There are two parallel negotiations related to the Iran nuclear power program: One between Iran and the P5+1 group and another between Iran and the IAEA. In this last case, the IAEA is applying the safeguard agreement in force with Iran and is controlling daily the nuclear activities in the most sensitive nuclear facilities declared by Iran within this program. Under this specific situation is almost impossible that the IAEA cannot detect any deviation of nuclear material to be used for any other purpose to the one declared by the government with sufficient time to impede the production of a nuclear bomb.

The key question here is the ratification of the Additional Protocol by Iran, which will allow the IAEA to inspect any other facility located in the country and not declared by the government and that the IAEA suspect that use nuclear material also not declared by the government for any military purpose. With the ratification of the Additional Protocol, Iran will not be in a position to develop a nuclear bomb without being detected at a very early stage.

The negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group will give to the international community additional assurances that Iran has no political intention to use any nuclear facility or any other military facility for the production of a nuclear bomb. Iran will also accept the application of the Additional Protocol and will reduce enrichment activities to the level that the country need at this stage of the implementation of its nuclear power program. The country will modify the ARAK nuclear research reactor to reduce the amount of plutonium that will be produced by the reactor when it start operation in the future.

With a good political will by both sides and without the desire of the P5+1 countries to ask Iran the adoption of measures and obligations outside of the international obligations assumed by Iran with respect the NPT and the IAEA, then the possibility of getting a good agreement are high. But if the P5+1 countries have the intention to force Iran to accept measures and obligations that are not included in the NPT or in the IAEA Additional Protocol and at the same time to keep the sanctions regime almost intact and to remove it step by step and taking into account the respect by Iran of the agreement reached, then the possibility of getting an agreement in March will be very little.

I think that the answer to this questions depends on the Iranian perception and interpretation regarding Obama's strategy and expectations. As it looks now the negotiation will be bring Iran to the place it feels close enough to its strategic vision about being a regional power with military nuclear potential and free from sanctions. Obama will be pleased that Iran is not a nuclear power under his watch and the world and region will have to deal with the very dangerous ramifications after his watch.

As far as  the IAEA is concern there is no sufficient evidence to prove that Iran is diverting from its peaceful nuclear program. Base on the fact that IAEA is the most competent authority in regard to nuclear proliferation, Iran right as a member of the non-proliferation treaty should be respected. As far, the p5+1 negotiation is concern I think there is little room for any success but my only worry is that preemptive measure should not be an option because it may only lead us to another Iraq

There is enough evidence that Iran did not fulfil all of its obligations as NPT state party and IAEA member state in the past. The evidences were related with the construction of enrichment facilities and other nuclear facilities without informing the IAEA. These facilities were detected and also the use of nuclear material without IAEA control and this is a violation of the safeguard agreement in force between Iran and the IAEA. Another thing is the production of a nuclear bomb by Iran. There is no evidence that Iran has produced a nuclear bomb and the country is still far into the production of this type of weapon, because the country has not the nuclear material to do that.

The latest IAEA report said the following on this subject:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has released today its most recent quarterly safeguards report on Iran. The main elements of the report are the following:

1) Iran’s average daily production of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) has decreased.

2) Iran has not managed to produce 3.5 percent LEU oxide from 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride fed into the Enriched U02 Powder Plant (EUPP). It has fed 2,750 kilograms of such LEU hexafluoride into the process lines but the output remains in intermediate forms of enriched uranium. The reason for not being able to make LEU oxide, as expected, is unknown.

3) Iran has increased the rate of feeding of natural uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into its advanced centrifuges at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP). The feeding rate is significantly greater than the previous three reporting periods and more than double the rate of the last reporting period. In the advanced centrifuges, after enrichment and the measurement of the enrichment level of the product, the product is remixed with the tails or waste, producing natural uranium.

4) The IR-5 centrifuge located at the PFEP has been disconnected and is unable to enrich uranium without reconnecting the pipework. This disconnection reflects Iran addressing concerns about its enrichment in the centrifuge in the last reporting period. The disconnection provides additional confidence that Iran is abiding by its commitments under the Joint Plan of Action.

5) No progress has been achieved in this reporting period on resolving the IAEA’s concerns on the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. In particular, Iran has not proposed any new practical measures to resolve this issue in a fourth step under the IAEA/Iran Framework for Cooperation. It has also not addressed the last two measures in the third step of the Framework for Cooperation that had been agreed upon in May 2014.

6) Suspicious activities continue at the Parchin military site.

Jorge Morales Pedraza. I think we are almost saying the same thing. I accept fact that Iran has breached some of the safeguard of NPT, but my point is as far as the report of IAEA is concern there is no substantial evidence that Iran possess the capacity or is willing to create a bomb. All the allegation so far is based on suspicion.

With respect to the second part of your coment,  yes we have the same opinion.

From the follow-up of events, there is a clear impact because the basis on which the negotiations was forced is political decisions and military threats