“The analytical approach to ontology stems from the fact that the question "What exists?" presents a fundamental ambiguity. " In a sense, as Quine wrote in 1948, it is a simple question that can be answered with one word: "Everything." All exists because there cannot be anything that does not exist, otherwise it would fall into the tangle of being and non-being (the "beard of Plato") that has plagued the history of Western philosophy. In this first sense, then, the ontological question can only find all in agreement and has no relevance with metaphysics. To say that something does not exist is simply a "contradiction in terms." But there is also a sense in which the question "What exists?" admits different answers. There is everything but not, of course, the chimeras or ghosts, and for Quine did not even exist the properties, possible individuals, or other entities causally inert as the meanings and propositions which philosophers of different orientations were otherwise inclined to include into their ontological inventory.

When Quine said "everything" meant to refer neither more nor less than to the material content of the space-time – one and only one entity for each distinct region of space-time-at most with the addition of those abstract entities that are the essence of mathematics on which govern the physical sciences. For other philosophers the quantifier "all" refers to something else, and their inventory will therefore be different from that of Quine. In this sense, then, the ontological question is far from trivial and no one expects to find a universally acceptable answer. For each of us there exists anything on which we are willing to quantify; but we can be prepared to quantify on different things. "

Being a sole science to have to study ‘matter’, ontology is also " the study of human beings", then "everything" becomes the object of ontology. And of everything "that is" it is necessary to know the principles and causes. Knowledge not only of the substances, but also of the principles and their causes, is for Aristotle the "philosophy prima", prior to any other development of speculation in the fields of ethics and logic.

Even in Aristotle's ontology is still more important than the logic and empirical dimension: only intellectual intuition for him is able to access it. Existence is therefore not a "predicable" of an entity. We can have the concept of god, his essence, in thought, but we can not translate this intellectual knowledge in a test of its real existence. From one side, the difference between real and ideal is illustrated by an example, the difference between "having 100 tolars and thinking of having them", whereby it wants to indicate the size purely empirical of existence. From the other the ideal of pure reason appears to be the ultimate structure of reason, which thinks Being as "the set of all possibilities for a complete determination of all things" but in fact only as an "idea".

Unlike the Aristotelian categories, which have a value both ontological and epistemological as forms of ‘being’ and ‘thinking’, the Kantian categories have a scope only epistemological and transcendental, as a priori forms of the intellect that are not valid for ‘being’ in an ontological sense, but only for logically-formal ‘thinking’, which brought him the accusation of phenomenalism by his contemporaries. According to Kant, in fact, ‘being’ is not caught at the immediate level of the intellectual intuition (which for Plato and Aristotle was the summit of knowledge), but it would be a simple copula assigned and traced by our ‘I’ to the limited scope of the phenomenon, on which reasoning exercises, through the categories, its critical and mediator functions. Kant was essentially accused of having emptied ‘being’of its own ontological dimension, putting the critical reason over intuition.

It was later the German idealism to develop this theme. In Hegel the ontological dimension becomes totally submissive to the epistemological one. With the statement ''all that is real is rational, all the rational is real "and with his triadic dialectics, Hegel claimed the possibility of absolute knowledge, being the" spirit "(Being) logically comprehensible.

Hegel actually ousted ontology from philosophy, assuming that ‘thinking’ was able to justify itself. The Parmenidean staticity became dynamic, and ‘being’ was passed into becoming. Thus Hegel overthrew the Aristotelian logic of non-contradiction, matching ‘being’ with its opposite, that is, with ‘non-being’. The Hegelian ontology is no longer the intuitive and transcendent dimension that led to the thought (as it was in classical philosophy), but it is placed at the end: it is the result of a mediation, of a logical process.

After Hegel the ontological problem, in its possible ramifications, became the central node of many philosophies that followed him. In many replayed the problem, which in truth is treated more or less indirectly in any philosophy.

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