There are several systematic methodologies for sharing benefits in coalitions among entities in energy markets. These include:

Shapley value: This is a well-established method for allocating the benefits of a coalition among its members. It is based on the concept of marginal contribution, and it assigns benefits to each member based on the value they bring to the coalition.

Nucleolus: This is another method for allocating the benefits of a coalition among its members. It is based on the concept of stability, and it assigns benefits to each member in such a way that the coalition is maximally stable.

Banzhaf value: This is a method for allocating the benefits of a coalition among its members based on the power of each member to influence the outcome of the coalition. It assigns benefits to each member based on the number of winning coalitions they can participate in.

Core: This is a method for allocating the benefits of a coalition among its members based on the concept of fairness. It assigns benefits to each member in such a way that no member can be made better off without making another member worse off.

The coalitional TU game: This is a method for allocating the benefits of a coalition among its members based on the concept of coalitional value. It assigns benefits to each member based on the value of the coalition to the members.

These are some of the well-established methodologies for sharing benefits in coalitions among entities in energy markets. It is important to note that the choice of the method will depend on the specific context and the objectives of the coalition. The researcher should also be aware of the limitations and assumptions of each method, and the effort should be made to evaluate the performance of the chosen method in the specific context.

Saeed Akbari Sharing benefits fairly among entities in a coalition is an important issue in the energy market, and there are several systematic methodologies and practical reviews that address this issue. Some of the most commonly used methodologies for allocating benefits in energy market coalitions include:

1. Shapley Value: This is a cooperative game theory approach that assigns a value to each coalition member based on their marginal contribution to the coalition. The Shapley value is widely used in practice, and it is considered to be one of the most fair and efficient methods for allocating benefits among coalition members.

2. Nucleolus: This is another cooperative game theory strategy in which each coalition member is assigned a value depending on their marginal contribution to the coalition. The nucleolus is thought to be more stable and less responsive to coalition membership changes than the Shapley value.

3. The Core-Selector Method is a cooperative game theory strategy in which each coalition member is assigned a value depending on their marginal contribution to the coalition. The core-selector technique is thought to be more consistent and less susceptible to coalition membership changes than the Shapley value.

4. Coalition-Specific Approaches: These methods are based on the peculiarities of the individual coalition and take into consideration the coalition members' specific aims and limits. The proportional fair allocation technique and the proportional marginal contribution method are two examples of coalition-specific procedures.

In addition to these techniques, various practical evaluations and case studies on the issue of dispersing advantages in energy market coalitions have been conducted. These analyses and case studies shed light on the problems and best approaches for disseminating benefits in energy market coalitions.

It is crucial to highlight that the best approach to apply will be determined by the unique coalition, its aims, and its members, and it is also necessary to consult with experts in the energy market and game theory to have a better understanding of the outcomes.