Some discussion and an interview with Kauffman at the link below

http://quantum-mind.co.uk/kauffman-on-recoherence/

A brief explanation of recoherence at the link below

http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/29147/what-is-behind-recoherence

Dear Alfredo,

As far as I can see from the abstracts this 'recoherence' involves retrieving quantum level information that might seem to have been lost in 'decoherence' in a way that is not fundamentally different from what Feynman describes in his lectures. If you set up a system in a clever way the information that you can extract from it can be made to seem to disappear and reappear like in the non-interference pattern that can be shown to be two interference patterns on top of each other after all. Is there more to it?

Kauffman's analysis of the 'mind-brain problem' seems to be at a very low popular science writing level that would have seemed ridiculous to Spinoza and Leibniz and still should I think. He gets almost everything wrong in the old chestnut way about randomness and free will that we have had for nearly a century. Recoherence is all about what we as observers can know about dynamic events. The problem of consciousness is about what the dynamic events can know about us! It has nothing to do with what those dynamic events might then 'freely' decide to do about our presence! 

I think this is a dead end.

Dear Jonathan, the part about free will is not the interesting one. Recoherence may be important for a solution to the famous "binding problem": the qualities of conscious experience (color, sound, smell, taste, etc.) are instantiated in several parts of the brain (visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, etc.). How are they integrated into conscious episodes? Kohler tried to address the formation of these Gestalts by means of EM fields, as many researchers do today. Recoherence approach brings another variable into the picture: entropy. Decoherence is related to irreversible entropy increase (see attached paper). In open, far from equilibrium systems, entropy decrease may reverse decoherence and then generate a macro coherent state that lasts for one nanosecond. These macro coherent states are good candidates for Whitehead´s "occasions of experience". Our experienced conscious episodes would be composed of a sequence of many of them in 1-sec chunks. What do you think?

As you know, Alfredo, I have a better idea along those lines, but OK, your case is fair enough. This is another option to consider, even if I personally think it won't work! I think we want a dynamic occasion that lasts 25msec and I am going for phononic interactions. Nanoseconds don't give time to get to the next chair before the music stops.

Dear Jonathan, the trick is that we may perceive a discrete sequence of many 1-nanosecond recoherent states as a continuous chunk with the duration of 1 second or more, while in reality this 1-second duration is composed of alternated decoherent and recoherent 1-nanosecond phases; in other words, the decoherent nanoseconds between the recoherent nanoseconds are not perceived

I don't think Feynman would be too impressed by that sort of idea, Alfredo. I think this is  using the language of QM to suggest 'realities' that QM simply does not deal with. As for Stuart Hameroff's model I remain unclear who is superposed - me or what I am perceiving. I cannot make sense of it I fear.

Dear Jonathan, Feynman was a genius, but we should not be attached to his views forever. Kauffman´s (not Hameroff´s) proposal is sketchy and he really does not distinguish between the connscious experiencer and the experienced content, as we do. This is an advanced discussion that is beginning to make sense to me. I would like to make the following remarks for your appraisal:

a) The subjective side of consciousness (the experiencer) is defined by a phononic pattern - as you originally proposed - with the difference that you locate it in dendritic fields and I locate it in calcium waves;

b) The objective side of consciousness, the contents of consciousness - also called 'qualia' - are distributed in the brain. The components of a conscious episode are instantiated in dendritic fields -we surely agree about this idea;

c) We have different approaches to the "binding problem". Among the dozen of binding processes classically identified by Anne Treisman, two kinds are fundamental IMHO: temporal and spatial binding;

d) You address temporal binding by means of the same phonon fields that define the conscious experiencer - am I wrong? Then you get the 25 ms phase, and I get the 1 second phase from astroglial calcium waves;

e) You seem to refuse the existence of spatial binding, the idea that qualities instantiated in a distributed way in the brain (color in the visual cortex, sound in the auditory cortex, etc.) need a mechanism to bind them into an integrated conscious episode experienced by the conscious subject. Your assumption seems to be that all neuronal dendritic fields have access to the qualities instantiated in all other neurons. Although dendro-dentricit connections and electric synapses do exist and could carry this job partially, I find it difficult to argue for sych a hyper-connectivity because - as Buszáki argues in his book "Rhythms of the Brain" - the dynamics of such a network would be far slower and dissipative than actual data about the brain suggest. Therefore, I think that you need to postulate some inter-cellular mechanism for the integration of distributed signals, but to do so you would possibly need to abandon the idea of single-cell consciousness in favor of some kind of Global Workspace approach....

Dear Alfredo,

I agree we don't want to rely on dendrito-dendritic complications. I do postulate an inter-cellular mechanism for integration. It is the synapsing of axonal branches on to dendrites, or in other words, ordinary old fashioned neuroanatomy! But to make sense of that I need to go back and unpick what I think is a false premise earlier in your paragraph. It is too late tonight for me to do justice to that and make it readable. 

Interestingly, Arnold and I have been having a debate on related issues with Masataka Watanabe on another thread (see Masataka's page). Masataka raised an interesting paradox about visual detail and we have been trying to thrash out the ways one could approach it. For me it all has to do with the propositional nature of axonal signals - although Arnold and I are not entirely in agreement on that! This is a very complex topic as you know. I will try to formulate a clear answer tomorrow.

Dear Alfredo,

We may not want to follow everything Feyman said but I would be wary of disregarding his understanding for what QM can actually do for us and what it cannot in practical terms.

So, yes, the experiencer we will take to be a phononic mode, without specifying further yet. The experiencee, or experienced, must be a distributed pattern that impacts on the mode. I take that to be a pattern of potentials.

Our approaches to binding may not be so different. I am not sure whether we are dealing with the sort of binding Triesman wrote well on. She was interested in feature binding in a discriminatory sense: so that A goes with X and B with Y but not A with Y. We are I think interested in the later stage of how you get AX and BY in the same ‘scenario’. But that is another issue.

I think we agree that we need some mechanism that partitions ‘time windows’ of experience and for me that is most likely to be the ~25msec between spikes or refractory states in a gamma situation.

I require spatial binding just as you do but I disagree with your premises. I do not think we can say colour is in the visual cortex. We do not allocate colours in our experiences until there has been complex feedback processing that involves inference of the presence of specific types of object. If we infer the presence in a picture of an opaque multicoloured cube we see certain colours. If we mask enough of the picture to remove the spatial clues the colour we see changes. I suspect that if we inferred the cube to be transparent, from highlight cues, we would have seen another colour. All this involves signals coming quite far forward in the brain. If those signals are signifying the colour of an object then we have to assume, whether on your model or mine, that the qualia of colour, which has to be local to the mode/potential interaction is ‘being manifest’ further forward in the brain too.

In fact there is a strong argument for saying that in the early visual areas there would be no need for a ‘colour’ qualia since there are no other sorts of qualia like sound to distinguish colour from. My guess is that the colours we talk about exist in an amodal qualia space, maybe Arnold’s retinoid space, well forward in the brain.

The other point about my model is that it allows the same information to be presented as a quale in millions of different places – in millions of ‘copies’, each in a dendritic tree, over a large area. It is not that there is ‘one distributed representation’ but there is distribution of many representations with the same ‘content’.

In this situation there is no need to bind qualia across large tracts of brain. All that is needed is that they are bound at the point where the signals that encode those qualia arrive – at a dendritic tree. So I absolutely do not assume that each dendritic tree has access to qualities instantiated in other neurons. Each tree gets ‘its own copy’ like each person getting USA Today under the door in a hotel. Qualia do not travel. The one thing we know about qualia is that there are only ever totally proximal to the event of experience. Nobody has ever found qualia travelling about. So, as I say, all we need is standard neurophysiology.

You might then ask how the brain ensures that each cell gets the same quale. The problem here is that we have no way of knowing what it means for two quale, experienced by different subjects, to be ‘the same’ other than that they have the same pattern of causal antecedence that confers ‘reference’. That antecedent sameness is guaranteed simply by both being fed by branches of the same axon.

I am interested to know how these arguments strike you. I guess my challenge to a brain wide mode would be what qualia it gets in the temporal and parietal lobes if colour is only in the occipital lobe?

Dear Jonathan, some replies below:

"I require spatial binding just as you do but I disagree with your premises. I do not think we can say colour is in the visual cortex. "

Alfredo - OK, what I should have written is that the signal (related to the sitmulus) that is processed to generate a color quality in the conscious episode is initially detected in the visual cortex.

"We do not allocate colours in our experiences until there has been complex feedback processing that involves inference of the presence of specific types of object. If we infer the presence in a picture of an opaque multicoloured cube we see certain colours. If we mask enough of the picture to remove the spatial clues the colour we see changes. I suspect that if we inferred the cube to be transparent, from highlight cues, we would have seen another colour. All this involves signals coming quite far forward in the brain. If those signals are signifying the colour of an object then we have to assume, whether on your model or mine, that the qualia of colour, which has to be local to the mode/potential interaction is ‘being manifest’ further forward in the brain too."

Alfredo - OK again, but in the case of a simple (non ambiguous) stimulus, e.g. a red apple, the red that you see depends on the signal that is detected at the vidual cortex

"In fact there is a strong argument for saying that in the early visual areas there would be no need for a ‘colour’ qualia since there are no other sorts of qualia like sound to distinguish colour from. My guess is that the colours we talk about exist in an amodal qualia space, maybe Arnold’s retinoid space, well forward in the brain."

Alfredo - Again my OK, but if the two of us look at a red apple and (report to) see it red, there must be a signal from the apple transmitted as a photonic field, reaching our eyes, thalamus and visual cortex. The same occurs for phonon fields in the air that we perceive as sound, ocorant molecules in the air that we perceive as smell, etc. The binding problem is how to integrate these signals into a conscious episode.

"The other point about my model is that it allows the same information to be presented as a quale in millions of different places – in millions of ‘copies’, each in a dendritic tree, over a large area. It is not that there is ‘one distributed representation’ but there is distribution of many representations with the same ‘content’."

Alfredo - This part of you model contradicts what important authors as Buszáki write about the brain. They say that the brain has a "small world" network with hubs that connect specialized regions. It is not an all-communicate-with-all network composed of generalist (non-specialized) nodes. 

"In this situation there is no need to bind qualia across large tracts of brain. All that is needed is that they are bound at the point where the signals that encode those qualia arrive – at a dendritic tree. So I absolutely do not assume that each dendritic tree has access to qualities instantiated in other neurons. Each tree gets ‘its own copy’ like each person getting USA Today under the door in a hotel."

Alfredo - The dendritic tree of a neuron does not receive copies of what is happening in all other neurons. Today there are techniques to mark active connections and they show that there are specialized regions and some regions do not connect with other regions. There is also a deeper problem here. One neuron cannot communicate a copy of the whole dendritic pattern to the others, excapt by means of action potentials, which encode the information in a binary-like code. This encoding destroys the amplitude-modulated pattern, reducing it to a frequency and phase modulated pattern.

"Qualia do not travel. The one thing we know about qualia is that there are only ever totally proximal to the event of experience. Nobody has ever found qualia travelling about. So, as I say, all we need is standard neurophysiology."

Alfredo - OK, it is the signal coming from the stimulus that travels and then participates in the process of generation of a conscious episode with all the qualia bound together.

"You might then ask how the brain ensures that each cell gets the same quale. The problem here is that we have no way of knowing what it means for two quale, experienced by different subjects, to be ‘the same’ other than that they have the same pattern of causal antecedence that confers ‘reference’. That antecedent sameness is guaranteed simply by both being fed by branches of the same axon."

Alfredo - This assumption contradicts brain morphology, as far as I can see. The axon of a neuron does not branch to all other neurons. The brain is not SO parallel. There are many serial processes leading to "convergence zones" (Damasio). Only the neurons in the convergence zones receive all selected signals that compose a conscious episocde.

"I am interested to know how thes arguments strike you. I guess my challenge to a brain wide mode would be what qualia it gets in the temporal and parietal lobes if colour is only in the occipital lobe?"

Alfredo - The color signal is initially detected in the occipital lobe and then follows a serial path, reaching the temporal, parietal and frontal lobes, which are the three main convergence zones ("associative cortex"). Only the neurons in these zones receive signals from all modalities, but there is some specialization in them (temporal - what, parietal - where pathways). 

Dear Alfredo,

You are seeing problems that I have not generated. Let me give responses.

Alfredo: in the case of a simple (non ambiguous) stimulus, e.g. a red apple, the red that you see depends on the signal that is detected at the vidual cortex.

Jo: I don’t think there are ‘simple stimuli’ in this sense. We only see red because our processing of the entire visual field leads us to infer that the apple has a disposition to preferentially reflect long wavelength light. The quale is our sign for an inferred disposition rather than an instance of operation of that disposition. Our brains don’t tell it like that, but that is what neuropsychology reveals.

Alfredo – [we] look at a red apple and see it red, … there must be a signal from the apple ... The binding problem is how to integrate these signals into a conscious episode.

Jo: Sort of but what we are binding are not the signals but the inferences we draw from making differentials amongst the signals. So the ‘raw data’ are lost long before the binding takes place.

Jo before: "The other point about my model is that it allows the same information to be presented as a quale in millions of different places – in millions of ‘copies’, each in a dendritic tree, over a large area. It is not that there is ‘one distributed representation’ but there is distribution of many representations with the same ‘content’."

Alfredo - This part of you model contradicts what important authors as Buszáki write about the brain. They say that the brain has a "small world" network with hubs that connect specialized regions. It is not an all-communicate-with-all network composed of generalist (non-specialized) nodes.

Jo: I am quite happy with Buszáki’s account. There is no inconsistency here. I was only talking about millions of cells – a tiny fraction of the whole. When I say large areas I am being general – it could be a few millimeters or it could include paired areas in both hemispheres maybe. My model imposes no particular constraints in this regard.

My understanding of the term ‘small world’ is that it defines a system in which all units DO communicate with all others through relatively few intermediary steps – some say six for the brain. But it doesn’t matter because my model only requires that a rich pattern of signals based on inferences derived from primary sensory signals converge on each of a bank of dendritic trees. All that needs is the complexity of dendritic trees we observe and the branching of axons we observe. Direct connections between all regions are not needed.

Alfredo - There is also a deeper problem here. One neuron cannot communicate a copy of the whole dendritic pattern to the others, excapt by means of action potentials, which encode the information in a binary-like code. This encoding destroys the amplitude-modulated pattern, reducing it to a frequency and phase modulated pattern.

Jo: I have not suggested that a single neuron communicates a whole pattern to others. These cells operate in banks in parallel. But there are two interesting complexities here. Firstly, I do not think cell output is binary. I am now convinced, from the work of people like Buszáki and Teisinga, that timing of output is crucial. The most likely way for neurons to compete for salience in sensory pathways is to compete on the basis of who fires most precisely in synchrony with the optimal receptivity time of the next bank of cells along. This makes sense of the hierarchies of synchronies and precessions. So the old idea that output was binary I think since 2009 has gone out of the window.

Secondly, a single neuron can indeed communicate a whole pattern to other neurons if we invoke what I call a mordant loop. In this situation the cell output takes a feedback route and effectively means, if it fires at the right time, ‘ repeat fire all cells that have just fired signals to my input (and thereby send copies to 10,000 other cells via axon branches)’. There are plausible short term reinforcement mechanisms that can do this. This has the interesting implication that the 'meaning' of a single cell output can be hugely complex and different at different times because it 'borrows' meaning from the short term state of a mass of other cells.

Finally, I do not know what you mean by amplitude modulated pattern. I do not think AM is relevant to this sort of system. The competition by firing time mechanism I have suggested is distantly related to frequency modulation but should not be equated to it. I think it will be relevant in preconscious salience selection but not at the level of consciousness, the presumption being that selection has occurred by this time and the function is now to respond to the selected material.

Alfredo - OK, it is the signal coming from the stimulus that travels and then participates in the process of generation of a conscious episode with all the qualia bound together.

Jo: Again, I would be careful here because the signal does not travel either. At each step an inference is made and a new signal with a new meaning generated. The retinal signals are not bound, it is the inferences drawn from differentials computed over them that are bound.

 Alfredo - Only the neurons in the convergence zones receive all selected signals that compose a conscious episode.

Jo: Precisely, my model implies that. When I say 'each' cell gets the same quale I am only referring to those cells in the convergence zone we are interested in, not all brain cells of course.

Best wishes

Jo

Alfredo: "Among the dozen of binding processes classically identified by Anne Treisman, two kinds are fundamental IMHO: temporal and spatial binding;"

It seems to me that the "elephant in the room" in all discussions of the binding problem is the unacknowledged need for a dynamic brain mechanism that provides the kind of volumetric space within which diverse features of our sensory world can be combined in proper spatiotemporal register with respect to a fixed locus of perspectival origin. I have yet to see a principled account of how quantum events can do the job.

Dear Jonathan, thank you for the detailed answers and good luck with your hypothesis of a "mordant loop" (to solve the binding problem). About AM, please take a look at the link below. Sorry for not believing in the "perception as inference"  assumption - it sounds like Kantian transcendental philosophy, or the traditional interpretation of absence of windows in Leibiniz´s monads (that you criticized in another forum)...

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Freeman's_mass_action

Some of us acknowledge the need for that mechanism, Arnold! You don't need to worry about quantum effects either - phonons are as classical as a wind up gramophone.

I don't think there is anything Kantian or Leibnizian about perception being inference Alfredo. It is just empirical Hubel and Wiesel fact. It is also logically inescapable. If you look at a picture for long enough without saccades the picture disappears completely. The brain infers from no change that there is nothing there despite the retina receiving the same number of photons.

Dear Arnold, the retinoid system locates signals in egocentric space, but does not bind the signals (e.g. the binding of images with sounds and tactile sensations as in the Francis Crick example of a person walking on the beach). The problem is that spatial binding is not merely the juxtaposition of objects in physical, geometric and/or personal space, but also the definition of and interaction between experiential qualities (qualia). This interaction depend on the qualities being processed.

Alfredo: "The problem is that spatial binding is not merely the juxtaposition of objects in physical, geometric and/or personal space, but also the definition of and interaction between experiential qualities (qualia). This interaction depend on the qualities being processed."

I see it differently. Our immediate conscious presence is of a coherent global surround with all qualities bound in natural register. A sense of interaction between experiential qualities requires a cognitive decomposition/analysis of our global conscious experience. So the process of binding disparate sensory features composes our phenomenal world, and cognitive unbinding allows us to think about the world of our experience.

Jonathan: "Some of us acknowledge the need for that mechanism, Arnold!"

Yes, Jonathan. There are some, like yourself, who "get it". Perhaps I painted with too broad a brush.

Dear Arnold, several brain  circuits are specialized for the processing of sensory qualities. There is a lot of unconscious processing before these qualities become conscious qualities ("qualia"). Becoming conscious is more than being located in egocentric space. The way that at each moment the qualities are bound depend on unconscious processing in distributed circuits. You seem to address this processing with your expression "natural register", but I did not understand what you mean. Please explain!

Alfredo: "The way that at each moment the qualities are bound depend on unconscious processing in distributed circuits. You seem to address this processing with your expression "natural register", but I did not understand what you mean."

The flash-lag phenomenon, given in the link below, is a good example of the difference between "natural register" in sensory binding, and "unnatural register".  

The circular trajectory of the continuously rotating line is evoked spatiotopically among corresponding autaptic neurons in retinoid space. When we track the trajectory of this rotating line, the heuristic self-locus (directed attention) and associated shift-control excitation lead the stimulus input coordinates, thus priming their leading cells in retinoid space and shifting the phenomenal/perceived spatiotopic locus of the rotating line slightly ahead of its input locus. When the extension line is flashed with the rotating line stopped, or at a very slow rotation speed, the extension is perceived as approximately co-linear with the rotating line (natural register). But when the extension line is flashed with the rotating line in rapid rotation, the extension is perceived as lagging the rotating line (unnatural register). The extent of lag is perceived to increase with the speed of rotation because the rotating stimulus leads by a greater extent as speed increases. An examination of the neuronal structure and dynamics of the retinoid mechanism provides a causal justification for the perceived lag.

http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/mot-flashLag/index.html

Dear Alfredo, Jonathan and Arnold, may I ask whether you have considered the possibility that the coherent order of protein-associated water may provide an answer to the different points you seem to disagree about. I am nothing but a simple hands-on practitioner working with the way experience is organized in the body (DFA Somatic Pattern Recognition). Observation in clinical practice seems to confirm ultrafast transmission of information through coherently ordered water.  Dr. Robert Becker in "The Body Electric" suggested in 1985 that the nervous system evolved within the older liquid crystalline lattice for handling more complex information and that today "all multicellular animals have this kind of hybrid system, whose complexities should provide work for at least a few more generations of neurophysiologists” (Becker, 1985, p. 260). Right now I have to go, but if you would like to say more, I'll come back later.

Dear Brigitte, surely water is part of the process, forming a complex with proteins and ions.

@Hansmann, there is extensive experimental evidence to contradict the notion that liquid water forms a persistant quasi-crystalline structure around proteins. I'm particularly fond of the work of Bertil Halle to this end (see linked page.)

(EDIT: fixed the link; ResearchGate was parsing a parenthesis as part of the URL.)

What sort of "clinical observation" could contradict this? Sounds a little homeopathic.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15306377

I don't know if this goes into the direction of your research, but these are the thoughts I arrived at when I read your question and the materials you provided. Decoherence and recoherence makes me think of the loss and recovery of the coherent order of water upon muscle activation/relaxation. I believe there is an interaction between the parts of the nervous system regulating myofascial tone and (quantum coherent) interfacial water. Water being a highly sensitive substance that acts as a two-way connector between environment and organism, I believe that hypertonicity loads a positive charge into the water that interferes with its receptivity and responsiveness and contributes to keeping experience within the restricted realm of habit patterns.  

Conference Paper Towards a fuller understanding of the interaction between my...

Ryan MB Hoffman, I am hands-on practitioner. I perceive the degree of hydration of a tissue and its ability to transmit information through my hands. The receptivity and responsiveness of a tissue is directly proportional to its degree of hydration, up to a certain point. Hypertonic tissues tend to be dehydrated, although there may be an edematous retention of water right next to them. But that is not hydration water, right? In any case, using the specific hand's-on wave-like intervention I learnt, a change is brought about which seems to take place in the "body-wide web" of hydration water or at least is conveyed by it.

I was not able to access the work you referenced, but I googled the name of the researcher and read his discussion of "Protein hydration dynamic" (Published 29 August 2004 doi: 10.1098/rstb.2004.1499 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 29 August 2004 vol. 359 no. 1448 1207-1224). It brought up a couple of questions: (1) All these studies Halle refers to are they in-vitro or in-vivo? Could it be that in the living organism the protein hydration dynamics are different than in vitro?(2) Is there any bulk water in a living organism in a quantity worth mentioning in comparison to the coherently ordered water?

In any case, thank you for the reference.

@Hansmann, I don't understand your point...because living cells avoid hypertonicity, salt is retained outside the cells (where, as you mention, it must be hydrated.) Water can hydrate things or it can participate in chemical equilibria, and it's possible (as explored in this thread) that, like any matter, it could mediate strange (but known) physics including quantum recoherence (especially at very low temperatures.) 

EDIT: It is later explained that I misunderstood the use of the term "hypertonicity" in this context. From here on, I've ameliorated my response. I thank B. Hansmann for the clarification; I readily accept that a manual practitioner can detect excess muscle tone. How excess tone relates to overall tissue hydration levels is something I do not understand beyond the well-known connections with electrolyte imbalances.

The test-tube and whole-organism contexts are different (Halle mostly works in a reductionist context, to answer your question.) But inside or outside the organism, fluctuations travel at the speed of sound, and most ordered configurations (including quantum coherences) quickly randomize. When a chemical structure resists the scrambling effects of thermal motion, that shows there are other forces (like chemical bonds) that  sustain the order.

But there's no evidence that additional physical interactions exists which are solely relevant to the whole-organism context. That's vitalism, and it's a fairly well-refuted theory. 

Your assertion that there is "coherently ordered water" in the organism is, to my understanding, an extraordinary claim. I'm not saying I can prove it's impossible, just that it doesn't seem consistent with natural science.

Alfredo,

Sorry for being a bit late with this remark so I return to the question of Kauffman's recoherence:

He is really a very bold scientist that dares to go out and speculate beyond known physics, while restating that he is a non-physicist. His speculations are not bad, but there is yet a need for him to find a proper base in the present view and understanding of physics. His presentation is so clever and interesting that “proper” critique often stifles in its infancy. Nevertheless he is doing great service by looking for possible “loopholes” in our fundamental interpretations of physical laws.

My personal view on the re-coherence business is that it a sort of “wishful thinking” that must be investigated from a completely different angle. Averaging over phases yields a statistical result, where some (all or partial) information has been lost to the environment. Recovering this information calls for a proper formulation based on dissipative systems and their dynamics, cf. Prigogine and beyond.

Adding “outside” information is of course, as said, a different matter. It requires recoherence as a result of microscopic self-organization. In addition the time characteristics become crucial as the usual decoherence phenomenon must somehow be protected and not wished for.

Best

Erkki

I had not realized that there had been a question for me, so please forgive the tardiness of my response. Ryan MB Hoffman, I use the term hypertonicity as refering to a state of myofascial tissues. It does not have anything to do with hypertonicity as it is used in chemistry, or at least I believe it doesn't. It's one of those cases where the same word is used for different concepts. Myofascial tone refers to the degree of tension a tissue has in a state of rest. When the tissue is hypertonic, that means it is in a state of continuous activation, even when not involved in any activity. Muscles present a degree of tension the person in unable to relax. The Medical Free Online Dictionary defines hypertonicty  as "abnormally increased muscle tone". I prefer the synonym it gives: high muscle tone. Unfortunately, hypertonicity is not "abnormal", at least not in present day humans. Apart from the physical pain and degenerative processes it brings about, it plays an important role in sensory perception, including propioception and introception, and, thus, in consciousness.

About "coherently ordered water" in the organism, I have learnt about it from scientists like James Oschman (Nature's Own Research Institute), Mae Wan Ho (Institute for Science in Society), Emilio del Giudice (National Institute for Nuclear Physics in Milan), Gerald Pollack (University of Washington), Giuseppe Vitiello (Università degli Studi di Salerno), and from the writings of Herbert Fröhlich, Robert Becker and Albert Szent-Györgi.  Their research is absolutely consistent with my observations in clinical practice. According to my understanding of it, which may of course be limited, most water of in the body is coherently ordered. But that doesn't mean it is rigid, like Halle implied in his discussion. Simply light moves through it at high enough speed for it to appear crystalline.

Rather than playing an important role in sensory perception, I should say that hypertonicity has an important effect on it, namely it strongly interferes with sensory perception, thus reducing consciousness.

Dear Erkki,

Many thanks for the comments.

Why did you oppose recoherence and dissipative structures? I believe that the mechanism behind recoherence in the brain is the "order from fluctuation" one, building from two tendencies, internal entropy production and a flux of useful energy (glucose) from the outside.

The main difference of this kind of approach from your hypothesis - as far as i can see - is that your "self-entanglement" seems to imply that the brain constructs conscious episodes from its own structural information, while the recoherence approach seems to be closer to the phenomenology of conscious experiences, allowing for external information to be "internalized" and "projected" back to the environment (we do not see an elephant as being inside our brains, but of course as being outside).

Alfredo,

There are mainly two obstacles here. Recoherence must somehow restore (partly restore) phase information, while protecting from decoherence.

The first is to integrate quantum and thermal correlations in a "constructive way" and then to find the appropriate time evolution that preserve the organization via "natural" time scales. The mechanism must explicitly display the traits of selforganization as well as "simultaneously" protect decoherence and furthermore support realistic life times and associated statistics.

Some of my work on my RG page is devoted to formulate such scenarious from first principles.

Dear Erkki:

This line of research seems to be one of the most promising in consciousness science. There is a lot of theoretical work to be done, and I can see that you are attacking some central issues.

Although I do not have a proper mathematical formation to attack the problem, I have tried to formulate a philosophical concept of recoherence adequate to my brain model of consciousness. I f you have interest, our discussion here can be beneficial for me!

Please tell me what is the second problem. In this post I will discuss the first one you mentioned.

I conceive the recoherent state of the brain (that we call a conscious state) as a sequence of macroscopic global states that last for very short times, but we pwrceive the sequence as a continuous duration - just because we do not consciously perceive the decoherent states between them!

In the brain, at each nanosecond there is the realization of an ensemble of decoherent states (according to Zurek's concept of decoherence), corresponding to unconscious qualitative states. Most of these states remain unconscious. A small fraction of these decoherent states is bound together by the order from fluctuation/dissipative structure formation mechanism, forming a conscious episode. When the episode is formed, endogenous and external patterns of information are integrated, and a conscious experience happens. An episode is the temporal sequence (lasting from 300 ms to 3 seconds) formed of many "instantaneous" recoherent macrostates. Together with the integration of information patterns emerges a feeling that feeds back on brain activity - and then we have a kind of circular causation (Formal, not Efficient causation) that resembles your "self-entanglement"). Please let me know if these ideas make sense to you.

From Stuart Kauffmann's RG page:

"A Theory of the Mind-Brain Operating in the Poised Realm between the Quantum and Classical Realms

Stuart Kauffman

Since Reneʼ Descartes proposed two substances, Res Cogitans and Res Extensa, mind and matter, we have been plagued to two major questions:

1) How can mind act on matter?

2) How can we have a responsible free will?

I shall propose a tentative theory that the mind-brain system operates in a “Poised Realm” that is able to pass reversibly, between Quantum coherent behavior and “decoherence” to classicity. Quantum decohrence is now the best accepted route from quantum behavior, with its strange interference pattern in the famous two slit experiment, described by the linear Schrodinger wave equation, and the classical world. In the theory of decoherence, “phase information” is lost from a quantum system to its environment and quantum behavior disappears. More, recent evidence suggests that the reverse, recoherence partially or completely to quantum coherent behavior, is also possible.

The Poised Realm may be sustainable. The mind-brain may operate in the Poised Realm. I will suggest:

1) That a mind-brain that is quantum coherent-decohering-recohering, “acts” on matter, not causally at all, but ACAUSALLY via acausal decoherence to classicity, hence may solve the problem of “how mind can act on matter”.

2) Both a deterministic mind and a purely quantum mind do not allow for a responsible free will. In the first case, I have no freedom of action.

In the second case, my actions are merely quantum random. However, there is new evidence in the Quantum Zeno Effect and the Quantum Anti-Zeno effect that the mind-brain system, while decohering or recohering, is NOT quantum random in its behavior and NOT deterministic either. A responsible free will becomes possible. Further, this behavior is not algorithmic, nor I claim, is mind. We may surpass the Turing machine. Most radically, quantum theory is consistent with an ontologically real “Possible” and consciousness may participate in the “Possible”."

(Copied and pasted by Alfredo Pereira Jr.)

If consciousness is a biological phenomenon, I have a problem in understanding the role of quantum events as being of particular significance for the existence of consciousness. Topological organization is critical for the viability and cognitive functioning  of biological entities, and I am unable to see how the quantum superposition of non-local probabilities transitions into the topological localities of biological systems. Has work been done that can explain to a novice like myself the systematics of such transitions?

Dear Alfredo and Arnold,

The key to restore phase information and at the same time obtain appropriate time scales follows from our thermalization formulation that merge thermal and quantum correlations from first principles. What happens physically seems to be a sequence of energy surface crossings that amounts to a sequence of state transitions that can not decohere. In addition to an entirely different kind of time evolution the associated statistics derived becomes the well known Poisson statistics that we know is the cell law used in cell research, e.g. cancer therapies in connection with Heavy Ion collisions in Hadron Therapy by Prof. Belkic and his group at the Karolinska.

It is also interesting to learn about this years Nobel Prizes in Fysiology and Medicine. The position- and grid cells studied by the Moser Couple are indeed very relevant here. I am sure this research also resonates with Arnold's.

Here is what I wrote a couple of years ago without knowing the present results:

In our model one might well anticipate expanding the encoding and decoding

processes to the appropriate regions in the cortex, viewing higher-level perceptions,

“codes of codes”, as an extended STN configuration in which it should be possible to incorporate a more distinct gene-based definition of the reproductive “social gene”, known as the meme, a notion coined as a concept for discussion by Dawkins [47]. For instance, the actual physical representation of an information processing capability in the brain leads to neural circuits in action and the question how e.g.

hippocampus processes sensory information. Neurons in the hippocampus register

information, not with respect to a single sensory attribute, or one of the five senses

individually, but more precisely, to a modality that depends on the synchronized information from several senses including spatial and temporal recognition. It is not

unreasonable to sanction the spatial map that maintains the unitary and subjective

nature of the conscious state, i.e. feature bindings via the present nesting of the

“codes of codes”.

Best

erkki

Dear Arnold, you are asking for one kind of answer that was given by Erkki (above). My own solution was presented in the previous post beginning with "this line of research...". Of course it is all theoretical at this point, but justified by the necessity of explaining how brain cells signaling to each other generate integrated conscious episodes with a feeling attached to them.

Erkki,

I know what a Poisson distribution is but , in the quantum model, what are the biophysical brain events that occur according to Poisson probabilities? And how are they systematically distributed over a structured topological space?

Dear Erkki, your response was too vague! Quantum correlations (superposition and entanglement) do decohere when the micro system interacts with a macro environment. All that thermal correlations can do (when not increasing the noise) is partly recohere the system. This action is very fast, but must be conceptually distinguished from the decoherence phase. 

I am not able of understanding your mathematical formalism, but if you proved that in a dissipative structure quantum decoherence does not occur, then you deserve a Nobel! I am more confident on the decoherence-recoherence two-alternate-phases picture that I proposed.

In regard to neural codes, the relation between synchrony and binding was not made clear by the main proponents (Singer and Gray). Besides this gap, it is not clear how a population of neurons binds the information patterns that they instantiate in their dendritic trees. We cannot confuse the fact that the signal generated by a single neuron encodes population activity with the desired mechanism of conscious binding. The latter requires the population to generate a kind of "Ursulian" hologram and at the same time to be sensitive of it. In my approach, these operations require the participation of the astrocyte network as a parallel interconnected information processing system that provides the desired circularity in the brain (neurons affect astrocytes that affect neurons).

The SMTT experiments provide empirical evidence that the retinoid model binds separate spatial patterns into a coherent holistic conscious experience. In principle, the same brain system can properly bind separate and diverse sensory patterns into a coherent holistic experience.

There is a lot to answer and comment upon here. Let me start with the reference to Feynman that Jonathan brought up initially:

Feynman’s lecture on the QM path formulation appears to refers to a so-called “closed theory of open systems” that envisions closed systems only as a limiting case of open systems. In this line of thought one imagines the existence of such a limit since one considers the Universe as closed. In other words one attempts to describe a closed system as a limit of an open system when the influence of the environment is negligible.

This is not right in regard to modern studies of chemical physics and quantum chemistry. First, regrettably we have no idea what the properties of such a limit will be. Our extrapolation will not converge, since indeed the theory of open systems will take on entirely different characteristics compared to close system QM. Second, our Universe is not a closed system, but this is another thread!

Arnold asked: How will quantum events “do the job”?

In fact this is quite simple, provided we have agreed upon the solution to the other difficulties, e.g. open system dynamics and decoherence protection. The dynamics emerges from a proper transformation theory pertinent to this framework. Here the participating cells are “exchanging” information according to a simple Gödelian code that is inherent in the dimension of the transformation as well as the associated Poisson mediated statistics. This is of course yet another thread!

Arnold asked regarding Poisson: … and how are they systematically distributed over a structured topological space?

The quantum model is the open system dynamics with emerging quantum and thermal correlations. This model, as I touched upon above, can be proven to yield stochastic Poisson processes. They become properly distributed and structured over topological space via an associated dynamical transformation theory. The relevant cellular communications appears to be described in a way that relates to the number of phone calls received by a call center per hour.

Alfredo: Your ideas make sense to me. My criticism rather centres on the correct physical formulation that must be accompanied by a proper spatial ordering and associated temporal sequencing, cf. quorum sensing and communication.

Furthermore Kauffman’s tentative theory (Poised Realm) is entirely depending on the possible reverse recoherence of quantum coherent behaviour. A deterministic mind requires a deterministic theory. Nevertheless I do not support fully Prigogine’s probabilistic dynamics, since the theory of open systems does combine some stochastic characteristics with that of telicit evolution, i.e. a process governed by a “program”, cf. the genetic code.

Better stop here.

Dear Erkki, many thanks for the replies, but you could have not stopped so early in my part... Does it mean that the other ideas I formulated make sense but are wrong?

Erkki: "Arnold asked regarding Poisson: '… and how are they systematically distributed over a structured topological space?'"

Erkki: "They [stochastic Poisson (quantum?) processes] become properly distributed and structured over topological space via an associated dynamical transformation theory."

This is the crux of the problem. What does the "associated dynamical transformation theory" look like? Is it like the retinoid model, or is it like something else that you can describe in biological terms?

It seems that you want to plug quantum events into the biology of brain mechanisms via the logic of mathematics. How will you know if you succeed? In any case, this is a major undertaking and I applaud your effort.

Dear Alfredo,

I understand that you want to discuss the functions of glial cells (particularly astrocytes, responsible for sentience) and their environmental influences on the neuronal network, e.g. the transduction of energy and associated neuronal synchronicity (the latter related to awareness).

I am not sure how to rigorously separate sentience and awareness (or you mean perhaps strictly self awareness). Nevertheless the conscious- and unconscious aspects, together with general physiological features, mandate, according to you, a triple aspect monism. Adding the word “monism” imparts of course a deeper fundamental physical origin, which does not exist in your model at present.

The main stumbling block to me is the ontological picture of brain activity, i.e. the evolution of a multidimensional state space and its possible representations, see e.g. some of my criticism in the previous posting, see also my answer to Arnold.

One particular position held by Chalmers is related to supervenience. Although he admits that biology naturally supervenes on physics, he states that biology does not logically supervene on physics. Fortunately a closer look at evolutionary mechanisms and their association with Gödel’s theorem(s) manifests logical supervenience.

These general assertions might lead to consequences, but I cannot immediately say what it will mean for you in detail. My position is unequivocably monistic with a subsequent teleonomic evolution of our universe etc.

I better stop here, while continuing to look at your papers.

Arnold,

Oversimplifying a bit, the transformation involves an open system of cellular sites (responsible for a particular task or perception etc.). The dimension "n" of the transformation (cf. the Q-value of a resonating cavity) acts as a quality characteristic that identifies appropriate cells (or molecular aggregates). The transformation subdivides into various blocks as "n" divides into (prime) factors (cf. the Gödel code for his theorems) that hides nested codes. The dimension depends crucially on the size of the dissipative system, their temperature and furthermore links directly with appropriate time scales.

This is a direct extension of molecular interactions to more complex (teleonomic) communications. Since open system dynamics here partakes with sequences of transitions (equal to the dimension "n"and its prime factors, which could be large) and furthermore imparts Poisson statistics, the cells, by manipulating (note the mean and the variance of the message is related to the ”community size "n" and the various prime factors, of cells” according to the character of Poisson statistics) phonon assisted communication between the cells, are subsequently able to utilize the stochastic Poisson process for sending messages!

I do not know if this makes sense to you – anyway I am sure that the retinoid system would benefit from such a “mechanism”.

Erkki,

i thought you would propose that the retinoid system was likely the realization of such a mechanism. Would this be the wrong way to think about it?

Arnold,

The “mechanism” proposed here is in particular valid for all kinds cells, neurons, glial cells, somatic ones etc. at various levels of communications. The point is to evaluate the precise properties of the retinoid system, i.e. the special features of autaptic neurons and their consequences for the selfreferential perception.

How could we possibly read a road map to arrive at our destination without an ability to control the movement of our heuristic self-locus (I!*) along the contours of the roads in our internal representation of the road map in retinoid space? What could be the alternative mechanisms?

About Kauffman's new research: see link below

http://phys.org/news/2015-04-quantum-criticality-life-proteins.html

To me, this is all buzz-word chit-chat Alfredo. If we know about Kronig Penney modelling and semiconductor theory then odd behaviour in Cerium/Indium mixtures is intriguing but no particular surprise, and as far as I can see nothing to do with neurology. We are not looking for strange forms of conductance. You and I are aware that we are looking for other interactions relevant to brain cell processing - or for that matter some other cellular mechanism like motility or phagocytosis. 

I am pretty sure that the rules of electron transit in proteins is of little or no interest except in mitochondria, which are electron transit organs, and suchlike. If we are looking for long range modes in larger structures like cells then it seems to me that we already have much more everyday examples than superconductivity - why not go back to 1968 and Fröhlich? At least his idea had some relevance. I do not understand why when people talk of quantum level analysis they are obsessed with electron modes rather than higher level Bose modes. But then I have said this before !

Good reply, Jonathan! I have the same impression, and suspect that the buzz is because some people think that the main difference between brains and computers is that brains use less energy, and then quantum conductance would be the key to biological computation (but not to consciousness, of course!). This new Kauffman research seems to be different from the posted hypothesis of recoherence. The latter is closer to the Fröhlich conjecture, but in my preferred version it is not about phonons instantiated in macromolecules - it is better applied to ionic kinetic energy inducing quantum-like communication in the brain.

Dear Andrey, I wrote that "some people" think that ... brains use less energy, but I am not among this people.

Dear Andrey, this RNA production you mention, although being a revolutionary hypothesis, cannot be taken as a process of "recoherence" in the sense of Kauffmann and other physicists. The RNA will produce proteins that will operate classically. Therefore, the process you mention does not make possible a quantum coherent process at the macroscopic level.

Dear Andrey, thanks for the correction. The question becomes: what is the "quantum" aspect in the activity of this non-coding RNA?

Dear Andrey, you are using the term "quantum" in the sense of functional units, but not in the sense of Quantum Theory. In the context of this theory, being "quantum"  implies being a wavefunction with superposition and entanglement. The binary or quaternary codes are not quantum in this sense, because there is no superposition and no entanglement between the two or four states.

Current thoughts of Stuart Kauffman on this topic (sent to a closed discussion list today):

"All, the use of the concept of Function arises in biology. The function of the human heart is to pump blood, not to make heart sounds or jiggle water in the pericardium. The human heart exists in the universe because it carries out this function and was selected to do so. Thus functions are typically subsets of classical causal consequences. As such, physics cannot talk about functions, for it cannot discriminate subsets of causal consequences. I believe the concept of function can be based on these ideas: 1) above the level of atoms, the universe is grossly non-ergodic. The universe will not make all possible complex things, from proteins length 200 amino acids, to hearts, to organisms. Most complex things will never exist. 2) One way to “get to exist” above the level of atoms is by being a Kantian Whole, where the parts exist for and by means of the whole.. A collectively autocatalytic set of small proteins, i.e. peptides, is an example of a Kantian Whole. Gonen Ashkenasy at the Ben Gurion has a 9 peptide collectively autocatalytic set. Here each peptide catalyzes the formation of a second copy of the “next” peptide by ligating two fragments of that peptide, around a cycle of the 9 peptides. No peptide catalyzes its own formation. This proves that molecular reproduction does not need template replicating DNA or RNA or RNA-like molecules. 3) Now we can define Function: The function of peptide 1 is to catalyze the reaction forming a second copy of peptide 2. But if the peptide jiggles water in the petri plate, that is a non functional causal classical side effect of the peptide, not its function. So we have defined “Function” as a legitimate concept in biology, More the evolution of the biosphere includes the coming into existence of unprestatable new functions, which functions are part of the phase space of evolution. But we cannot pretate that ever changing phase space, hence can write no laws of motion for the evolving biosphere, which is therefore not reducible to physics. Hearts exist in the non ergodic universe above the level of atoms by VIRTUE of the fact that they pump blood and contribute that function to the survival of organisms having hearts.

None of this is yet quantum mechanics or mind. But it is not impossible, given the emergence of Quantum Biology, that living organisms are more richly quantum than we have thought. You may be interested in the Poise Realm, hovering reversibly between quantum and classical FAPP by decoherence and recoherence. This provides a way by which a partly quantum mind can act ACAUSALLY on the “classical meat” of the brain to yield a mind brain system which is not merely epiphenomenal, as it must be on classical physics due to the causal closure of classical physics. Such Acausal “acton” may provide an answer to Descartes’ Res cognans and Res extensa, where there is no known way for Res cogtans, mind stuff, to act causally on classical brain. If ao, we may be able to begin to ascribe function to quantum aspects of biological systems. Indeed the ‘function” of quantum aspects of the light harvesting molecules is thought to be the increased efficiency of photosynthesis, done smulaternsously compared to sequential classical hopping of the exciton to the reaction center."

This paper suggested by Brian J Flanagan seems to imply the existence of a fractal and/or holographic effect generated by a particle population spin distribution. possibly supporting a projective geometric hypothesis about how the brain operates "conscious binding" generating recoherent states. Of course, this is all hypothetical - as the whole of the discussion in this question.

https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9906086?fbclid=IwAR1dAiTy4d7l8-e1a30K3u6NTMctK_slAe_ggaeOSVDjzsWHFe9V6JbbzAY

I'm sure we all have a lot of respect for Dr. Kauffman, but...

Like so many others, he appears to have missed a fundamental point, perhaps owing to one of Bohr's more unfortunate ideas, asking:

"Is There A 'Poised Realm' Between the Quantum and Classical Worlds?"

Let us attend Freeman Dyson:

"There is nothing else except these [quantum] fields: the whole of the material universe is built of them."

He elaborates:

Physicists talk about two kinds of fields: classical fields and quantum fields. Actually, we believe that all fields in nature are quantum fields. A classical field is just a special large-scale manifestation of a quantum field.

But since classical fields were discovered first and are easier to understand, it is necessary to say what we mean by a classical field first, and go on to talk about quantum fields later.

A classical field is a kind of tension or stress which can exist in empty space in the absence of matter. It reveals itself by producing forces, which act on any material objects which happen to lie in the space the field occupies. 

§

In order to describe completely the state of the fields in a given region of space, it is necessary to specify the strength and the direction of both the electric and the magnetic fields at every point of the region separately. This is the characteristic mathematical property of a classical field: it is an undefined something which exists throughout a volume of space and which is described by sets of numbers, each set denoting the field strength and direction at a single point in the space.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Field-theory-Scientific-American-offprint/dp/B0007G2M1M

___________

I'd like to close by earning my curmudgeon dues, and ask everyone to please try to get this thru your heads. You can thank me later. Donations also welcome, but please don't send cash thru the USPS.

Then again, I do find heuristic value in the idea put forth here:

https://bit.ly/2NLHMS1

Does the balance between order and chaos "produce" consciousness?

That overstates the case, but...

Too much order tends to stasis, whereas consciousness is dynamic.

Too much chaos tends to dissolution -- and to nervous disorders.

So it seems as though there must be something to the basic picture on view.

Brian J Flanagan

Of course, all types of organization stay between chaos and order, as famously pointed by Henry Atlan in the 1984 book "Between Crystal and Smoke".

However, the concept of field proposed by Freeman Dyson does not seem to explain neither classical not quantum fields: "A classical field is a kind of tension or stress which can exist in empty space in the absence of matter. It reveals itself by producing forces, which act on any material objects which happen to lie in the space the field occupies".

The idea of a completely empty space defies logical reasoning. It makes more sense to me to propose that space-time itself and the matter within it derives from a primitive Energy, from which the fields and forces are manifested, resulting in the macroscopic world with its three aspects: Matter, Information and Feeling.

The paper on geometric projection departs from an ensemble of spin values. As far as I know spin does not happen in empty space, but requires a particle. If the particle is material is an issue we can discuss, but it does not make sense (to me at least) to refer to spin in the absolute vacuum!

Once we assume a field made of particle spin at the micro level, the concept of recoherence at the macro level becomes more palatable. The macro coherent state can be conceived as the (temporal) projection of the microscopic spin network, producing a holographic effect that we call consciousness.

Well, a crystal is highly ordered and quite static.

Let's begin with Einstein:

"A geometrical-physical theory as such is incapable of being directly pictured, being merely a system of concepts. But these concepts serve the purpose of bringing a multiplicity of real or imaginary sensory experiences into connection in the mind. To "visualize" a theory therefore means to bring to mind that abundance of sensible experiences for which the theory supplies the schematic arrangement."

And now fast-forward to the present with Brody & Hughston:

"The manifold of pure quantum states can be regarded as a complex projective space endowed with the unitary-invariant Riemannian geometry of Fubini and Study. According to the principles of geometric quantum mechanics, the detailed physical characteristics of a given quantum system can be represented by specific geometrical features that are selected and preferentially identified in this complex manifold. In particular, any specific feature of projective geometry gives rise to a physically realizable characteristic in quantum mechanics."

What's the connection?

The projective plane and the color continuum are isomorphic with one another.

~Weyl

The basic idea here is that color is then just such a "physically realizable characteristic in quantum mechanics," and is among the "sensible experiences for which the theory supplies the schematic arrangement."

We can go further, with a little help from Feynman:

Our program was successful. We have an expression for the energy density that is the sum of an “electric” energy density and a “magnetic” energy density, whose forms are just like the ones we found in statics when we worked out the energy in terms of the fields. Also, we have found a formula for the energy flow vector of the electromagnetic field. This new vector, S=ϵ0c2E×B, is called “Poynting’s vector,” after its discoverer. It tells us the rate at which the field energy moves around in space. The energy which flows through a small area da per second is S⋅nda, where n is the unit vector perpendicular to da.

https://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/II_27.html

_____________

Here, da gives us area. The energy which flows thru da gives us its frequency, by

E = hv.

In the case of photons, we recover color via inspection: we simply look up the CIE values to find the color associated with that frequency.

We then have colored areas, which is what we perceive.

Brian J Flanagan We are in agreement about the projection process that gives us the qualia we experience.

I don´t know if you agree about the projection happening in time, in the transition from micro to macro, and then being considered as a recoherence process in the sense of Kauffman.

In your response you did not address my philosophical remark about spin and fields being not located in empty space.

Atiyah has an intriguing video where he addressed spinors.

https://bit.ly/3ie9d5f

____________________

As to Kauffman & etc., he hasn't got the most basic facts right, so his whole approach is a non-starter for me.

"Empty space," is a much-discussed topic in theoretical physics v. the virtual vacuum and so forth.

https://bit.ly/3iigC3t

____________________

As to the following, it is wholly unclear how you get from here to there. Also, you might consider coming up for air from time to time. And then, one gets the impression that you're arguing from theory to fact in your eagerness to support a pet notion about how the world works. If you insist on doing so, kindly leave my name out of it.

"This paper suggested by Brian J Flanagan seems to imply the existence of a fractal and/or holographic effect generated by a particle population spin distribution. possibly supporting a projective geometric hypothesis about how the brain operates "conscious binding" generating recoherent states."

Brian J Flanagan

I am arguing from a philosophical theory to a scientific theory, and asking your opinion. Of course, you do not need to agree.

Kauffman´s departing point, as well as mine, is the decoherence approach. I know that you do not agree, but there is no final word yet in the interpretation of the transition from micro to macro. This question is open to different possibilities.

The issues I raised about projective geometry (spin networks projected to perceived color) come from your post. Your answer does not depend on your (dis)agreement about the process of decoherence/recoherence.

For the record, I stress that the projection does not make sense in my philosophical approach if it begins in empty space, and if it is not temporal. If you assume these premises, then please leave my name out too!

How does your philosophical theory square with physical evidence and theories?

Where did I discuss spin networks?

You write: "projection does not make sense in my philosophical approach."

Projection of... What?

Projective geometry describes "empty" space beautifully.

The dualities which pop up everywhere in contemporary physics find a natural home in projective geometry.

http://www.iecl.univ-lorraine.fr/~Wolfgang.Bertram/Atiyah-Duality.pdf

Alfredo Pereira Junior

I've done a bit of homework:

"We have classified all of the unitary irreducible representations of SU(2): there is one for each n. Therefore, there is a projective representation of SO(3) for each n. Apparently, in order to classify the projective representations of a group, we need to look at its universal cover!

Furthermore, we know that these are the only irreducible projective representations of SO(3). Say there were an irreducible projective representation of SO(3) with an essential cocycle that wasn’t born from an SU(2) representation. We could then make a projective representation of SU(2) with an essential cocycle, which doesn’t exist.

By the way, all this “projective representation” stuff is what people are talking about when they say that you have to “rotate” an electron twice in order to get back to where you started. They just mean that SO(3) can only be represented on C 2 projectively. If you try to lift the the non-contractible loop in SO(3) to SU(2) in a continuous way, the lifted loop will start at 1 but end at −1.

The projective representations of SO(3) are the half-integer spin representations of SU(2). These are the spins that we missed before we considered projective representations."

https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/noahmiller/files/representation-theory-quantum.pdf

____________

So it seems that, once again, I must thank you for prodding me to explore a new realm. Sorry to be testy.

Brian J Flanagan I proposed a Projective Theory of Consciousness, so I am not against the projective operation. Your citation of my message is not complete.

In the philosophical theory I argue for all beings have a source, that I call Energy, meaning the potentiality and power to generate all reality, including space and time.

The unfolding of experienced reality from Energy happens in time.

Elementary particles with their spins, and the spin networks, are not projected from empty spáce, but from Energy.

The projection happens in time: Energy -> Spin Networks -> Decoherence -> Recoherence

In this view, the projected colors (and all qualia) come from the temporal process of Energy.

OK, back away from the bong.

Brian J Flanagan

Energy is eternal, the Big Bang is just an event in spacetime.

"Energy is eternal"

Many feel the same way about God.

Yes, you understood well, in my philosophical view Energy takes the place of God.

In the metaphysics of Triple-Aspect Monism, Energy is the source of all reality. The existence of God is conceived as an intentional object of human social consciousness (as the First Mover of Aristotle in Pierre Aubenque´s interpretation, or Ludwig Feuerbach´s thesis).