I believe it is too early to place direct responsibility for this tragic incident on Pakistan, as the Indian government has not yet provided any conclusive evidence linking the attack to Pakistan or to armed groups allegedly supported by it. It is entirely possible that the attack was carried out by local groups based in Kashmir, opposing the Indian military presence and the perceived violations of civil rights by the Indian authorities in the region. I think that the truth can only be established through an independent, neutral, and objective investigation. As for India’s possible suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, such a move would represent a dangerous escalation in the South Asian context. If implemented, it could be perceived as a form of collective punishment targeting the population of Pakistan, which in turn might be viewed as a violation of international law.

Dear Oleksandr Veretilnyk

Thank you for your response to my question on ResearchGate regarding India’s strategic response to the Pahalgam terror attack. While I appreciate your call for an independent investigation and caution against premature conclusions, I respectfully disagree with the assertion that it is too early to attribute responsibility to Pakistan or that the attack could solely be the work of local Kashmiri groups. From an Indian perspective, supported by evidence and historical context, India’s response, including the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and other diplomatic measures, is a justified reaction to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, aimed at safeguarding national security and holding Pakistan accountable. Allow me to address your points with relevant facts and logic.

First, the attribution of the Pahalgam attack to Pakistan-based terrorist groups is not speculative but grounded in credible evidence. The attack on April 22, 2025, which killed 26 civilians, mostly tourists, in Baisaran Valley, was initially claimed by The Resistance Front (TRF), a known proxy of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a UN-designated terrorist organization. Indian authorities, including the Jammu and Kashmir Police, have identified three suspects, two of whom are Pakistani nationals, Adil Hussain Thoker, Ali Bhai (Talha Bhai), and Hashim Musa (Suleiman), all confirmed LeT members. Digital traces and intelligence intercepts further point to safe houses in Muzaffarabad and Karachi, indicating Pakistani involvement. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has taken over the probe, uncovering forensic evidence and cross-border linkages. While TRF later retracted its claim, Indian intelligence suggests this was a tactical move to deflect international scrutiny, a pattern consistent with Pakistan’s historical use of proxy groups to mask its role in cross-border terrorism.

Your suggestion that the attack could be the work of local Kashmiri groups opposing Indian military presence or civil rights violations overlooks the sophisticated nature of the attack and the broader context. The Pahalgam attack involved military-precision planning, with attackers armed with M4 carbines and AK-47s, targeting tourists in a remote valley, an operation beyond the typical capacity of local insurgents without external support. India has long alleged, with substantial evidence, that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supports groups like LeT and TRF to destabilize Jammu and Kashmir, particularly after the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, which Pakistan has sought to counter through intensified proxy warfare in less militarized regions like south of the Pir Panjal range. The timing of the attack, following successful elections in Jammu and Kashmir and a tourism-driven economic revival, further suggests an intent to disrupt India’s progress in the region, a strategy consistent with Pakistan’s historical objectives.

Regarding the call for an independent investigation, while impartial inquiries are valuable, Pakistan’s track record raises doubts about its commitment to transparency. Pakistan has consistently denied involvement in major terror attacks, such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2019 Pulwama attack, despite evidence linking these to LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed, respectively. Pakistan’s proposal for a “neutral” probe, as stated by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, appears to be a diplomatic maneuver to deflect responsibility, especially given its failure to dismantle terror networks operating from its soil, as noted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in past reviews. India’s skepticism is further justified by Pakistan’s recent appointment of ISI chief Lt Gen Muhammad Asim Malik as National Security Adviser, signaling the military’s dominance in security policy and its reluctance to curb terrorism.

On the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, I respectfully disagree that this constitutes “collective punishment” or a violation of international law. India’s decision to suspend the IWT until Pakistan “credibly and irrevocably abjures terrorism” is a strategic response to Pakistan’s material breach of international norms through its support for cross-border terrorism. Strategic expert Brahma Chellaney has argued that Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) permits a state to suspend a treaty in response to a material breach by the other party, providing a legal basis for India’s action. The IWT, signed in 1960, was a gesture of goodwill by India, allocating 80% of the Indus basin’s western rivers to Pakistan despite ongoing hostilities. Pakistan’s continued sponsorship of terrorism, as evidenced by the Pahalgam attack, undermines the treaty’s foundational assumption of mutual cooperation. India’s suspension is thus a proportionate measure to pressure Pakistan’s agrarian economy, which relies heavily on Indus waters for 80% of its irrigated land, to cease supporting terrorism.

Moreover, India’s current infrastructure limits its ability to completely halt water flows, as most dams on the western rivers are run-of-the-river hydropower plants with minimal storage capacity. This mitigates concerns about immediate “collective punishment.” India has also outlined a phased plan to enhance dam capacity, which would maximize its water use within the treaty’s framework, further underscoring that the suspension is a diplomatic signal rather than an immediate act of aggression. Pakistan’s claim that the suspension is “unlawful” ignores its own violations of international counterterrorism obligations under UN Security Council resolutions.

The geopolitical consequences of India’s actions are significant but necessary to address Pakistan’s impunity. The suspension of the IWT, closure of the Attari-Wagah border, and expulsion of Pakistani diplomats have isolated Pakistan diplomatically, with global powers like the United States, France, Russia, and Israel unequivocally supporting India’s anti-terrorism stance. Pakistan’s ceasefire violations along the Line of Control (LoC) for eight consecutive nights since April 25, 2025, and its mobilization of forces indicate a defensive posture, reflecting the pressure of India’s measures. In Kashmir, India’s intensified counter-terror operations, including the demolition of militant-linked properties and detention of over 1,500 suspects, aim to dismantle local support networks, enhancing regional stability.

In the broader South Asian context, India’s actions signal a shift toward a zero-tolerance policy on terrorism, potentially deterring future attacks by raising the costs for Pakistan. However, escalation risks remain, particularly if Pakistan, backed by allies like China, perceives water diversion as an “act of war.” India’s diplomatic outreach to the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan and discussions with UN Security Council members demonstrate its intent to build a coalition against Pakistan’s terrorism, reducing the likelihood of unchecked escalation.

In conclusion, India’s response to the Pahalgam attack is justified as a necessary defense of its sovereignty and security against Pakistan’s well-documented support for terrorism. The suspension of the IWT and other measures are proportionate steps to hold Pakistan accountable, with manageable risks to regional stability. An independent investigation, while ideal, must account for Pakistan’s history of obfuscation. I welcome further discussion on how India can balance its security imperatives with regional stability while ensuring justice for the victims of Pahalgam.

Best regards,

Subham Tripathy

#IndiaPak #Waterwar #PahalgamAttack

Dear Mr. Tripathy,

Thank you for your response. I found it interesting to learn about the Indian perspective on this issue. However, as a scholar committed to impartial analysis, I must respectfully disagree with many of your arguments, as they appear to me to be unsubstantiated. Allow me to explain what I mean:

The fact that the suspects in the Kashmir attack held Pakistani citizenship does not, in itself, prove that the attack was coordinated by the Pakistani government or carried out in Pakistan’s interest. Citizenship does not automatically imply state responsibility. Let us recall the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, a well-known Middle Eastern terrorist and leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. He was born in the United States and remained an American citizen throughout his life. Does that mean the U.S. government or the American people bear responsibility for the attacks carried out by that organization? Another example is the tragic attack on the Crocus City Hall concert venue near Moscow, in which hundreds of civilians were killed or injured. The perpetrators were citizens of Tajikistan and members of the terrorist group ISIS. Can we claim that the government of Tajikistan, or the Tajik people, were responsible for this atrocity simply because of the attackers' citizenship? In short, I do not believe that Pakistani citizenship of the assailants constitutes sufficient evidence of Pakistan’s involvement in the attack.

The argument that Pakistan is responsible for the attack because it has “historically supported terrorism” is also problematic. This line of reasoning is often mirrored in Pakistani discourse about India. For example, it is commonly claimed in Pakistan that Indian intelligence agencies are behind attacks by Baloch separatists, because “India is historically interested in destabilizing Balochistan”. One of the key pieces of evidence cited is India’s alleged support for the secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Similarly, Pakistani authorities have repeatedly accused India of supporting Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. However, just as these accusations often lack verifiable evidence, the current Indian claims regarding Pakistan's responsibility for the Kashmir attack also appear to rely more on political narratives than on concrete, independently verifiable facts.

Allow me also to express my disagreement with your view that exerting pressure on Pakistan's agricultural economy by threatening to withdraw from the Indus Waters Treaty and "cut off Pakistan’s water supply" can be considered a proportional response. The very idea of leaving Pakistani farmers without water is reminiscent of a dehumanizing discourse, such as the one that emerged in Israel after the Hamas attacks in October 2023 — a discourse that called for collective punishment of all Gaza residents, branding them as “accomplices of terrorists”. As we all know, these calls — which at first seemed to come only from radicals and populists — soon translated into real policies: a total blockade of Gaza, the suspension of humanitarian aid deliveries, and restrictions on water and medicine. As a result, thousands of children in Gaza are now dying from hunger and disease, and international human rights organizations have described the situation as a genocide in real time.

I also struggle to understand how demolishing the homes of terrorism suspects or their relatives can contribute to counterterrorism efforts. The Israeli experience in the occupied Palestinian territories shows that such practices do not produce security or stability, but rather fuel more violence and resentment. Their only observable effect is escalation, not peace.

Would it not be wiser, under such tragic circumstances, to pursue a political solution — to initiate dialogue aimed at addressing the root causes of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir? Genuine, sustained peace in the region is in the interest of both Pakistan and India. Without dialogue and compromise, the cycle of violence will likely continue, harming both nations and countless innocent lives.

Respectfully, Oleksandr Veretilnyk

Dear Oleksandr Veretilnyk ,

Thank you for your continued engagement on this critical issue. As a researcher committed to empirical rigor, I must respectfully challenge your arguments, which I find misaligned with the substantial evidence surrounding the Pahalgam terror attack of April 22, 2025. India’s response, including the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and targeted counterterrorism measures, is a legally grounded and proportionate reaction to Pakistan’s documented sponsorship of terrorism. Below, I systematically counter your points with verifiable evidence from credible sources, reinforcing India’s justified stance.

1. Citizenship and State Responsibility: Evidence of Pakistan’s Involvement You argue that the Pakistani citizenship of the Pahalgam attackers does not implicate the state, citing Anwar al-Awlaki and the Crocus City Hall attack. This analogy is invalid given the specific evidence linking the attackers to Pakistan’s state apparatus. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) identifies three suspects i.e. Adil Hussain Thoker, Ali Bhai (Talha Bhai), and Hashim Musa (Suleiman), with two confirmed as Pakistani nationals and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives. Hashim Musa, a former Pakistan Army Special Service Group para-commando, was trained in Pakistan before joining LeT, with operations coordinated from LeT’s headquarters in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The NIA’s preliminary report establishes an operational nexus between LeT, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and the Pakistan Army, with ISI directives guiding the attack. Satellite imagery reveals a LeT training camp, ‘Jangal Mangal,’ in PoK, hosting meetings between LeT chief Hafiz Saeed and ISI operatives. This evidence transcends citizenship, confirming state-sponsored terrorism. Unlike Al-Qaeda or ISIS, LeT’s ISI-backed infrastructure is well-documented, as seen in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, corroborated by US intelligence and David Headley’s testimony.

2. Historical Support for Terrorism: Documented Patterns You suggest that attributing the attack to Pakistan’s “historical support for terrorism” mirrors unverified Pakistani claims against India. This equivalence is empirically unsupported. Pakistan’s role in Jammu and Kashmir terrorism is substantiated by primary sources. The South Asia Terrorism Portal confirms The Resistance Front (TRF), which initially claimed the Pahalgam attack, is an LeT proxy founded in 2019 to escalate violence post-Article 370 abrogation. The NIA links the Pahalgam attack to a 2024 Ganderbal attack by the same LeT unit, with operatives communicating with Pakistani handlers. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) criticized Pakistan’s inadequate counter-terror financing measures, keeping it on the grey list until 2022. The 2019 Pulwama attack by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) led to UN sanctions on JeM chief Masood Azhar, despite China’s initial resistance. In contrast, Pakistan’s accusations of Indian support for Baloch separatists or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan lack international corroboration. The 1971 East Pakistan intervention was a UN-documented humanitarian response to Pakistan’s genocide, not covert destabilization. India’s claims rest on forensic evidence, intercepts, and NIA findings, unlike Pakistan’s speculative narratives.

3. Indus Waters Treaty Suspension: Legal and Strategic Justification You compare the IWT suspension to Israel’s Gaza blockade, labeling it disproportionate. This is misleading. The IWT, signed in 1960, allocates 80% of the Indus basin’s western rivers to Pakistan, a goodwill gesture despite hostilities. Pakistan’s breach of international counterterrorism obligations, evidenced by the Pahalgam attack, justifies suspension under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). India’s temporary curtailment of water flow through the Baglihar Dam on the Chenab, with plans for the Kishanganga Dam, is a diplomatic signal, not a humanitarian crisis, as current run-of-the-river dams limit diversion capacity. Pakistan’s claim that this is an “act of war” ignores its own violations of UN counterterrorism resolutions. India’s actions, including trade bans and airspace restrictions, are within international law, supported by the US, France, and Russia. Unlike Gaza’s verifiable famine, Pakistan’s water dependency is mitigated by alternative sources, and India’s measures are calibrated to pressure, not starve.

4. Demolition of Militant-Linked Properties: Targeted Counterterrorism You question demolishing terrorism suspects’ homes, likening it to Israeli policies. India’s actions are contextually distinct and evidence-based. Post-Pahalgam, nine properties linked to confirmed LeT operatives, starting with Adil Ahmad Thoker’s residence, were demolished to disrupt terror financing and local networks. The NIA interrogated 2,800 individuals, detaining 150, and identified 20 over-ground workers providing logistics. These targeted demolitions, backed by NIA evidence, have contributed to a 50% reduction in Jammu and Kashmir terror incidents since 2019, per the Ministry of Home Affairs. Unlike Israel’s broader punitive measures, India’s operations focus on active facilitators, deterring future collaboration. The Pahalgam attack’s reliance on local sleeper cells, confirmed by a reformed operative, necessitates such measures.

5. Dialogue and Root Causes: Prerequisites for Peace You advocate dialogue to address Kashmir’s “root causes,” assuming mutual goodwill. Pakistan’s actions, including the Pahalgam attack targeting tourists to disrupt Jammu and Kashmir’s economy, undermine this. Previous dialogues, like the 2003 ceasefire and 2015 Lahore talks, failed due to Pakistan’s continued LeT and JeM support, as seen in the 2016 Uri and 2019 Pulwama attacks. The NIA’s evidence of ISI involvement in Pahalgam confirms Pakistan’s role as a primary driver of violence. India’s diplomatic measures suspending the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme, expelling diplomats, and curbing water flow are necessary to prioritize security, backed by global support from the US and EU. Dialogue requires Pakistan’s credible dismantling of terror infrastructure, per UN mandates.

So, the Pahalgam attack, executed by LeT with ISI and Pakistan Army backing, is substantiated by NIA reports, satellite imagery, and intelligence intercepts. India’s response suspending the IWT, targeting terror networks, and imposing economic measures is legally justified and proportionate, supported by global powers. Your analogies and call for dialogue overlook Pakistan’s culpability and the empirical reality of its terrorism sponsorship. As researchers, we must anchor our analysis in evidence. I welcome further evidence-based discussion to explore regional stability.

Respectfully, Subham

Dear Mr. Tripathy,

Thank you very much for your detailed and thoughtful response. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to exchange views on such a complex and sensitive topic. If I may, however, I would like to respectfully offer a few alternative perspectives on several points you raised:

1) Regarding the organization you mentioned (Lashkar-e-Taiba) — to the best of my knowledge, this group has not claimed responsibility for the recent attack in Kashmir. Responsibility was instead claimed by The Resistance Front, which is not officially recognized as a subsidiary of Lashkar-e-Taiba. While some Indian officials and media outlets speculate about a possible affiliation, this remains unverified and subject to debate. Therefore, I would be cautious about asserting a direct connection or assigning responsibility to Lashkar-e-Taiba without further conclusive evidence.

2) With regard to your reference to FATF findings — it is indeed true that FATF has criticized Pakistan for insufficient efforts in combating terrorism financing. However, I believe it is important to distinguish between “insufficient efforts” and active complicity. The former may result from various systemic challenges, including institutional weaknesses, corruption, and security limitations. In fact, Pakistan itself continues to suffer from frequent terrorist attacks, which suggests that the government may lack the capacity, rather than the will, to fully suppress militant and separatist groups operating within its borders.

3) On the issue of the NIA’s investigation — I fully understand your reliance on its conclusions, but I believe it is worth approaching them with a degree of caution. As seen in many countries, including some major powers, counterterrorism agencies may occasionally operate under political pressure or align their narratives with prevailing government interests. One example is the recent attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, where despite ISIS (specifically its Khorasan branch) claiming responsibility, Russian authorities publicly blamed Ukraine, a state currently at war with Russia. Similar patterns can be observed in the Middle East, where attribution of attacks is often shaped by broader geopolitical rivalries. In South Asia as well, such dynamics have been evident in India-Pakistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. In this context, I find it difficult to assume full impartiality on the part of Indian agencies, especially given how swiftly political figures attributed blame even before the NIA concluded its investigation. The speed of the inquiry also raises some questions. If intelligence services are so efficient, one might wonder why such attacks are not intercepted in the planning stages — particularly in a region like Jammu and Kashmir, where nearly 500,000 Indian troops are reportedly stationed.

4) Regarding the demolition of homes of suspected militants — I would be cautious about assuming a clear causal link between this policy and improvements in regional security. The decline in militant or protest activity may result from a variety of factors, including socioeconomic development, infrastructure investment, improved access to healthcare and education, or, alternatively, increased repression. To properly assess the impact of such policies, I believe a more systematic, scholarly investigation would be necessary.

In general, I understand and respect your viewpoint, which — as I see it — reflects a broader trend in contemporary international affairs that views the demonstration of military strength as a key to national prestige. However, I tend to disagree with this premise. As the ongoing conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Ukraine, and elsewhere have shown, military interventions rarely resolve underlying disputes or bring about lasting peace. Rather, they often lead to prolonged human suffering, mass displacement, and long-term regional destabilization.

Thank you once again for sharing your insights and engaging in this meaningful discussion. I look forward to continuing our exchange.

With kind regards,

Oleksandr Veretilnyk