A good question --also a classical question in philosophical treatments of ethics: the theme of the "deontological" vs. the "teleological;" "the right" vs. "the good;" and Kant vs. Aristotle. Its also a very large question.
My inclination is to say that purely rule-based conceptions of morality are too restrictive, and they tend toward top-down social structures. The conception is, often, that there is a clearly "right" thing to do in any possible circumstance or situation. But this is a somewhat doubtful notion if only because human beings keep inventing new sorts of situations--e.g., by means of innovations of knowledge and technology. But if everyone supposes that there is a uniquely applicable rule to apply in any possible situation, then the net effect, in cases of conflict, is to redefine the rules top-down.
On the other hand, a purely teleological conception of morals may open the doors to self-interested innovations of rules and special pleading --if the appropriate rules are taken to be those which will produce the good. In addition, of course, different people have different conceptions of the good, just as different people and peoples have differing conceptions of the correct rules of conduct.
In a way, its a matter of order vs. freedom. Order without freedom is stultifying; and freedom without order may be quite destructive. We should keep the rules so well as possible--noting that "ought implies can," and preserve as well broad participation in the innovative elements of morality. Accepted public mores are better respected, properly formative of the public law, and best reformed with broad consent.
A good question --also a classical question in philosophical treatments of ethics: the theme of the "deontological" vs. the "teleological;" "the right" vs. "the good;" and Kant vs. Aristotle. Its also a very large question.
My inclination is to say that purely rule-based conceptions of morality are too restrictive, and they tend toward top-down social structures. The conception is, often, that there is a clearly "right" thing to do in any possible circumstance or situation. But this is a somewhat doubtful notion if only because human beings keep inventing new sorts of situations--e.g., by means of innovations of knowledge and technology. But if everyone supposes that there is a uniquely applicable rule to apply in any possible situation, then the net effect, in cases of conflict, is to redefine the rules top-down.
On the other hand, a purely teleological conception of morals may open the doors to self-interested innovations of rules and special pleading --if the appropriate rules are taken to be those which will produce the good. In addition, of course, different people have different conceptions of the good, just as different people and peoples have differing conceptions of the correct rules of conduct.
In a way, its a matter of order vs. freedom. Order without freedom is stultifying; and freedom without order may be quite destructive. We should keep the rules so well as possible--noting that "ought implies can," and preserve as well broad participation in the innovative elements of morality. Accepted public mores are better respected, properly formative of the public law, and best reformed with broad consent.
The moral decisions made by individuals that directly affect their person, usually part of a culture or tradition, where certain virtues and values exist and are considered; those that to a certain extent are unconscious.
Once the person takes these convictions in the form of moral values as valuable to his life and tries to transform them into rules or norms for others, he can communicate them verbally or in writing so that his fellows may have knowledge of them; and once reasoned and considered valuable to themselves, it is when they are incorporated into their tables of values and ethical principles.
Also behavioral guides in the different human groups of society.
Kant defines morality in a form of a statement which goes like this: So act that the maxim of your will could always hold as a universal principle of legislation. Accordingly, our moral acts are ascertained by the rules defining our duty. In communitarian conception of morality also known as consequentialist's view, however, morality is observed in light of both individual behavior and social standards. In both conditions, rules overshadow one's behavior. However, there are circumstances where moral behavior ignores the rule of duty and/or the society. Exemplifying this would be the case of euthanasia whereby a doctor or an intimate care giver transgresses the bounds of duty and ends the life of the patient. It seems that man's moral sensitivities are as mysterious as his/her inner complexities.
Rules depend on the exercise of power prior to or upon the establishment and adhereing to the described rules. They are thereby subject to community or ideological forces and invariably conditions at the moment when such rules were established or applied. Certainly, at times, conditions rather than commonsense-with its assumed desire for review-applies fixing new situations within the paradigms of old, non-repeatable conditions.
Rules involve adherence, whether absolute or conditional, which itself becomes of greater import than the original set of rules.
It depends on the rules, on the situations, on the susceptibility of the person and of course on the opportunities of making decisions… and so on. So, it is an equation with too many unknown factors.
Unfortunately, there are rules which deny morals and ethics. These are rules fabricated by despots and autocrats. It is a moral task not to follow these rules.
I think a character-based or, you might say, virtue ethics perspective is the correct one. You may discover some rules as part of exercising your judgement as a moral agent, but it seems rare that a rule comes with no exceptions. It can in principle, of course, be difficult to say what is good judgement as contrasted with bad judgement, but I think that is reflective of the fact that moral questions are often difficult to answer, and that the exercise of judgement, dialogue, debate etc. help elucidate this, so that if questions are not answered, perhaps they are better understood. I think this approach also facilitates asking the right questions, rather than seeking answers to questions that maybe shouldn't be asked in the first place. So I would say that rules have some place in ethics, but the wise person asks in each situation whether any rule should be applied at all and, if a rule or rules can be applied, how should they be and to what extent...
Rules do not have the consistency the question implies and, as said earlier, are subject to flux. What appears to be consistency is the viewing of rules/the appliance of rules from single events or within single-framed contexts.
Thou shalt not kill-while rarely observed is nevertheless posed as an unalterable ethic until changes ensure other possible contexts. It remains however an unaltered rule while being constantly altered. Thou shalt not commit adultery-remains constant within the context of marraige, which itself is alterable although the rule is apparently not but nevertheless is constantly altered. The only apparent consistancy are the words.
Rules governing contracts are constantly broken within pragmatic frames of rule-alteration, and either the understanding of contract or rule re-established. Even, in such situations, are the words modified. A contract becomes 'subject-to'.