater economic power after the war but that country chose isolationism instead of world involvement. By the 1920s and 30s Europe was no longer the dominant cultural force, except in art (as distinct from literature).

Compared to the USA and later Russia (ostensibly part of Europe) it was clear that Europe was assuming a secondary position.

I think that we went beyond initial question in our discussion. Probably we have to address the following theoretical question: Is there a possibility of peaceful coexistence of several empires?

Europe before 1914 was a collection of few empires and had much less number of states than before and after. On the other hand, there was no ideological contradictions (all have been capitalists) and many of kings (well, a monarchy does not mean feudal economy) of that time were relatives to each other. Was it possible (in principle) to have some peaceful agreement? The third world was already divided, there were no empty spaces. But there was a possibility of peaceful economic growth for all. Note, that between 1945 and 1990 the world was bi-polar, with ideological confrontation - and still there were no big wars.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Griepink & readers,

Yes, of course, it is always more than just economics. But I see the economic competitions as feeding the nationalism, the arms race, and the expansions and competitions of the colonial empires. What propagated in politics drew national, political cohesion from the competitions for economic benefits of powerful nations with large empires.

I recommend the following review of a recent book on the causes of the Great War. The book is The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 by Christopher Clark; and the review appeared in the London Review in 2013.

See:

https://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n23/thomas-laqueur/some-damn-foolish-thing

I quote from the text of the review:

Work on the origins of the war tends to fall to one side or the other of the necessity-contingency divide. There are the tragico-ironic stories that echo Tocqueville’s observation about the French Revolution: ‘Never was any such event, stemming from factors so far back in the past, so inevitable and yet so completely unforeseen.’ By virtue of its magnitude and consequences, the Great War must have great causes: the crisis of imperialism (that was Lenin’s view); nationalism and its conservative turn in the late 19th century; the forty-year arms race; the system of alliances; the domestic politics of left and right; or, as Arno Mayer, one of my own teachers, argued, great architectonic pressures, which began to sweep away the old regimes of Europe in 1789 and finally succeeded by 1918. (Two empires and one kingdom that had been party to the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 were swept away.)

---End quotation

The various specific points you emphasize strike me as isolated elements of an overall, political and military competition rooted in the dizzy economic expansion of the later 19th century. True, Germany and France fought over Alsace for centuries. Why? Because holding it strengthened their hands. But the development of 19th-century nationalism was more intense and produced ever greater motivations for pursuing conflicts --old and new. There were also new, industrial and economic means of pursuing the conflicts. True, Italy and Germany wanted to catch up with Britain and France in the competitions for colonial empire. But it was now possible, given industrial means and economic resources, to build great navies to pursue these aims. (This is what happened in the U.S., too.) A stronger economy meant the possibility of a stronger army and navy, which in turn implied the possibility of colonial conquests, thus ensuring markets for even more economic growth and power. No doubt, the war started from the alliances built on fear and the pursuit of power, but the nationalistic discord was facilitated by this earlier, great episode of globalizing commerce and production. The European powers slowly but surely built themselves into irreconcilable political corners, to the point that any little conflict could light a general conflagration. If it was not Austria-Hungary and Serbia, it might have been some other little local fire.

Everyone knows, in general, terms that human beings fight wars, and as agents, it seems they can refuse to fight them. Wars become (nearly) inevitable when countries either cannot or do not desire to understand their neighbors well enough to solve outstanding problems. A building sense of national power and greatness will likely make reconciliation seem less desirable. A building sense of national greatness and cultural uniqueness will often diminish the ability to understand what is different --and perhaps thought of as inferior. Continue to build such configurations over decades, and the facility for peace will be eventually much diminished.

H.G. Callaway

you wrote:

@H.G. Callaway I understand your point. But isn't it more than just economics? It is also fear/power/politics. France and Germany fought over the Elzas for centuries. Italy and Germany became nation-states rather late and wanted to catch up with England and France. England and France wanted both colonies in Africa and could have gone to war. The Ottomans had empire conquest for centuries and needed that to keep the politic system. Austria-Hungary was a "nation-state" with different nationalities inside. The same accounts for The Ottoman Empire. The war started because of an incident related to Austria-Hungary. It started because of alliances made out of fear or power. Of course the economic component was a major influence, but maybe it was also evident war would come?

I do not know to what extent theoretical structure of states and empires is developed. In this article I try to figure out some foundations for structural economics: Article Elements of Structural Economics

Clearly, states are more complex than purely economic structures. But we need to analyse both internal and external stability. Internal depends on national, religious and ideological homogeneity of population. Both Stalin and Hitler managed to consolidate their states and to create two super powers before the World War II. (Clearly, the human cost was extremely high, and this type of consolidation is not unique and perhaps not optimal.) Their clash was clearly a human and economic disaster for both countries.

But if we look at the countries before the World war I, I would say that they were myopic regarding internal stability and possible changes (revolutions). The end of the war resulted not in a standard outcome, when one empire conquers the other, or when both return to peace in initial conditions. The most unexpected outcome was the revolution in Russia, then Civil war (with very similar power on both sides, but final victory of "reds") who then started to propagate the idea of global revolution.

I agree with @Peter that there was a possibility of diplomatic equilibrium between Germany, Britain and France. But it is not clear how the idea of global revolution (implemented first in Russia) could change those empires internally.

@Zbigniev is right that technological advance was great between 2 wars. For me it is still unclear whether the source of those technologies was the result of normal scientific development, or there was some "magic" contribution from unknown source.

Zbigniew it does seem you are talking more about economic events after WWII whereby the USA bolstered up Europe in order to provide a threatening bulwark against the USSR. While the USA was prepared to take on so many defence responsibilities, of course Europe would look as economically impressive as before (or close to).

Famously in the 1950s and 60s commentators in the USA referred to Britain as their aircraft carrier providing largely free access to Europe in case of a Russian surge. In the 1960s Kennedy offered Britain, by now in a much reduced state, in part through payment of war debt to the USA, and lack of external economic assistance, a chance to be a USA state. France, locked into Germany, surely appears more economically and militarily impressive (sic) than is realistic after losing so many colonial wars, so disgracefully?

This was all wise policy on the USA's part, but would Europe have so swiftly recovered without such a policy? Is France what it once was? Hardly. Germany has survived because of its embrace of pacifism, and, of course, union with other European states.

Surely, a case can be made for the two wars ruining Europe and only the lack of competition from the East and the prestige of empires saved them. Cultural primacy, reflected off USA's dominance, should not convince so easily of historical continuance.

The situation after WWI was exaggerated by reparations, a foolish act, not thankfully repeated after WW2, and distorted by the respective empires. The loss of talent must have hit hard. Of considerable importance in recovery was the growth of the financial sector throughout the 1920s.

thanks for the above, i'll look into it.

I would like that when discussing such serious topics as this one would take into account the opinions of experts who seem to have much more information than we do. Therefore, I recommend reading the materials from:

1. http://www.markedbyteachers.com/as-and-a-level/history/was-world-war-1-inevitable.html

"Was World War 1 Inevitable?" (in English). One shortest phrase:

"The First World War was inevitable, because of all events that happened to the same time, with the exception of the assassination of the Archduke ".

2. https://www.svoboda.org/a/24204574.html (in Russian)

"Was the First World War inevitable? Did Russia not participate in the war? How to assess Russia's participation from a military point of view?"

This material can be translated into any language using Google Translator (https://translate.google.ge/) in parts, taking into account the limitations of the amount of text. One shortest phrase:

"Alain Besancon (French historian): When you walk with a torch on a powdery depot, can you say that an explosion is inevitable? It could not be considered unavoidable, this is my answer".

Well, Gennady, some of us are actually experts. If we took the alarming view to believe what we are told, if that is acually what you are saying, then all discussion promptly ends. Like Peter (possibly) I teach history and write on it. I teach psychology, English, Business, Health and Social Care too. Also, I write on these.

I agree with Peter, in the end what you have produced is historian's/writer's opinions. History is not an exact discipline, or rather it is not an 'opnion based' discipline but is subject to constant re-considerations.

Again, Peter is right, this is a discussion not about what experts say-and your trust in experts is somewhat alarming, indicating perhaps a very different approach to knowledge than mine.

Excellent Grennady, recommending what is apparently opposed to you. Someone who thinks!

Dear Stanley Wilkin and Peter Griepink,

I was not sufficiently correct with the phrase about experts and I apologize. I just wanted to express an idea in order to take their opinion into account as accumulated knowledge about this subject. You know that in history there are still a lot of open questions that require correct interpretation. I know at least two such questions about the Second World War, of which nothing is known at all to a wide audience,  but it is these events that are of fundamental importance for their understanding.

1. Hitler could have defeated Stalin, because he hoped in his plan "Blitzkrieg" on the Fifth Column of traitors among the generals. Yes, there were many traitors among the generals. However, this fact is still classified in the archives as secret. For example, there is some information that Goebbels spoke about the fact that among high-ranking generals in the USSR they have their own person as a traitor. Who is he? I would give dearly to learn about this. For example, there are opinions that the People's Commissar for Defense Marshal Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Zhukov, bear the main responsibility for the catastrophe of the first days of the war.

However, Stalin did not shoot them and even made them heroes, but apparently he knew everything about them. Because Stalin was a politician and understood the situation well at that time. Was General Zhukov a traitor?

Sources are:

Andrey Fursov. Arsen Martirosyan. The conspiracy of Soviet generals

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ukXJw18tH0

Pyakin VV Tragedy June 22, 1941 Zhukov. Who was behind Zhukov?

https://ok.ru/video/305493840262

At the same time, I would also like to know: Was Admiral Canaris a traitor and an agent of England? Did he know the real state of affairs in the USSR and deliberately misinformed Hitler?

2. Hitler could defeat Stalin because he thought that since the overwhelming majority of defensive factories are in the Western part of the USSR, after the seizure of territory, Russians will have nothing to fight. However, the decisive role was played by the relocation of defense factories to the East in non-threatened areas, which was brilliantly accomplished in the shortest possible time. Entire armies were surrounded, millions of captured soldiers, but not a single echelon with factories was captured. While this topic is still classified as secret, there are no books and films, but it was this event that decided the outcome of the war.  Elena Anatolievna Prudnikova believed that all the military operations were simply operations of "covering up" in comparison with this main operation of relocation of factories. Hitler and his generals thought that it was impossible to implement such an operation, because it is not feasible at all. He was cruelly mistaken. Just before the war, more than two thousand secret factories were built in a short time, like bare walls, with electricity supply and paths for trains. In these factories, later, echelons arrived and the factories were restored, which were rapidly releasing military products.

Source is: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HV8x1X1hukY

Of course, these are not the topics in this discussion, but they are very interested to me.

Dear Zbigniew Motyka,

unfortunately I can not share your opinion that Stalin was a traitor. Just the opposite. He destroyed many of the traitors during Tukhachevsky's conspiracy, but some still remained. Many books have been written about this period. About It should be tolded for a long time to correctly understand the essence of the tragic start of the war for the USSR. The situation changed dramatically when Stalin completely took power into his own hands by the creation of the State Defense Committee. The first days of the war, Stalin was all the time in the Kremlin. There is a book of meetings of Stalin with other leaders in seconds during the day. But this topic seems to be another and a longer discussion and I would not want to abuse here. However, the topic of betrayal of Tsar Nicholas II in February 1917 has a direct bearing on our discussion of the First World War. The tsar was cruelly betrayed by his closest associates and, above all, by his generals, headed by General Alekseev. It is a fact. The most surprising thing was that there were only two generals (both non-Russians) who were completely faithful to him: it is German Fyodor Arturovich Keller and Azerbaijani Huseyn Khan of Nakhichevan.

Fine, Grennady, I didn't really think you were. I will come back on your response later.

Dear Peter Griepink,

I want to say that any Youtube Video can be understood from the subtitles in any language from the list in the Translate option. Try to do this if you can. There is a lot of important information, which is not known to the majority of people. I have attached a screenshot "Youtube.png for a link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ukXJw18tH0 with English subtitles. Unfortunately many books devoted to this acute topic are written only in Russian and not translated into other languages. I just in case have attached one book by Arsen Martirosyan "The tragedy of June 22: blitzkrieg or treason?"

For me personally, a war in which people die can not have any justification. But there are other opinions and even recent history is witness.

I think that there is a danger of a quarrel. If we depart from being neutral scientists and put our feeling to the events of past history (including both the World Wars I and II), we will clearly focus of different (official) treatments of history even in different countries. But each of countries has different schools too. It is good to present different opinions here, but it is important to respect the opinions of others. And to use more logic rather than emotions.

For example, Marxist science (the major in the USSR before 1990) has been treating history in a deterministic way, with small role of a person and high role of the population (especially the working class). But the global changes in 1990s have shown that this idea has been at least short sighted. The changes did not favor the working class and they could not stop not only the shift to capitalism but also growing income inequality.

There are some moments of history (bifurcation points) where several routes have high probabilities a priori. There have been many such points in 1914-18 (will the WWI start or not, who will be with whom, will Russian revolution take place, etc), 1939-45 (who with whom) and 1989-93 (will the Soviet block dissapear or evolve in Chinese way, how the reforms will go in Russia, etc). There are also fundamental works of Ilya Prigogine about such unstable points of a such complex system as the society, where a small shock could change the path. A lot depended on particular persons at these moments. A lot of information still remains a secret. This justifies the possibility of investigations based on an "alternative history".

I have already seen even global maps with alternative dynamics. It might be not a normal science, but those paths were not just hypothetical, the pattern evolution had non a negligible probability.

And deeply welcome, actually.

I give an example of such video as a sequence of maps. Clearly one can criticize the details, because there are many possible paths even in this scenario.

WW2 - What if Soviets join Axis in 1940. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PY4pjCTEUU4

Done abroad, in English and Italian. (Please, do not blame Russians for this view, if you dislike it). I also saw the recent British movie about Churchill in 1940. It shows how close was UK to the full loss that time, when Germany did not start fighting with the USSR. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darkest_Hour_(film)

I think that these disputes are very useful for one very important reason: we must strive first of all to understand the moment of truth in order to convince each other. So far, unfortunately, everyone remains at their own opinion and does not try to understand other points of view, no matter how convincing they were. If we as scientists do not will come to agreed views without any doubts, then what to do to ordinary people who believe what is said from morning till night in all media. There are facts and analytical analyzes of these facts. Let's calmly analyze and convince each other with faultless arguments almost like strong evidence. I am for an honest and impartial dialogue.

Dear @Gennady, I am also for an honest dialogue. But do not you think that the truth can be a bit fuzzy (uncertain, not the final truth), especially in history? One hidden (secret) detail can change many views. Many theories were considered undoubtable (like Marxism just 30 years ago in the USSR), but what can happen in few decades?

It is important that we read each other. This can help to see weak and strong points in our beliefs. There are many professionals of different scientific schools who never agree with each other. Some even fight with each other, oppose publications, defenses of theses, etc. Hope that we will coexist peacefully.

There is also a social danger from mutual convergence to some point (which later might occur to be far from the final truth), because it will cause a huge turbulence in many minds. To my mind, the society is more robust when it sees only part of the truth as final and considers many other beliefs as subject to change (given new information is revealed). For example, we have too little exact knowledge about many conspiracies.

P.S. Gennady, your reference 22June is interesting but too long. Even few of those who know Russian will read it completely. If you would make 0.5-1 page abstract in English with the main findings (little known from other sources), this can help the readers of this question a lot.

Dear @Peter, I do not have higher ability to convince people comparing to you. History is not my topic. But I try to participate in all discussion where it seems to me that I can contribute something useful. Here I also have expressed some of my ideas on this topic.

Regarding the public knowledge about some scientific facts (even known, not those discuss-able, like here), I want to attract your attention (and maybe of other readers) to the role of internet in forming knowledge asymmetry; see https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_does_google_search_shape_public_knowledge

Dear Peter Griepink,

You asked "Maybe that has some answers with mathematical history?"

In my understanding, I did not see in these answers any connection with the Mathematical History. At the same time, I tried to make a very impudent attempt to start from a clean slate and initiated a discussion on Mathematical History in https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_gives_credibility_to_science_Can_we_really_rely_on_scientific_discoveries. I mention in my answer that this view may be erroneous, but this point of view has the right to be considered. Please have a look this answer. Thank you in advance.

Dear @Peter, as I leaned from math, a trajectory should be continuous. Maybe there are some modern deviations from that but the classical math is like this. Most of the processes in natural sciences are also continuous (if we stay with classical Newtonian theory, and do not go to quantum mechanics, where a state is just a cloud of probabilities). Dynamics of populations of animals are also modeled with continuous models, like the logistic equation, Lotka-Volterra model, etc.

However, recent development (last 30 years) of computer science and numerical methods allows to get a solution only as a sequence of numbers in discrete points, and the concept of a trajectory becomes more ambiguous. Since mathematization of social sciences is done also in the recent decades (unlike physics, with more than 300 years of history), the fraction of discrete models there is also high. They also like to use more statistics, with its random jumps, etc. That is why the modern historical science probably stresses more a random component rather than smooth evolution.

In fact, differential equations allow to study both, with smooth behavior most of the time and a set of bifurcation points.

For the general discussion of discrete and continuous models, you can see my question: https://www.researchgate.net/post/Mathematical_modelling_should_it_be_discrete_or_continuous

Dear @Peter, you are right that there are 2 issues: a) how do the social processes develop, b) what do we know about them. Our knowledge, especially about events that took place many centuries ago, is discrete. Probably, for a modern history we have a continuous view, even as a set of news coming every minute. We also need some aggregation. In statistical physics, for example, the temperature (as the average speed of particles) changes continuously in time.

The 1st issue is about development. As an applied mathematician by my 1st education, I see the social dynamics as a multi-dimensional process is some abstract space. Let economic growth be its 1st component. It is mostly continuous, because we observe few % of annual growth, and can draw a smooth line of a country's GDP over years. There might be some shocks, caused by wars or natural disasters, but more or less the process is continuous most of the time.

Now let us model social organization. Here have both discreteness (monarchy, republic, etc) and continuity, that can be measured, for example, by the level of personal liberty. (It is still tricky, how to assign a digit for it, but there are different questionnaires.) We see many reforms, but part of them are followed by counter-reforms, and sometimes there is some inertia even over centuries.

If we return to the original question about wars, how to measure peace and war? On the first glance, it is discrete with just 2 states. But there is a difference between a global war and a local conflict. Perhaps, we can introduce a unit interval [0,1], where 0= global peace and 1=global war, and then assign a number to every year according to % of global territory involved in conflicts. Then this measure will be probably continuous in time, apart from few critical points, like the start of WW1 and the start of WW2.

Dear @Peter, @Gennady and others, I am probably talking about some subject that does not exist yet. There is no mathematical history, as far as I know. But if some future scientists (probably also applied mathematicians and not pure historians) will start to develop it, they probably will use some of the ideas that I have stated above, or similar.

We probably can define some global characteristics, as economic growth, social tension, social freedom, etc. Then the probability of a war in a certain point of time is probably an increasing function of social tension (more between different countries or blocks) and decreasing function of economic growth. For example, growing resource scarcity (for example, of water) can be the origin of future wars.

Income disparity in a country is likely to be a source of internal tension, with the rising probability of revolts and revolutions. But for a revolution we also need an organized party (in the theory of Lenin). But as we see, national and religious heterogeneity is a more frequent source of internal conflicts in the recent years.

I have given already my article about structural economics, but perhaps this one, about Econo-physics, is also an interesting way to model social processes using an analogy with physical processes: Article Econo-physics: A Perspective of Matching Two Sciences

Dear Yuri Yegorov,

I very much enjoyed reading your full discussion https://www.researchgate.net/post/Mathematical_modelling_should_it_be_discrete_or_continuous

My specialty is Combiunatorial Optimization and I have been solving mostly discrete models. Immediately I will tell from myself that Discrete Mathematics is in demand only when Continuous Mathematics is absolutely powerless to solve the problem. Of course, an analytical solution is always a million times better than any discrete solution, no matter how accurate this solution would not be. Nobody argues! However, in my opinion, in real life discrete models are many times larger than continuous models,  Since not so often continuous models can be solved. And then the continuous models are replaced by discrete models which have no alternative.

I extracted some of the phrases from your discussion, which I imagined were very relevant.

1. Yuri Yegorov: "... even the modern educational system is likely to be biased to more discrete thinking, than it was 30-50 years ago".

Absolutely agree. However, the modern educational system is the result of degradation in the era of Globalization,  where analytical thinking as "continuous thinking" can be destroyed at all. Well, imagine that for example in the USA and France schools the fractions are not studied at all:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-TlqQjmTLH4 "Academician Arnold about American Education"

https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_is_the_degradation_scale_in_the_higher_education_worldwide

Do one need mathematics at school? http://scepsis.net/library/id_649.html

Academician V.I. Arnold: Traveling in Chaos http://www.nkj.ru/archive/articles/5174/

That is, the fraction 1/3 (as a non-continuous object) is not studied at all, but the number 0.333 ... (as a discrete object) is considered.

2. Lall B. Ramrattan: "It is paradoxical in the sense of the fall of the Former Soviet Union." But they prefer to stay with the degenerating program, trying to make it progressive again.They seem to have one foot in the discrete domain, and the other in the continuous domain. "

    Yuri Yegorov: "Marxists are" discrete "only because they did not elaborate math." If one would put dialectical materialism into mathematical form, there are plenty of possibilities to arrive at evolutionary models with structural change, that are both continuous and discrete approaches " .

It seems to me that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not associated with the phrase of Lall B. Ramrattan. What was in fact - it was the disgusting betrayal of the elite led by Gorbachev in 1991, just as the betrayal of the elite from the entourage of Tsar Nicholas II in February 1917, when the Russian Empire disappeared from the map of the world. In October 1941, the situation in the Soviet Union was many times worse, but the country was not destroyed as in 1917 and 1991. Because there was no betrayal in the encirclement of Stalin, since the vast majority of traitors were destroyed before the war. So form Marxism has absolutely nothing to do with it. By the way, there are big doubts that Stalin was a Marxist. And in general, there is an opinion that Marxism is a British project!

3. Since you are a mathematical physicist on the first profession, I would be interested to know your opinion about Elena Anatolievna Prudnikova (a physicist by profession, graduated from the Polytechnic Institute from St. Petersburg), who wrote 25 books on historical topics. She said in an interview in Youtube that she developed her own method of mathematical physics, which she uses to analyze historical events from the point of view of obtaining conclusions. Her analytics are built on these conclusions, which are the result of applying its method. What could you say about this? Unfortunately I did not find any publications of her method.

Dear @Gennady, thanks for the interest to my question about math (but it differs from this topic, so better we argue on math in my question). I do not know Prudnikova, as I do not know many other important researchers. I happen to know Sergey Pereslegin, with whom I was studying together at the faculty of physics in LGU, see http://2045.com/expert/245.html . I am not familiar with his current research in detail, but after reading this text you can find something about his (very complex) philosophy. If I would see a similar article about Prudnikova, then we can talk about her.

P.S. As for betrayal in the circle of Stalin, it was, and is considered in the alternative history. For example, Tukhachevskij could have planned to kill him in May 1937. As you show in recommended book by Martirosyan , June 1941 was a betrayal to great extent. But it is also true, that the USSR could resist that, although with very high cost of human lives. And what about the death of Stalin and his follower Beria?

Dear Yuri Yegorov,

I was very glad that you personally are well acquainted with Sergei Pereslegin. I wanted to find one video of Pereslegin about "The relocation of defense enterprises in the war 1941-1945", while I was searching, I found one video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YDPLdAVRpQ

with the sensational initial phrase of Pereslegin: "I want to say that the situation on June 22, 1941, from my point of view, was not bad, in some respects even good ... In this respect, it is very fortunate that on June 22 the Union received an extremely powerful blow from the enemy ... ". I have not watched this video yet, but I will definitely look and analyze it later.

Sergei Pereslegin is very familiar with Elena Prudnikova. Here is one of her videos on the subject of "Relocating ..." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5gbzJJqX8rc

I have a huge request to you: if you have contact with Pereslegin, could you ask him to find out from Elena Prudnikova about her method. It is very interesting and important to know, unless of course this is not a secret of Elena Prudnikova. As for the death of "Stalin and his follower Beria", then Elena Prudnikova has excellent books on this issue. That's why she is interesting to me and I write about it.

Here is the full list of her books: https://royallib.com/author/prudnikova_elena.html

In particular, "The Second Murder of Stalin" and "The Last Battle of Lavrentiy Beria".

The actual measurement of each war's effects is an excellent idea, and would constitute a new discipline, surely? Not one that simply determines historical consequences, but one that carefully engages with known costs.

Dear @Peter, I think that belief in power of computers is a kind of modern sickness. Any good theory should be based on formulae. Imagine that we do not know laws of Newton (that also allow to solve some mechanical problems analytically), but jump into interaction of thousands, millions of particles (depending on computer power) - without knowing the law of how they interact? Then we probably would not invent diesel engine and a rocket up to now. Just publish results for million particles, 10 million, etc - without being able to understand any regularity.

Some computer games, like Civilization or Monopoly - are also based on smart and compact sets of laws. So we should first start from suggesting simple dynamic equations. Then to build the core interactions, that are already known as stylized facts in history. Then maybe to get some fundamental theorems for these models, to check if they contradict reality or not. And only after that to do simulations on computer.

There is already "Risk" game, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_(game) . Perhaps, alternative history simulations are done using similar ideas.

I think that there are Clausewitz's works on war theory, unfortunately unfinished; see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_von_Clausewitz . I did not read them, but probably one law says that "the speed of motion on the border is proportional to the difference in the pressures (military densities) from both sides". Another law says (not sure that his, but very useful in the 2nd World War, especially for "blitz Krieg") that "a successful attack needs 3 times higher military density than the defense".

In Risk game one can spread soldiers over space, and then toss cubes on a contact line, simulating random battle outcome that takes into account those densities. So some similar laws should be written not only for the war case, but for different macro activities of countries.

P.S. Thank you, @Zbigniew, for caring about soviet soldiers.

this link is useful

www.nytimes.com/books/first/k/keegan-first.html?scp=6&sq...

regards

John Keegan, Hassan, is a first rate military historian who was one of the originators of the ordinary soldier's approach to war, that is how they felt before, during and after battle. The use of alcohol to combat fear in more distant times, drugs (the Viking beserker and possibly suicide bombers), and Benzedrine during more recent wars. The evacuation of urine, etc, before combat.

Nothing justifies war in a world that has millennia of civilization. CI

The First World War wiped out an entire generation in Europe. people who might, if they had continued to live, have advanced science and the arts. In a sense it was the last authoritarian war whereby people of a higher class told people of a lower class what to do and how to die. The masses were sacrificed to the benefit of the few. It rang the knell of Europe as a dominant force/a case of cultural suicide.

Why do wars happen? Here are one quote "there are things more important than peace", attributed to Reagan, in fact was uttered by State Secretary Alexander Haig and is an indirect quote of "the right is more precious than peace" (President Woodrow Wilson, in a speech before Congress when the United States entered the war, 2.4.1917) - https://oboguev.livejournal.com/1350664.html.

If this is so, then “wars are inevitable”, because the politicians have decided this for us. And now the question arises: "What can save the US from a huge foreign debt of 22 trillion dollars?" All agree on one word - "war".

Gennady, war is constantly used and its proficacy is at times acceptable/perhaps/and although at times war has served reasonable ends as a whole it has not. America is now run by a supreme pragmatist who does everything for effect and such types rarely engage in war. But who knows?.

"What can save the US from a huge foreign debt of 22 trillion dollars?"

A new paradigm. I think it's better than a war .