How should Adolf Eichmann have been punished? The question assumes that punishment is an appropriate response to his crimes. Hannah Arendt agreed with the Supreme Court of Israel that Eichmann should be put to death, though her reasons were quite different. She concluded her study of his trial, ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem’, with the following words of condemnation: ‘no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you. That is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang’. She would have condemned him to forfeiture and elimination rather than punishment. Suppose Eichmann had not been sentenced to death. If he is to be punished, how is it to be done? This is the challenge implicit in Arendt’s final condemnation. If he is allowed to live, how are Eichmann's judges, the correctional officials, prison warders and the broader community which they represent, going to ‘share the earth’ with him? Eichmann would probably have made a compliant prisoner. He was compliant with his interrogators: Arendt records that he told them that, ‘he would like to find peace with [his] former enemies’. If he is not to be executed, must the criminal justice system offer him opportunities for redemption, reconciliation and eventual release?