Dear Jim, while Book I is a book of metaphysical philosophy, I always regarded book three (and the  essays and histories) as a kind of self criticism of this very philosophical target. (my PhD was written about the philosophy of moderation in the Scottish Enlightenment)

As for the question - I go for a hsitorical understanding of the progress. To get civilised does not mean to get into a different ontological realm. It simply means to cultivate the mind and the heart, and to condition oneself so as to be able to acquire the virtues. In other words one does not become wise - simply prudent through this very progress.

Ferenc

Dear Ferenc,

Thank you for your insighful response (and I would very much like to obtain a copy of your disseration if at all possible.) For my purposes, I am grounding in Hume's "progress of the sentiments" a secular geneology of a specific type of moral obligation. And, amongst the Scottish conjectural historians, it can sometimes be difficult for me to see if they were intending to present historical or ontological accounts. As a point of departure, I take Rousseau and Hobbes here to have offered the crudest versions of what Gould might have called a 'Darwinian just so' story.

Jim

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Hueber, 

I am not sure this will help much with your specific question of whether a "progress of sentiments" in Hume should be understood as "ontological" or "historical," but I have come across the idea in related authors that there is something like a "second nature," which can be acquired to supplement or augment human nature. The idea is in John Witherspoon, as I recall, who was called to Princeton from Scotland and headed the College of New Jersey (as Princeton University was then called), at the time that James Madison was a student there. Witherspoon was later a signer of the Declaration of Independence.

Witherspoon certainly believed in the possibility of acquiring the virtues, and perhaps his most famous work ( a commencement address given repeatedly) concerns his interpretation of the ancient ideal of "magnanimity." I recall a focus on conscience and on religious liberty and tolerance. Specifically, the idea is that genuine faith is facilitated by the absence of subtle forms of coercion and influence connected with politicized religion, as we might put the matter, and that the general acceptance of the freedom of conscience constituted an improvement of human nature. As I recall, this idea was connected with the possibility of constitutionally instituting freedom of conscience --as in the First Amendment.  

If any of this might be of interest, I could look up the references. But in any case, you might want to take a look at my little paper on Witherspoon. Surely, an improvement of human nature might count as "ontological" ( and count to the "progress of sentiments") but it also seems to be clearly historical, especially given the background of the great religious wars and the English Civil Wars of the 1640's in particular.   

H.G. Callaway 

Dear Jim, thanks for your response. My dissertation, although published, is not in ENglish so you cannot really consult it.

Howerver, my essay on Hume and Wittgenstein is available at Researchgate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270760898_Hume_Wittgenstein_and_the_Certainty_of_Culture

In the meantime, let me add, that Prof. Callaway's references to second nature and to Witherspoon seem to me also relevant.

Best,

Ferenc

Conference Paper Hume, Wittgenstein and the Certainty of Culture

Dear Ferenc (and Jim and Prof Callaway),

I read with interest this threat partly because of my particular interest in Deleuze and, in turn, his profound interest in Hume.

Given your recent comment, could I check with you as to whether Hume himself made the distinction of culture as a 'second nature' (and if so, where?)

Thanks

Maria

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Nichterlein, 

I would tend to doubt a Humean usage of the term "second nature," for culture, though this might be suggested by Hume's emphasis on "custom." Its an empirical question of what is in the texts, of course; and I do not have my Hume texts at hand.

There is an on-line paper which readers of this thread may want to consult, "Virtue Ethics and Human Nature," by one R. Hursthouse, published by the Hume Society:

http://www.humesociety.org/hs/issues/v25n1-2/hursthouse/hursthouse-v25n1-2.pdf

This paper seems favorable to the concept of second nature, in the context of a discussion of Hume, but seems not to quote Hume using the term. 

I suspect that "second nature" is a bit too much of a Whig term of art, and Hume too little the Whig. He's more the period Tory --sometimes said to have "kidnapped the Scottish enlightenment."  Those more inclined to defer to great political power are also usually more inclined to emphasize human flexibility and malleability both in themselves and in others. The Whigs resisted royal power and excesses of empire in the name of a settled culture and scheme of law. The American Revolution was an expression of this. Hume was of interest to the Whigs, of course, both in Britain and in America, but partly, I suppose, as a critic who had to be answered. 

BTW: no need of "Prof," "Callaway" will do just fine.  

H.G. Callaway

Dear All (and especially Martin)

The discussion about second nature in Hume concerns his analysis of the historical origins of justice. Criticising those, who claim it is a natural virtue, who distunguishes between natural and artificial virtues, and claims, that justice belongs there. It is fond by a kind of "trial and error" (basically by chance), but realising its use, it becomes a kind of second nature.

Here is a discription of the thing int he Stanfor Encyclopedia of Philosophy online, from their article on Hume:

"Hume rightly showcases his pioneering account of justice. In the Treatise, he emphasizes the distinction between the natural and artificial virtues. The natural virtues—being humane, kind and charitable—are character traits and patterns of behavior that human beings would exhibit in their natural condition, even if there were no social order. The artificial virtues— respecting people's property rights, fidelity in keeping promises and contracts, and allegiance to government— are dispositions based on social practices and institutions that arise from conventions.

Hume believes that nature has supplied us with many motives—parental love, benevolence, and generosity—that make it possible for us to live together peacefully in small societies based on kinship relations. One of his important insights is that nature has not provided us with all the motives we need to live together peacefully in large societies. After arguing in Treatise 3.2.1 that justice is artificial, in T 3.2.2, he asks two different questions: What motivates human beings to establish the rules of justice that give rise to property rights, and why do we approve of people who obey these rules of justice? The first question concerns justice as a practice as constituted by its rules. The second concerns justice as a virtue, a person's disposition to obey the rules of justice."

Here you find the loci as well.

Best,

Ferenc

(P.s. for all those who are interested in the conventionalist Hume, I can wholeheartedly suggest the writings of Donald Livingston on Hume.)

I am sorry, I wanted to addresss the last comment to Maria (in brackets).

F

Philadelphia, PA

Dear readers, 

Here is a bit more on the theme of "second nature." 

First of all, a straightforward dictionary entry may help as a common-sense starting point:

second nature

1. a habit, characteristic, etc, not innate but so long practised or acquired as to seem so

--From the on-line "Free" dictionary.

Secondly, it seems clear that the concept of "second nature" has Aristotelian roots, which point comes out in the following definition from an on-line etymological dictionary: 

second nature (n.)

late 14c., from Latin secundum naturam "according to nature" (Augustine, Macrobius, etc.), literally "following nature;" from medieval Aristotelian philosophy, contrasted to phenomena that were super naturam ("above nature," such as God's grace), extra naturam ("outside nature"), supra naturam ("beyond nature," such as miracles), contra naturam "against nature," etc.

--end quotation

The idea here seems to be "second nature" as a social and moral extrapolation from nature. 

A third point is that the concept seems to be quite prominent in the contemporary work of John McDowell, who is sometimes described in terms of an Aristotelian naturalism. See, for instance, the following critical article, on-line:

http://www.uta.edu/faculty/richarme/BSAD%206310/BSAD%206310%20Fall%202010/Forman%20-%20naturalism%20and%20ethics.pdf

All of this, as concerns "second nature," seems to me somewhat distant from Hume's work. In particular, Hume's account of "custom" has a strongly nominalistic element to it, and it is this nominalistic element, more than emphasis on convention which seems telling in the contrast between Hume and the British and American Whigs. "Natural rights" in the language of the American Revolution came to supplant an early emphasis on "the rights of Englishmen." 

If the term "second nature" appears in Hume's writings, then I am sure that relevant passages should turn up here. "Progress of sentiments" might just be his replacement to paraphrase out of talk of "second nature."

I recall here a line from Santayana, to the effect that "The family is nature's greatest invention."  Certainly, the universality (or near universality) of the family suggests that it is closely tied to human nature. (The bond of mother and child, wife and husband, the long dependence of human children, etc.) Consequently, the question arises of where to draw the line of "second nature.'  

But notice variations on the family, as in the prevalence of the nuclear family vs. the prevalence of the extended family in various societies. It seems plausible to think that the variations are "second nature" in the respective societies. (Parents in many Western societies feel strongly that the children should move out at a certain age, and this seems self-evident. If the adult children find it extremely difficult to become independent, doesn't this show a social-political defect--in a Western-style society?) Noticing variations in family patterns is far from saying that related customs are "artificial" in their respective societies, merely conventional, or easily replaced by alternatives found elsewhere. 

It seems evident, in any case, that we will not make much sense of "second nature" except in relation to particular societies and their social, moral and intellectual traditions. We may expect similarities between distinct societies, of course. 

Aristotle's definition of mankind as the "rational animal," seems as much normative as it is descriptive. What comes to us in-born is a capability to develop in society in the direction of rationality. Though rationality (as later developed) is not in-born, it can become "second nature," in a life arising from the intellectual and mortal virtues. This is a kind of moral vision of human possibilities, which is not to say that rationality is not sometimes denigrated and disparaged. Is a society possible based on strong denigration and disparagement of rationality? Well, in some sense it is possible at least in the short-run. (Consider the idea that "whoever has power is right" --much discussed in Plato) The perspective of the Aristotelian vision is that such a society will be defective and self-destructive. 

H.G. Callaway

Michael Gill has aruged that our tendency to annex the concepts of “justice and injustice” with a “sense of moral good and evil” instills in us  a new sense of duty – one that is borne out of “sympathy with public interest”, and which manages to reach beyond the confines of its self-interested origins (quotes here from Hume's Treatise). He (Gill) claims that this was a crucial advance that Hume made on the views of Shaftesbury, Mandeville, and Hutcheson - all of whom believed that that social learning and experience could perhaps redirect man’s natural motives with respect to justice, but not create new moral duties per se. According to this account, Hume's great advance here is to tease apart the "chronologically earliest cause" from the "underlying reason for" our current moral judgments.

Thoughts?

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Huebner, 

This is an interesting twist on your opening question. It strikes me that it touches on the question of "universal" duties or obligations. But on the other hand, a duty in relation to "public interest " is one thing, and and the idea of universal duty is perhaps something else again. Your claims for Michael Gill would seem to depend on support by suitable texts from Shaftsbury, Mandville and Hutcheson--and a thorough search of the sources.  Also, it is not entirely clear, from what you say, what it would mean to "create new moral duties per se."  

In any case, it is perhaps worth noting here that broader obligations and sympathies need not be viewed as conflicting with narrower duties and sympathies, though there is an almost cult emphasis on the contrast at times. One may take the view that we often do not know enough about the wider world to meaningfully act on its behalf and in accordance with obligations we may accept regarding it. But it will remain possible to act through those situations and relationships closer and better understood. Where an obligation to, say, "universal beneficence" is recognized or accepted, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," we may still be in such doubt as to what we could possibly do for random strangers, or random strangers halfway around the world, that acting within a more restricted sphere will be sensible. Charity, as they say, "begins at home."  (This is not to say that it must end at home.) 

Justice, plausibly, originates in ideas of balance (the ancient Egyptian symbol was a feather poised) and giving each his or her due. It is not hard to imagine, say, ancient hunters or fishers dividing their catch among themselves or a mother distributing food among her children --with a sense of justice or fairness. I recall there is a verse in the Old Testament, enjoining, in effect, "Don't eat meat on the mountain." This first struck me as very strange, until I realized that it implied the need to bring the game back to the family or the larger group.  All of this seems to fall somewhat short of modern conceptions of the "public interest." But on the other hand, I do not know that such examples do or do not "reach beyond the confines of its self-interested origins."   

H.G. Callaway

Dear Huebne,

When looking at the Treatise project as a whole (the call out the "experimental method" to the philosophy of human things), it is impossible to say that Hume is treating such an important notion of Book II as historical, since his philosophical project aims to understand human nature and its faculties as a whole. Nor is it plausible that "ontological" in this case, represent what we understand by this term today. Perhaps Hume wanted to highlight the importance of a more relevant sense that an historical progress, but there is no such thing as an "ontological progress" that is compatible with your philosophy. I believe that by ontological he is taking a very general notion of philosophy as opposed to history. Finally, I also believe that the notion of progress of feelings is enrolled primarily in a moral sense of the meaning. Also not in the sense of morality as we have both in ancient philosophy as in other modern as Kant, but in a more commonly of "moral" in the literature of the time it meant "that which relates to human affairs."

Best Regards,

Mariane

Dear Federec:

In your first commentary here, you said that the Book I is a metaphysical one. I understand that this can be defended (and it is, in a kind of literature) because of the final parts of causality and especially Part III on time and space. However, the first half of the book is clearly the exposure of an epistemological theory of human faculties to introduce the principle of copying and a general support for the theory of Hume's ideas. I usually read the part "metaphysics" that follows as Hume trying to give account of problems considered as metaphysics from the epistemological theory he developed in the previous parts. What do you think?

Best regards,

Mariane