Osama Rahil

Hey Osama, what is wrong with you? Your entire answer has been plagiarized verbatim from Chrys Jordan on Quora:

https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-strongest-evidence-for-and-against-the-Sapir-Whorf-hypothesis

Hein Retter Yes, Hein, an "exemplary answer", like dozens of others posted by this guy who just does copy-and-paste without acknowledgement of the source and presents the answers as if they're his own. Even the explicitly added EDIT and the personal "I agree..." statement have been copied from Chrys Jordan on Quora.

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which states that a person's native language influences how that person thinks, is impossible to prove or to disprove.

EDIT: For clarity, there are two versions. The strong version asserts that our native language determines our cultural perspective. The weak version only asserts that there is a strong correlation between the two.

The strongest indications that the weak version of the hypothesis is correct include the following:

* In languages with grammatical gender, people associate masculine qualities with masculine nouns and feminine qualities with feminine nouns.

* In English, we give person-centered directions: turn left here, turn right there. In Dyribal, an aboriginal language from Australia, you give compass-based directions: turn east here, turn south there. As a side effect, when confronted with two hotel rooms that are identical except for being reversed, an English-speaker is more likely to think they look alike, and a Dyribal speaker is more likely to see the difference.

* Benjamin Whorf himself cited the Hopi language, which does not have the concepts of past, present, and future.

The two weaknesses in the theory, particularly the strong version of the theory, were mentioned by George Steiner in his book, After Babel. In my own words:

But the second point can be countered: translations are never exact. Whorf found no way to adequately interpret the Hopi perspective on time into English.

Linguists and anthropologists have generally backed away from asserting that linguistic habits completely determine a person's world view and ideas; but they demonstrably do play a role. The question of how much of a role they play, remains open. And Steiner's comment about the circular nature of the argument remains. How much does our culture influence our language, and how much does our language influence our culture?

I agree that there is some correlation. But it is not always in one direction or the other.

Edited to improve the general argument.

Best Regards Israel A. C. Noletto

An exemplary answer of Osama Rahil, I think, that could be a lexical entry for today's discussion. 50 years ago I was working on the Sapir-Whorf hyothesis, at that time there was still a certain myth formation connected with it. But of course it is interesting: the languages do not divide the extralinguistic reality all in the same way, so that language is formed by reality which can be, for instance, very flat and very rocky. The language of the inhabitants uses a greater number of concepts for all "anchor concepts" if they are important for life and culture of the inhabitants. A much differentiad landscape, like Norwegian costal landscapes , must have more concepts to express these differences; language in desert landscape if there live people, show a field of special concepts for the anchor concept "desert", because they are used for every day life and overcoming, it is important to know different effects of sand, temperature etc, the similar in a landscape of ice and snow, where inuits live. But I am not sure whether statitistical tests showed clear significant differences to confirm the thesis.

Hein Retter

Prove or disprove the Sapir-Whorf is not exactly the point of my question. As it happens, there are cases that support or discard the hypothesis in all the languages I myself can speak. I find it pretty intriguing the evidence Lera Borodistky. On the other hand, Steven Pinker also makes a strong point in the matter. The thing is, many governments have done what Orwell “predicted” in 1984, changing what displeasing things are called into more pleasing names. They appear to achieve some remarkable success.

Osama Rahil

Hey Osama, what is wrong with you? Your entire answer has been plagiarized verbatim from Chrys Jordan on Quora:

https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-strongest-evidence-for-and-against-the-Sapir-Whorf-hypothesis

Hein Retter Yes, Hein, an "exemplary answer", like dozens of others posted by this guy who just does copy-and-paste without acknowledgement of the source and presents the answers as if they're his own. Even the explicitly added EDIT and the personal "I agree..." statement have been copied from Chrys Jordan on Quora.

Israel A. C. Noletto

RE: many governments have done what Orwell “predicted” in 1984, changing what displeasing things are called into more pleasing names. They appear to achieve some remarkable success.

Yes, sanitizing speech seems to work well enough for politicians. An interesting counterphenomenon is the introduction of politically correct labels that end up taking on the objectionable connotations of the labels that they are supposed to be alternatives to, the history of terms for mental deficiency being a prime example.

Numerous examples support the 'soft' Whorfian / Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis that language structures thought. A classic Cognitive Psychology study of encoding (Carmichael, Hogan, & Walter, 1932) presented participants with pictures like: O-O labelled either "glasses" or "dumbell" and later asked participants to redraw from memory. If the word was "glasses" participants often 'bent' the line for a nose and if the word was "dumbell" participants often made that line thicker. Many examples of framing effects from Social Psychology illustrate how language shapes people's thinking (e.g., pro-choice and pro-life as perspectives in the abortion debate). An interesting example from Developmental Psychology is how children learning to count in a language that's more regular then English more quickly (Miller et al., 1995; link below, regular such as 11 being ten-one, 12 being ten-two, etc.). Though language clearly matters for thought, it's also clear thought shapes language. You might read Developmental Psychology accounts that compare and contrast Piaget's and Vygotsky's theories where the debate concerning language and thought is central. Piaget's account of sensori-motor intelligence is particularly persuasive to me. The study of gesture provides similar compelling evidence. You also might look in Cognitive Psychology textbooks for many interesting cross-cultural examples. Hope this helps some, Israel. ~ Kevin

Children Learning to Count in Different Languages:

http://www.rcgd.isr.umich.edu/life/Readings2007/Miller%20Ed%20Reading%201.pdf

Israel A. C. Noletto

It may be that I didn't answer your question. I have, as usual in RG, given a comment, a small reminder, what has occupied me once. There are many language games, which are available on the same topic, but have no congruence, however some touch. In the dispute between J.-F. Leotard and J. Habermas I find the position of Lyotard much more convincing.

Language philosophy and psychology became interesting for me in the context of communication in everyday life. Paul Watzlawck gives many examples in his little book "Wie wirklich ist die Wirklichkeit" how understanding depends on peculiarities of language.

A second approach is offered by history. Romanticism is an important field of origin for the interest in the languages of the peoples. The philosophical interest in language was integrated into the "Volksgeist" concept, starting with Johann Friedrich Herder. Of course, you can't get past Wilhelm von Humboldt. After all, he is the starting point for the idea that it is not consciousness that produces the concepts, but, conversely, language with its special structure and its concepts that shapes thought. But you think about this especially when you have been to countries with different languages for a guest stay. I learned Russian at school, know a bit about the Finnish-Estonian "language area" and was more often in Hungary, but much longer in Poland. And in Japan I was three times. Everything is wonderfully stimulating for language studies, although I am a psychologist by nature, I am a layman linguistically. I can only say that the study of languages and their traditions is fascinating, and if you add the languages of the indigenous peoples of America and Africa, that is overwhelming.

Thirdly, the idea that one can change the awareness of reality from bad to better by "improving" the concepts comes from the philosophy of pragmatism. There this aspect is systematically included and it is widely used today. John Dewey did not say, "There must be action!" But he preferred to say: "There we need intelligent action". Such expression did not make it better, but it made a better impression with the audience: When he once again criticized the state of democracy, he used to say: We must demand "radical democracy". Such adjectives, like "radical", did not change reality, but the hope grew that it could change from bad to better. Then, when you study history again, the facts were very different. From the bad it went further downhill with US democracy to the present super-bad state. I experienced similar attempts to increase the good reality in real socialism.

Kind regards, Hein Retter

Dear Israel A. C. Noletto and readers,

I don't have a direct answer to your question. However, I would like to point to two problems with the hypothesis. The first is that the hypothesis might be based on a false assumption. The second is that the evidence in favor of the hypothesis (as Whorf presents it) might be due to a fallacy. I base my discussion on an entry in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences on Relativism and the Social Sciences:

„Whorf’s theory of linguistic relativism is founded on his claim that speakers of different natural languages, or more precisely natural languages belonging to different families, operate according to different grammatical rules and that these different grammars shape the thoughts of the native speakers of that language. What follows from such a claim is that the same physical evidence does not necessarily force upon a perceiver the same picture of the universe, for the picture is formed by the grammar of the language. Therefore, different languages are said to entail different pictures of the universe irrespective of those pictures’ basis in the same physical data. Grammar, for Whorf, is the “shaper of ideas” and that which provides “thought materials.” Therefore, Whorf hypothesizes that the nature of reality is relative to the grammar of a natural language.“ (p. 804; )

As the article points out, Whorf proposed his theory before the advent of Generative Grammar. (p. 805) Recent research suggests that language consists of a core system for the generation and interpretation of expressions. This core system seems to be uniform for humans, the variations in language types is due to a secondary system for externalization. (Bolhuis et al.)

If this is correct, the Whorf's basic assumption is plainly false, there are no “different grammars”. However, it does seem to be the case that language is closely connected with though. In fact, the core system seems to be optimally designed for the interaction with the thought system. (Bolhuis et al.)

As the article points out, Whorf's hypothesis “that the nature of reality is relative to the grammar of a natural language” might has things backwards: Given “Whorf’s claim that one can read off a metaphysics from the grammar of a language.”, one might argue that he – in fact – reads a metaphysics into a grammar (assuming for the sake of argument Whorf's understanding of grammar).

This might be a general problem with supposed evidence for the hypothesis. As the article states:

“[The] real problem is that what had appeared to many (including Whorf) as a thesis founded upon, if not logically forced upon one by, the results of empirical studies of the grammar of natural languages is actually a set of claims emerging from the observer, such as Whorf, who is in the grip of an unacknowledged picture of grammar that leads him to first misrepresent his own language and then proceed to misrepresent those he is studying.” (p. 806)

In other words: one's intuitive judgement about one's own language might influence one's interpretation of another language. This would be re-enforced by the fact that we cannot introspect into how grammar (i. e. the core system) actually works (and apparently, our intuitions about grammar are false).

It might be possible to approach the question from a different direction: If we take thought to consist of some system that feeds into language, then it could be that language actually gives a precise structure to generated expressions. As Chomsky has pointed out, if we introspect, then might have different bits and pieces floating around and sometimes some are formed into a complete thought, in the form of a complete expression (I think I have only heard Chomsky say this in talks).

If this is correct, then we might have the possibility that although language is uniform, the thought systems might differ. Little is known about theses systems (from what I can see, the cognitive systems might be rather uniform as well), but the possibility of different conceptual frameworks, so to speak, that in some sense influence how we see the world should not be disregarded.

Best,

Sven Beecken

• Kaldis, Byron, ed. Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Vol. 2. SAGE, 2013.
• Bolhuis, Johan J., et al. "How could language have evolved?." PLoS biology 12.8 (2014): e1001934.

Sven Beecken

Thanks for this comment, In former times have often had the opportunity in other countries to be present at conversations of local philosophers with representatives of German classical philosophy from the 17th and 18th centuries. For my sake, the conversation was sometimes conducted in English. But then it is sometimes difficult to understand what the foreign interlocutor means. It was strangest in Japan, where the individual university teachers are very strongly specialized either in the Anglo-American, French or German language and culture area. I had the impression that my Japanese interlocutors were most impressed by those German philosophers who are not exactly the easiest feven for Germans, namely Hegel and Heidegger. It is very interesting from the point of view of communication theory that in such conversations nobody can control what someone else means. And if Heidegger's "Kehre" comes into conversation now, that there are times when deadly efforts to "understand" threaten to turn into humour and comedy. This is then self-relativization and exercise in modesty of aspiration. And then I get the idea that my hosts, who are really very much at home in philosophy than I am, are probably more right about their understanding than I am. One will remember Paul Watzlawick's booklet, "How real is reality". In this respect, the Sapir-Whor hypothesis could still tolerate some additional hypotheses when it comes to abstract terminology, which does not involve logic or mathematics. Sentences, but has to do with vividness and aesthetics.

For a decent introductory discussion of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the last section of chapter 3 of Steven Pinker's book, The Stuff of Thought might be a good place to start. Pinker distinguishes 10 versions of the hypothesis but only regards 3 of them as amounting to genuine linguistic determinism. He ends up rejecting them all, plumping instead for a Theory of Conceptual Semantics.