Analytic philosophy is certainly not what it once was. The sense of conviction in its core mission and figures is gone. At the same time, analytic philosophers continue to control most philosophy departments.
So, is analytic philosophy dead or alive? Or a zombie, perhaps?
In my part of the world, analytic philosophy is still unheard of. Predominate here is German ideology and its derivatives.
What exactly do you mean by "The sense of conviction in its core mission and figures is gone? In other words, what is this core mission and why do you think "conviction in its core figures" matters? There are dominant figures, but they are dominant because of their arguments and their is lots of work on all sorts of interesting questions. So, I guess really can't make much sense of what you are getting at. Care to elaborate?
You are asking the same question that Richard Rorty made, and he reached the conclusion that it was time for the abandonment of analytic philosophy for a more pluralistic approach. I agree with him and understand your question under this view, however, I don't see the analytic philosophy dead, at least in Brazil, it is still is alive and dominate the public and academic debate, especially in social sciences, like law, for example.
Apreciado Marc Champagne:
Para el Diccionario de la lengua española, la Filosofía analítica es la “corriente filosófica, de tradición anglosajona, que destaca la importancia del lenguaje, de su verificabilidad y precisión en el análisis de las proposiciones filosóficas”.
Asimismo, sabemos la historia del tema: Wittgenstein y Russell, el positivismo lógico del “Circulo de Viena”, Moore, Ayer, Quine, Putnam, entre otros… Nos los recuerda la Enciclopedia Oxford de Filosofía, editada por la Oxford University Press en el original y por Tecnos en su versión al castellano, la cual asimismo dice en su último párrafo sobre el tema que: " Putnam i Nozik piensan y escriben con espíritu analítico, que respetan la ciencia y que ambos autores son paradigma de una ciencia razonable, coherente con su rigor argumentativo, su claridad y su determinación a ser objetivos.
Si consideramos cada punto de forma individual:
1. Espíritu analítico,
2. Respeto al a ciencia
3. Rigor y claridad argumentativos, y
4. Deseo de objetividad,
cabe afirmar que todos ellos pueden, y deben, ser de aplicación a cualquier tipo de razonamiento abstracto.
En cuanto a la filosofía analítica propiamente dicha, y a la que se cita al principio de este texto, parece ser algo reduccionista. La filosofía (en general), es el complemento de la ciencia, en el deseo humanao de avanzar en el pensamiento . No veo que otra cosa pueda ser cualqueir tipo filosofia; la libertad expresiva de dicho pensamiento, como derecho del ser humano, debe ser total.
Yo creo que lo más importante es el estudio de la realidad perceptible, desde el punto de vista del hombre que la vez forma parte de ella. Y hay una función especial que todo pensamiento filosófico debe perseguir: evitar el dogmatismo y el oscurantismo. Todo debe poder ser estudiado, comentado y revisado a la luz del pensamiento libre y razonado, se be bsucar las argumentacioes o, al menos, de aproximaciones respecto a los temas, términos , teorías o hipótesis de que en cada caso se trate.
El artículo de la Enciclopedia Oxford citada, lo firma; A.Q. , siglas que corresponden a Lord Quinton, del Trinity College de Oxford.
Pero, en definitiva, no tengo suficientes criterio objetiovs para opinar sbre el estado de viva o muetra actual de Filosofia analítica; pero sí sý que sólo lo que es auténtico pervive en el tiempo.
Miquel.
Hello
No, will never die, it is impossible. The concept is holistic
Analytic philosophy, also called linguistic philosophy, a loosely related set of approaches to philosophical problems, dominant in Anglo-American philosophy from the early 20th century, that emphasizes the study of language and the logical analysis of concepts.
Best regards
Ingrid García
I agree that it’s in a different life period, just not sure whether it’s in maturity or senility.
Hello Joachim LIpski, Your expression is very sharp.
I really think that what matters is knowing who we are and how to act.
Philosophy is not the study of language. Language is a system of signs that are used for human communication. (The remaining animals do not have the language of man).
The philosophy is the reflection on the facts, it is an attempt to look for something of rationalization in the absurdity. Philosophy stems from ignorance, human bewilderment and perplexity and fear.
Why are we a being for death? What does it mean to "be a man"? After 5000 years of thinking, we only have slight approximations to these issues.
It is about trying to get closer to the truth within the contradiction. This is the base.
Actions and thoughts must be ordered by their importance. Man has the right to wonder about his origin as a species.
Hello Miquel Ricart
while I partially agree with you, I think the important insight on which analytic philosophy is based is that many philosophical questions are properly answered by investigating the meaning of concepts. For example, „what is the meaning of life?“ may non-analytically be seen as prompting a search for an external thing or analytically as a question about the meaning of the concept „the meaning of life“. Without having a grasp of the latter, the former answer is in more than one sense meaningless.
While admittedly not all philosophical problems can be solved using a purely analytical approach, I believe the analytical approach is a prerequisite for the solution of any theoretical problem - by clarifying or even determining what could even qualify as an answer.
I agree that Analytic philosophy emphasizes the study of language and the logical analysis of concepts. But isn't there a third characteristic of Analytical philosophy, namely, to stay informed scientifically and to study the results of natural science as Carnap, Hempel or Quine did? I don't think this strand of philosophy is dead and it doesn't deserve to be a Zombie. Accompanying and observing science critically is a task that still needs philosophers.
The answer depends on your view on analytic philosophy. If you ascribe to it the capacity to be precise with systems of meaning, then analytic philosophy certainly can derive its importance from a need to be clear with one's account of things. However, precision and accuracy are two different norms, and it has never served anyone to conflate the two. If you want to prescribe the judgments and values that follow from an axiomatic base, then it pays to be precise; if you want to describe how the world is, then understand that the world is under no obligation to stick to any axiomatic base you deem it to possess. Insofar as analytic philosophy appeals to the expressible features of our reality, then it is still irreplaceable as a way of clarifying that expression. Nevertheless, insofar as it appeals to the ineffable, then analytic philosophy's appeal has often given way to continental philosophy's speculative profundities.
I don’t think that the analytical approach is dead, but at the same time it has issues at recognizing the core aspects of the hermeneutical approach for answering questions about fundamentals problems regarding human cognition. I personally think that the analytical approach is indeed needed more than ever for tackling specific issues about modality and logic, as well as issues concerning our current state of culture and history, but at the same time it has to start taking a more open approach towards different forms of methodologies, specially if these can deliver more suitable answers to specific
@Martin Boehnert. The border between analitical philosophy and philosophy of science is indeed rather faint. I don't think that the opposition anglo-american tradition versus continental philosophy has so much to do with this distinction. The range of problems the single philosopher especially likes seems to be the main criterion that can help to distinguish between the two fields. For instance, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend are philosophers of science (Popper is not only that, of course) but I would not say that they are analytical philosophers. Going back in time, Riechenbach was certainly a philosopher of science, but am not so sure we can also rightly regard him as an analytical philosopher. On the other hand, analytical philosophers share a method, which combines logic with a particular way to cope with language, or at least they did so in the golden era of analytical philosophy. I don't think that the same can be said of science philosophers. I feel they share a style but not really a sharply established method.
Antonio Pasini, I very much agree with you. I believe that philosophy is based on reflection and free dialogue. Perhaps an excess of formalism damages the essence of the philosophical thought. And even more so if philosophy must seek solutions and interpretations of facts.
Hello @Martin Böhnert, we can talk about Analytical Philosophy as a package, a whole with the three characteristics. If we would state that this is all what philosophy needs and all other approaches are in vain (e.g. hermeneutics), I wouldn't agree. How do you get out of pure theorizing? Philosophy needs here illustrative material from science, society or art (e.g. in the tradition of the Stanford School) to get in contact with reality. Since there can be still confusion with concepts (see e.g. Kitcher on genes resp. species), the analysis of language and concepts will still be relevant. But I consent then that Analytical Philosophy is rather important as a method than as a package.
Hello @Martin Böhnert,
I've mentioned above society and art. I wouldn't say that aesthetics or sociology belong to the philosophy of science. I don't share the optimism of naturalists that every issue can be reduced to natural science at last (a). (Nonetheless, we still can analyze society and art meaningfully.) This doesn't mean I'm an opponent of naturalism but I'm siding more with Dewey than with Carnap or Quine. The reason for this is that every theory (including philosophy) is an abstraction resp. a tool. Every analysis will show its limits, too. (Remember also discussions about paradigm shifts.) Constructions or new experiments are needed in order to create a new synthesis (b). Therefore, analytical philosophy is neither necessary (cf. b) nor sufficient (cf. a) for the philosophy of science.
I'm not sure if that was your question. But we can take an example: What is communication? Can we answer this question by the philosophy of science? Maybe we can talk in terms of evolutionary adaptation or game theory but I don't think the question will be answered then completely. You can stay scientifically informed with regard to such theories and do your linguistic analysis. But I feel it won't be enough.
Does a bricklayer or a farmer need analytic philosophy?
And what about myself? Theoretical research in the field of the foundations of physics. Actually, the nature of reality, once the aim of every philosopher.
About 99,9% of all the people on this planet never knew that “once upon a time” analytic philosophy was alive or dead. Moreover, do we need to read all those papers about analytic philosophy to do our jobs in a successful way? Of course not.
So if you want to do (or not) analytic philosophy, don’t feel troubled. The world don’t cares.
With kind regards, Sydney
Dear Xinyuan gu
You are perfectly right, it has no sense to write an opinion in between the lines.
With kind regards, Sydney
This sounds a bit Marxist-oriented to me: Philosophy, science and art are the "Überbau". All what counts is hard work, which connects us rather with medium, dry things than with mental and spiritual fantasies.
I don't like these utilitarian thoughts where society has to turn itself towards an ultimate good that is imposed by an abstract idea. The utilitarist's problem how to calculate your benefit against my benefit is at once the problem of the neoliberal's theory of economy. I don't think John Stuart Mill's proof in «Utilitarianism» has succeeded.
Ideas can change the world. We can indeed ask which reward the bricklayer or the farmer could have from philosophy or science. I think the latter will profit from studies on animal behavior or plant intelligence. Instead of saying that the one doesn't want anything from the other, we should ask what can the one benefit from the other. For example, there is a discussion if a cow can feel through its horns. Some philosophers and scientists argued together with farmers that the cow's horn is like a sense organ. Now you can see more cows with horns on our fields. We could now quarrel if cows with horns are happier but in this case the fact remains that ideas have changed the world.
Can't we ask the same question about any other discipline? Just replace "analytic philosophy" with the name of other major theoretical practices:
"Physics is certainly not what it once was. The sense of conviction in its core mission and figures is gone", such as the figures like Schrödinger, Faraday, Einstein, or even Planck.
"Chemistry is certainly not what it once was. The sense of conviction in its core mission and figures is gone", such as Curie, Lavoisier, Pasteur, Mendeleev, etc.
"Continental philosophy is certainly not what it once was. The sense of conviction in its core mission and figures is gone", such as, I don't know, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Adorno, etc.
I suspect it would be a sort of nostalgic feeling we all have about those great analytic philosophers - who were interestingly mainly mathematicians and logicians! - such as Russell, Frege, Moore, Wittgenstein, and the like. They were the father and the maker of a paradigm shift in philosophy. We are, however, now living in and within this new paradigm. Of course, within this paradigm, many minor delicate and complex issues emerge which need to be dealt with. This exhausting practice may elicit the feeling that the practice is being getting boring and far deviated from its golden original goals. But, I think, this is the implications of the natural process of living in a now for-a-long-time dominated by giant analytic figures paradigm. Perhaps, nonetheless, this is also a sign for a paradigm shift!
After “40 Cases”
The Downstream Citation of Plagiarizing Articles in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy Research
This article documents how a serial plagiarism case discovered over a decade ago continues to generate negative effects in the downstream research on medieval and early modern philosophy...
"Some philosophy articles might be exposed as containing plagiarized material, might have editorial notes appended to them indicating as much, or might even be retracted, yet no matter how thoroughly or how many times their plagiarism is noted, they will continue to be cited in the literature and affect the course of scholarship.
Seemingly unkillable, such articles constitute what we can call the problem of zombie plagiarism..."
https://brill.com/view/journals/viv/61/3-4/article-p245_1.xml
https://dailynous.com/2023/11/01/zombie-plagiarism-in-philosophy/
I think that the application of formal logic to the analysis of philosophical problems with a particular methodological emphasis on linguistic analysis maintains all its vitality and interest. This a tradition which goes back to Aristotle and the Stoics. It is however important to complement this approach with an adequate 'phenomenological' method. See Gödel's 'The modern development of the foundations of mathematics in the light of philosophy'.
This comment aims to highlight a simple and apparently local technical issue. But I think that it has significant and profound implications for the future direction of philosophy. The death of analytical philosophy refers to a genuine phenomenon where the foundational principles of this school of thought have either been eliminated or extensively revised. By the time Dummett acknowledged a potential reconciliation with Husserl, the divide between continental and analytical philosophy had become increasingly irrelevant.
However, for those who prefer to view the remaining aspects of this philosophy as its true essence, there is ample material for contemplation, albeit discovered belatedly. Analytical philosophy is gaining increasing prominence in philosophical institutions, primarily due to its affinity with the style of debate and propositional content of natural sciences. Additionally, the rigor and clarity exhibited by analytic philosophers contrast with the hermeticism often associated with certain branches of continental philosophy, which may appear nonsensical to natural scientists.
Now, let me propose a thesis: the natural inclination to "analyticize" philosophy departments and specialized journals stems from the fact that this approach lends itself more readily to safe bureaucratic treatment. Given that safe bureaucratic treatment is the easiest parameter for large-scale selection judgments, it is only natural that there would be a preference for a philosophy style like "analytical philosophy". Consider, for instance, the parameters that reputable international journals employ to safeguard against the inadvertent publication of subpar work. While references are undoubtedly a criterion, they possess inherent limitations, since one can mimic referential standards. It is important to note that an original article lacks measurable metrics to evaluate its quality. That is exactly what it means to be "original" in a certain sense: there is no previous parameter to judge it. Consequently, the most effective approach to safeguard oneself is to insist that these arguments are presented in a technical and conclusive manner. In my perspective, the emphasis on mathematical symbolism has granted such arguments a natural superiority in the eyes of evaluators. Since analytical philosophy, which initiated (or capitalized on) this trend that had been steadily growing since Bolzano (or before), remains the philosophical style associated with the utilization of codes and symbolisms in its discourse, this would explain how it colonized the institutional universe of philosophy.
A philosopher such as Rorty, who is analytical but not particularly fond of argumentation through codes, presents a challenge for evaluators. Despite this, I think (although I cannot prove it) that his arguments are more original and substantial than 80 percent of the content published in codes. It is important to note that we are discussing a strictly facilitating criterion. My thesis is voluntarily superficial: it asserts that a bureaucratic element of facilitation has inadvertently become a filter for determining what is publishable in general. As a result, this has led to the undeniable dominance of Analytical philosophy from an institutional standpoint, even though there are no longer central theses and unified paradigms that define this school.
The dream of an analytic philosophy
Introduction
In the essay “What is analytic philosophy?”, which opens the Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy, Michael Beaney argues that analytic philosophy has been widely recognized as the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world since at least the middle of the last century and that in the last two or three decades its influence has grown significantly in other parts of the globe. Curiously, however, Beaney does not give a clear answer to the question that gives his text its title, leaving what is meant by analytic philosophy somewhat vague. This situation is not surprising, since there is not the slightest consensus even among philosophers who are included in this tradition about what would define it. In fact, the enormous effort expended by different authors over the last decades to characterize analytic philosophy shows that there is no clarity regarding what analytic philosophy is and how it differs from other philosophical schools. Moreover, what can be glimpsed of such effort is the existence of a great desire on the part of the self-titled analytic philosophers to establish an analytic philosophy.
Considering this picture, it is argued in this article that analytic philosophy has never really constituted itself as a philosophical school, but rather a dream shared by a group of philosophers with aspirations to overcome the severe criticisms that have been directed at philosophy since at least the 19th century – among them, a broad attack on the obscurantism of philosophical texts, on the lack of methodological and argumentative rigor of philosophers, on their lack of familiarity with scientific advances and on their metaphysical controversies. The purpose of this discussion is to show how the criticisms directed at philosophy as a whole in recent centuries have not really been resolved by analytic philosophers, but rather “pushed” by them to what they came to call continental philosophy a few decades ago.
In fact, analytic philosophy has never constituted itself as a philosophical school in its own right. In the paper "The Dream of an Analytic Philosophy" I discuss this question.
Gustavo Augusto Fonseca Silva See also Aaron Preston's Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion (2010).
https://www.amazon.com/Analytic-Philosophy-History-Illusion-Continuum/dp/1441131965
Dear Clarence Protin,
Thank you for recommending the book. Hans Glock, for example, tried to rebut Preston's arguments, but in my view to no avail. It is curious that in the eighth chapter of the book "What is Analytic Philosophy?", Glock wrote: "Geo-linguistic, historiographical, formal, material and 'ethical' conceptions of analytic philosophy have all been found wanting. Have we reached
the end of the line? We certainly face an impasse. It may seem that we are
forced to conclude (with Preston 2004) that analytic philosophy does not
constitute a distinctive phenomenon. At the very least it looks as if we have
to agree with Leiter when he claims: 'I don't think anyone knows what
Analytic Philosophy is' (2004b).
Fortunately, we do not have to throw in the towel quite yet."
Well, I do think that we have to throw in the towel.
By the way, I'd like to invite you to take a look at my new book "Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy in Light of the Diagnosis of Autism."
All the best!
I'm trying to find a definition of "Philosophy" in which a domain of thought can be considered "dead" instead of something that people read and dialogue with. The practice of philosophy involves rejecting invalid (deductive reasoning) or non-cogent (inductive reasoning) ideas. The practice of rejecting them is itself doing philosophy. So, I don't see a definition of "philosophy" or of "dead" that can make the OP's question intelligible. The premise of this entire thread needs to be rewritten in a way that is, well...cogent.
Gustavo Augusto Fonseca Silva Thank you very much for the Wittgenstein book. I will read it as soon as possible.
I would like to recommend my own work on this subject, which has been published in Husserl Studies. In my research, I have delved into the reasons behind the divergence between analytical and continental philosophy. I will post it in the end of this brief reflection.
If it is true, as many claim here, that the main theses of analytical philosophy no longer hold water. The linguistic turn, for instance, seems to have lost its prominence in comparison to the philosophy of mind. It seems true that, even in questions of style, rigor, clarity and "scientific" methodology there is a lot of rhetoric, bravado and myth. There is, however, a kind of human and intellectual "energy" that remains driving philosophy towards this division between analytical and non-analytical philosophy (which, for lack of a better definition, is encompassed under this thick umbrella of continental philosophy).
I firmly believe that these "energies" are not incomprehensible. They manifest in distinct preferences among authors from these respective traditions. These preferences shape the types of questions deemed worthy of exploration, (as Kuhn would say in his analysis of paradigm formation in scientific study). From my reading, I have found that no characteristic defines this division more clearly today than the inclination of analytical philosophers to tackle philosophical questions directly, treating them as inquiries that can be answered with specific technical solutions. This has even led to a revival of metaphysics inside modal logic in the latter half of the twentieth century, a field that was once considered nearly obsolete. On the other hand, continental traditions stem from a different philosophical lineage, which often leads them to approach questions from a historical perspective. They view philosophical inquiries as stages in a continuous process of learning and self-awareness, rather than seeking simple and definitive answers.
This is very clear in the approaches to problems of (epistemology) method and semantics. The approaches to method and semantics in continental traditions have given rise to hermeneutical problems concerning the historical development (buildung) of meanings. In contrast, analytical traditions tackle these issues through technical resolutions that have grown increasingly complex over the years, including the exploration of hyper-intensionality.
It is very likely that a non-analytic philosopher who approaches the problem from a sociological-historical perspective would be dissatisfied with the "hyper-intensional" solution to problems of determining granular representations of meaning. He would finish the article stupefied. Where's the interesting part? Analytical philosophers who tried to go deeper into the skeptical consequences of the problem, such as Quine (indeterminacy of translation, inscrutability of reference) reached continental audiences more easily, precisely because the sphere in which meaning "fails" can be the origin of a self- awareness of its historicity. But since Quine, analytic philosophers have increasingly gone to the other extreme. This also serves as an indication that the parts of Quine's philosophy that a continental philosopher would like are exactly the same parts that an analytic philosopher finds uninteresting or non-sense. This also shows that Quine is an analytical philosopher by definition and institutional inclusion, but his peers would not hesitate to expel him if he delved too deeply into the more "historicist-hermeneutic" paths produced by his skepticism. Luckily for him, his broader orientation was naturalism.
The borderline cases are very instructive: Richard Rorty is an example of a philosopher who studies, develops and narrates the universe of philosophers of analytical philosophy but whose work has much more chances of being accepted for publication on "less analytical" or even continental platforms. Not only is his work lacking that kind of thorough exposition of recursive definitions and presentation of conclusions in "code" form, but there is also an orientation toward questions that not only do not interest analytic philosophers, but also seem non-sense to them.
While this scheme serves as a simplification that can certainly be refined, my thesis is straightforward: the unity experienced by analytic philosophers is not merely coincidental or sociological in nature. Instead, it is defined by a distinct approach and line of inquiry.
This helps explain why analytical philosophy asserts itself institutionally with such cohesion and unity, even without a fixed "thesis" per se. There exists a dimension in which the "dream" of analytical philosophy materializes as reality: its institutional realm. The method and style of analytical philosophy have garnered an aura of respect, even if they are based on myths and unrealized projects. This is evident in the fact that individuals working in analytical philosophy, as well as advisors and university positions aligned with this approach, remain united in upholding the "code" of austerity that ensures philosophy's standing among the other sciences. This is undoubtedly positive news for philosophy as a whole.
However, since the Sokal-hoax event, there has been a drawback in philosophical reflection. This drawback involves the exclusion and marginalization of an aspect that (I think) is intrinsic to such reflection. This aspect is connected to a type of reflection that transcends categorical barriers and does not conform to fixed methodological models. It is important to note that this observation is easier to make when one is at a distance from the excessively obscure and annoying parts of Hegel and Heidegger's work. This is especially true considering that philosophers in the analytic tradition, such as Brandom and McDowell, have made significant efforts to translate these intricate theses into a more accessible yet still brilliant format. However, it is possible that something has been lost in these "translations," and I suspect that the indecipherability of certain philosophical works is not an anomaly but rather a characteristic.
Finally, here is the work (I appreciate the readings):
Article Two Versions of Meaning Failure: A Contributing Essay to the...
Gustavo Augusto Fonseca Silva I have been reading your book with great enjoyment and interest (I am about in the middle). I think it is destined to become a classic in its genre (alongside Gellner's Words and Things). Here is a list of my favourite literature on Wittgenstein (some of which might be of interest to you, as they do not appear in the bibliography of your book).
Ernest Gellner, Words and Things: A Critical Account of Linguistic Philosophy and A Study in Ideology, with an introduction by Bertrand Russell, Beacon Press, 1960.
C. W. K. Mundle, A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy: with Second Thoughts - An Epilogue after Ten Years, foreward by P.L. Heath, 2nd edition, Glover and Blair, 1979.
Aaron Preston, Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion, Continuum International, 2007.
Uwe Meixner, Defending Husserl: A Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein and Company Versus Phenomenology, De Gruyter, 2014.
Mark Steiner, Mathematical Knowledge, Cornell University Press, 1975.
J.N. Findlay, Wittgenstein, A Critique, Routledge and K. Paul, 1984.
Alain Badiou, Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy.
Laurence Goldstein, How Original a Work is the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ?
J.W. Cook, Wittgenstein’s Metaphysics, Cambridge, 1994.
J.W. Cook, Wittgenstein, Empiricism, and Language, Oxford, 1999.
Dear Clarence Protin,
Thank you for the words of encouragement and the bibliography—some of these texts I discuss in other works. But Gellner's books on W. could not be missed. I briefly discuss Words and Things in the Notes (p. 216). I find Gellner's courage to publish this book in England in 1959, at the height of W.'s popularity and linguistic philosophy, admirable. In chapter 8, I take up some points from Gellner's reflections. I hope you find them appropriate.
Best wishes.
Thanks for the apt book recommendation, Clarence Lewis Protin
Under the pressure of job placement pigeonholing, the expression "Continentalist" has been repatriated by those working on non-analytic European figures and movements. We should keep in mind, however, that this catch-all term was initially coined with a pejorative intent by academic rivals in Britain and the US. Whether or not we agree with Aaron Preston's book that analytic philosophy was an illusion, I hope we can all agree that "CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY" PICKS OUT SOMETHING EVEN LESS COHESIVE AND UNIFIED THAN "ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY."
It was a walking zombie back in the 1960s when I was in college. Took a course in it. Was the most boring and ill-conceived bunch of thinkers I ever read. Only thing of use was reading Wittgenstein. But I have never used one word of his in all my scholarly work since then. I find so-called Continental and Asian philosophy far superior for my own research and writing.
Marc Champagne As someone from Socio-Legal Studies who has been a TA in a Philosophy Dept, who took a PhD course that was offered as Socio-Legal Studies and as a PHIL doctoral course credit, I see direct an extremely cohesive and coherent, unified project:
Analytic philosophy is the mainstream philosophical literature from common law jurisdiction.
Continental philosophy is the mainstream philosophical literature of civil law jurisdictions.
This division was articulated by academic institutions in common law jurisdictions, specifically the UK and USA, and then spread from their Ivy League and Oxfordian elite to the common law colonial universities where their grads get teaching positions: Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the American University satellite campuses on other continents.
this entire discussion is easily, almost effortlessly, filtered into two intellectual traditions based on how their methods of analytical thinking into the social dimensions of philosophy as they overlap the social dimensions of law. Note the incredibly imperialistic arrogation of "analytical" by the UK and USA; whereas ALL philosophy is methods of analysis.
Just look at the concept of "property" in the USA versus in the EU.
If someone claims "analytical philosophy is dead" then they are making a very potent claim about what :property" is, what "personhood" is, and how corporate law should be argued across USA-EU legal cases.
I don't think there is anything incoherent at all about the two categories. They are both categories with colonial and legal importance. They are both categories with legal power, that inform the different cultures and societies in different legal jurisdictions. they are the two categories that inform how we construct debates about, for example, AI and copyright, data as property, and human rights legislation or tribunal adjudication.
As a tradition, I think it is dead, but as a method, it is well and alive.
The proponents of the analytic tradition have laid down definite research programs ranging from the foundations of mathematics to the scientific reduction of metaphysics--all of which reached their respective dead-ends. Whether these programs were worth undertaking or not, they bequeathed an argumentative and clear approach to philosophical problems that helped clarify many of our perennial debates. This analytic approach is very much evident in how English-speaking philosophers write today.
Raphaël Enthoven thinks that a machine will never be a philosopher. Do you think so? A New Question On: https://www.researchgate.net/post/Raphael_Enthoven_thinks_that_a_machine_will_never_be_a_philosopher_Do_you_think_so
"From science to law, from medicine to military questions, artificial intelligence is shaking up all our fields of expertise. All?? No?! In philosophy, AI is useless." The Artificial Mind, by Raphaël Enthoven, Humensis, 2024.
There was a time when I hated seeing my students using copy/paste to insert texts into their work without clearly and precisely specifying it. Paradoxically, I note with surprise that today, in this universal fascination with AI, educational systems are less offended by the use of AI to produce intellectual works as part of training courses leading to graduation.
In his masterpiece "Critique of Pure Reason" [1], Kant asks, “How is it possible to know anything about the world?” In his view, two things are necessary for knowledge: intuitions and concepts. Roughly, intuitions are perceptual experiences. Concepts are the general categories in terms of which we understand things. Humans need both intuitions and concepts to perceive things and to think about them" See: https://api.taylorfrancis.com/v4/content/books/mono/download?identifierName=isbn&identifierValue=9781912281916&type=previewpd
[1] Kant, I., Meiklejohn, J. M. D., Abbott, T. K., & Meredith, J. C. (1934). Critique of pure reason (p. 51). London: JM Dent. (almost 29 k citations) Available on:
http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/Philosophers/Kant/The%20Critique%20of%20Pure%20Reason%20%20%20Immanuel%20Kant.html
The "ontological argument", that is to say, the rational proof of the existence of God from the essence, stated by Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), disputed by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), then reformulated successively by Descartes (1596-1650) and by Leibniz (1646-1716) magnificently illustrates what Jeanne Hersch called “the philosophical illusion”. Since its refutation by Kant, the "ontological argument" interests only historians. In fact, it holds an important place in the history of philosophy despite its well-accepted falsification by Kant's "criticism of pure reason".
See:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Science_Conscience
I might be wrong, but it seems to me that analytic philosophy has been turning into a kind of scholastic philosophy, in many respects not too far from Middle Age scholastic philosophy. If this is really the case then analytic philosophy, if still alive, is terminally ill.
Antonio Pasini
There have been some attempts (calling these a "movement" seems too grandiose a term) within analytic philosophy to combine elements of scholastic and analytic methodology in pursuit of a contemporary philosophical synthesis. Analytical Thomism is one embodiment of this pursuit. But to regard analytic philosophy at large as a type of scholasticism would be at best an extremely hyperbolic metaphor. It reminds me of a joking riddle once posed by Francis Sparshot:
Q: Why is Winston Churchill like Father Christmas?
A: They both have beards , except Winston Churchill.
PS: Sparshott himself was not a boilerplate analytic philosopher; although he was interested in the same issues in aesthetics that exercised analytic philosophers, he wrote about them in a literary style.
The Recent Article by Solove, D. J. (2024), "Artificial Intelligence and Privacy" (Available at SSRN), "aims to establish a foundational understanding of the intersection between artificial intelligence (AI) and privacy, outlining the current problems AI poses to privacy and suggesting potential directions for the law’s evolution in this area". The author arrives to the conclusion that "Substantial reform of privacy law is long overdue. Policymakers are concerned about AI, and a window appears to have opened where new approaches to regulation are being considered. Hopefully, this will present the opportunity to take privacy law in a new direction. To adequately regulate AI’s privacy problems, the longstanding difficulties and wrong approaches of privacy law must be addressed."
Available on: http://aitimes.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Artificial-Intelligence-and-Privacy-202401SSRN-id4713111.pdf
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Raphael_Enthoven_thinks_that_a_machine_will_never_be_a_philosopher_Do_you_think_so
The Idea of humanity "is more controversial today than ever before. Traditionally, answers to the questions about our humanity and 'humanitas' (Cicero) have been sought along five routes: by contrasting the human with the non-human (other animals), with the more than human (the divine), with the inhuman (negative human behaviors), with the superhuman (what humans will become), or with the transhuman (thinking machines)." In the recent volume by Claremont, Calif, Dalferth, I. U., & Perrier, R. E. (2023). "Humanity: an endangered idea?: Claremont studies in the philosophy of religion, conference, 40, 2019. Religion in philosophy and theology", the authors tackled these philosophical issues. In each case, the question at stake and the point of comparison is a different one, and in all those respects the idea of humanity has been defined differently. What makes humans human? What does it mean for humans to live a human life? What is the humanitas for which we ought to strive? "This volume discusses key philosophical and theological issues in the current debate, with a particular focus on transhumanism, artificial intelligence, and the ethical challenges facing humanity in our technological culture"
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Raphael_Enthoven_thinks_that_a_machine_will_never_be_a_philosopher_Do_you_think_so
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Science_Conscience
“Is analytic philosophy dead?”
- really that is rather strange question, since really any, including analytic, philosophy never was alive; what was/is for quite evident and logically rigorous, reason:
- in mainstream philosophy [and all sciences, though] all really fundamental phenomena/notions, first of all in this case “Matter”, “Consciousness”, “Space”, “Time”, “Energy”, “Information”, are fundamentally completely transcendent/uncertain/irrational,
- while the “ontologies ” of these phenomena/notions were/are in all philosophy existence as a science the main philosophical problems/subjects for study, however, again, really innumerous philosophical attempts to solve really scientifically any of the problems resulted in scientific zeros.
It is evident for any normal human that any scientific elaboration of any concrete other “philosophy”, including “analytical” one, problems is principally senseless till the ontologies above are transcendent. Moreover, scientific definitions of all fundamental phenomena/notions above, can be made really only together.
Really the fundamental phenomena/notions above can be, and are, rigorously scientifically defined only in framework of the Shevchenko-Tokarevsky’s philosophical 2007 “The Information as Absolute” conception, recent version of the basic paper see
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363645560_The_Information_as_Absolute_-_2022_ed
- what, including, makes the other main mainstream philosophical branch “Epistemology” really superfluous, since what the mainstream epistemology really does now is a “teaching” of researches in concrete sciences how they should make their researches, what is, of course, senseless, if ridiculous, the researchers know that much better than any mainstream philosophers, who really make no real researches,
- and makes be superfluous all other innumerous concrete mainstream “philosophies”, again including analytical one.
Besides, after the ontology of the phenomena/notions above is now clear, “Matter”, “Consciousness”, “Space”, “Time”, “Energy”, ceased be subjects in real philosophy, and that now are Meta-subjects for study in concrete “ordinary” sciences;
- while the absolutely fundamental “Information” really is the subject for study in real philosophy. Though, of course, “Information” is subject for study in concrete sciences also, but real philosophy in this case must study just utmost fundamental aspects in this phenomenon, aimed at solution of really utmost fundamental and seems utmost old, philosophical problem – what is place and role of now “human beings”, more correctly “homo-two sapiens consciousness” in the “Information” Set.
Including at that such problems as in
“…"Humanity: an endangered idea?: ….In each case, the question at stake and the point of comparison is a different one, and in all those respects the idea of humanity has been defined differently. What makes humans human? What does it mean for humans to live a human life? What is the humanitas for which we ought to strive? … the ethical challenges facing humanity in our technological culture"……”
- which are really – what is rather unusual in the mainstream – important, and are concretely formulated, and are just real philosophy problems, can be really scientifically elaborated only in framework of the “The Information as Absolute” conception as concrete constituents of the utmost fundamental philosophical problem above.
More see the linked above paper, recent SS post in https://www.researchgate.net/post/Can_AI_replace_Human_Peer_Reviewer_for_scientific_articles_and_manuscrits/8is relevant to this thread question.
Cheers
On The Paradox of Intelligence. "The title of this essay [1] is “On the Limit of Artificial Intelligence,” which immediately implies a question: in what way can one talk about the limit of such a thing, given that intelligence, as long as it is artificial, is more susceptible to mutation than human intelligence whose mechanism is still beyond comprehension? Or in other words, how can we talk about the limit of something that virtually has no limit? The artificiality of intelligence is fundamentally schematized matter. However, it has the tendency to liberate itself from the constrains of matter by acting against it in order to schematize itself. "
[1] Hui, Y. (2021). On the limit of artificial intelligence. Philosophy today, 65(2), 339-357. Available on:
https://www.academia.edu/download/82559783/Yuk_Hui_On_the_Limit_of_Artificial_Intelligence_.pdf
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Science_Conscience
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Raphael_Enthoven_thinks_that_a_machine_will_never_be_a_philosopher_Do_you_think_so
Nausea (French: La Nausée) "is a philosophical novel by the existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, published in 1938. It is Sartre's first novel.... It comprises the thoughts and subjective experiences—in a personal diary format—of Antoine Roquentin, a melancholic and socially isolated intellectual .. Roquentin's growing alienation and disillusionment coincide with an increasingly intense experience of revulsion, which he calls "the nausea", in which the people and things around him seem to lose all their familiar and recognizable qualities. ... Sartre originally titled the novel Melancholia, based on the engraving Melencolia by the German Renaissance artist Albrecht Dürer (an enigmatic and gloomy winged female figure thought to be a personification of melancholia – melancholy) It was at first refused by the Nouvelle Revue Française (N.R.F.)... In 1937, however, the imprint's publisher, Gaston Gallimard, accepted it and suggested the title La Nausée. The novel has been translated into English by Lloyd Alexander as The Diary of Antoine Roquentin and by Robert Baldick as Nausea."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nausea_(novel)
See Also
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Science_Conscience
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Art_of_State-of-the-Art_on_Science_Knowledge
Jamel Chahed You say "Since its refutation by Kant, the 'ontological argument' interests only historians". However, it is also of continuing interest to logicians who are interested in its logical properties. Also a number of logicians, whether they are interested in the ontological argument or not, do not share Kant's view that existence is not a predicate or property, on which his refutation depends.
Analytic philosophy seems to be rather in a recession period, after its legendary pioneers such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, Alfred Tarski, and W.V.O. Quine etc. New analytic philosophers comparatively can't add new original important concepts for a long time !?
Recent SS post in https://www.researchgate.net/post/Can_philosophy_help_to_innovate_and_develop_scientific_theory , page 883, is relevant to this thread question
Cheers
"One way to understand the philosophy of AI is that it mainly deals with three Kantian questions: What is AI? What can AI do? What should AI be? One major part of the philosophy of AI is the ethics of AI". The Chapter by Müller, V. C., 2024, "Philosophy of AI: A structured overview. In Cambridge Handbook on the law, ethics and policy of Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press", presents "the main topics, arguments, and positions in the philosophy of AI at present (excluding ethics). Apart from the basic concepts of intelligence and computation, the main topics of artificial cognition are perception, action, meaning, rational choice, free will, consciousness, and normativity. Through a better understanding of these topics, the philosophy of AI contributes to our understanding of the nature, prospects, and value of AI. Furthermore, these topics can be understood more deeply through the discussion of AI; so we suggest that “AI Philosophy” provides a new method for philosophy. The philosophy of AI is separated from its coüsin, the philosophy of cognitive science, which in türn is closely connected to the philosophy of mind"
Available on:
https://philarchive.org/archive/MLLPOA
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Raphael_Enthoven_thinks_that_a_machine_will_never_be_a_philosopher_Do_you_think_so
AI technology advances raise fundamental questions about our spiritual relationship with technology. The book by Swati Chakraborty, Released on October, 2023 "Investigating the Impact of AI on Ethics and Spirituality, IGI Global Ed." focuses on the spiritual implications of AI and its increasing presence in society and "emphasizes the need to examine the ethical considerations of AI through a spiritual lens and to consider how spiritual principles can inform its development and use." The book covers topics such as: "data collection, ethical issues, and AI and is ideal for educators, teacher trainees, policymakers, academicians, researchers, curriculum developers, higher-level students, social activists, and government officials"
Description: Artificial intelligence (AI) is beginning to appear in everything from writing, social media, and business to wartime or intelligence strategy. With so many applications in our everyday lives and in the systems that run them, many are demanding that ethical implications are considered before any one application of AI goes too far and causes irreparable damage to the personal data or operations of individuals, governments, and organizations. For instance, AI that is fed data sets that are influenced by human data collection method biases may be perpetuating societal biases with implicit bias that can create serious consequences. Applications of AI with implicit bias on recidivism prediction models as well as medical algorithms have shown biases against certain racial or ethnic groups, leading to actual discrimination in treatment by the legal system and the medical systems.
Regulatory groups may identify the bias in AI but not the source of the bias, making it difficult to determine who to hold accountable. Lack of dataset and programming transparency can be problematic when AI systems are used to make significant decisions, and as AI systems become more advanced, questions arise regarding responsibility for the results of their implementation and the regulation thereof. Research on how these applications of AI are affecting interpersonal and societal relationships is important for informing much-needed regulatory policies.
Investigating the Impact of AI on Ethics and Spirituality focuses on the spiritual implications of AI and its increasing presence in society. As AI technology advances, it raises fundamental questions about our spiritual relationship with technology. This study emphasizes the need to examine the ethical considerations of AI through a spiritual lens and to consider how spiritual principles can inform its development and use. This book covers topics such as data collection, ethical issues, and AI and is ideal for educators, teacher trainees, policymakers, academicians, researchers, curriculum developers, higher-level students, social activists, and government officials.
See: https://www.google.tn/books/edition/Investigating_the_Impact_of_AI_on_Ethics/gmLbEAAAQBAJ?hl=fr&gbpv=1&dq=%22scam%22+%22AI%22&pg=PA13&printsec=frontcover
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Raphael_Enthoven_thinks_that_a_machine_will_never_be_a_philosopher_Do_you_think_so
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Scientific_Integrity_Research_Ethics_and_Higher_Education_Deontology_The_Senior_Scholars_Duty
Analytic philosophy is bounded & limited strictly by logical mathematics whereas continental philosophy is verbal so having almost no boundaries & limits compared to analytic philosophy !?
"In modern analytical philosophy, the relation between the mind (Aristotle’s psyche, Lat. anima) and the body has been a major recurring theme, at least since Descartes’ famous dictum cogito ergo sum ‘I think therefore I am’. Cogito is the incarnation of the Aristotelian logos." Extract from the just-published paper: "Giannakidou, A., & Mari, A. (2024). "The Human and the Mechanical: logos, truthfulness, and ChatGPT", Available on: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.01267.pdf
One may also read there: "Now, human beings are also able to deviate from co-operativity and in so doing they can mislead or lie– something that, we will argue, the sophisticated text producing AI is also unable to choose to do. If you lack the concept of truth (which needs the world), then you also lack the ability to know, to believe and to lie"
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Science_Conscience
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Raphael_Enthoven_thinks_that_a_machine_will_never_be_a_philosopher_Do_you_think_so
The chapter by Stellino, P. "Ludwig Wittgenstein: Suicide as the Elementary Sin. In: Philosophical Perspectives on Suicide, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020" thoroughly examines Wittgenstein’s view of suicide. "After an introduction in which it is shown how Wittgenstein’s early life was affected by several suicides and how he himself often thought of this possibility, attention is first drawn to some of the important sources that influenced and shaped his view of suicide. Subsequently, in order to contextualize his otherwise obscure remarks on suicide, an overview of Wittgenstein’s peculiar worldview as well as of his understanding of ethics is provided. Finally, in the third and last section, attention is focused on Wittgenstein’s remarks on suicide. Their meaning is explained and Wittgenstein’s peculiar view of suicide is elucidated"
About the book
The volume "Philosophical Perspectives on Suicide, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020" "aims to address in a novel way some of the fundamental philosophical questions concerning suicide. Focusing on four major authors of Western philosophy - Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein - their arguments in favour or against suicide are explained, contextualized, examined and critically assessed. Taken together, these four perspectives provide an illuminating overview of the philosophical arguments that can be used for or against one’s right to commit suicide. Intended both for specialists and those interested in understanding the many complexities underlying the philosophical debate on suicide, this book combines philosophical depth with exemplary clarity.
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Could_Suicide_Death_Penalty_and_Euthanasia_be_Rational_and_Morally_Defensible
"What kinds of issues does the global crisis of climate change present to aesthetics, and how will they challenge the field to respond?" The paper by Brady, E. (2022). "Global climate change and aesthetics. Environmental Values, 31(1), 27-46, 2022," tries to answer the above question. The author argues that "a new research agenda is needed for aesthetics with respect to global climate change (GCC) and outlines a set of foundational issues which are especially pressing: (1) attention to environments that have been neglected by philosophers, for example, the cryosphere and aerosphere; (2) negative aesthetics of environment, in order to grasp aesthetic experiences, meanings, and dis/values in light of the catastrophic effects of GCC; (3) bringing intergenerational thinking into aesthetics through concepts of temporality and ‘future aesthetics’(4) understanding the relationship between aesthetic and ethical values as they arise in regard to GCC." The authors concludes his paper by writing: "there is much more that philosophy can offer concerning the aesthetic aspects of denser urbanisation, agricultural changes and changes in transport modes that are predicted to occur as GCC intensifies. Last but by no means least, given that GCC is a trans-spatial, global phenomenon, the field of philosophical aesthetics will need to fold in global perspectives, cross-philosophical exchange and geopolitical considerations more extensively than is currently the case.
To be requested on:
Article Global Climate Change and Aesthetics
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Adaptation_and_Resilience_to_Climate_Change_Temporal_Paradox_versus_Chronology_Protection_Conjecture
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Art_of_State-of-the-Art_on_Science_Knowledge
"The journey through the philosophical and practical dimensions of predictive analytics reveals a landscape rich with possibilities and ethical considerations.. By navigating the ethical labyrinth with transparency, accountability, and a commitment to societal well-being, decision-makers can harness the transformative potential of predictive analytics responsibly." From the conclusion of the paper: "Farayola, Oluwatoyin Ajoke, et al. "Advancements in predictive analytics: A philosophical and practical overview." World Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews 21.03 (2024): 240-252. Available on: https://wjarr.com/sites/default/files/WJARR-2023-2706.pdf
Abstract: This review would summarize recent advancements in predictive analytics within the financial industry, exploring both the technological developments and their philosophical implications. It would evaluate the balance between data-driven decision-making and ethical considerations. Predictive analytics has witnessed remarkable advancements, blending
philosophical considerations with practical applications to redefine decision-making processes across various industries. This abstract provides an overview of the philosophical underpinnings and practical implications of the
evolving landscape of predictive analytics. Philosophically, predictive analytics raises profound questions about determinism, human agency, and the ethical implications of data-driven decision-making. The abstract explores the tension between the predictive power of algorithms and the need to preserve individual autonomy, delving into the ethical considerations surrounding privacy, bias, and accountability. Practically, the overview navigates the cutting-edge tools and techniques that drive predictive analytics. From machine learning algorithms to big data analytics, the abstract examines how these technologies empower organizations to make data-driven predictions, optimize processes, and gain actionable insights. Real-world applications in business, healthcare, finance, and other domains underscore the transformative impact of predictive analytics on operational efficiency and strategic decision-making. As predictive analytics continues to shape the future of information processing, this abstract encapsulates the dual nature of its evolution – a philosophical exploration of its ethical dimensions and a practical examination of its applications, offering
a holistic understanding of the field's implications for individuals, organizations, and society at large.
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Raphael_Enthoven_thinks_that_a_machine_will_never_be_a_philosopher_Do_you_think_so
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Scientific_Integrity_Research_Ethics_and_Higher_Education_Deontology_The_Senior_Scholars_Duty
"Weighing contemporary events related to the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine against Kant’s stated requirements for “perpetual” or lasting world peace, it is abundantly evident that the present seems to be further than ever from the possible actualisation of such peace on a global scale. Much will have to change for that to be contemplated" From the conclusion of the paper "Olivier, B. (2024). Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1795) and the Russia-Ukraine/NATO Conflict. Phronimon, 14-pages." Available on: https://unisapressjournals.co.za/index.php/Phronimon/article/download/15283/7572
The author opens his article with an extract from Immanuel Kant's famous essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), "This scheme of a federation of the nations of the world, in accordance with principles which would put an end to war between them, was one whose interest for Kant seemed to increase during the last twenty years of his life. It was according to him an idea of reason. … Its realization is the realization of the highest good—the ethical and political summum bonum, for here the aims of morals and politics coincide: only in a perfect development of his faculties in culture and in morals can man at last find true happiness. History is working towards the consumption of this end. A moral obligation lies on man to strive to establish conditions which bring its realization nearer. It is the duty of statesmen to form a federative union as it was formerly the duty of individuals to enter the state. The moral law points the way here as clearly as in the sphere of pure ethics: “Thou can't, therefore thou ought’st.” (Smith 2016, 1511. Translator’s Introduction, The Collected Works of Immanuel Kant 1491–1527)"
The complete Immanuel Kant's volume "Perpetual Peace (1795), translation by Mary Campbell Smith, 1903, is available on: https://oll-resources.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/oll3/store/titles/357/0075_Bk .pdf
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/War_Peace
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Science_and_history_serving_political_and_ideological_narratives
"The true nature of suicide is in the combination of internal and external motives of this phenomenon. It is philosophy that can explicate the essence of this phenomenon, without dispersing it into a multitude of potential components." From the conclusion of the paper by Shevel, Anzhelika, et al. "Adevelop the Concept of Suicide in a Philosophical Context, BRAIN. Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience 14.4 (2023): 440-457." The article presents "the research of gifted students on the question of attitudes toward suicide from ancient times to the Middle Ages (group 1); attitudes toward suicide from the Middle Ages to the present (group 2); attitudes toward suicide from the New Age to the present (group 3)." The authors come to the conclusion that "the attitude toward suicide was negative with the advent of Christianity, but the Donatists ("schismatics" of the Carthage Church, 4th-7th centuries) sought to achieve holiness through the cult of suicide. The Orthodox Church gained a strong advocate in Augustine the Blessed. In 411 a council was assembled at Carthage to which representatives of the Donatists were invited. Augustine won a complete victory over the Donatists. Five church councils affirmed Augustine's views on suicide as a sinful act and systematized the punishment for it. The attitude towards suicide from the New Age to the present time was studied by 3 group of gifted students and came to the conclusion that at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries suicide was considered as a social, ontological, medical problem, a sign of social pessimism, protest, loss of meaning of life during moral and metaphysical (spiritual and mental) crisis. times to the present time."
Article available on:
https://dspace.uzhnu.edu.ua/jspui/bitstream/lib/57449/1/Scopus%202023%20Adevelop%20the%20Concept.pdf
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Could_Suicide_Death_Penalty_and_Euthanasia_be_Rational_and_Morally_Defensible
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Science_Conscience
Analytical philosophy has been almost a British-USA phenomenon. That did not really expand out of these core areas... It is thus not surprising, based on academic seniority that there is a time lag in phylosophy department leadership.... Yes it is a still breathing ghost...
Really scientific answer/comments to the thread question is/are in SS post on page 6, March 8 and links in the post, so here only a comment to
“…Analytical philosophy has been almost a British-USA phenomenon…”
- yeah, that is essentially so, however that
“…. That did not really expand out of these core areas... It is thus not surprising, based on academic seniority that there is a time lag in phylosophy department leadership.. Yes it is a still breathing ghost..…”
- really isn’t essential, any/every other countries’ existent philosophies really are fundamentally nothing else than some transcendent mental constructions; why and how – see pointed SS post above – which, as that in Marxism is said [something as] “develop illusions of classes about the classes themselves”.
I.e. mainstream philosophy now – and always earlier - is nothing else than some political structure that “substantiates fundamentally” what exists and happens in states in all countries political structures; and in this function mainstream philosophy isn’t ghost.
However that has no relation to real science at all, what must be really scientific, including philosophical, if we say about philosophy as some real science, theories see SS post on pages 29 –- directly, and on pages 30, 31, 34, the posts that contain some useful in this case comments in https://www.researchgate.net/post/What-criteria-do-you-have-in-mind-while-characterizing-a-scientific-theory/34
Again in this thread - real and really utmost fundamental science “philosophy” is possible only basing on the Shevchenko-Tokarevsky’s really philosophical 2007 “The Information as Absolute” conception, the link see the post on page 6, March 8.
More see the pointed post, SS posts in https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHAT_IS_THE_MYSTERIOUS_STUFF_OF_INFORMATION_A_Short_but_Clear_Definition/246pages 242, 243, 244, 246, and 251, though,
- are relevant in this case as well.
Cheers
The recent paper by Petricini, T. (2024) "What Would Aristotle Do? Navigating Generative Artificial Intelligence in Higher Education", Postdigital Science and Education, 1-7", explores the application of Aristotle’s virtue ethics in guiding and promoting ethical practices within higher education in the context of generative AI. To be requested on:
Article What Would Aristotle Do? Navigating Generative Artificial In...
Abstract: The vast technological shift that resulted from the Covid-19 shutdown across the globe forced educators to reexamine pedagogy. As schools at all levels shut down, educators were suddenly thrust into digital teaching and learning. Many educators reported being overwhelmed with fear and worry for family, friends, and students. Some used the forced space to reflect on silver linings, such as the revelation of technological inequities in the population. We walked away with numerous insights about ourselves, our technology, and our teaching. Yet one of the greatest insights from our time in crisis was that many of us across the globe were still radically unprepared. Similar to the Covid-19 crisis, yet to a much lesser degree, educators were again asked to pivot quickly with generative artificial intelligence’s (GAI) quick emergence at the end of 2022. Educators’ responses were mixed again, and while many were fearful, quite a few more were hopeful.
The postdigital mindset may have fostered this lack of preparation. Because of the inseparability of our digital technologies with everyday life, their use has become mundane, and reflecting on the mundane is often difficult. In the face of GAI, again, many universities and instructors arrived unprepared. Academic integrity policies were suddenly outdated. Assignments were suddenly pointless. Society needs students trained in GAI, yet higher education does not offer such preparation. Educators have a duty to meet the needs of our students, yet it cannot be assumed that moving forward with navigating the use of GAI tools is intuitive or that educators have relevant skills for the task. Finding a path forward in navigating GAI usage prompts a millennial leap forward. Yet I found guidance from a much older era—Ancient Greece.
See also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Art_Science-Aesthetics_Philosophy_ASAP
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Scientific_Integrity_Research_Ethics_and_Higher_Education_Deontology_The_Senior_Scholars_Duty
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Raphael_Enthoven_thinks_that_a_machine_will_never_be_a_philosopher_Do_you_think_so
"Today more than ever the principles and ideals of science, humanity and progress need to be vigorously defended. We take their gifts for granted; newborns who will live more than eight decades; grocery stores overflowing with food, potable water available at the snap of fingers, and garbage disappearing at the same rate; drugs that destroy a painful infection; boys who are no longer sent to war; girls who can walk the streets without fear of any danger, critics of powerful rulers who are not sent to prison or killed because of their criticism; in the pocket of a shirt you can find all the information about the world and culture. All these are human achievements and not rights born from the universe." From the just-published outstanding Paper by Fekollı, Jetmira. "The Influence of Enlightenment Ideas on Human Progress and Well-Being, Interdisciplinary Journal of Research and Development 11.1 S1 (2024): 72-72." Available on: https://www.journal-uamd.org/index.php/IJRD/article/download/377/339
The analysis carried out in this essay leads the author to reformulate within the conclusion, the ideals of the Enlightenment related to the language and concepts of the 21st century. "First, a scheme will be designed that aims to facilitate the understanding of the human condition through spirituality and modern science. Who we are, where we come from, what challenges we will face and how we can face them. Not neglecting to build a clear consensus, these ideals have been treated by today's intellectuals with indifference, skepticism, and sometimes even with contempt. According to the theory of this paper, when these ideals are properly evaluated, then we understand that the ideals of the Enlightenment are actually noble and capable of evoking emotions and being a source of inspiration; become a motive for living. This paper follows the relative debate about scientific progress also inspired by philosophical progress, in terms of truth, problem solving, knowledge and the process of understanding. Equally important, the paper will describe philosophy and science in a common framework, to understand and appreciate science and human progress."
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Scientific_Integrity_Research_Ethics_and_Higher_Education_Deontology_The_Senior_Scholars_Duty
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Art_Science-Aesthetics_Philosophy_ASAP
"...knowledge is to be acquired; once acquired, it can be applied to help promote human welfare. But this philosophy of knowledge-inquiry is an intellectual and humanitarian disaster..." From the just-published Chapter by Maxwell, N. (2024) "Bad Philosophy, the Climate Crisis, and Other Global Problems, In: The Philosophy of Inquiry and Global Problems, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham". The reason for this announced disaster is that the philosophy of knowledge-inquiry "violates three of the four most elementary rules of rational problem solving, and as a result fails to give priority to the task of helping humanity resolve the climate crisis and other global problems that need to be resolved if we are to make progress to a better world—one in which there is peace, democracy, justice, liberty, and sustainable prosperity, for all We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities around the world. , so that academic inquiry puts all four rules of rational problem solving into practice, and becomes rationally devoted to helping humanity learn how to make progress towards a better world—a kind of academic inquiry rationally devoted. to help humanity create a wiser world."
Book presentation (By the editor). Universities have long been dominated by a philosophy of inquiry that may be called knowledge-inquiry. This holds that, in order to do justice to the basic humanitarian aim of helping to promote human welfare, academic inquiry must, in the first instance, seek knowledge and technological know-how. First, knowledge is to be acquired; once acquired, it can be applied to help promote human welfare. But this philosophy of knowledge-inquiry is an intellectual and humanitarian disaster. It violates three of the four most elementary rules of rational problem solving conceivable, and as a result fails to give priority to the task of helping humanity resolve those conflicts and problems of living, such as the climate and nature crises, that need to be resolved if we are to make progress to a bet..
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Adaptation_and_Resilience_to_Climate_Change_Temporal_Paradox_versus_Chronology_Protection_Conjecture
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Climate_Change_and_Climate_Models_Progress_and_Limits
"We suggest that Plato’s arguments against suicide might be helpfully adapted into our preventative repertoire today, and that these arguments might be particularly poignant and helpful for military service members, both active duty and veteran." From the paper by Avramenko, R., & Bunn, P. D., The Politics of Suicide: Miasma and Katharmos in Plato’s Political Thought, Perspectives on Political Science, 53(2), (April, 2024), 94–105. To be requested on: Article The Politics of Suicide: Miasma and Katharmos in Plato’s Pol...
Noting that, despite the medical and scientific progress, suicide shows little sign of abating, the authors argue that "a supplemental resource for addressing the contemporary problem of suicide might be found in the history of political thought. Namely, we suggest turning to Plato who constructs suicide as an action perpetrated by an identifiable and guilty individual who, in committing suicide, harms the polis itself. For Plato, this political harm must be understood in terms of pollution (miasma) and purification (katharmos)."
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Could_Suicide_Death_Penalty_and_Euthanasia_be_Rational_and_Morally_Defensible
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Art_Science-Aesthetics_Philosophy_ASAP
If dead, why almost all UK & USA academicians in philosophy departments are mainly writing academic articles related to analytic philosophy ?!
Art & Science - Aesthetics & Philosophy (ASAP) https://www.researchgate.net/post/Art_Science-Aesthetics_Philosophy_ASAP
Watch'n Listen to this superb interpretation of the mythic blues song "Baby Please Don't Go" by the Great John Lee Hooker accompanied on the Harmonica by the talented Van Morrison. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zw7MqRcMmUA
Captivating performance from an exceptional duo of artists. note the rhythmic sound by JL Hooker's left foot on the Wooden floor (impressive of simplicity and rightness).
Just-Published: "The Paradox of Intellectual Property in Capitalism, by João Romeiro Hermeto, Springer Nature, 2024. This is "an innovative book that comprehensively discusses and analyses intellectual property under capitalistic social conditions and relations. It not only addresses some historical developments of intellectual property but also brings to the fore the very notion of what knowledge is, knowledge creation, and knowledge production and appropriation within a Marxist framework. Nonetheless, the adopted approach pays heed to multiple fields of knowledge, providing rich discussions that facilitate the understanding of actual social totality in which capitalism, knowledge production and appropriation, and the struggles of appropriation mutually reinforce each other, although not devoid of antagonisms and contradictions. In light of contemporary capitalism, the transformations that social property relations are undergoing must be scrutinised -- such as those brought about by the development of digitalisation and the convergence between big pharma and tech giants. What are the conditions of intellectual property creation today? What theoretical assumptions does it make? Under what social relations is intellectual property produced? Throughout, the emphasis is not on individual cases or symptoms but on the overarching logic: the logic of capitalism as revealed in intellectual property."
Volume Consultable on:
https://books.google.tn/books?id=W2f_EAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=fr#v=onepage&q&f=false
To be requested on:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/379614034_The_Paradox_of_Intellectual_Property_in_Capitalism
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Sciences_Paradoxes
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Science_and_history_serving_political_and_ideological_narratives
the common idea of the "civilized" or "not" can be illustrated by this image: The "civilised" lady, well-born, in her "Hubris" and nobility attire; and the "uncivilised" "go-barefoot", outside of History, you just have to see what he is wearing. And you will find "civilized" people, including in the academic area, who will explain to you that fortunately there are "civilized" people who "uncivilized" people can serve to find out how to feed theirs. The history of Africa, Asia and the Indo-Pacific knows this way of thinking that "civilized" people look at others at any level of society, including within the academic circle. the Kanaks of New Caledonia are the most recent example.
Image: Woman transported by jinrikisha (rickshaw- pousse-pousse), Guimet Museum, Paris, Distr. Rmn / Image Guimet, Photograph 45 from the album AP15884, early 1890s.
Commentary by Kōzaburō Tamamura
The rickshaw, jinrikisha in Japanese 1 (人力車), was developed in Japan around 1870, then exported by the British throughout their empire under the abbreviation of rickshaw. It is still in use in Calcutta. In Japan, it advantageously replaced the very slow and uncomfortable kago (cf. proof 15929) and was acclaimed by Japanese city dwellers and visitors to the point that this new element of Japanese modernity was paradoxically considered by Westerners as an element of modernity. 'traditional' exoticism of Japan and widely represented in tourist albums where, on the other hand, one very rarely finds a test of the horse-drawn trams of Tōkyō or the new train lines, other new means of transport. For short distances in town it was pulled by a single kuruma or djin, according to the vocabulary of the time for the rickshaw puller. (Own traduction from French)
Source:
https://guimet-photo-japon.fr/notices/notice.php?id=389
After analyzing the fundamental aspects of Augustine's teaching on suicide, notably those of Letter 244 in an exhaustive analytical reading, the article by Chabi, K. '"Augustine on Temptation to suicide: A Reading of his Letter 244 to Chrisimus, Mayéutica, 46(101), 2020, 19-32", provides remarkable interpretations which show the relevance of Augustine's recommendations for understanding the nowadays question of suicide. Available on: https://www .academia.edu/download/66320649/KOLAWOLE_CHABI_mayeutica_2020_ENERO_JUNIO_Chabi.pdf
There one may read within the conclusion: "Sixteen Centuries separate us from Augustine and many of the matters he reflected on remain present in our society today... In our “highly civilized” society, many factors such as mental disorders, including depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, anxiety, and substance abuse, stress caused by financial difficulties, relationship problems etc., lead many people to commit suicide. How should a Christian in possession of all his faculties and free of the disorders and situations mentioned above react in. the face of adversity? That is what Augustine tried to address in his Letter 244, object of our study in this article... Augustine's advice and consoling words to Chrisimus go beyond the predicament of that layman in 5th Century North Africa and can prove truly relevant even to us today in the face of the instability of worldly prosperity."
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Art_Science-Aesthetics_Philosophy_ASAP
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Could_Suicide_Death_Penalty_and_Euthanasia_be_Rational_and_Morally_Defensible
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Science_Conscience
"..in the comparison between Nietzsche's superhuman and Kierkegaard's knight of faith, .. Kierkegaard, like Nietzsche, wants to restore singularity and human agency. However, Kierkegaard, based on a leap of faith, tries to revive human singularity and agency, while Nietzsche's superhuman is only a ritual that attempts to confront slave morality by relying on himself." From the Just-Published Paper by Hossein Roohani "Comparing Collective Morality from the Perspective of Nietzsche's Superhuman and Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, Sociological Cultural Studies (2024)." See: https://socialstudy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_9401_en.html
The author writes in Conclusion: "Just like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard is a supporter of human singularity and a staunch opponent of modern collectivist morality. It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that Nietzsche goes against modern morality by appealing to the knight of faith ; however, Nietzsche deals with modern morality from an earthly perspective."
See Also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Art_Science_Politics_Philosophy
On the Rational vs Irrational... Physics vs Metaphysics. Dyson Freeman wrote on the topic: "Science and religion are two windows that people look through, trying to understand the big universe outside, trying to understand why we are here. The two windows give different views, but they look out at the same universe. Both views are one-sided, neither is complete. Both leave out essential features of the real world. And both are worthy of respect. Trouble arises when either science or religion claims universal jurisdiction, when either religious or scientific dogma claims to be infallible. Religious creationists and scientific materialists are equally dogmatic and insensitive. By their arrogance, they bring both science and religion into disrepute. The media exaggerate their numbers and importance. The media rarely mention the fact that the great majority of religious people belong to moderate denominations that treat science with respect, or the fact that the great majority of scientists treat religion with respect so long as religion does not claim jurisdiction over scientific questions" Freeman Dyson (March 15, 2000). Progress In Religion (Speech). Templeton Prize Reading".
Comment: it is IMHO not suitable for us "scientists" to mix Science and Belief, Natural and Supra-natural, Physics and Metaphysics, Chemistry and Alchemy, Rational and Irrational... Moreover, it is destructive for the critical spirit of young people to make amalgams between scientific discourse and non-scientific and/or pseudo-scientific speeches. On the contrary, it is necessary, and it is our duty, to always specify to them the line of demarcation between SCIENCE and other intellectual activities. Read more on this necessary demarcation within this remarkable Chapter philosophical thinking by Gómez‐Morales, Yuri Jack. "Science/Non‐Science and Boundary Work," The Blackwell encyclopedia of sociology (2007). Available on:
Chapter Science/Non‐science and Boundary Work
See also:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Art_Science_Politics_Philosophy
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Scientific_Integrity_Research_Ethics_and_Higher_Education_Deontology_The_Senior_Scholars_Duty
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Science_and_history_serving_political_and_ideological_narratives
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