Abstract
The “use” theory of meaning arose from the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. On this approach, language and meaning are public affairs and learnable from public sources. Wittgenstein’s teaching to “look for the use” of language was partly aimed in criticism of Cartesianism and similar doctrines of modern epistemology—down to the early work of Bertrand Russell. Wittgenstein rejected the notion that we might start off with reference to private, indubitable ideas or impressions and build from them to justify our knowledge of the external world. Language, meaning and reference are first of all public in character; and there can be no purely private language with meanings and/or referents which could only be known to a single person. We learn the language used to describe the world and to ascribe mental states to self and others on the basis of publicly available usage and (defeasible) criteria of application; and linguistic usage is grounded and understood in relation to our on-going cultural practices, interactions and activities. The commonalities of perceptual experience—and the general reliability of perception—arise from biological evolution, and common evolutionary descent; and these are the biological facts underlying the philosophical appeal, persistence and plausibility of empiricism. The commonalities of thought, in contrast, arising out of the plasticity of mind, depend on interpreting linguistic expressions in a common, publicly available, object-oriented language. The empirical lexicographers who formulate definitions for dictionaries follow and elaborate Wittgenstein’s advice to “look for the use.” Dictionary definitions and entries are based on extensive empirical studies of usage. Moreover, along with consulting experts, the same empirical practice is also important in writing dictionaries of technical terms of use in the various sciences. This point is important in understanding the relationship between the “use theory” and the languages and practices of the sciences. Dictionary definitions, understood as common meanings, generally aim to classify, comprehend or encompass, unify and explain the empirical evidence of usage. As will be argued, this last point constitutes a departure from or development of later Wittgenstein and the “use theory.”
See the full draft paper at:
Preprint Chapter Five Meaning and Linguistic Usage: Ten Comments on L...
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Readers,
You are invited to a discussion of my draft paper, "Meaning and Linguistic Usage: Ten Comments on Later Wittgenstein," your comments and questions are also invited invited.
The full text of the paper is available via the following link.
See:
Preprint Chapter Five Meaning and Linguistic Usage: Ten Comments on L...
Please have a look.
H.G. Callaway
Words have meaning, not to say meanings. It is particularly true when they are used in Scientific Fields where semantics, by the "Scientific Definition", Takes All Its Sense. By formalizing these concepts, the use-based theories of meaning provide an epistemological framework that is fundamental to know through all stakeholders in any scientific debate. May this discussion Thread contribute to specifying for researchers the importance of semantics in scientific discourse, by definition rigorous and which cannot suffer any blurring.
Philadelphia, PA
Dear readers,
Please have a look at the following draft paper.
Conference Paper Putnam and Dennett on Instrumentalism and the Intentional St...
Comments invited.
H.G. Callaway
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