That's a common ad hominem argument: "Yours is not physics, but metaphysics." But, seriously, is it possible to do any physics completely free of metaphysical assumptions and, in consequence, some level of speculation?
normaly are intended to say that no contribution to physics can be detected in the matter under consideration. To admit at least a contribution to metaphysics is formally polite, but actually more of an invective since the speaker typically shows no high esteem for metaphysics. The question whether all physics contains elements of metaphysics is not touched by this. If such elements can be identified in some work, this is typically not considered a defect unless elements of good physics are missing.
Some day It will be a physics who will define the metaphysical phenomenon if evolute with good growth rate but appeared current knowledge is not seems to be sufficient for the purpose.
In an early chapter of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had asserted that to make metaphysical assumptions in order to form a mental picture of something, including physical phenomena is the very nature of human mind. We can understand these uncountable occurences in the history of physics itself, for example, in the case of Newton's second law, written formally as F=dp/dt, but we inevitably accept the idea or imagine that force is the"cause" of the change of momentum over time, which is, in Poincare's view, metaphysical in nature. The almost simillar case was recognized again in Meyer's work of conservation of energy, in which energy (Kraft) was thought as "indestructible cause". The main difference between physicists (or scientists in general) and metaphysicians is that the former always confine themselves to use such assumptions as long as they are required to explain or to justify some observations. As far as I know, the attempts to exclude all metaphysical elements in physics, for instance by those of positivists who did not admit the existence of a universe independent of their senses, would turn physics itself to be meaningless and soulless, as oppsed by Planck. This reaction was followed by Heisenberg and Weinberg in some aspects.
I am sure that all scientific approaches in the histroy were (and are) based on explicit or (more frequently, implicit) metaphysical (or onthological) assumptions. Some are aware of it, some others not but that does not change the fact.
I refer you to Godels incompleteness theorems http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems which would indicate the answer to your question is a definite no.
It is hard to see how a physical theory cannot have some non-trivial axioms which could be termed metaphysical since they cannot be proven, just not dis-proven by observation.
It is interesting that the axioms we do have of quantization and relativity derive from the physics of observation - i.e. these are the axioms that have survived the inspection by observational physics, so in one sense it could be said the metaphysics follows from the observations and not the other way around.
It is my personal view only that a third major axiom is required to finish the unification of physics: that of scale invariance. The final theory will remain incomplete, but internally consistent. If I am wrong, then what we have at present is as good as it gets - complete but inconsistent. Both outcomes are allowed by Godels theorems.
Well I have long argued Godels theorems could well lend themselves to a much more general interpretation in both philosophy and physics, although I accept not with the same rigor mathematicians apply to proof of such.
I would also argue even a finite discrete universe is subject to Godels theorems because it is always possible to embed that mathematical structure inside a larger structure. The smaller is therefore consistent (it encompasses all observations), but incomplete because it is unobservable until some part of that larger structure influences the smaller. Of course such a postulate is not a theory because it cannot be tested, therefore it is metaphysics - but the possibility of that metaphysics cannot be denied on the basis of observation within the physical structure, and so will always be part of any theory of physics based on mathematics.
I suspect some physicists would argue ANY mathematics is metaphysical, and all observation requires measurement and is therefore mathematical in nature. I for one cannot imagine a theory based on something that does not involve any measurement at all, so I maintain the answer to the original question is: No.
Scale invariance does not seem to sit well with the existence of Planck's constant within the framework of our current theories, but it is my opinion the unification problem originates in the mathematics and not in the physics.
Even though G.H. Hardy had asserted that in many aspects mathematics and theoretical physics is hardly to distinguish, the motivation and framework of both disciplines are different: pure mathematicians concern themselves in the logical structures, patterns, and their properties represented by symbols, while physicists always need to explain and justify physical phenomena in the mathematical structures.
Many philosophical ideas can be argued about the different nature between them in new terms, for example by Kant's analytical-synthetical knowledge. In my opinion, mathematics is one convenient method to avoid too many subjective metaphysical assumptions for its objectivity, but it is still the science of structures, not objects. When physicists try to formulate their theories, sometimes they need to assume the very existence of unobservable objects and conditions in order to build a structure, for instance in the case of kinetic theory. That's why metaphysics can not be excluded at all from physics, it is inherent to human mind and creativity. Godel had hoped that a philosophical value available from his incompletness theorem is that human mind is more than a logical machine, for its complexity, including intuitiveness, ability to recognize many structures, and to grope reality in metaphysical terms. Metaphysics is related to the issue of an object's physical existence, it is not about the existence of a pure logical structure.
Dear Dr. Chavoya-Aceves,
Many thanks for your appreciation, but actually I am just an undergraduate, now I am in my third semester.
Physics without metaphysics is engineering. In other words, physics-metaphysics=engineering, so that engineering+metaphysics=physics or metaphysics=physics-engineering.
Can you, please, elaborate on your thesis that "Planck's constant is really just a definition of the unit of energy, much like the speed of light is really just a definition of the unit of distance."
In the case of current speculative physics without hope to find out or prove through experiments in future, observation is adorableness. It is nothing more than pure speculation to make other believe what is their individual metaphysics or sense of aesthetics. What Fenda Pratama told is in nutshell current physicists are trying to answer all questions with out excusing themselves from answering and acknowledging their limitations. Instead, they are going in this race farther and farther by relaxing scientific conditions of accepting a theory to develop a Grand Theory of Everything. They don't show to accept status of gods of small things, instead they are creating their own universes to be their Lords.
The conviction in the limitation of human mind to grasp absolute reality had already commenced in modern physicists especially since the age of quantum mechanics. A memorable attitude in this case had shown by Weisskopf by quoting Hamlet:"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt in your philosophy". The more obvious one is given by men like Bohr or Feynman, who asserted that many aspects of quantum mechanics are baffling, even unintelligible to a certain point. We have no any philosophical scheme that always survive in the pursue of knowledge. In the other hand, the grand edifice of physics must find generalization to all physical phenomena, or otherwise, there is no physical science at all, since science is characterized by its universality in explaining every detail or side of the universe in an expanding, coherent structure. But often, such attempt went too far beyond the the range of scientific understanding itself, for example, Fechner and Mach had failed to build a consistent psychological science based solely on the physical terms. Our understanding is always imperfect, since it is only a reflection of a reality, but it is an applaudible venture of a man of science, to understand a universe external to him.
I apologize for the "Dr. (Professor)". Please understand I have no means to determine exactly who you are. In consequence I have to conduct myself following conventionalism. Conventionalism, in my discharge, is not essential in this context. I personally don't care if somebody calls me "doctor" or just "Oscar". Some people is more strict about those things.
I agree with you largely especially your observation, "Our understanding is always imperfect, since it is only a reflection of a reality, but it is an applaudible venture of a man of science, to understand a universe external to him." However, to what extent it is advisable to answer all questions and reject all questions at hand where there is no reach of mind or science. Further, is it not possible that a theory in its disciplinary context may be internally coherent without referring to external world? Example is here from consistent and coherent theories of economics to which pollution and other environmental and ecological adverse impacts of production, distribution and consumption processes are just “EXTERNALITIES” which cannot be considered in an economic theory as though economic system operates no on the Earth rather in a Vacuum? Is it not similarly true in speculative physics or science as a whole?
I know scholars may have antagonistic real or well considered opinion. However, it does not entail them to down vote another real or well considered opinion without demonstrating the truth as Fenda Pratama did in a very persuasive manner. It raises a question in my mind to what extent scientists (including physicists) know their art. This stupid doubt arose in my mind from a small piece of news published recently in the Times of India, “Gamers vs. Scientists.” The news was from an article in ZME Science published on Tuesday, September 20, 2011. The story goes like below:
“Scientists from University of Washington have been struggling for the past decade to decipher the complex structure of an enzyme that exhibits behaviour similar to that of an enzyme key in the development of AIDS from an HIV infection, and which might hold a critical role in building a cure for the disease. Gamers playing spatial game Foldit have managed to collectively determine the enzyme’s structure in ten days.
“Puzzled by the intricate structure of the M-PMV retroviral protein, an enzyme that plays a key role in the development of a virus similar to HIV, scientists have striven to find its chemical key for ten years now. Each enzyme has millions of possible combination in which it can fold its atom bonds, and determining its precise structure is a very laborious enterprise even for high-end computers with large processing power.
“---University of Washington biologists sent the virtual 3D model of the M-PMV to the online game Foldit, where gamers folded and turned it into a myriad of combinations. Eventually, and remarkably enough, the gamers obtained the optimum one – the state that needed the lowest energy to maintain. Now unlocked, scientists have a concrete means of understanding how the enzyme works, and consequently how to attack it.”
This piece of information gives insight that not sometimes but in most cases:
The question to what extent our cognition can be applied validly to form mental pictures of the external world was previously treated by Kant in order harmonize both virtues of rationalism and empiricism. The scientists who finally found the triumph of their works never let themselves to be limited by particular philosophical schemes or scientific methods because of their full appreciation to creativity. Scientific motivation is based on the simple assumption that the external universe can be comprehended, at least to some level of abstractions. This assumption, of course, is hardly to be questioned, perhaps, it is inherent to unconsciousness of all human being. Dewey even characterized the scientific attitude as "that which is capable enjoying the doubtful". Physicists would assert that they comprehend something if they recognize mathematical structures, orders, or patterns that fit to describe an aspect of the external universe. We can not ascertain the safest philosophical scheme or scientific method of all, which in consequence, it must assert definitely the boundaries of accessible reality or knowledge. Such epistemological theory is often deplored because of their own limitation or rejection to all possibilities beyond its frame of thinking and applicability. An example of this case is the positivism, which asserted that it is advisable to ask and answer about something only if both the question and answer can be justified by senses or logic. In physics, a question will not meet an answer at the end if the answer (i.e. descriptions as the consequences of the adopted model) is not included in the structure of the already established comprehension. For example, physicists would assert that it is illogical to ask an electron's color or to answer definitely both of its position and momentum at same time.
The coherence (to some extents) in sciences depends on the nature of interpretation of phenomena in the terms of already established concepts. In natural sciences, the coherence occurs since various and wide range of phenomena are reduced to the set of simple universal laws. For physics, since its structure is built on the operational and mathematical concepts, it must refer to the external world in the form of strict interpretation of experiments and observations. In some aspects of social sciences, for example the Hegelian theory, coherence appears for its interpretation that observed historical/social events or phenomena follow a (gigantic) main scheme based mostly on speculations, subjective observations, or nonoperational concepts, therefore the main scheme is more flexible to adapt. In the case of "gamers vs. scientists", I think the problem was then unlocked because a much more powerful method based on another system of automation was available: it is not to replace (but it is possible to expand) the previous fundamental concepts (such as lowest energy) which allow the formation of the enzyme's structure itself, just as the computer scientists could determine millions digit of pi ahead on pure mathematicians, but without modifying the established fact that pi follows a certain characteristic mathematical structure. One more analogy, this time is without automation: Although Einstein's famous equation is true, no one including himself could determine practical method to transform mass into energy before unexpected result obtained by Meitner and Hahn, which was not predicted in his original paper.
After absence from RG for few days I found time to respond to your post. Let me clear on the onset of this short response that I am not against rationality, science nor physics. I largely agree with you, but my moot question is still not resolved. Why scientists or physicists entertain too many questions which they cannot answer or their notions (concept/theories internally coherent) are not realised in time and space be it time traveling machine (which recently is reported that Time Machine, if realised, MAY move forward (in future) not backward (in past) or be researches or claims of cold fusion or be it gravity defying machines. All were well considered theories which convinced physicists on board of companies or governments, decision making bodies scrutinised proposals and accepted them as feasible resulting in the loss tens of millions of dollars. Whether to what extent the internally consistent theories of physics are really interpret or mirror reality is shown by well known author of VOODOO SCIENCE: THE ROAD FROM FOOLISHNESS TO FRAUD, Robert L. Park. His article "Seven Warning Signs of Bogus Science". Does this paper not point out that physicists are claiming what they really don't know or can prove. The article is attached below.
but then maybe Robert Park misexpressed himself, what he likely meant was 'people who work in ignorance of, or sundered from, previous work on their subject'.
There is nothing wrong in working in some isolation, however there is something terribly wrong in working on a subject whilst unaware or dismissive of work performed by others in the same field, and as Robert Park noted, it is usually a sure sign of quackery .... Most worthy work, even when disruptive, builds upon previous results.
I however meant more in our modern era, when much solid work has been carried out by other researchers, than used to be the case in earlier times - the era of pioneers such as Newton et al.
I am reminded of this when trawling through some of the self-published fanciful 'physics' literature on Amazon, works like e.g. 'the infinity delusion' and too many others - most of which would definitely qualify under Park's definition, and it's all pretty sad.
Science takes a long time to adopt different views, even when only slightly different and/or complementary of the foregoing - Thomas Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' is still quite relevant.
The conservatism of the scientific establishment - as a defense mechanism - has been further hardened by recent cases - Sokal, Bogdanovs .... and also perhaps by the occasional granting of advanced science degrees to people who just maybe did not quite deserve them, but have used them to advance questionable agendas ....
Article attached was just a provocation for reaction. Since, Pratama was not willing agree to accept that some kind of metaphysics is involved in the present physics. to go beyond from known is the name of research. I also take string theory somewhat metaphysical in nature as making no reference to empirical evidence or knowns or reality. Now, discussion has started in right direction.
@Oscar, it depends on how you define 'metaphysics'. If you define it as the extension of our current knowledge, then it's ok, but if you define it as something simple superior to whatever, then probably will not be proved such a habit to be creative.
In my early answer corresponds to Oscar's original question, I have asserted that it is impossible to exclude entirely metaphysical elements from physics, including from the modern one. My "persuasive argument" as you pointed out is not to be exaggerated: I did not mean that the coherent science will always expand in ease or continuity to reach its main goal that all questions have their own answers in a huge structure of a single knowledge. The history revealed us, in some cases, even the comprehension to realize that two concepts in physics are eventually complementary took long time, e.g. the concepts of "vis viva" and "vis mortua" debated between Leibniz, Bernoulli, and disciples of Descartes. I just defend that many worthy discoveries were based on the previous results even when they were disruptive, as asserted by Chris Ransford precisely, and usually it is more appreciated if one theory unite separated previous concepts and experiments. Therefore, it is inevitable to refer at least to what already established science. Of course, the attached paper is disputable, it seems to me that what Robert Park intended (if he was really serious) is to characterize the "true science" in the perspective of sociology, but it is even not the real one since it lacks of conceptual scheme and built only on suspicions and prejudices. It is worse than classical positivism which is built on (imperfect) epistemology. I have never considered that you against rationalism and science, instead, you reminds me to Paul Feyerabend, who, disputed many aspects of science as human creation, then it is true that science can not be regarded as purely objective since motivations, constitutions, and societies are involved. I think it is relevant for today's science, when fantastical discoveries are rapidly published in popular books.
who takes into account the goal which the paper declaredly has to serve (being a decision aid for lay persons in natural sciences) has probably to confess that he would hardly do better. My impression was : well done!
of course you have to avoid 'false criteria'. What I tried to convey is that Parks criteria are reasonable and the best you can formulate for the purpose given. To consider criteria false when they don't work in one percent of the cases is the kind of common sense that scientists show too often.
you can not do justice to Robert Park's endeavor without seriously taking into account the declared purpose. This is particularly evident if we look to the last of Park's points:
If taken as a general principle to be applied to value any contribution to natural sciences it plainly says that all new laws are bogus. So, no relativity, no quantum theory, ...., all bogus. What is utmost sillyness if taken as a general rule, is a very good criterion when only applied to cases that judges possibly have to handle. I have extended experience with evaluating 'inventions' offered to my former employer and assume that these cases are in a sense representative for those the envisioned judges have to deal with. Since a new natural law can hardly be expected to make its first appearence in a court case or a business idea, it is quite obvious that a proposed device that needs a new physical law for working will very probably be not a good project for a company to sponsor. With a wrong advice one may make the company loose money or ruin one's credit as a scientific counselor. This can be exciting. In such a context your claim is a message from cloud-cuckoo-land.
Being new to this thread, I find the question "Is it possible to do physics without making any metaphysical assumptions?" a problematic concern constituent of the current American obsession with STEM disciplines. After all, traditionally physics was identified as natural PHILOSOPHY. So being, to ask whether physics is possible without metaphysical assumptions appears the product of a distinctly contemporary view. Well, more of the contemporary rehash of logical positivism, which died down in the 1960s, but rose again in the 1970s subsequent to the moon landing, and then the obsession with applied science to make things to sell beginning with Ronald Reagan's presidency.
That expressed with expected vituperative and/or ridiculing retort, let me explain. As a natural science, physics is wedded to observation (controlled experimental or not), and there in lies the heart of the matter. Observations are autonomous events of the same and/or different observer or observers. Additionally, their constituency in any instance is determined by the observer, rendering them a nominal determination by the observer. As so, scientific observation is an "ought", a normative valuation of what is. This is a little off topic, because introducing not a metaphysical entity, but challenging the 20th Century presumption of an "is"/"ought" distinction.
Metaphysics arises with the question of the source of this nominal determination: The brain, as cognitive scientists obsess. Well, insofar as the brain itself as an entity and source of, what, consciousness(?), is constituent of conscious determination, to assume it is the source of consciousness is at best circular. Alternatively, understanding the source of consciousness as immaterial to escape these difficulties, is to introduce the metaphysical. Dare I say it, it is to introduce, gulp, epiphenomenal or not, THE MIND! And if that ain't metaphysical, then I don't know what is.
Now problems for the isolation of physics from metaphysics mount. Observations by one's self are historic, subject to memory. Raised now is the metaphysical question of "What is history?" This is something of which natural scientists should be aware, because history is constituent of those humanities, whose legitimacy long has been suspect by natural scientists, who, as Werner Heisenberg has asserted, are concerned with "reality". Exception here is natural history, which is legitimate, when human history is suspect, except in the case of observations by scientists. As to the distinction, keep in mind my previous observation about nominalism.
Let's go on. Ah, yes, observation. Arguing a private language is impossible, Ludwig Wittgenstein implicitly concludes scientific observation is inherently uncertain. Effectively, the scientist cannot know the scientist's own observation. Responses to this argument descending into quite sophisticated metaphysical thought, well I think you can guess the implication for the question of this thread.
Matters multiply when considering the natural scientist's proudly asserted claim that, unlike the humanities and perhaps social sciences, the observations of natural scientists are verifiable by the observations of others. Hmm, insofar as observation of another is a conscious event, and the consciousness of an observer is privileged--viz., no one else can experience, and thus know, it--it is quite impossible for the scientist, natural or otherwise, to know the experience of another. To think the consciousness of another can be known is, ahem, to engage in metaphysical speculation.
Ah, but matters do not end here. Proudly physicists inform us of a sub-atomic "zoo" of unobservable theoretical entities. Unobservable, eh, then how are they distinguishable from philosophically metaphysical elements? Well, they're scientific, not humanistic, that's how! Ah, yes, again arises the ethic of positivism. And, not only that, but the unstated presumption scientists are not like other mere mortal humans. Unlike the creatures studied by the social sciences and humanities, they are unbiased and have special insight. This is important, because a natural science is a SOCIAL activity. Insofar as the social sciences are uncertain, then their subject matter must be uncertain. Being so, then every natural science must be uncertain. That they are not can be so only if their constituents are "super human." Otherwise, their certainty is in doubt, and we all know that ain't so.
This is all tied together by the physicist's creator. Unlike the drivel propounded by Semitic theologians, the universe began with a "Big Bang" out of, what, why nothing! Oh, yes, and subsequent to this mother of all violations of the conservation of energy, all is bound by the conservation of energy to insure physicists' formulas have a definite product. What makes all this even more plausible is it is so much more reasonable than the Semitic notion of an eternally existing being creating the universe in seven days. Yeah, sure.
Harry, "Semitic part" includes Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. All of these religions arose in the Middle East, constituted by peoples speaking Semitic languages. It is for this reason I used the term "Semitic religions." It is also why I abhor limiting the expression "anti-Semitic" to people of the Jewish faith.
I am thinking that if you look at the word meta-physics is it not the word Meta self explanatory? To me it is simply a greater magnification into the world of physics and natural order.. Like a high powered microscope except now your at the level of meta and one day we will figure out how to magnify even further. Is physics mystical? Or metaphysics mysticism? My answer is no, it is a natural order and part of the universal law for the curiosity and consciousness of the human being. It is a natural inherited birth right for all living things to venture into the unknown and thirst to know what lies beyond the veil of the naked eye. The capacity of the magnetic field of a human eye to see what is unseen and yet does not register in a mental material picture. Is it possible that the eye itself can see the particle energy in infinite flux that is constantly in motion on the material plane? Is it possible that because of his or her belief systems that people blocks themselves from seeing this wonder?
Sure, when you cross the street you have already made many mathematical and physical calculations that are expressed in a couple of seconds occur instantaneously.
the ethymology paragraph in Wikipedia's Metaphysics article tells us that your 'self explanatory' interpretation of 'Meta' is not historically correct. Since I was told the same thing many times in university lessons I believe that the Wikipedia statement is correct.
Short comment here. "Meta" means "after" in classical Greek. What occurred is when Aristotle's students were putting together his lectures into an anthology, they proceeded historically. Having finished the "Physics", they found themselves with a lecture which did not fit any standard Greek category. So, they did the practical thing, and titled the lecture "After Physics" or, in descended translation, "Metaphysics".