Is the primary role of populism to course-correct dysfunctional democracies? On the whole, do the benefits of populism (i.e. increased civic engagement and representation) outweigh the cons (i.e. irrational, emotion-based decision making)?
It would be helpful to define populism. I remain confused by the term. A restrictive definition would limit it to movements that are generated from below without elite guidance or control. This would exclude fascist movements that have popular support. It would also exclude Chavismo in Venezuela or Peronism in Argentina. But when the US tried to remove Chavez from power, the spontaneous occupation of Caracas by 1 million citizens for a period of several days (weeks?) suggests some Venezuelan populism was self determined. The Tea Party in the U.S. is not a citizens' movement. It is guided by elites with their own agenda. The anger is genuine and comes from common experience, but the policies are managed from above. An expansive definition would include the above cases and many others. The popular benefits of broad-definition populism are genuine for a short period, but they are rarely sustained. The benefits of narrow-definition populism are harder to judge because there don't seem to be any historical cases of populist control of institutions long enough to make a difference. Most genuinely popular rebellions in world history have been crushed quickly. Lawrence Goodwyn, in his book on the Farmers' Alliance of the 1880s, indicates that there has to be an independent economic base for populism to survive. He argues that that base does not exist in urbanized societies, and thus there can be no true populism. The drift toward fascism of all 20th-21st century forms of populism supports his contention.
Good question. I think you may find that American and European opinion on this question will divide.
The following definition of "populist" may help. Webster's says:
Populist,
1: a member of a political party claiming to represent the common people especially, often capitalized : a member of a U.S. political party formed in 1891 primarily to represent agrarian interests and to advocate the free coinage of silver and government control of monopolies.
2: a believer in the rights, wisdom, or virtues of the common people.
---End quotation
A basic question is whether the people themselves are the best judge or guarantor of their own interests. Democracy does seem to involve this assumption: Government by "consent of the governed;" "Government of the people, by the people and for the people." One notices the tendency of elites, especially economic elites to ignore emerging public discontents they may engender; if this is continued and extended, then populism is a likely factual consequence.
Readers of this thread may find the following short piece of background interest:
Thesis Hamiltonian America
I would suggest that the Jeffersonian party (now the American Democratic party) is an original model of a kind of populism --which arose in popular reaction against Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists of the early republic.
Not sure there is a 'European' and (North) 'American' view on populism, apart of course the particular US movement under that name. But did you mean something else?
Today's politics of populism has lost its meaning, it is very difficult to interpret populist interests as interests born of society to society such as the desire of democracy, I still doubt whether populist politics are born of national interests (public / citizen interests) or the national political interests (interests political party) or moderate goverment nterests? the clue is that by looking at populism's political goals whether for (justice, welfare, equality) or (power, ideology) or (stability of government, trust)
I take it that Webster's reports the American usage. The meaning given in Websters is pretty neutral. That is partly a matter of history, since the American populist movement of the late 19th century was a start on removing the long domination of the post-Civil War Republicans and the economic influence of the Gilded Age. The chief figures of the Populist party were later incorporated into the Democratic party of Woodrow Wilson --including Wilson's Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan
Contrast the definition of "populism" from the Cambridge English dictionary:
. mainly disapproving
political ideas and activities that are intended to get the support of ordinary people by giving them what they want:
Their ideas are simple populism - taxcuts and higher wages.
In the American tradition there is a certain expectation that populism, at first, will be somewhat inarticulate--but may eventually become more sophisticated. Its a matter of some general discontent and felt political slight --which requires articulation and development.
For example, in the late 19th-century, the great industrialists had things just about as they wanted. They raised import taxes to very high levels with the consequence that the prices of manufactured good became very high --cheaper imports being effectively excluded. American farmers had to pay these protected prices, but their produce was sold on the world market and their prices were not protected. Large numbers of farmers, especially in the South and the West were going broke and formed the basis of the populist movement --at first calling for inflationary policies to make the repayment of loans cheaper for them--"free (coinage of) silver."
Yes indeed but US populism is pretty sui generis if taken against the broad swathe of say Latin American populism and the new populism of Western Europe to call it that
Or, might we say that in Europe (the basis of my comparison) traditions of elitist politics are stronger?
However that may be, the U.S. tradition of attending closely to public discontent derives significantly from the British Whig tradition of the 18th century --who were often sympathetic to the American Revolution and thought the expanded British empire of those times a threat to "English liberty." The writings of Edmund Burke, for instance are highly regarded, especially in more conservative circles, in the U.S.
The more radical American patriots at the time of the American Revolution, would sometimes call their more conservative colleagues, "good Whigs" (a mild complement); and these more conservative patriots were brought along in the Revolution. The Revolution, of course, grew out of public discontent with British policies-- "taxation without representation" in particular.
Generally, I take it, the vehemence of opposition is a measure of the rigidity of the pre-existing political establishment.
H.G. Callaway
---you wrote---
Yes indeed but US populism is pretty sui generis if taken against the broad swathe of say Latin American populism and the new populism of Western Europe to call it that
I'd say that logically, by all that one can consider correct, it is the political left that should be the "populists." It is the left that should be those who look out first for the best interests of the populus, the "common man." It is the left that should be listening, and taking seriously, what the populus is frustrated about.
If there is any illustration of just how badly politics have devolved, I'd say it is that instead, the left has become the home of the slogans of a self-proclaimed "political elite," who feel they have to instruct the populus on what they are permitted to think, and permitted to articulate. How did that even happen?
We are not supposed to have "rulers," in democracies. On the contrary, we are supposed to have "public servants." That idea seems to have been lost. And yes, I agree with HG Callaway, that Europeans have traditionally been more accepting of a "political elite." Maybe, there's a merging going on, across the Atlantic. It seems many in the US are also not repelled, at the notion of this "political elite." Not necessarily a good thing.
Populism is always a factor in democracies. It only becomes a topic in national media when populist candidates win. There is no emergency function unique to populism.
As far as Est-Central Europe is concerned, populism is identity-based and challenges the post-1989 liberal-oriented party system on three grounds: ideology, corruption and alienation, that is, as being too ideological, corrupt and alienated from the people. The result is a limitation of political competition, without moving yet towards political radicalism.
In 2018 the most used and abused term was undoubtedly that of ‘populism’. Rarely has a term been so over-inflated and so over-extended that it has become practically meaningless, while at the same time achieving iconic status. I propose here to carry out a (very) brief deconstruction of the term populism and the presentation of an alternative reading based on the work of the late Ernesto Laclau (On Populist Reason) and my own Latin American in Europe hybrid viewpoint.
When the liberal newspaper The Guardian ran a long feature on populism (https://www.theguardian.com/world/series/the-new-populism ) we knew it had arrived as it were. The general gist of the project was that ‘populism’ was a major political foe in the global North for all left-liberal folk. It introduced authoritarianism and irrationality into good old centrist politics. These so-called centrists included Tony Blair and Hilary Clinton who were given a platform for their views that included for the latter a call for the liberal centre in Europe to lead on keeping migrants out so that migration would not become an issue of the populist right. The mind boggles is all I can say ( https://blog.oup.com/2016/01/migration-global-trade-unions/ ).
The new Northern orthodoxy on populism emerged in the mid 2000’s as a way to categorise such diverse emerging political figures such as Trump, Farage, Le Pen, Wieder and Urban, along with their Southern cousins such as Chávez, Morales and the Kirchners. Populism was defined as an anti-elite politics, also anti-pluralist and usually based on some type of identity politics (Jan-Werner Müller What is Populism).
The purpose of defining populism we are told is to help in defeating it as it is a threat to liberal democracy, whether it comes from the far right or the far left. The current crisis has, apparently nothing to do with neo-liberalism and its paroxysm in 2008-09, the austerity politics which followed or the popular reactions against both. By focusing on this version of ‘populism’ as the cause of democratic decline, this liberal onslaught has itself undermined democratic institutions and the very meaning of democratic citizenship. It has allowed the liberal political classes to evade responsibility for the authoritarian trend in the North Atlantic (eg Trump, Brexit, Le Pen) while scapegoating those resisting it (eg Sanders, Corbyn, Melenchon) and demonising those in the global South who have combatted neo-liberalism such as the progressive regimes of Latin America dubbed ‘bad’ because populist lefts.
Central to the development of a national-popular will in Latin America was the concept of the people (pueblo). For Ernesto Laclau it is only by developing and extending Gramsci’s work in this area that we can overcome the exclusion/opposition between particularity and universality in the construction of the people. “For him there is a particularity a plebs—which claims hegemonically to constitute a populus while the populus (the abstract universality) can exist only as embodied in a plebs. When we reach that point, we are close to the ‘people’ of populism” (Laclau 2005, p. 107). The development of populism is probably the main difference between Latin American political development and that of other regions.
To this day, in international commentary on the “left populism” of Chávez et al. we find quite an ethnocentric emphasis on the irrationality of populism and a constant tendency to see it as the enemy of “normal” political development toward class patterns and progressive social transformation. For Laclau , on the contrary, “populism presents itself both as subversive of the existing state of things and as the starting point for a more or less radical reconstruction of a new world order wherever the previous one has been shaken” (Laclau 2005, p. 177).
The old order was changed utterly by the emergence this national-popular ideology and world-view. It could also become radicalized at key conjunctures when the “people-oligarchy” opposition became the dominant divide in society.
In Western Europe, on the other hand, the term ‘populism’ is used mainly in a pejorative way to refer to the rise of a new right and its demagogic leaders. The different trajectory of the term in Latin America should warn us against any claims to universality of this discourse. Yet we may also learn from Latin America where the left ‘populism’ of the post 2000 left governments was also the result of the flawed and biased system of representative democracy that preceded them.
Maybe the ‘crisis of representation’ referred to in the Latin American debates may also be a factor in the rise of the ‘new populisms’ of the North Atlantic. Following Laclau we can understand how populism is best understood as a political logic or discourse that belongs neither to the left or the right (this does not mean it is beyond left and right but that is another issue). This populism creates a ‘logic of difference’ between power and those challenging it. The construction of a people – populism?- is not therefore a degradation of democracy. Indeed, all successful socialist movements in the past have been ‘populist’ in this sense. It emerges thus as subversive of the political order, the existing state of affairs and offers a starting point for a more or less radical reconstruction of society.
The Latin American debate on populism could maybe be brought to bear in Western Europe to provide a different vantage point to what has become a rather debilitating polarisation between ‘populism’ and centrist liberalism. It could add some nuance and complexity to the debate especially from a progressive perspective. That has already happened through the engagement of Ernesto Laclau and in particular Chantal Mouffe with Podemos in Spain (see https://www.lwbooks.co.uk/book/podemos-in-name-of-people ). But there is far less sign of a broader perspective in the Anglo sphere. It would allow us to move beyond the notion that liberal democracy was an unambiguous human good and populism an obvious bad.
The cause of radical democracy is ill-served by a demonization of populism and an uncritical embrace of liberalism. We would do well to recall now- in the midst of the complex Brexit crisis- what Laclau said in relation to what ‘creates the conditions leading to a populist rupture’ which he saw as a ‘situation in which a plurality of unsatisfied demands and increasing inability of the institutional system to absorb them differentially exist’
I think this is certainly a pertinent question since we are witnessing the rise of a new wave of populism (of different and contesting sorts).
In order to evaluate whether the benefits of populism outweigh its disadvantages, I think we should analyze the cases of successful left-wing populism today. Take the case of Podemos in Spain and the mobilization led by Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn in the US and UK respectively. The case of Morena and AMLO in Mexico is also a good case study.
What do these examples tell us about the roots of left-wing/progressive populist politics today?
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have studied left-wing populism extensively and have argued that this phenomenon needs to be understood against the unchallenged consensus between the center and the right vis-a-vis the economic model (neoliberalism). That is, left-wing populism can best be seen a strategy to rupture this consensus. This goes hand in hand with Mouffe's conceptualization of politics as a space of contestation, conflict and antagonism--rather than one of consensus. At its core, left-wing populism delineates a 'frontier' between the people and the elite, enabling liberatory politics for the former.