I find it odd to think of the definition of science as varying from language to language. If a language doesn’t have the word “science”, then it can’t have a different definition of “science”. The German word “Wissenschaft” is often translated as “science” but that translation typically depends on the context. Wissenschaft encompasses any discipline that involves systematic study, whether experimental, empirical, theoretical, interpretive, or exegetical, including fields like literary studies, which wouldn’t be regarded as scientific by English-speakers. So a strict translation of “Wissenschaft” into English would at best include science as a disjunct.
English usage allows history to be classified as a social science, and history does have methods or methodologies, although these vary according to different schools of historical research; similar things can be said of other social sciences. In the natural sciences and mathematics, there is (perhaps) less variation or more consensus in methodological approaches, but one can still find many differences there as well (e.g. some experimental physicists regard string theory as more metaphysics than science).
Traditionally history was regarded as in the same ballpark as literature, but nowadays it also relies on results from other disciplines, or intersects with other disciplines, in both the natural and social sciences (e.g. an art historian may need to apply some chemistry or physics for dating and authentication). Still, some historians (and others) want to continue to think of history as an art rather than as a science. Why isn’t it both? After all, doctors working in clinics labelled as “Medical Arts Centre” or “Medical Sciences Centre” are doing the same stuff.
Dear Joseph Tham,
I think it be reasonable to define history as a "scientific" discipline. Not as a" hard " science like physics, for example, but as a "soft" and human/social science like sociology, for instance. Description of phenomenona, their tentative explanation, and some possible predictions lie at the heart of any science. All of this also happens in history. More to the point, "historia magister vita est" (history is a good, if not not the best of all teachers"
Unless we espouse a postivist conception of science, it makes sense to thik of history as a scintific discipline like economy, sociology, psychology, and so on.
KInd regards,
Orlando
People say that if we do not learn the mistakes from history, we will repeat them. I am not so sure.
It is not clear that we can learn much from history.
Does history have a specified methodology for collecting data? Fields in the social sciences do but I'm not clear that history does.
John Traphagan I think that I agree with you. The problem is that the definition of science varies from language to language. Perhaps it is an issue of "lost in translation". We need help from linguists on this topic.
Personally, I do not think of history as a science. I suspect that this is not only an issue of language, but also of cultural environment. I wonder if this even might be different among different groups of English speakers.
I find it odd to think of the definition of science as varying from language to language. If a language doesn’t have the word “science”, then it can’t have a different definition of “science”. The German word “Wissenschaft” is often translated as “science” but that translation typically depends on the context. Wissenschaft encompasses any discipline that involves systematic study, whether experimental, empirical, theoretical, interpretive, or exegetical, including fields like literary studies, which wouldn’t be regarded as scientific by English-speakers. So a strict translation of “Wissenschaft” into English would at best include science as a disjunct.
English usage allows history to be classified as a social science, and history does have methods or methodologies, although these vary according to different schools of historical research; similar things can be said of other social sciences. In the natural sciences and mathematics, there is (perhaps) less variation or more consensus in methodological approaches, but one can still find many differences there as well (e.g. some experimental physicists regard string theory as more metaphysics than science).
Traditionally history was regarded as in the same ballpark as literature, but nowadays it also relies on results from other disciplines, or intersects with other disciplines, in both the natural and social sciences (e.g. an art historian may need to apply some chemistry or physics for dating and authentication). Still, some historians (and others) want to continue to think of history as an art rather than as a science. Why isn’t it both? After all, doctors working in clinics labelled as “Medical Arts Centre” or “Medical Sciences Centre” are doing the same stuff.
thank you for a wonderful answer. There is much to think about in your answer
History is something related to past study but it involves a systematic study, trying to extract that which is recorded with certain treasure-able information and perhaps it is a study of science in simple terms the a systematic approach from the observations.
History can also be said as scientific as it correlates with the discovery of unknown facts hidden in gold old age.
History is needed in very corner of the research work done. Be it a Information Technology, Medical science, Health care or any new discovery is based on the history of the instrument.
To conclude "History repeats, it never ends".
If "science" is used strictly, it should include the concept of repeatable, verifiable experiments. Since "history" is not absolutely repeatable, the study of it is not a science. But there certainly are cycles, revisits, similar phenomena. History is the best teacher, for although it doesn't repeat, it does rhyme (as Mark Twain put it).
Dear Joseph Tham,
I think, yes. It is reasonable to define history as a "scientific" discipline.
History is the teacher of life for anybody, for a society and for a separate individual.
I think history is more of a humanity but where methods are concerned, it ca be considered a social science. Historians systematically collect and analyse data.
How do we define science? It's actually a term that is rather ambiguously used in English, at least. Physicist Richard Feynman pointed this out quite nicely in his discussion of how we use the term. He wrote:
“What is science? The word is usually used to mean one of three things, or a mixture of them... Science means, sometimes, a special method of finding things out. Sometimes it means the body of knowledge arising from the things found out. It may also mean the new things you can do when you have found something out, or the actual doing of new things. This last field is usually called technology....”
John Traphagan Science must have testable hypotheses that we can reject. I agree with Karl Popper's ideas. We use the quality of the predictions to assess the degree to which we can called something a scientific discipline.
Joseph, I disagree with you. I'm an anthropologist and I do observational research. Science can also involve systematic observation and description. A hypothesis is not required, although a research question is.
John Traphagan Dear John, respectfully, I do not think that anthropology is a science. Doing research is not the same as doing science. For example, historians do research, and so do philosophers. A researcher is not a scientist. The distinguishing feature is the "testable" hypothesis. What would be an exemplar of a testable hypothesis in anthropology? Please do not interpret this as a challenge. Due to my ignorance, I am not sure what a testable hypothesis would look like in anthropology.
Well, by that logic, then many parts of geology are not science, either. Anthropology is a very broad discipline, so I don't think you can characterize it in one way. However, I think your definition of a science is simply too narrow. I realize that a researcher is not a scientist. I simply disagree with your definition--Richard Feynman disagrees, too...
John Traphagan I have the GREATEST respect for Feynman. Super guy. I agree that my definition is narrow. The reason is that I wish to exclude disciplines, such as history, philosophy, astrology, and possibly economics. We can CORDIALLY agree to disagree on this definition, and it is perfectly okay.
Warm regards.
Of course, we can cordially agree to disagree--no need for caps on that one. But I have a question for you: Since you've already made up your mind that history is not a science, why did you pose the question?
John Traphagan Let me explain. In some discussions with Russian-speakers, I found out that in the Russian language, history is a "scientific discipline". I do not know Russian, and I was puzzled. I pushed them to specify the criterion that would distinguish a scientific discipline from a non-scientific discipline. None was forthcoming. Coming from an Anglo-Saxon tradition, it was puzzling for me that they would think of history as a scientific discipline. Many decades ago, I had read Karl Popper in college, and I went back to read Popper's ideas. This is my motivation for this question. It could turn out that the definition of science depends on language. It may sound strange (perhaps a linguist or anthropologist could shed light on this) but it could explain why we have problems in translation.
You might consider reading a bit more broadly than Popper. As for history, I agree that it isn't a science. But the issue is based on methodology, not on the existence or lack thereof of a hypothesis. By your definition, if I do a study of a geological formation in order to understand how it is structured, that's not science unless I have a hypothesis. That doesn't make sense to me. I actually think this is a major problem with organizations like NIH, which sometimes take such a narrow view of what constitutes science. Is there a need for a clearly articulated research question? Absolutely. But it need not be in the form of a hypothesis that can be tested.
John Traphagan Please suggest some people that I should read. Again, I have not read Popper since college. It is certainly possible that there are new ideas out there. Happy to read and learn about new developments. The fundamental issue is how do we distinguish a scientific discipline from a non-scientific one. There may be a continuum from perfect science to perfect non-science.
Dear Joseph Tham ,
the question as to how define what constitutes "science" is the well known demarcation problem.
First a remark on Popper that may be of interest here. Popper wrote is early philosophical works in german. In german the term "Wissenschaft" is used, but that is not identical to "science", as Wissenschaft clearly includes disciplines like the humanities, theology, and philosophy. "Wissenschaftstheorie", in some sense a synonym to epistemology, was in the scope of Popper's thinking. His solution to the problem of demarcation emphazises the falsifiability as decisive.
There was an intensive debate between Popper and Theodor Adorno in the 1960ies, whether critical rationalism is applicable to describe the working in the social sciences exhaustively ("positivism debate"). Adorno, Hans Albert and Jürgen Habermas from the Frankfurt School denied the neutral and objective approach of Popper in the context of society.
Then you question, if economics can be regarded as a science. You may have a look at Philip Mirowski: (2011)
Book More Heat than Light
Mirowski works out how economists tried over decades to imitate scientific approaches and to transfer physical concepts (equilibrium, friction, potentials, Lagrange function,...) to the realm of economy. As economics deals with empirical evidence and economists formulate testable hypotheses, I would count it among the (social) sciences.
Best,
Thomas
Thomas Neusius Thank you for your answer. I tried to read Habermas in English during my college days, 30 years ago. I could not follow and understand him. Maybe his ideas are clearer in German. But in English, it was difficult. What are the new ideas on falsification? Generally, I agree with Popper. Who are the latest philosophers who are writing in this field? I think there is a big division between the Anglo-Saxon approach and the Continental philosophers. In principle, i think the idea of falsification is a good criterion for determining whether a discipline is scientific or not. It is not sufficient to simply disagree with falsification. If you disagree, then you must provide an alternative criterion of distinguishing a scientific discipline from a non-scientific one. In general, my guess is that English language speakers would not think of history as a scientific discipline. Again, this could simply be an issue of language and translation. A researcher is NOT a scientist, in my opinion, based on my narrow definition of science.
To answer the initial question: I count History as a discipline not among the sciences. Popper's demarcation criterion seems plausible to me. However, in German language history is definitely among the disciplines labeled "Wissenschaft".
Thomas Neusius The one discipline that is a problem is mathematics. Strictly speaking, it is not a science because in a mathematical axiomatic system, there are axioms that cannot be falsified (Godel's incompleteness theorems). But mathematics is not a non-science either. Did Popper know the work of Godel? That would be very interesting. We need a philosopher of science to help us here.
Popper referred to Gödel in his writings, so he knew his work. He certainly was aware of Gödel's principal findings.
Critical rationalism doesn't apply to math, since in math hypotheses can be proven to be true, while in empirical disciplines, hypotheses can only be proven to be false - all others are in the state of "not proven to be false, yet".
It's a matter of definition whether to include math as science or not. But there's little doubt about the different objectives in math and in other disciplines.
Thomas Neusius Great. So Popper knew about Godel's work. Even today many people are not aware of Godel's work. It is truly mind boggling. I prefer to put mathematics in a category by itself. What are other alternatives to distinguishing science from non-science, if people reject the idea of falsification?
What is the "range" of critical rationalism? Some disciplines are beyond science.
I would distinguish between physical science and social science. I also would suggest that positivism is a science tradition, but not the only one. There is science that deny the existence of an objective world, which then of course brings the whole idea of truth, verification, falsification, hypotheses, etc to a collapse. To understand the world as something constructed might sound absurd if understood comprehensive, but the same one could say with regards to a objective world, which can be reproduced again and again, if the variables are controlled / controllable.
Eberhard Weber Could you briefly elaborate on the criteria that you would use for distinguishing the physical sciences from the social sciences?
I think study history also science. systematic study of any problem is called science. carbon dating, genetic sequencing are very closely related with history
A scientific discipline has hypotheses or statements that can be falsified. As simple as this. If it does not have falsifiable statements, then it is NOT a scientific discipline.
dear Joseph Tham what you are telling is a good definition of 'Hypothesis-Theory' continuum... i think range of science is much bigger than 'Hypothesis-Theory'
History, like hard science, is a philosophical investigation. Their final goal is obtaining knowledge (scientia as per the latin old meaning), but they obviously differ on theory, methods, aims and of course, the subject(s) of investigation in time and space. In a nutshell: History can be a scientific discipline when approached with earnest intent and without bias .
You can answer the question in very different ways, I will mention two possibilities.
1 / Pragmatically, a field of work (i.e. an area in which people work) can be defined as science if it has university status through chairs, teaching and research that produces verifiable knowledge available in textbooks and encyclopaedias.
2 / One can also place the question in a scientific-historical context in which, at the latest in the Age of Enlightenment, criticism of the Church - as heir to the Reformation - has developed so strongly that critical examination of religious statements, not least statements of the Bible, was demanded and begun (for instance with Hermann S. Reimarus); as is well known, an early example is the so-called "Constantine donation", a forged document from which the (Catholic) Church in the Middle Age derived far-reaching claims of ownership.
From it source-critical research developed and in the 19th century the historical-critical method.
3/ Undoubtedly it was Wilhelm Dilthey who - on the traces of I. Kant - tried - I think successfully - to place the hermeneutic sciences such as philosophy, theology, law (three of the four faculties of the old university), also history as scientifically equal to the natural sciences. The difference between "explaining nature" and "understanding individual human life (psychological processes, individual experience), emphasized by Dilthey, was important 120 years ago; today the transitions between "explaining" general laws and "individual understanding" of human expressions of life have become rather fluid.
In any case, the question posed can hardly be adequately discussed, I think, without considering its history of reception.
Dear Hein Retter , as pointed out above, there are further approaches to shape the meaning of science. Joseph Tham suggested to start from Popper's falsification argument. I doubt that the German terminology (Geisteswissenschaften vs. Naturwissenschaften) can be transferred congruently to the English language. Science may be more than Naturwissenschaft but less than Wissenschaft. As an other example, theology is often not counted among the sciences, but among the Wissenschaften. The case of history is less clear.
Best,
Thomas Neusius
Thomas Neusius
Lieber Herr Neusius, ich habe keine Einwände gegenüber ihrem Beitrag.
2/ Die Bedeutung Diltheys liegt aus meiner Sicht vor allem darin, dass er "Geschichte" gegen Hegel und den Hegelianismus eben gerade nicht (mehr) als "Geschichtsmetaphysik" verstand, sondern als empirische Wissenschaft im Sinne des Kant'schen Wissenschaftsverständnisses. Man kann natürlich dabei den Erfahrungsbegriff sehr weit und sehr eng sehen. Ich setze hier mal Erfahrung mit "Erleben" im Sinne Diltheys gleich. Das ist viel enger als etwa gleichzeitig der Erfahrungsbegriff in der American Philosophy von Peirce, W. James und Dewey pragmatisch entwickelt wurde.
3/ Dilthey war ja mit Helmholtz befreundet, und es wäre ein Missverständnis, wenn man Dilthey als Kritiker der Naturwissenschaften sehen würde (was manchmal geschieht). Aber er hatte wohl etwas dagegen, Wissenschaft - egal ob Naturwissenschaft oder Geschichte - als reinen Positivismus zu betrachten (Man denke an seine Auseinandersetzung mit Mills und Spencer, sowie an die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Dilthey und Hermann Ebbinghaus).
4/Als fortzuschreibendes Moment historischen Selbstverständnisses lässt sich bis heute über die simple Frage natürlich streiten - wie man sich pragmatisch auch einigen kann: Was ist ein Fakt - historisch gesehen?
5/In bezug auf die Psychologie hattte Dilteys Versuch allerdings Schilffbruch erlitten, sie vor den Naturwissenschaften als eine "verstehende" Lebensphilosophie zu retten.
6/ Poppers Ansatz ist ja nur auf der Basis eines empirischen Wissenschaftsverständnisses sinnvoll, und in seiner Kritik des "Historizismus" werden Konzepte wie der historische Materialismus (Marx/Engels) ausdrücklich abgewiesen - wiederum aus einsichtigem Grund: Die Bestandteile der Theorie sind allzu gut falsifizierbar, und man muss Ideologie zu Hilfe nehmen, um sie als "wissenschaftlich gerechtferitgt" aufrecht zu erhalten.
7/ Es würde mich und vielleicht andere ebenso freuen, wenn Sie Ihren letzten Satz, etwas ausführlicher und argumentativ gestalten, dass mit der Geschichte etwas unklar sei.
Besten Gruß, Hein Retter
I have taken care now to get a translated text, written in German above, into a bad (mechanical) English, for further interested discussion participants.
Dear Colleague, I have no objections to your contribution.
2/ In my view, Dilthey's significance lies above all in the fact that he understood "history" against Hegel and Hegelianism precisely not (any longer) as "historical metaphysics", but as empirical science in the sense of Kant's understanding of science.One can, of course, see the concept of experience very broadly and very narrowly. Here I equate experience narrow, with "Erleben" in the sense of Dilthey. This is much closer and emotionally uploaded than the concept of experience in the American Philosophy of Peirce, W. James and Dewey was pragmatically developed at the same time (and somewhat later).
3/ Dilthey was friends with Helmholtz, and it would be a misunderstanding to see Dilthey as a critic of the natural sciences (which sometimes happens). But he probably had something against considering science - no matter if natural science or history - as pure positivism (think of his argument with Mills and Spencer, as well as the argument between Dilthey and Hermann Ebbinghaus).
4/As a continuing moment of historical self-understanding, the simple question can of course still be argued about today - how to agree pragmatically: What is a fact - historically speaking?
5/In relation to psychology, however, Diltey's attempt to save it from the natural sciences as an "understanding" philosophy of life suffered a reed break.
6/ Popper's approach only makes sense on the basis of an empirical understanding of science, and in his critique of "historicism" concepts such as historical materialism (Marx/Engels) are explicitly rejected - again for a clear reason: the components of the theory are all too easily falsifiable, and one must use ideology to maintain them as "scientifically justified".
7/ It would please me and perhaps others as well if you make your last sentence, somewhat more detailed and argumentative, that something is unclear with history.
Best, Hein Retter
Dear Mr. Hein Retter ,
I've been told, science is more narrow than "Wissenschaft". But in the course of this discussion it became clear, that even "science" is not uniquely defined and there is some leeway, which covers disciplines sometimes subsumed among (social) sciences and sometimes not. Indeed, I understood science to be an empirical undertaking. But the example of mathematics, usually also included to the sciences, could be a counterexample, admittedly.
Certainly, historians and archeologists use scientific methods. But the object of history is not accessible to empirical research.
Best,
Thomas Neusius
Empirical methodology, including experimental research, is not the concern of a single science, but is available to all sciences, wherever one is dealing with the distribution of characteristics, - mainly in biology, psychology, sociology, economics, pedagogy (educational research, "Bildungsforschung", for example), and of course in historical-comparative or culture-comparative research, whether it is descriptive or inferential (test-) statistics.
sequel
I take an example in which theology, history and archeology meet, as the Israeli historian and archeologist, Israel Finkelstein, has shown (in his book"The Forgotten Kingdom") using the example of the Empire of King David or of Jeroboam I or J. II with regard to the data of the Bible or the "Old Testament". It looks as if there was no kingdom of David, as the Bible described it, because the remains of the buildings as they were found for other times and kings of Israel or Juda could not have existed in such a way (the author will forgive me if I simplify it too much here). Of course, because of the meagerness and the ambiguity of finds, the scope for interpretation is great, but the simple task that Leopold von Ranke had already set for historical scholarship is still today the movement of research: historians want to know what the past really was like, and free the network of facts from myths or purposive misrepresentations as far as possible. I myself have a great deal to do with research into contemporary history, which also involves examining the extent to which the self-representation of contemporary historical personalities deviates from reality in times of crisis and dictatorship. A cv-researcher who examines resumes written to reach high positions in state and politics almost always comes to the conclusion that every written, career-oriented resume conceals and embellishes things for its own benefit. Yes, we know, so we are acting as human beings, but as human beings and scientists we also know that. When we get a little older, we soon reach the point where you feel you are piece of history. A view back in the first publications 50 years before can generate such a feeling.
Also vom deutschen Sprachgebrauch her gesehen, ist doch science
als "Wissenschaft im Sinne der Naturwissenschaften" zu verstehen, während die interpretierenden (oder narrativen) Wissenschaften ebenso wie die normorientierten Wissenschaften (Recht, Ethik) eher in die "humanities" fallen.
Lieber Herr Retter,
ja, grob würde science = Naturwissenschaft wohl passen, wobei dann wieder die gesamte empirische Sozialforschung, Wirtschaftsforschung, etc. rausfiele und der Begriff "social science" ja diese enge Auslegung durchbricht. Insbesondere scheint science und humanities keine disjunkte Begrifflichkeit zu sein.
Vielen Dank für Ihre reichhaltigen Beiträge und viele Grüße
Thomas Neusius
Of course historians are respectable scientists and they are Working with scientific Standards, methods, etc.
Carsten Weerth
Historians are certainly respectable academics and researchers. However, it is not clear that they are scientists. That is the whole point of this discussion. With falsification as the admittedly narrow criterion for distinguishing a scientific discipline from a non-scientific discipline, a historian is not a scientist. Please give me an example of a falsifiable statement from the discipline of history.
A historian is a cultural scientist, not a natural scientist.
In German language we differ Naturwissenschaften von Kulturwissenschaften...
Carsten Weerth Since I do not know German, I am unable to comment. Are we back to a linguistic issue and are we losing meaning in translation? A cultural scientist may sound perfectly okay in German. In English, it just does not sound right, as least to me.
You are clearly underlining that these Findlings are about the common ussage of a term academic history of certain subjects in different parts of the World...
Difficult to make final judgements...
@geraldo hostin
Are you saying that history becomes a science when the historian “approaches it with earnest intent and without bias”, and presumably it is NOT a science when the historian does not approach it with earnest intent or with bias? This shifts the criterion to “earnest intent” and “bias” which are far vaguer than falsification.
Carsten Weerth
For argument sake, suppose we have a committee of German language experts, and they say that in the German language, to say that a “historian is a cultural scientist” is perfectly okay.
And we have a committee of English language experts, and they say that in the English language, to say that a “historian is a cultural scientist” sounds awkward and strange.
How do we resolve this difference? My suggestion is the reason why it sounds strange in English may be due to a very narrow definition of science in the English language.
It is not clear why a physicist, sociologist, biologist or economist should be a "scientist" and why a historian should not be a scientist. Whoever makes this assertion and claims to be a scientist himself has an obligation to bring rational arguments (not a questionable statement) about a public discussion. There are enough introductions to the history and theory of science, introductions to general history, introductions to the history of scientific disciplines (even economics); only if one questions this in publicly accessible sources of information (this is permitted, and even recommended) with arguable objections, then one can discuss.
I have not yet experienced a senate or faculty session in which an economist and a natural scientist accuse each other of not being scientists. I don't think such mutual contempt is good.
But those who only simply let go of an assertion that the university discipline x is not a science and those who have studied this Pseucdo science, not a scientist, create in an immoral way pressure for justification on those colleagues who do not know this kind of discussion.
In Germany you make a distinction between Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft or Kulturwissenschaft. Both of them are Wissenschaft. In France you can find sciences humaines or sciences de I'homme, sciences sociales and 'les sciences' that is the term for the natural sciences. It's the same in Italy.
История - безусловно социальная наука. Она входит в перечень научных дисциплин. Существуют научно-исследовательские институты по истории. Большое количество ученых занимаются различными историческими проблемами. Однако необходимо различать методологию естественных и социальных наук. Историю нельзя считать точной наукой. Попытки разработать математический аппарат, описывающий, объясняющий и прогнозирующий исторические процессы обречены на неудачу, поскольку существует очень много переменных. Изучение истории предполагает учет не только общих закономерностей, но и частных случаев, которые невозможно описать математически.
Science is a process of investigation. I recognize the nuances in other languages. In some connotations, "science" and "rigorous academic study" are synonymous. "Science" also is seen by many to be a prestige term, to be a level above simple "study". The question becomes whether "science" is applied, that is to say, "the scientific method."
History does use hypotheses and theories. However, I would argue they are not "scientific" as the outcomes measured are far more subjective and testing "for" and "against" the hypothesis cannot be done using scientific protocols.
There is a reason why many fields, such as history, have the expression "there is an art and a science to this". Elements of science are definitely used in these fields, including history. However, a scientist studying the history of a development is not branded a "historian" or is made into a "statistician" for using related mathematical tools. Short of invoking Asimov's psychohistory of the FOUNDATION series, I do not see "history" to be a scientific field using conventional English language terms and context.
Of course, anyone can have his subjective opinion, express it and discuss it, whether "history" or "technology" has anything to do with the claim of science. The diversity of opinions, including theoretical approaches, is part of the appearance of modern science. The argumentation used applies equally to many other established subjects, political science, pedagogy (which for a long time was only "history of education"), economics, psychology, sociology, theology (a "hot potato"), logic.
I'm just saying that it is useful to deal with the history of the reception of the question discussed here. The question of whether a certain field of work can be called "science" has its own history with results. And it seems that astronomy is a science that knows no present, only past (of course in connection with the future of the cosmos). But "astrology" - the interpretation of fate for a certain date of birth, which fills the reading corners of magazines, which we do not call a science that does not have university chairs either.
One of the things that belongs to modern science is that it performs an ideology-critical function towards itself, i.e. criticism is taken for granted not only from outside, but also from within. This applies to every scientific discipline. For in addition to a comprehensive theory formation, each science also has its own structures due to its special field of activity and must solve its problems. In history, for example, the question is quite central. What is the relationship between analytical and moral judgement? The question of historical justice cannot be solved analytically alone. At the end of an investigation we also have to make a moral judgement about National Socialism, for example, or about how to deal with ethnic minorities. But as in any science, they are never final in history, but hypotheses can be changed or better substantiated by new findings. If the scientific claim is abandoned, i.e. the effort for an intersubjective concept of truth, then the door is open to ideology and the justification of false theories, which are, however, usually successful in short, for the first time.
if someone claims today: in Germany there were no Nazis, Hitler was a peaceful citizen, and there were no Concentration Camps, then it is not a matter of a dispute of opinions in which the one who cries out loudest is right. No, we must resort to scientific research and findings.
As I understood this discussion, it is about the English usage of the term "science". First, the meaning of the term depends on the way it is used by native speakers. It may turn out, that the usage is pure convention. That may even be an inconsistent usage and no clear rational behind it.
I have the impression, the topic is partially emotional, as the term "science" conveys a lot of reputation. Clearly, many disciplines strive to present themselves as scientific. Economics is just an example of a discipline that imitated scientific approaches
Didier Sornette:
Article Physics and Financial Economics (1776-2014): Puzzles, Ising ...
After that, it becomes a political issue. The reputation of a discipline is central to acquiring grants. I consider this an essential driver for the emphazise that is given to the question: science or not?
BTW: I'm not convinced that formal structures at universities are a valid measure of scientificness. I think there are examples of chairs that have a rather esoteric understanding of science.
In the United States, history is filled with revisionist's views, changing societal pressures to conform to political social currents, and social experiments of differing perspectives of the same events. Ask about the history of the civil war to a plantation owner, a senator, a slave, a banker, a general, and a family who lost a son in battle. Ask about the meaning of the Confederate flag to a slave, a family who lost a son and father, a yankee that never fought, and a student going to college on mommy and daddy's trust find established to avoid taxes in 2019 and you'll get many versions of "history". How is that scientific?
I would think: not chairs have esoteric character - otherwise they should be called for our discussion - but professors who are holders of these chairs. They are also committed to scientific truth, but there are many different personalities. I know this well from the humanities. Since I taught at a technical university, I often met physicists and computer scientists at a social gathering. I always thought that such differences in the conception of science or the affiliation to citation circles only existed in the humanities, but not in the "exact" sciences. I very soon had the opposite experience: the dispute is much greater, probably because projects are financed with much larger sums of money.
In an attempt at humor from a bygone era, I believe it is fair to say, without insulting anyone in this politically charged and toxic climate , that is it likely that many economists might have p.... envy?
A professor is an academic and conducts research.
A researcher conducts research. A researcher is not necessarily a scientist.
For clarity in communication, we must be transparent and clear about the words that we use.
If a historian claims that she is doing rigorous research, it is fine. But if she claims that she is conducting “scientific” research, then I have my doubts, at least, regarding the English language. I do not know German and have zero competency in making any such assessment.
Just because a discipline claims to be scientific does not mean it is scientific unless we have a criterion of determining whether it is scientific.
Imagine a renowned astrologist makes the claim that she is a scientist because she conducts rigorous research. Would it be acceptable? Would the claim depend on the language? If it is in German, then her claim is okay but not in another language?
Imagine a famous theologian makes the claim that she is a scientist because she conducts rigorous research.
A theoretical economist makes the claim that her deep research in the mechanisms of collective choice (in the field of social choice theory) is scientific research, would we accept it just because she claims that it is so? I have yet to see a “continuous” function for price in the marketplace. It is clearly falsifiable. But in economics, it is axiomatically true and cannot be falsified.
In your mother tongue (language), is history a scientific discipline? @fateh Boutekouk
Of course, history if pursued with scientific methods is science!
What is the scientific basis for general equilibrium theory and capitalism?
From a conceptual (theoretical) point of view, roughly speaking, a perfectly competitive system is Pareto-Optimal.
Is this a mathematical statement or a scientific statement?
Fateh Boutekouk
Maybe the idea of "scientific discipline" depends on the language. In Arabic, would you think that "astrology" (not astronomy) is a scientific discipline? How about theology? Painting and sculpture?
Astrology is better. It helps you to structure your life. For example you should have cut your hairs (I have no hair at all) if the stellar constelor lation is appropriate. This is also what the homeopathic doctors will tell you. Me am a normal doctor and do not believe in nonsense.
History is extremely important! as a sience! Please consider that many young peopele, e.g. in my country, who have no idea what happened in the Nazi times! Please consider also what happened in colonialism! Never forget, and be strongly aware: Historical science is the only discipline to uncover all the injuries, crimes and human rights violations which have been commited! Hands up for good historical science (avoid of deniers and fake distributors)!!!!!!!!!
Christian G Meyer Do you believe that losers write history? Hmmm. Interesting....
Yes!. Interpretations of the past express both the circumstances in which the historian elaborates his work and the actual process of historical development; in examining the past historians analyze their own circumstances which determine the subjects to be studied, the means by which research is conducted, and the analytical procedures available; reference to their circumstances is necessary and clarifying to explain the social nature of historical research. The historian decides whether and when to judge, and critical selection may vary if it is not reflected in the discourse, the complexity of thinking about the dynamics of history. Interpretation is the activity of historians (La Historia como ciencia, Luis Sánchez Jaramillo)
THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning at the moment that it broke out, and believing that it would be a great war and more worthy of relation than any that had preceded it. This belief was not without its grounds. The preparations of both the combatants were in every department in the last state of perfection; and he could see the rest of the Hellenic race taking sides in the quarrel; those who delayed doing so at once having it in contemplation. Indeed this was the greatest movement yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but of a large part of the barbarian world- I had almost said of mankind. For though the events of remote antiquity, and even those that more immediately preceded the war, could not from lapse of time be clearly ascertained, yet the evidences which an inquiry carried as far back as was practicable leads me to trust, all point to the conclusion that there was nothing on a great scale, either in war or in other matters.
Thucydides, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, translated by Richard Crawley.
History is a science ever since.
Elena Velkova Velkovska Perhaps in your mother tongue, history is a science. On the assumption that English is NOT your mother tongue, I would like to suggest that history is not a science, as it is commonly understood in the English language. I do not know Greek. Perhaps in the Greek language, history is a science. I plead ignorance and request the professional opinions of experts on this topic.
I won't really consider history as a science on subject basis. Though there are very scientific things that are historical in nature. History is learnt after events take place. Its not futuristic however it is very useful in future predictions which are purely scientific in nature.
- Badges
- Science topic
- Similar topics
- Philosophy
- Philosophy Of Science
- Reasoning