On a  first take, the answer is undeniable: they are incommensurable, indeed. Particularly when you take into account, as it seems in the question, Husserl's phenomenology.

Phenomenology is very used in that it bounds us to reality and moves us to identifying essences, as it happens. I believe that phenomenology is a restraint when we focus on creativity and construction, on imagination and challenging or defying reality appearances.

(I know the works by Husserl on imagination - compelling, provoking, very intelligent, and yet not entirely convincing…).

I don't believe there is a conflict between the two. Essences in phenomenology relate to  structures of experience rather than textures (content / meanings). Some structures are essential and invariant... the existence of consciousness, power difference, and spaces. How these are experienced is socially constructed.

Although there are similarities, phenomenology is individually focused whereas social construction suggests that all that is exists in relationships. Thus, it is often argued that phenomenology affirms a "self" construct and social construction deconstructs or "empties" it.  One reason I enjoy Alfred Adler's post-psychoanalytic theorizing (ca. 1920-1937) is that he affirmed a dialectical position (both/and) in regard to the self and relationships.  As I have written elsewhere, Adler affirmed that knowledge is socially embedded and relationally disturbed but did so without emptying the self.  I will be glad to make available articles in which I demonstrate the above position by Adler.  Send an email to [email protected] and I will send them to you.

Phenomenology brackets and helps to identify either social construction or its deconstruction. Post modern theorists use it as they find it eloquently handy for their analysis and theorisations. Experience and intentionality espoused in consciousness makes construction social or otherwise permissible, amenable and doable. 'Social constructionism', better use, social construct, could also be socially engineered as an essence of its intentionality and the 'a posteriori' experience of being and reality. Social construct cannot escape either.  Phenomenology is being argued by some as  incommensurable, yes, but not necessarily essentialist in essence for philosophical query and investiagtion cos we have other several means.

Agree with those that do not see a necessary conflict: if I am simply (even from my discourse community) bracketing certain ideas or tossing them under the rubric of irrelevant metaphysics ("transcendental ego" and the like) and as a "scientist" recording the experience of something, it is possible that I would not experience a conflict. However, if the notion of "scientist" were part of some colonizing influence alien to my community, then I might find (as I believe I do) phenomenology to be part of what Derrida called "the scientificity of science."

Yes, agree with Derrida's argument ' of the 'scieintificity of science' which Russell has raised in the discussion, cos his  (Derrida) process. deconstructs the mega, the defined, the classical, status quo (also a phenomenon) into phenomena yet to be wrestled with pure 'scientificity' which in fact led to post modern ideological agenda  and its positive assault on the fossilised thinking but carried a logic like,  'throw baby with the bath water'. Puritanical in its own way and radically romanticised for obvious reasons. Philosophical in analysis but lacked realism. 

"As above, so below." In other words, human values are a subset of universal values, social constructionism is a reflection of penomenonology. They are commensurable, this was assumed under a Christianized Europe for hundreds of years. All of the great religions would assert this in some sense, so the answer is "No," they are NOT in-commensurable.

I like "human values are a subset of universal values." Universal values are the real problem, are they not? The ultimate social construct is to claim that our society's values represent universal values. That means that every time we encounter a different set of values, they cannot be universal values, but the values of the other.

Scott Russell: We cannot claim any more than being a subset of universal values because we're not universal citizens yet and can't claim to know or benefit from what 'They' know (yet.)

If I am not mistaken Berger und Luckmann introduced the phrase social constructivism or constructionism to social science. At least, their work is one of the most cited in this field. Luckmann was Alfred Schütz' student and Schütz introduced phenomenology to sociological thinking. Luckmann claims that the difference between phenomenology and sociological analysis lies with the difference of "constitution" and "construction", the former describing the basic mechanism of how subjective meaning comes into the world, the latter describing the content and context of the basic mechanism.  

Universal values are all at some point could have been values particular to a group. It might have been universalised, the very word universe is relatively new. What we humans maintained was the particular, and was partcularised for a groups which obviously is a social construction. Yes constitution is a more developed form of the same. We have universalised values which had their origin in a particular setting. This is what we have agreed like a social contract. Universal values remain conceptual, and perhaps impractical  unless we implement and behave in particular situations. Universe is universe because of the particular. 

"Essentially"- I think not. Especially if language and metaphors are involved. One way a reconciliation can be reached between the specific and the universal is perhaps to think of family resemblances as it was used by Wittgenstein.

I thank one and all for your responses.

In the meanwhile I have tried to come up with one of my own, and would like to run it by you.

I guess the answer is twofold. One part of the answere is "depends how one construes phenomenology, social constructionism and essence". While more riggid constructions and construals would certainly make the two incommensurable, some more flexible construals make the combination possible.

The second part of the solution I have arrived at concerns the discermnet of "inquiry towards essences" versus "inquiry of essences". I guess we chan strive to find essences without assuming that our destination is an actual essence. That is to say that we work to uncover the foundational aspects of a given experience (i.e., a phenomenon) and acknowledge that whatever we uncover is contingent and constrained by various Discourses. That is, it is not essential in the realist meaning of the word.

Which one is best suited for conducting interviews in mixed method research??

Come back to the concept of phenomen and the discourse on the universality and particularity which I raised. This is so paramount, it is particularity and its significance that led to a concept of Universality. Universality is empty without the particular, but of course particularity gains much when it is universalised. This is an existential phenomenon if one wishes to argue.

Thank you for posting this question. I am not sure if I should be typing here or creating another question to clarify an answer given on this thread by Matthias Peter Klemm

To break it down to layman's terms, and please correct me as this is a question as opposed to a statement: phenomenology focuses on the 'what' (the conscious experience) while constructionism focuses on 'how' the conscious experience towards an object came about... is this correct?

Phenomenology is not necessarily 'what is' or the (conscious experience) because it includes the reality of 'what is not' too. To say 'what is' (conscious), is also to assume what is unsaid (unconscious), its part of the phenomenon itself. So the construction is what combines what is and what is not, because 'what is' contains the 'what is not yet' or at least it is sub-texted ( built in). However, the construction at this point may not fulfill the fuller construction too, because it is yet another phenomenon.