The clearest fairly recent example is probably Elliott Sober's work on the units of selection (The Nature of Selection, 1984), and later on group selection with David Sloan Wilson (Unto Others, 1999).  It's easier to see the effect in retrospect, and it's not easy to separate the contributions from philosophers and from philosophically sophisticated scientists, but there is a great deal of discussion between philosophers and theoretically inclined biologists on Genomics, Systems Biology, Microbiology, Systematics, Big Data, etc., and many biologists seem to think this is a productive dialogue.

Dear colleage,

I would answer that philosophy dissertation will not solve any problem related to Biology or any other Science. But, before being consider as a Philosophy esceptic, I want to explain my point.

Science is only a branch of the empiricism that is focus in solving problems. All Science is done in a question-answer structure, and it is unable to go further. Science finishes in the very moment you obtain your results and you analize them comparing to previous knowledge. In this point you start using informal logic (or casual logic, I do not know how English speakers call it) which is part of philosophy.

In addition, since the XIX century there are many discussions about the value of paradigms in Science, and this is an exclusive working area for Philosophy. For years, intuctivism was the way of performing Science and Popper added a new point of view, falsifiability. But Poppers falsifiability was corrected afterwards by many authors, for example Lakatos.

For Biology, exclusively, there are two big problems that are not close to be solved and only can be discussed through use of Philosophy. First, Evolution. Evolution is not under Scientific paradigms as biologist cannot try experiments of speciation. Evolution Biologists support their theories in Philosophy and they obtain philosophic results as they cannot prove their point. The second big point is the origin of life as it cannot be repliable. 

In each field of Biology there are many philosophical questions to be solved (many models for carcinogenesis, "arms race", ecoimmunology trade-offs...). Philosophy must not be ignored by scientifist because, knowing or not, they are continuously using it in their jobs. 

I hope I have helped you. I apologyze for my English.

I think you have not finished yet, didn't you? I don't found the reason of why the "philosophy dissertation will not solve any problem related to Biology"? So what is the contribution of this activity, So the scientifics just have to concern with the logical part of the philosophy analysis? what about the ontology or the epistemology?

Of course it has. There are many excellent Philosophers making important contributions to the development of Science, in particular helping other researchers to dissect their schemes of thinking and their approach to interpret data, bridge in-vivo/in-vitro/in-silico techniques, or to understand the role played by scientific visualization in the generation of new knowledge, just to cite some.

See for example this paper (dx.doi.org/10.1152/ajpheart.01151.2011), published in the reputed American Journal of Physiology, where a philosophical analysis helps to address relevant questions such as the validation of computational models in Biology.

Warm regards.

Regarding your second question, the hardest questions I have had to address during my scientific career have always come from Philosophers. This is because they usually interrogate the roots of your knowledge and the way you approach your scientific research, yielding a more comprehensive interpretation of the limitations of your work. If a biologist thinks that Philosophy cannot solve anything, I would firstly question their capabilities to understand their own scientific method.

The answer is yes, and Alfonso has given a couple of excellent examples. I could add that a colleague of mine wrote his dissertation in the philosophy of science on the concept of function in biology. The more interesting question is why someone would think that philosophy does not contribute to biology, or to any other empirical science.

I think one reason is that the conceptual problems that philosophy has solved tend not to be discipline specific, and so the distinctions that come out of the analysis become accepted generally. Indeed, they often become a part of the conceptual framework that everybody takes for granted as obvious (even though it may not have been considered obvious before the analysis). So, to rebuke those who "diss" philosophy, you have to find a concept they are sure to take for granted, and say that the concept, as they understand it, is a product of philosophical thought. ‘Function’ is one example, both of a concept that isn’t only found in the domain of biology, even though it particularly important in biology, but also of one that has become a part of our everyday conceptual scheme. It is a part of the demarcation problem for biology. The demarcation problem has to do with what it is that distinguishes biology, say, from chemistry. The idea is that we move from chemistry into biology when the entities we are studying have functions (an idea that is still controversial). Another example is change. We take for granted that change is the possession of one and the same entity of different properties at different times, requiring both identity of entity over time and difference in properties. Sounds easy, and yet Aristotle’s analysis of change, which is now part of our background assumptions, is widely regarded as one of the main achievements of Greek philosophy.

Another reason why people tend to overlook the contributions of philosophy, is because they think that philosophy is what philosophers do. But this is not the case. The sceptic who argues that philosophy does not contribute anything is making a philosophical point. Many of the conceptual problems that biology deals with, have been adequately dealt with by biologists themselves, often blissfully unaware of the fact that they were doing philosophy. Stephen Hawking recently argued that Philosophy is dead, not realising that he was keeping philosophy very much alive with his argument. Philosophy is a particular kind of intellectual exercise, and you don’t need a degree in philosophy to do id (although it helps a lot).

The purpose of this question tried to do a compilation of problems solved, whether there is one that it cannot be debatable at present, or its discussion is absolutely unnecessary.

I mean I know the great success and contribution of the philosophy of biology, e.g., the contribution to the evolutionary biology by the greatest philosophy of biology D. Hull (http://etss.net/evolution/reviews/hull/david_hull_publications.htm one list of some publications). but I'm not absolutely sure whether there is any solved problem. The human's race discussion has been finishied already? or is still the autonomy of biology, regarding the physics or chemistry, an open discussion?

A nice quote "An antimetaphysician is just one who holds primitive and unexamined metaphysical beliefs" M. Bunge 1999 p. 3.

Let me   put my opinion   here : "experimental/ scientific/  practical" has their origin in philosophy (probably that's why PhD  in any subject is  called doctor in philosophy :D). What is : "experimental/ scientific/ practical"  now has  been a question of philosophy. All  these following questions  has been philosophical  at some point of time

Does void exists ?     lead to relativity.Can  we snatch  ligtening from god ? lead to   discovery of fire. Are  there people in moon ?  lead to astrology .  Can we bring life back... ?    leads  to medicine and the  quest in biology is  still on...

It is not difficult  to agree that  'those realised  now must  have been existing long in someone's thought'.  Is that a  philosophical statement !    

The primary task of philosophy is not to solve problems but to ask basic and important questions.

Precisely such questions were at the beginning of all science that have ever led to the development of science.  A deontological approach in research -   means discussing ethical issues of the method and the design of natural science projects - is as important as the question of the consequences and outcomes. 

Greetings from Germany

UR

Of course philosophy and biology have been contributing to each other in the larger project of understanding the world and ourselves.

Let us remember that e.g. when bacteria where discovered, there where at first many different rival theories who could equally well explain the data, resulting in different methods of treatment of bacterial deseases. In cases like that, biologists and philosophers alike are engaged in conceptual critique and clearification.

One strinking example is the phsyician, biologist and philosopher of science Ludwig Fleck, who made important contributions to immunology and to the philosophy of science at the same time.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwik_Fleck

For me the first question would be “what are the real conceptual problems of biology or more in general, for the life sciences?” ...  :-)

Ok, I will try to expose it more clearly because it is true that my previus written was a little bit chaotic.

Phylosophy has no limitations because all the knowledge we have is Phylosophy. But the only branch in Phylosphy in charge of solving problemas is Science.

As Science is just a standarized "empiricist Phylosophy" whose issue is not to create new knowledge but to solve problems. Due to that has its own structure: Hypothesis about a problem --> methodology to approach the problem --> results of the methodology --> discussion about what the results say about the hypothesis. Due to that, it cannot go further than the previous assumptions. So, if it goes further is due to lucubrations of phylosophic-but-not-scientific character. 

But Phylosophy is not the answer to the question, indeed, it provides newer questions. Science solves its own questions (unless you accept that Science is Phylosophy).

About epistemiology. Anything can study itself but under its own conditions. So to consider epistemiology as a valid knowledge has to be considered as not part of Science but part of Phylosophy including part of the Science. It will be a long discussion and I am not able to answer this properly. Less in English.

Ontology is magic (it is a joke). Ontology is only reasoning, nothing to do with Science. At least in my opinion. You can analyze Science with Ontology but never in the other way (if you consider Science as an strictly empiricist way of thinking).

Of course, scientists have the obligation to include Phylosophy in their thinking because Science is a very stable knowledge (unable to create new knowledge) but the main phylosophy branch scientists have to use, in my opinion, is Logic.

Let me suggest a different picture of the interrelationships between empirical science and one branch of philosophy, metaphysics. Maybe that can illustrate a more general connection. I think they are continuous and partly overlapping, in accordance to what is sometimes called methodological naturalism (in philosophy); they are all part of the human race’s project of understanding the world we live in.

Now, particular empirical disciplines study particular domains of entities; physics studies the smallest components and the way they interact; chemistry studies larger compounds—molecules—and their interactions (reactions); biology studies even larger and more complex entities, typically those that have internal self-replicating functions. So on also for the social and behavioural sciences. Metaphysics is also interested in finding out what the world is really like, but it approaches this question on a higher level of generality. It studies the more general categories of entities there are. So for instance while the individual disciplines find electrons, gold, and foxes, metaphysics finds a category of persistent entities, different from the category of events, which are typically changes in the persistent entities, like spontaneous decay, dissolution, running etc.

Then we have a division between the persistent entities and the properties that they have, and the relations they stand in. Also the causal connections there are. So, metaphysics abstracts from the results of the empirical sciences certain highly general categories and asks what is the minimally common element that is common to each instance within each cateogory. This in turn influences thinking in the empirical sciences, e.g. about causal connections. There is no empirical discipline that studies causal connections as a general feature, but plenty of disciplines that study particular types of causal connections. Naturally, in between these very rough structures mentioned here, there are intermediary issues, e.g. what is a function, etc. Some philosophers think they arrive at an understanding of these categories without considering the results of empirical science (and some natural scientists think they deploy no philosophical concepts), but to understand the ultimate structure of reality without considering the particulars is too obscure for me.

I have a totally different view about the relationship of philosophy in science--philosophy comes first--it identifies the starting points and axioms which underlie all science but it does not do science work--Ayn Rand (an Aristotelian) identified the core axioms: existence (reality), the law of identity (everything is something) and consciousness (one's means of awareness). The law of causality is implicit in the law of identity-axioms are self evident to perception and cannot be contradicted without accepting them in the process-philosophy also has to identify the method by which one knows (epistemology) which requires a valid theory of concepts--without that science cannot progress at all-

There have been many suggestions about components in the ultimate or general structure of reality that we are supposed to understand without considering the empirical. There is the Law of Causality, Law of Identity, Consciousness, and Life. Without knowing which of the many laws of causality or identity we are talking about, it is perhaps difficult to reach decisive answers. But, the very fact that there are many laws of causality and many laws of identity at least mean that the a priori road to determining these concepts is fallible.

Aristotle’s ‘everything that comes to be, comes to be by the agency of something’ is one suggestion which turned out to be false once we worked out inertial motion. Since objects continue in their state of motion in the absence of forces (and hence in the absence of the action of an agent) then they change their position without agency being involved and hence novel constellations of objects come into being without agency. This empirical piece of knowledge thus dramatically changed our view of this particular law of causality. Similarly, spontaneous decay is a violation of the more general formulation ‘there is a cause to everything’. So we are now reduced to find out which changes exactly are causal changes and which are not. So again empirical knowledge forces a change in our basic philosophical concepts.

As for the law of identity, I think the formulation ‘everything is something’ really is a derivation of ‘everything always has a determinate nature’ which used to be called the principle of ontological determinacy, and which J.M.E. McTaggart thought was so fundamental that he called it the ‘Total Ultimate Presupposition’. Now, McTaggart thought this principle was a priori certain, because to admit its falsity would be to admit that reality is contradictory and if it were, nothing could ever be known or intelligibly stated. So it was a logical truth that everything had to be determinate. Leibniz had similar views about this, but he had to support his thesis by appeal to a supremely logical God who would never have found reason to create a reality either with contradictory nature, or with indiscernible duplicate natures. However, the uncertainty of quantum physics is an empirical input that is challenging this view; can an entity be in an indeterminate state? The question isn’t settled, but it still appears as if it cannot be settled except by taking empirical science into account.

Consciousness however is not a priori, because we cannot state ‘I have a consciousness’ without first having had conscious experiences, and thus can only make the claim on the basis of empirical input. It is then a more puzzling question that even though we can recognise a conscious experience from day one, we still don’t really know what it is or how it arises. We don’t know a priori, and we don’t know a posteriori (i.e. on the basis of experience).

I am not sure what I can say about Life as a presupposition of biology, so this is a good a time as any to stop.

Well this could go on foreve but I will make a few comments.

1. You do not need philosophy to understand what life is: a process of self, generated goal directed action and a conditional process--this differentiates life from inanimate matter--goal directedness is set by evolution--if an organism does not act to satisfy it needs it goes out of existence- goal directed action is unconscious in some respects and conscious in others (depending on the organism in question)--there is no vitalism and no mysticism--

2. There is only one law of identity: to exist is to be something specific--what an entity is determines what it can do or will do in specific circumstances--if an entity is nothing in particular it is nothing-philosophy does not tell you what any given entity's nature is: that has to be discovered by science

3. There is no such thing as randomness metaphysically--including with particles--particles do not randomly turn into hot fudge sundaes or cell phones-- randomness is an epistemological concept (lack of full knowledge about something)-not knowing what every particle does not not mean it acts at random--

4. Confusion about species and the like is due to philosophers not having had a valid theory of concepts--this has been terribly damaging to philosophy and science--Aristotle was much closer to the truth than Plato (who was a plague on mankind for denying the senses and leaving concepts floating in space)- but the issue was resolved by Ayn Rand: Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology and a book by H. Binswanger: How We Know.

The attached works comprise the result of a detailed philosophical analysis of living systems aimed at providing answers the following questions;-

1. How do complex living systems develop and maintain their high level of complexity in the face of the laws of thermodynamics.

2. How does the brain work and what is the neural correlate of consciousness.

3. If a universal model of living systems can be developed then can it provide an answer to the complex philosophical problem of time perception ?

Chapter Life, Catalysis and Excitable Media: A Dynamic Systems Appro...

Article How Long is a Piece of Time? Phenomenal Time and Quantum Coh...

Article Time, Mind and Quantum Coherence: Physics, Psychophysics and...

Article The Candle and the Flame:- Structure, Energy, Information an...

I think time is also not well understood--time is simply a measurement of relative motion--e.g., how many pulses of a quartz crystal does it take to go to the store and back-time requires a frame of reference-to measure time you need a standard (many options)-- time pre supposes existence- the universe is not in time, time is in the universe--time is not an entity but a relationship-

Ulrike Ritterbusch that is an interesting contribution, although the primary task of the philosophy is not necessary solve problems, this is one of the final outcomes of the philosophical debates, another can be the elimination of the problem, like happened with the vitalism vs materialism problem in the organic or biochemical fields, or the Nicolas Dierks's example

Yes Eberhard, you are right, nevertheless we have started to do that, there are a partial list of the conceptual problems of the life sciences: 

1. The real potential, the veracity of the conclusions and so on of a certain kind of methodological procedure 

2. The epistemological and ontological status of the function concept, is not reducible to physics concepts, does it define the central core of the biology, or at least is it a useful concept to defend the life sciences autonomy? 

3. The definition of life. gene, specie, information (In my opinion the life's definition problem has been solved, from a formal or analytical procedure by the autopoiesis theory, moreover other people thinks that the autopietic's concept of life has philosophoical complications, see http://sonoran-institute-for-epistemic-studies.org/images/AUTOCATAKINETICS-YES.PDF)

4. The ontological problem within the levels of selection discussion

5. The human's race notion

6. The random nature of the genetic variation, the ontological meaning of chance

and so on...

But all of these problems are in a continuous discussion, none of them have been eliminated or solved

Yes, The philosophical analysis of a concept, is a collection of conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the application of that concept. The bi conditional (phrased as “if and only if” and having truth conditions satisfied if both parts being tested have identical truth values) can be used in this process, and philosophical analysis is a common technique used to simplify the determination of truth values for a bi conditional with numerous characterizing consequent.

Jeanan: Sorry--that's not the way I approach what a concept is.

The clearest fairly recent example is probably Elliott Sober's work on the units of selection (The Nature of Selection, 1984), and later on group selection with David Sloan Wilson (Unto Others, 1999).  It's easier to see the effect in retrospect, and it's not easy to separate the contributions from philosophers and from philosophically sophisticated scientists, but there is a great deal of discussion between philosophers and theoretically inclined biologists on Genomics, Systems Biology, Microbiology, Systematics, Big Data, etc., and many biologists seem to think this is a productive dialogue.

I would say that the example of Aristotle is very interesting, because one third of his works deals with biology and zoology. Significant progress in the understanding of his conception of biology has been made since the 1980's with a book by Pierre Pellegrin on classes and genres in Aristotle's biology. Nowadays, people ask if Aristotle offers a system based on teleology and/or functionalism. That said, it would be hard not to see that he has done a significant contribution to biology, because his treatises are, along with other treatises in the Hippocratic Corpus, the first evidence of systematic work being done to understand the world of living organisms. His theories might be very outmoded, yet the Lyceum was the place of intense work on Biology and what we call "Natural Life" (i.e. for Aristotle "dying organisms" as opposed to everlasting organisms like stars or Gods...).

Aristotle really founded biology, using the inductive method--he did make errors, e.g., he did not know about the experimental method but that is not his fault. That discovery came much later.  I don't think his view of teleology was totally correct--I recall that he said water falling was teleological-but I am not an Aristotle scholar--but I think it is correct to view living organisms as teleological, that is goal directed with life as the built in goal (thru evolution), but without any implication of supernaturalism or vitalism..

For us, it seems like Aristotle has founded biology, because his treatises on living organisms are the only one remaining of a long period dedicated to the understanding of the origins of life. The Greeks had many theories on breathing, sexual or non sexual generation, on blood, and so on, and Aristotle's text leave us wondering how many treatises were written on the same subject before his birth. No doubt his contribution is "foundational" as we say, but he surely got the idea of studying living organisms from a tradition of inquiries (Gk. historias). Some of them were indeed empirical in a moderate sense: the complete and systematic observation of a set of symptoms leading to a sure diagnosis (see Aristotle Metaphysics, book I, ab initio). Sure, it's a long shot from there to Biology, not to say empirical biology, but it bears traces of some tradition of research in the domain of living organisms. In a nutshell, the beginning of Aristophanes' Clouds leaves us wondering how much Biology there was in Greek Cosmology.

Aristotelian biology makes a comeback in a small way every few decades (the last big era was in the 1930s) but it is not all that illuminating of modern biology in my opinion, most especially the teleological thinking (unless it is the teleology brought about by selection).

I also disagree that the task and value of philosophy of biology lies in necessary and sufficient definitions or biconditional inferences, as biology is messy and generally full of exceptions. David Hull used to say that every generalisation in biology had exceptions, including that one.

I think the value of philosophy to working biologists lies in forcing them to think in a metalevel fashion: not "what is a gene?" or "what is a species?" but "what would make a good definition of genes, or species?" and it transpires that these concepts are way harder to pin down that most biologists think (honorable exceptions aside).

Moreover, philosophers deal with questions like "what is a good explanation in biology?" that many biologists have rarely if ever critically reflected upon. Most biologists tend to parrot what they learned from their earliest professors on any topic that is not their active field of research (which is why most biologists still seem to think a species is what Ernst Mayr said it was).

I strongly recommend Griffiths' and Stotz's latest book on the philosophy of genes as an example of a serious and illuminating discussion of a biology topic that even experts can benefit from.

I would like to second Professor Dupre's suggestion above concerning Wilson and Sober's (see http://socio.ch/evo/sobwil.html) contribution to the group selection discussion as an example of a genuinely philosophical contribution to a biological literature.  It showed that that the contemporaneous argument about levels of selection was more an argument about bio-ideology than an argument about fact. 

Stefan,

Would be interested in your discussion of teleology.  Have written some on "teleonomy".  Not sure how I will know about the new thread when you start it, but please do what you can to tell interested folks how to get to it. 

I think John Dupré is modest when he carefully gives just a few examples of contribution of philosophy to biology. There are really great influences of philosophy on the development of biological sciences. This contribution is methodological but also practical. Aristotle was mentioned. The insistence on the experiments by Roger Bacon was of great importance in the late Middle ages; or theoretical – philosophical ideas of Galileo all were very concrete. In modern times, let me just mention Popper's critique of induction that made us careful with our experimental results when projecting corresponding generalizations. And one practical aspect of his philosophy: Popper’s or Marxists’ objections to psychoanalysis were stimulation to experimental psychology and neurobiology in the recent times and resulted in decline of psychoanalysis. Statistics was greatly influenced by philosophers and the use of statistics in biological and medical sciences is a concrete result that shaped the inferences of experimental medicin that could be useful for clinicam practice.

I think Popper was one of the great disasters ever to befall the philosophy of science-see my article in the J. of Management, 2007 (33:6),  Popper was opposed to reality, causality, concepts and proof. He replaced proof with disproof, thus totally reversing the nature of science which is based on gathering evidence. He wanted deduction from random emotions. This is simply not how science progresses or has ever progressed. See for example D. Harriman's book: The Logical Leap.

Edwin

I wrote: …Popper's critique of induction that made us careful with our experimental results when projecting corresponding generalizations. And one practical aspect of his philosophy: Popper’s or Marxists’ objections to psychoanalysis were stimulation to experimental psychology and neurobiology in the recent times and resulted in decline of psychoanalysis.

I maintain that what I wrote is the case.

And this is where our discussion may finish.

And please, no fringe science, no fringe philosophy. Please write just about what you know. And use arguments, not empty declarations.

I know what Popper advocated--I read him! And it did not take Popper to discredit Freud--the whole system was arbitrary and fell of its own weight--

Dear Edwin,

I will not vote your comments down.

First. Some of us on RG have been “fighting” with Popper’s ideas for almost half a century. Therefore the fact that you “read him” is not an exclusive privilege here. I expect that people who take part in this discussion are professional scientists or philosophers who have good reasons to believe to know what they are discussing.

And second. Please try to be fair with us. This means do not make an illusion that what you say is widely accepted opinion, but tell us that this is your or somebody else’s opinion that has not received much support from the community. We will probably love to see what you think. Yet do not make us search your lists of publications, do not give us just a link, do not force us to buy and read a 500 pages book. Instead of empty declarations, give us the supporting arguments, write or give us a PDF article to download. Help us enjoy your original ideas. You can do even more. Bring your original idea that opposes academic consensus here on RG for a discussion, but make clear that the idea is NOT a main stream opinion. People will love to criticize your ideas. Just be fair with us, please.

I would like to study more thoroughly the deep disagreement between Edwin Locke and Dragan Pavlovic about Popper. In order to do that, I will have to show that the opposition between the more general Popperian method, for which falsificationism is only a part, and the Baconian inductivism is in fact the important dichotomy.

For Popper, who considers enumerative induction as inconsistent, the only way to scientific methodology is not to prove a hypothesis but only to show that we have the possibility to falsify it. As he said in Conjecture and refutation (1963): induction, i.e. inference based on many observations, is a myth. It is neither a psychological fact, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific procedure. So that he proposed a way of reasoning from a hypothesis to the facts implied by it in a deductive way. However this will lead to as much theories as there are hypotheses to verify, and will restrict scientific research to a task of validation. But, as Hume, he defines induction as a generalization from specific observations. In this case it is true that such a generalization may always be refuted by a new observation: rival theories are infinite.

But for Bacon, induction has another meaning more thorough. For the previous meaning, he clearly said: For the induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is childish; its conclusions are precarious and exposed to peril from a contradictory instance; and it generally decides on too small a number of facts, and on those only which are at hand. (The new Organon, 1620). The second meaning, which we can call eliminative induction, had been used by Galileo, Descartes and Newton, and is defined by Bacon as: The other derives from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but as yet untried. The way Newton found his laws, not from hypotheses but by induction in the Baconian meaning, is a perfect example of this way of reasoning. We can say that eliminative induction can reduce the infinite number of hypotheses because, with the elimination of other theories, the space of possibilities is then reduced.

Nowadays this Baconian induction leads to the mechanistic theory applied as well in natural sciences, as in biological sciences or in social sciences: see for example Craver and Bechtel, 2006, Mechanisms in The philosophy of science: an Encyclopedia.

For biological sciences, about which we discuss here, I think that a very good example may be found in the joint paper by Phyllis McKay Illari and Jon Williamson published in Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (2010) on: Function and organization: comparing the mechanisms of protein synthesis and natural selection.

Monsieur Courgeau, Cher Daniel,

It has been an honour to get your response.

I am also flattered with your support – if I understood you correctly?

After the interpretation of Peter Urbach (Francis Bacon’s philosophy of science, 1987), Bacon did not stick blindly to induction as it was maintained so often earlier. Popper of course did not think that science is based on inductive inferences. I did not have deep disagreement with Edwin. Indeed Popper was NOT anti-inductivist and he certainly cannot be called “great disaster”. But I simply think that Edwin announced a position that is untenable and unorthodox and in fact a common sense illusion. Many physicists, who did not really have time to think about this, hold similar simplistic position. Yet my later comment was methodological one, dedicated to other people on this forum suggesting to try to maintain critical positions, similarly as they were doing when exercising their scientific careers. This site is kind of amusement, but complete los of fundamental rules of scientific communication may be bad and repulsive to many commentators.

I am certain you enjoy nice Mediterranean weather and hope you are not getting too much rain these days.

Just to be clear I have never viewed induction as just simple enumeration. See Dave Harriman's book, The Logical Leap. for more on this. I am also a co-author of one of the most successful theory building efforts in the history of psychology (goal setting theory)--which has been going on for over 45  years. (First presentation in 1990 after 25 years of research by me, my co author and others) This effort did  involve summarizing the studies but also: looking at all negative results, identifying moderators and causal mediators, examining generality, using diverse methods,  integrating the core ideas with other inductive theories, and constantly refining the theory. This approach (described in my 2007 article) is totally different that what the journals seem to want now: have a theory (or pretend to have one), make deductions (often made secretly after the fact), test them and consider the matter closed. I don't think this process works to build solid theories. I do not pretend to have a full theory of induction but Harriman makes some valuable observations about the process.

Edwin

Are you aware that we, humans, project our theories even after a single "experiment"! Or even without experiments!

Please read Popper. I cannot continue such discussion. Sorry.

I read Popper--but we should end the discussion

Edwin

Yes, let us end the discussion. Thanks for being patient with me, I am, sometimes, unpleasantly, quite emotional in the discussions.

The person who down voted my last comment obviously did not even understand what we were talking about.

Dear Dragan, dear Edwin,

The main aim of my comment was to contrast the two different significations of the word induction made by Popper and Bacon. Evidently Popper was right in rejecting enumerative induction but he did not understand that Baconian induction was not enumerative. In fact I think that Popper’s falsificationism leads to an infinite number of rival theories and falls finally into the same criticism as enumerative induction.

I read with great interest the paper of Edwin on: The case for inductive theory building, and I mainly agree with his approach which follows the views of Bacon and Newton that has moved science – and the world – forward. I am trying to do the same for demography, a science born with Graunt in the XVIIth century in the line of Bacon, but which needs a true axiomatization of its concepts in order to go forward. See the joint paper written with the philosopher Robert Franck.

Edwin,

I cannot read carefully 30 pages of text right now. One of the reson being that, when I looked quickly through the text I could not escape the impression that this is an unorthodox description of history of the philosophy science. If this is right description of how the ideas about logical bases of scientific method developed and what they were, then your contention may be interesting. However, I doubt it. Presently, I cannot continue this discussion.

DANIEL: i AM GLAD WE ARE ON THE SAME WAVELENGTH.

DRAGAN; YOU ARE RIGHT--I AM UNORTHODOX.

I propose, instead of second hand analyses, to see the originals.

Galileo, Backon,  Kant, Popper, all free free online:

https://www.stmarys-ca.edu/sites/default/files/attachments/files/Dialogues_Concerning_Two_New_Sciences.pdf

https://resources.oncourse.iu.edu/access/content/group/800abd97-71ef-49fe-800e-37a7e411eea3/Bacon,%20Novum%20Organum.pdf

http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/kant/critique-pure-reason6x9.pdf

http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/popper-logic-scientific-discovery.pdf

I know perfectly the originals of Galileo, Bacon, Kant, Popper, Graunt, Newton, etc. and I try from this reading to make my own opinion on contemporaneous scientific research. 

No, dear Daniel,

We can never “know” them too well. This discussion is slightly a failure, but this is not a real problem. Philosophy is about clearing the failures up.  I saw that people use the secondary sources, so I offered the primary sources, Okay.

Nevertheless, the question that Popper asked was whether science was based on induction and his reply was “no” since induction did not a priory guarantying the validity and the soundness of the arguments. This is however not a problem if science did not claim truth, as I personally believe.

In science, as in ordinary everyday life, we need a single experience to infer how the world is. The logic behind relies on causation: if the conditions are the same, some specific cause will always produce the same effect (event). If the conditions are not the same (the causing event varies, there are confounding causes, the effect – resulting event is not well defined) we need to repeat the experiment and are satisfied with the mean effect. Also if our measurements are not precise (there are probably never precise enough) we may need to repeat the experiment.

If the event/object of the enquiry varies a priory (size of the tennis balls produced in China), we will repeat measurements to get the mean. Or to see the survival rate of the Ebola patients, we need repeated measurements because of above given reasons (all conditions are unknown). But on the contrary, only one or two Michelson-Morey experiments are needed to establish "aether wind" characteristics. Yet if a priory the nature of the cause or the result varies we need to establish probabilities of the outcome. In biology and medicine we deal with some badly defined conditions and inevitably we need probability and may be Bayesian inference.

However!

The concept of “induction” that is discussed in the philosophy of science is extremely complex. The induction of Beckon has also been highly complex and has never been understood. Let me just explain it superficially. He confuses the two types of induction with “hypothesis”, I mean abduction, and then with verification or even Popper type bold conjectures. Induction is for him the “anticipation of nature” (one that he dismisses as simple enumeration) and “interpretation of nature”, both concepts quite confusing in principle to be discussed here. Popper (Conjectures and refutations, 1963, page 14) and Peter Urbach (“Francis Bacon’s philosophy of science”, 1987, chapter 1) tried to clear the issue but I think both were unsuccessful. The fact that not only people on ResearchGate, who are not philosophers, but all mentioned philosophers confound induction with abduction (hypothesis of Pierce – that is basically kind of fallacy of confirming the consequent), makes it all simply too complex. If you, on the contrary know all this so well – then I have a lot to learn from you.

The best book on induction that I have read is David Harriman's The Logical Leap. In addition to explaining induction it deals with concepts, philosophy, mathematics and some history regarding scientific discovery.

Dear Dragan,

I enitrely agree with you that we can never know them too well, and that our understanding can evolve with time. I will try to answer your questions later, as I am now participating to a Conference in Paris.

Dear Edwin,

I examined the Ayn Rand "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" from 1979 (I saw the 1990 edition). I also examined some secondary sources for her views on ethical issues. I decided not to spend more time with such texts and ideas.

If David Harriman's “The Logical Leap” is based on such a « philosophy », I regret, I do not have time for this. However, if you would try to understand why I have such attitudes – after reading my comments and may be my papers, particularly those on ethics, and if you then would still think that I should have confidence in you and read the book, I will buy the book and read it. The responsibility rests with you. Can you take this burden?

To ALL

Some trivialities.

The reviews on Amazon. com of the David Harriman's “The Logical Leap” , are not from independent readers; They are ALL (I verified, Travis Norsen, Allan Gotthelf etc.) from the members of the Ayn Rand Institute (ARI).

Also you could read this on Wikipedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayn_Rand_Institute

(…) ARI also established a board of governors, which initially included Harry Binswanger, Robert Hessen, Edwin A. Locke,…(…).

Dear Edwin, you could have disclosed your conflict of interests. This is where our dispute ends. I will certainly not buy the Harriman’s book

I have nothing against that group, may be even one day I will mature enough to read her works. But, would people who have some special links BEYOND their universities, who belong to some religious groups, secret or public societies, groups with some special programs, political groups and similar, and who promote the tasks linked to those groups, please inform us about this, put this information on the RG site. There are people, like me, who prefer to share their opinions, ideas, dispute or agree with, communicate about science, philosophy or research – with the private persons exclusively and NOT with the groups that have some particular and not private, genuine scientific and intellectual aims. Please.

Philosophy (of Science) formulates conditions on the possibility that biology solves problems. That is why it is philosophy, not science.

Dragan: ARI has no board of governors--your information must be 25 years old (it did have a board of advisers which I was on for a few years in the 1970s but even then it was in name only). It  has always had a Bd. of Directors. I am not on it and never have been. There is no conflict of interest in my recommending Harriman's book. I get no royalties and had nothing to do with writing the book. I will not take responsibility for educating you. I came on AR's philosophy on my own and have studied it for over 50 years. Wiki says it has no ARI website. Nor am I very interested in the critics. here is why: I have been reading smears for about 50 years--in 99% of the cases the attacks of AR have been by people who never actually read what she wrote. Among the few who did read something, they often accuse her of holding views which are the opposite of her actual views- or make some bizarre misconstrual --and she was a very, very clear writer. I did write a refutation of Jennifer's Burns smear book which is on file in the Ayn Rand archives. But there is only so much dishonesty I want to spend my time on. If someone wants a serious discussion of AR's actual ideas, based on actual reading her work first-hand, I am willing--at least to start a discussion. Those who want only to discuss her critics, not her work, should seek out someone else.

What is AR again?

AR is novelist-philosopher Ayn Rand.

Thank you. I did not know she had an elaborate position on epistemology.

Dear Edwin,

You should have removed the semicolon and parenthesis (I corrected it now) and the link would have worked. This is the address where your name is. It is easy to remove – if you realy want to remove it.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayn_Rand_Institute

Ayn Rand "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" could be read (partially) here:

http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Objectivist-Epistemology-Expanded-Edition/dp/0452010306#reader_0452010306

Dear Erwin I am not interested in the work of Ayn Rand. I am satisfied with reading some 20-30 pages. I think what she writes is "not significant". This thread is not to make the publicity of her ideas or of the David Harriman's “The Logical Leap”. Please do it at some other place.

I think that your comment on Popper was not correct and your article that you offered does not show correct development of the philosophical ideas about logic of science. You cited almost all secondary sources and I am not sure that you saw the original works. This thread is not the right place to discuss this. Please do not try to pull me into discussing the mentioned issues. Sincerely I do not have to say anything favorable about this all. And yet, I just do not want to say much more about this here. Thanks, Edwin.

Benoit: AR has a revolutionary theory of concepts in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology--this is the issue she considers most important in epistemology.

Dragan: Please do not tell me what I can post. You do not control the website. All your comments were simply evaluations without reasons. Given that it is just as well that we do not have any further discussions.

Dear Edwin

There are probably two aspects that are quite important when discussing on RG: to say the truth and to be fair and respect the others.

You attacked blindly almost entire philosophy of science saying that it has been a disaster (Popper), and tried to promote the views of Ayn Rand and some book – some other work on logic of physics that is strongly and covertly (!) supported by ARI. I responded by explaining some aspects of the method of F. Beckon, pointed out your errors (all were in the response to Daniel – I put it there to avoid making you feel offended - may be you missed those comments, they were in the sections 5 and 6 on the thread); then I discovered your conflict of interests. I only “advised” you to restrain of making publicity for Ayn Rand Institute, where you were one of the presidents (as you now say that it was long ago).

You accused me of “telling you" what to write  and that I did not advance any argument in my previous comments. You are not saying the truth, you are not fair and you are not respecting my friendly comments.

Well, I have admiration for your “Goal setting theory”. Yet I still believe that your understanding of induction is incomplete, that ARI publicity on RG involves a conflict of interest; and that your attack on me in your last comment was misplaced and unfair.

I must do some homework then, because I do not know what she wrote. Yet, for the sake of this discussion, could you please summarize what AR has to say on the participation of philosophers to the development of conceptual analysis in biology?

Benoit

AR epistemology (partially):

http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Objectivist-Epistemology-Expanded-Edition/dp/0452010306#reader_0452010306

AR ethics:

http://biblioteca.mygeocom.com/wp-content/uploads/filebase/R/Rand%20Ayn/Ayn%20Rand%20-%20The%20Virtue%20of%20Selfishness.pdf

AR Institute

https://www.aynrand.org

I examined partially "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology". This is unfortunately a bad homework of some pedagogy student who tried to solve some problems of epistemology and failed. All arguments are in relatively short questions and answers, prescriptions, counsels, strait dismissal or acceptance of short life formulas… Something like a cookbook for practical, diligent housewives.

I examined what Rand had to say about morality. Sorry, this is simple, but falsely pretentious text that advocates egotism. The style is similar, the conclusions strait and with little real argumentation. May be she had a hard life. But this does not justify such untenable position expressed in such a trivial way.

Now when I think that the Ayh Rand Institute supports AR research, I want simply to know why and who are those people; and whether they in fact have some other aims, because AR modest work hardly deserves such a support. May be this is just her family. Then, this is a fine gesture and I would support it, why not.

Yet whether her work had some influence over biology or science? Not that I know.

If I am wrong, please advance strait, complete arguments, I would like to learn. However, please, do not offer me to read 20 or 40 pages paper that proves something, or to read entire books.

THE ONLY WAY TO OBJECTIVELY EVALUATE AYN RAND IS TO READ WHAT SHE WROTE NOT WHAT SOMEONE ELSE WROTE- with one exception--her student Leonard Peikoff presented a thorough summary of her philosophy: Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. Here you can get it all in one place and it is accurate--"partially" examining someone else's alleged summary is very likely to be a waste of time- (I am not saying no one else knows her views but the outsider would have no way of knowing)--For those wanting just epistemology and in more detail than Peikoff's book, her  Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology is the place to go--As for Harriman's book, the support of ARI and Peikoff is stated directly in the Preface, page 2. I am disgusted by these ridiculous claims of some type of conspiracy. And I was never a "president" of ARI but I am proud to endorse them with no conflict of interest at all. These ad hominem attacks need to stop. They are obviously mean to divert people from looking at the actual ideas.

Time for a rethreading here.  I would hate for the original discussion of whether and how philosophers contribute to the development of science to be lost in a stormy discussion of LIbertarian philosophy of science, etc.  Suggest you-guys set up a new discussion thread on Objectivist Views of Science and leave a pointer here for those of us who want to follow you there.  Thank you. 

Ayn Rand was not a libertarian and rejected that philosophy--as to me: I have no desire to present AR's ideas from scratch--that could go on forever-if someone who has read her work or Peikoff wants to discuss her ideas, I may be willing--

Whatever --

This is the current thread:

• Has the philosophical analysis contributed to solve any biological conceptual problems?
• Of course the first question would be how many conceptual/empirical problems, of philosophy's interest the biology has? How many of those problems has been solved?
• Just in case of any extremist response, what would you say to a biology scientists who thinks that the philosophy cannot solve anything?

Anything else should best go elsewhere out of respect for the original questionner's intent.

n 

This reply is to Nicholas:

I think I may have said this before but just in case I did not: I think philosophy does two things in relation to science:

1) it identifies the axioms underlying philosophy and thereby all science (and shows how to establish that something is an axiom)--axioms cannot be proven in philosophy because they are presupposed by any attempt at proof--axioms have to be validated as axioms (see Peikoff, ch. 1 for AR's view)

2) it presents a theory of epistemology, how we know, including, and this is crucial, a theory of concepts (Peikoff, chs. 2 & 3)

After that, it is up to the  special sciences to make discoveries. For example, philosophy can tell us that everything obeys causal laws but it does not discover Newton's Laws--that is up to the physicists..It does not discover or validate evolution--that is up to Darwin and his successors--etc.

Side point: I do not see the laws of mechanical causality as validating psychological determinism--that is another discussion-

Nicholas

He, he, ... and if you want to know more, go and read Peikoff and AR.

About Ancient philosophers (Vth B C) one could make the case that some Physicians would reject any conceptual analysis prima facie, on the basis that it is just hot air (On Human Nature, §1). There is a trace of this attitude towards analysis in the distinction Aristotle makes in science between "physikos" (which I could paraphrase as "according to the natural phenomena") and "logikos" ("what follows from a piece of valid reasoning"). Greeks, or some of them, were surely aware that in fields like health and related matters like biology, facts matter first (see Aristotle, Metaphysics Α, 1 981a-b), and concepts are only approximations intended to refer to things they also called matter, causes, forms, individual and species, ends. To get a clear answer from the perspective of "Ancient Empiricism" on biology, and how they saw the contribution of conceptual analysis to solving problems, one would need to start looking in the Hippocratic Corpus where it could be found, get a good grasp of the Plato-Aristotle quarrel on Forms, and then look in the treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus on nature (On Reproduction, Motion of Animals, On Plants, etc.) where problems of classification arise or where classification is used to make distinctions between phenomena that can be correlated. A huge program... But it could be a fascinating book. I wonder if anyone knows anything like that being ever published.

To sum it up: I guess philosophical analysis can help, but when it is limited to concepts, although it is no waste of time to spend some time thinking about concepts, Aristotle and other "Empiricists" thought any purely logical analysis is bound to be disproved by facts. Philosophical analysis can help, but the philosopher might not be the best person to know if the analysis has done any good.

Philosophy and Biology make a strange couple, but they've been living together a long time!

Since this started as a thread on biology and philosophy it might be worth remarking that I have been working in the philosophy of science in general and biology in particular for several decades, and I have never to my recollection encountered a single reference to Ayn Rand.  I don't know her work that is being discussed here.  I once read one of her political books, found it somewhat repellent, and found no reason to read any more since she is not known as a contributor to my field.  So I cannot say that she does not have wonderful insights on the nature of science.  I can say that her work would provide a decidedly eccentric route into the subject, as opposed to, say, Carnap, Hempel, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and dozens or hundreds of more recent philosophers who have worked specifically on the philosophy of biology, often in close collaboration with biologists.

There are some very precise answers to the Aimer's question and some proofs of how philosophy (for example of Ayn Rand - AR) can predict and influence theoretical and practical science or even create predictions in the past. Such are for example Dr. Peikoff’s (from Ayn Rand Institute) concepts of ethics, epistemology and philosophy, developed here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoAWCwm-UXw&list=PLC1662D288BEAB4DE

This would be an example of how the "philosophy" of Ayn Rand can influence the science of war (compare to Clausewitz, “On War”, 1832). Some of the fruits of such A. Rand philosophy were consumed recently in the Middle East wars. There are more similarly wise theoretical treatises on the site of the AR Institute.

Indeed, Ayn Rand’s journeys to ethics (“The virtue of selfishness”) may even produce retrograde predictions that could be mirrored, for example, in the “Lebensraum philosophy” and seen as resulting in the concrete practices from the late 30s and after. The mechanisms employed in such practices (killing people) may, as they did, influence population distribution and may have some distinct biological effects.

The "ethics" of Ayn Rand may help, if accepted, to revive the state of nature of Hobbes and finally regulate the overpopulation of our planet.

Such “philosophy” is of course just bullshit.

Hold on, folks.  I think we are abusing the thread.  Remember, we are supposed to be responding to a question. That's what's different about RG discussions.  We don't just fling out opinions; we answer questions.

  I took the question as arising from the questioner having had to defend his interest in philosophy against assaults from "hard" scientists to the effect that phiilosphers waste everybody's time by spinning out into hopeless arguments and ideological bickering.  I am afraid that, by behaving as we have, we have proved his opponents' case.  He has asked us to provide specific examples where philosophical work has had a positive effect on the development of a science.  What is the HEURISTIC value of philosophy? Mostly, we have failed him.

One person has offered Sober and Wilson, and I agree with that choice.  I might suggest another example: William Wimsatt's resolution of the problem of emergence:  something like," an emergent is any property of a whole that arises from the order of presentation or arrangement of the parts."  (Please correct me if I have this wrong.)  While I am hard pressed to come up with any specific experiment that arose from that definition, it does put me in mind of many experiments I might do, if I were not old and dumb.

A third example might be Charles Peirce's "pragmatic maxim" (the meaning of a [scientific] conception is just the difference in scientific practice that adopting that concept would yield), which, arguably, led to the vast flowering of American behaviorism. 

The contestants in this argument seem to AGREE that philosophy makes a difference to science.  But this premise is exactly what the questioner questions! What EVIDENCE do we fans of phiolsophy have that a philosophical innovation has ever lead to a a SCIENTIFIC advance.  I think it's a fair question that deserves to be answered on its own terms. Again,  I reproduce the question below for your consideration.

Remember:  the problem here is not to decide which of philosopher is right; the problem is to reassure the questioner that  philosophers of science  are not  vultures that pray upon the battlefields of science.  Rather they are the generals who set the battle and the diplomats that make the peace.  . 

N

• Has the philosophical analysis contributed to solve any biological conceptual problems?

Of course the first question would be how many conceptual/empirical problems, of philosophy's interest the biology has? How many of those problems has been solved?

Just in case of any extremist response, what would you say to a biology scientists who thinks that the philosophy cannot solve anything?

Here is a short one: some heuristic procedures in medecine are borrowed from dialectical analysis as one can see in passages like the opening lines of On Regimen, and see also Diseases I 1 1 & Épidémies, IV 3 §12. From passages like these and others, one can safely say that: Being proficient at refuting incorrect statements through questions and answers seems to be a sign of knowledge for the Sophists and Hippocratic authors. Socrates’ avowal of ignorance needs to be interpreted from this context.

This is a sign of a heuristic method being put to use, and it has contributed to many fields from geometry to politics. It eventually came to be criticized as purely conceptual, but it is clear that the analysis was a rule of thumb: always check if the contrary of your statement is not true.

For Aristotle, concepts are born out of experience; so when we map correctly a category on a fact, science can start dealing with causes. In this case, the heuristic has a clearly empirical twist, but was formulated by a philosopher who also thought that assertions we make need to be "analyzed" according to the logic of the Analytica Priora. I imagine Aristotle answering: 'well 'conceptual biology' is per se a sub-matter of dialectics, because the only way you can approach it is with your logic, but if you can start with the right premises, if you get the categories right, then your work is to analyze what you can deduce from what you already have 'in hand''.

The Greeks contrasted empirical from dialectical heuristic, and this does not mean, at least for them, that the dialectical heuristic was a waste of time. 

I hope this contributes to answering the question, Nicholas, at least from the perspective of Ancient philosophy.

I posted the above question to another bulletin board and got this recommending  of a reading which was authored by[our own] John Dupre (see above). 

http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ptb;view=text;rgn=main;idno=6959004.0001.003

I scanned it quickly and it is, indeed, a splendid exploration of the line between the living and the non living.  .  I deeply wish I had written it myself.

But it still begs this thread's question.  What is the pragmatic value of taking one or another view of life?  Can we show, somehow, that biology took some sharp turn for the better BECAUSE of this or similar writing by philosohers?   Perhaps the question is faulted in some way, and we don't need to answer it.  But as of the moment, I can't see how.  The more days pass without our giving good sharp answers, the more the question seems to answer itself. 

N

Here in Santa Fe, there is an informal discussion group ("FRIAM") which has met every Friday Morning for at least the last decade to discuss issues in AI, technology broadly, computer science, philosophy of mind, physics, complexity, and ... pretty much anything else that comes up.   Today, one member of the group defined philosophy as including the exploration of the metaphors underlying science.  If this definition is taken as authoritative, then when Darwin employed pigeon-breeding as a metaphor for the exploration of the design of species in nature, he was doing philosophy.  Of course, another way of looking at the situation is to view the deployment and criticism of metaphors as an essential component of any scientific enterprise.   Either way, people capable of engaging in that activity, have an important role to play in the development of science. 

N

I will re-iterate: I think philosophy's role in science is indirect only: metaphysics: Is there a reality out there, is there causal law, etc? and epistemology: how does one know? what is the role of the senses? how does one form valid concepts?

I think Popper was totally on the wrong track (against concepts, causality, and induction). I think Kant was a disaster by separating reason from reality. Post modernism amounts to pure skepticism: the dead end of philosophy..

So the real issue is: which philosophy, if any, can set a proper base for science?

There is a reason that I chose Ayn Rand's philosophy: it gives intelligible, non contradictory answers.

I now think that I do not need to make any comment here.

yes through fostering mindfulness

I will put it another way: philosophy, if it is a rational philosophy, sets the foundation for science (metaphysics, epistemology) but it does not deal with the content of science (that would be rationalism which has always proved to be disastrous, e.g., Descartes)). Given the foundation, the rest is up to scientists. As those those who claim Rand's work has had no effect, I beg to differ, I am an internationally famous I/O psychologist and her philosophical base was of enormous help to m, but I had to do the actual science myself.

As to the snide comment on Rand's ethics by a person who did not used his name, let me say that if you actually read her work you would know that she is the foremost defender of individual rights and thus political freedom of anyone in history, including John Locke..

For me, the answer is pretty obvious: yes, philosophy support all kinds of human knowledge, be it scientific or not.

But I understand those arguments stating that sometimes metaphysical may be empirically useless if not quite harmful.

The bad use of metaphysics may be almost so pernicious as the bad use of any empirically grounded thesis.

Here I try to focus on a clear example of the appropriate philosophical concepts [taken from Kant's Transcendental Aesthetics] that whether applied to a weird, nonsensical quarrel, unfortunately so often mentioned by the popular media, exposes such a dispute to a ridicule.

I am talking about the wordy questioning whether mankind so much as the whole of the biological species were created by God, as literally implied by Genesis narrative separately and at once (or almost at once), or not, i.e., and all organisms have evolved by Natural Selection as suggested by Charles Darwin.

The former alternative has been called by many CREATIONISM, and the latter DARWINISM.

As said above, this is NONSENSICAL quarrel!

To see how useless it is to waste energies with such wordy talks, it is enough for us to take into account God's eternity, that is, time doesn't make sense for Him! But that answer would require a certain religious belief, which is not our purpose here.

In the Transcendental Aesthetics, (First Part of The Critique of Pure Reason, 1787), Immanuel Kant, one of the most deep Philosophers of all times, demonstrated that TIME does not belong to things in themselves, but is an  pre-condition (an a priori) that OUR SENSES impose to all kinds of perception.

Hence, we are quite unable to conceive anything outside of time. But time itself is not attached to whatever object!

A fortiori, if we believe in God, He might have created all biological species through Natural Selection (a process in TIME,at least for us Humans), and whether we think this way it would never mean that Darwinism contradicts Creationism.

A silly media quarrel to sell books!

I disagree that Darwinism vs. creationism is a nonsensical quarrel.God is an invalid concept. It is not based on evidence but on faith. Faith is belief in the absence of evidence, i.e., belief based on emotion. Religion denies the whole realm of epistemology:: that valid beliefs require a cognitive process, and replaces it with magic, i.e., revelation--knowledge without effort, without means, without the need for validation. The method of Darwin was totally different: he looked at actual evidence, the evidence of the senses and its integration by means of reason. You cannot integrate fairy tales with science.

As to Kant, his stated purpose was to destroy reason in order to make way for (protect) faith. (He was an ardent Christian). He did so by separating reason from reality--by claiming that the real (noumenal) world was unknowable. This was the greatest disaster in the history of philosophy and laid the groundwork for modern skepticism.

Dear Mr Locke, I must say that you missed my point.

I have just intended to demonstrate that Creationism and Darwinism don't have any insurmountable logical incompatibility! As it clearly emerges from a careful pondering with respect to the common sense notion of time.

Whether you believe in God, be it from a religious point of view or not, is not relevant for such a logical purpose.

It would be enough, for my same purpose, to take Einstein's relativity, or any other theory that points out to the serious human limits to deal with time, its perception by our senses as well as with all time processes.

The nonsense of the mentioned quarrel is intrinsically attached to dealing with time as an absolute.

Well Marcos, I totally disagree. Mysticism and science are incompatible. And I do not see what such a conflict has to do with time. Time is a measurement of motion--it is not an entity but a relationship- I do not see any big issue there.

Dear Marcos, 

Like yourself, I believe that phenomenal time represents a key problem for those that take the task of reconciling our conscious experiences with physics seriously. The attached paper attempts both to reconcile our own temporal experiences with what we understand about  (objective?) time, and also, to derive a metaphysical perspective that is logically consistent with what can be experienced, observed and logically justified.

Edwin, as to the question as to whether physics and mysticism are incompatible or not - well, it comes down to what you define as being 'mystical' - Of course, as a philosopher, I prefer the term 'metaphysical'. Metaphysics - can be taken to mean any speculations regarding aspects of the physical universe that we inhabit that are not currently understood, which, if we were to understand them, would alter our understanding of ourselves and the universe that we inhabit profoundly.

I do not believe that paradigm shifts in physics are possible without metaphysical thinking. Einstein was most certainly a metaphysical thinker.

Article Time, Mind and Quantum Coherence: Physics, Psychophysics and...

I see no necessary connection between the metaphysical and the mystical-metaphysics refers to the science of being qua being--I think Aristotle said you have to start somewhere because you cannot prove everything--so the starting point would be axioms--what would be philosophical axioms;; from Ayn Rand: (1) self evident to perception; (2) implicit in one's first perceptions; (3) the base of all knowledge and all proofs; (4) cannot be rejected without accepting them in the process. There are only 3: (1) existence; (2) the law of identity: everything is something; (3) consciousness; #1 comes first. The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. Free will is also a derivative axiom (I am working on this in a book). In contrast mysticism is belief in the absence of evidence, which basically means emotion. Using faith as a starting point makes all claims arbitrary. You can't get to knowledge from there.

And intuition?

Intuition is something fed to you by your subconscious based in stored knowledge--it is not necessarily either true nor false--it has to be validated-

For a reference view https://books.google.com.co/books/about/Studies_in_the_Philosophy_of_Biology.html?id=NMAf65cDmAQC&redir_esc=y

Dear Dr. Gruner,

Thanks for the recommendation.  What is your connection to the volume?  Would you be so kind as to say a few words about its relevance to the thread? 

N

Right!

.  But as I understand the thread, we are looking for specific examples where a philosophical analysis has made a difference for the science, where BECAUSE a philosopher pointed out some confusion in the science, or revealed some heretofore UNapproached angle on the science, the science actually got better.  We have turned up at least one  example ... Sober and Wilson's revelation of the deep confusion in the so-called "group selection" debate.   Do other examples spring to mind from your reading of the Dreisch book? 

I wrote on this, with regards to Jane Smiley's novel A Thousand Acres.  Below: abstract and paper. Hope this might help

This paper examines Jane Smiley’s presentation of space within a distinctive scientific discourse. It argues that mathematics and other sciences are recruited in A Thousand Acres in a manner that turns literary language into a scientific analysis of the land and the people and by which ekphrasis poses as a distinctive therapeutic mechanism of recall since, after all, the whole narrative is presented as an act of remembering a past along with a specific space. The study also underlines how Smiley questions the validity of science, mainly mathematics. Nonetheless, it concludes that by recruiting the sciences within her ekphrastic style, Smiley underscores that cognitive ekphrastic literature is the domain where the contested sciences and humanities might be allied, and where the sciences might overcome their abstractness and numbness and the humanities achieve a rational background

Article 14. “Below the level of the visible: The Mathematics and Phy...

sorry, here it is

Article 14. “Below the level of the visible: The Mathematics and Phy...

Clearly entire Biology as we know it today has its origins and conceptual framework created in Philosophy since at least Aristotle "Physics" written around 350 BC. The ideas of complexity, system, and evolution have been pivotal concepts for development of modern biology ever since Lamarck published his "Philosophie Zoologique", which was technically a beginning of science that today is known as Biology.

Having said the foregoing I am not sure what is more important for science, formulating "right" questions or providing answers to questions. As far as Biology is concerned, Philosophy has greatly contributed (and continues to do that) into formulating basic research agenda for biologists. If "philosophical analysis" has led to a "solution" of "biological conceptual problems" is difficult or impossible to tell. For one thing formulating a problem is not the same as contributing to its solution. (Philosophy appears to be on the formulation side.)

I believe that everything you say is true.  But the original questioner did not ask us for statements of faith.  He asked us for EXAMPLES where biology has been moved forward by a philosophical reformulation.  On the whole, we have not come up with many examples.  Do you have any? 

That's a purely rhetorical question. There is no answer as I've just stated. I am not sure what you mean by a "statement of faith". I haven't issued any but I do hate this chat already. (Just kidding).