One effect is there may be a new treaty, INCLUDING China and other countries. The US Secretary of State proposed one, and his Russian counterpart said Russia is interested. One of the problems of the treaty is it did NOT include China, Iran, etc.

If this does not work out, the main short term effect is that the US may now work on its own weapons in this class, something it was not allowed to do under the treaty. Russia did it anyway - so their continuing to do it changes nothing. Same for China, Iran and others not bound by the treaty. No changes in any of those cases.

The long term problem is that these are much more dangerous weapons than long range weapons are. The time to make a decision while they are in flight is far less - quite possibly less than the time needed to detect and classify the launch. So the risk of a too-quick decision to launch a counter attack raises the risk of a larger war. So is the risk of no-decision to implement countermeasures (which includes trying to intercept them). This is not ideal for a safe world.

However, nuclear weapons are not really practical to use. There has been no nuclear weapon launched in anger since 1945. This in spite of early theory (in the only country that had atom bombs) that they could be used effectively even in peacetime! [Look up Atomic Diplomacy.] It was hoped that mere possession of atom bombs, and bombers to deliver them, and having actually demonstrated the political will to use them, might deter ALL wars - to the point no powerful conventional forces were needed at all! This failed utterly. Most early threats to use under Atomic Diplomacy clearly failed. The two that were believed to have worked at the time turned out (once we knew what really was going on in the minds of the other side) to be cases of confusion. China thought they had stood up to the US threats, the US thought China had backed down, and neither really grasped that they misjudged the other side. Anyway - not even the US in the 1950s was really willing to use them, threats or not. [Study the Eisenhower era policy. In particular his reaction to the plan to use them in Indochina. When the National Security Council sounded like it might approve such use, he lost his temper and cried "My God! We can't use those awful things on Asians twice in less than ten years." Presidents don't want such a political legacy, particularly over some dispute over a colony of an ally. Big nuclear wars are only possible on the margins, sliding sideways into one without a serious intention of doing so.

It is SMALL nuclear conflicts that are increasing in probability exponentially. The failure to seriously enforce non-proliferation - or even for the nuclear powers to comply with the NPT (in the almost never mentioned sense) - has led to several dozen small nations and groups working on atomic bombs. Many are "undeterrable" - due to ideology of lack of any place one can target in retaliation. The almost never mentioned - or even thought about - part of NPT is the quid quo pro. Non-nuclear states agree NOT to develop IN EXCHANGE FOR the nuclear states disarming "as soon as possible." Zero effort was taken for decades. Until the IMF Treaty. Since then we got rid of 90% of nuclear weapons - at least some progress. But now we are restarting the nuclear arms race. The MAIN EFFECT of deploying more - and more kinds - of nuclear weapons is insuring other nations want their own deterrent capability. So one effect - if IMF is not replaced - is more investment in nuclear weapons generally, and more incentive for minor nations to become players. Greater trade in these technologies will only facilitate the truly dangerous minor players, particularly absent a serious non-proliferation regime that is effective.

May I respectfully suggest that you formulate a more concrete question, one less abstract and general? For example, "[What Is the Relationship Between] Intermediate Nuclear Forces and Kremlin ambitions in Eastern Europe."

Sir: The U.S. is committed to building (and likely using) low yield nuclear weapons.

https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/28/us-nuclear-weapons-first-low-yield-warheads-roll-off-the-production-line

As such, I think it will take a conflagration, likened to the odious use of chemical weapons in WWI and the attendant devastation that followed, before there will be sufficient political will to see nuclear weapons permanently banned.

DCB

Dear Lawrence Trevethan,

Yes, if world powers can go for a new treaty with all countries with Nuclear weapon power, It is important for peaceful world.

Thank you

Piyal

Dear Thomas Blau,

Thank you for comment. However, you can involve for this discussion.

Piyal

Dear David Benton,

Thank you for answer. But I believe that the Production of nuclear weapon with low explosive power (from 100 kilotons of TNT) is not a solution.

Piyal

My views on small yield nuclear weapons derive from three different backgrounds: actual experience with a unit able to field 1 kt weapons (so we had to think about applications), a study of the technology (working on weapons systems), and a (the very first) study of the law (with a focus on US law and US recognized parts of international law).

Generally speaking, the problems with historical US (and foreign) nuclear weapons planning are that they weapons are too large, often compounded by a willingness to use them on civil population centers. Using large weapons will generally have catastrophic (and illegal) environmental impacts not in the interests of any country - even the one using them. This is much worse if weapons are used on cities - which unfortunately was the original application (in spite of wartime planning to hit military targets - the fleet base at Truk, and using 12 tactically in Operation Olympic). Common perceptions that this is somehow legal are wrong, even in the worst scenarios. See US Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (and the first place I learned the law). Reprisals are generally strictly forbidden, and always forbidden against people who did not engage in whatever a reprisal is a reprisal for. Trained in three USN/USMC and one Army type MP schools, I assure you that we take US law seriously: it isn't just some academic theory (although it used to be - before anyone started asking questions; I was apparently the first to do so, over half a century ago).

In the Reagan era, my ideas about small nukes were rejected because they were considered too likely to escalate into a general war (which, in the Cold War era, may have been the case). These ideas have now more or less become official policy - in part because we have a much more information about foreign nuclear weapons and planning. Nevertheless, the points I raised in that era are generally being missed by bureaucrats (apart from targeteers - the only people who have consistently refused to break the law since the 1960s - at least in US services). In fact, it was one of these (O-6 = Colonel or Navy Captain rank) who first brought the problems of targeting to my attention - in public at the University of Washington in 1969. THEY fear being convicted of war crimes if they target a population center! I did not know, however, until 2016 that not even Moscow is targeted: a unique public brief by 13 serving or former CIA directors disclosed all 68 warheads targeting Moscow in fact have the same aim point - and it is NOT in Moscow at all. [It is a long range missile defense radar surrounded by forests and fields well over a nuclear miss distance even for a strategic warhead]. Almost no

one thinks in terms of my personal experience - use of nuclear weapons at sea - in a purely tactical situation - with underwater detonations involving zero risk of fallout, zero risk of civilian casualties, and only extremely local environmental effects. A 1 kt detonation is very survivable even by a naval target, particularly a submarine, unless it is a direct hit. The main reason I agreed with the decision to remove those warheads from the arsenal is that modern technology provides far more reliable ways to fight at sea which is far less expensive and runs no risk of losing control of a nuclear weapon. Yet another experience I had was in defeating an attempt to CAPTURE small nuclear weapons - it is a real problem. US ships in port are almost defenseless - with a tiny watch and only the petty officer of the watch is "armed" - with an unloaded pistol. And - FYI - it is a matter of treaty law one is supposed to guard nuclear weapons to prevent capture by terrorists or others. Still - it is quite clear that tactical nuclear warfare is possible IF one

uses truly small weapons (not these monsters usually called "tactical") AND IF

one is restrictive in planning. And if one is not willing to do that, one is opening a real can of worms. It is not very sensible to wreak the global economy and eco-system. Forget the direct damage and casualties of general warfare targeting cities - just the ECONOMIC effects of wreaking global trade will cause most people on the planet to starve to death within a few months, and it won't be feasible to simply grow or hunt more food in vast areas. Survivors are going to be hunting nuclear warriors to exact revenge.

Dear Lawrence Trevethan,

Thank you. Yes, We have to face the reality.

Piyal Aravinna

In that sense, to reopen the nuclear issue is to open the field to new radical actors (Iran, North Korea, among others) that would endanger the face of the earth

Dear Bladimir,

If It possible, that is agood idea.But, do you think that the major parties, specilly USA will aggree to accept their power ？

Piyal Aravinna

The problem is in the nature of these regimes. DPRK is the case I know most about. The decision to acquire nuclear weapons was taken on the DAY of Nagasaki's bombing, BEFORE DPRK became a nation. Its founder, Kim el Sung, was a major in the Soviet Army, leading a tiny, irregular unit. He saw them as a way to solve Korea's historic problem of being invaded (and often conquered) by China, Russia, Japan and, kind of, the USA. He stored Japanese atomic equipment for decades until the program could exploit it. Later, DPRK ruined the economy, diverting electric power to separate uranium. A state willing to foster starvation to get atom bombs is NOT one that theories of deterrence apply to: even if they work, they only work if the nation values its own people. DRPK was chosen to be the distributor of nuclear (and missile) technology by Russia and China - a policy that only changed in 2017 (for fear of the consequences when someone uses this technology - dozens of players having been facilitated by that policy). I do not think DPRK should be accepted as a nuclear armed state.

Iran is, if possible, more alarming. It is the only nation whose president ever said "if we had even one bomb, we should use it on Tel Aviv." Never mind this was political speech intended to be popular among radical clerics - it isn't the sort of attitude one should trust in a nuclear armed nation.

Preventing a nation from becoming a nuclear armed one is possible - and we have done so. But it is not practical for a large nation (as Iran is) in the long run. It is also not practical given WE have not honored the NPT ourselves, and given WE have proliferated (notably Isreal). Nuclear weapons tend to make nations nervous, and want to deter attacks by them. NPT might be practical IF we are willing to honor it (but that means disarming ourselves "as soon as possible" - something we long ignored - finally began to do - but are now ignoring again. Other regimes are possible, but no one is working on them. And FAILURE to punish Pakistan or North Korea when they broke deals with us sent a message: agree - cheat - and there are no meaningful consequences. Such signals doom policy to fail.

I do NOT expect serious policing of nuclear weapons until the next one is used on a city. After that - in days - policy will change. The risk is too theoretical - politicians will put off facing the problem states until it is clearly an immediate concern.

Dear All,

It is important to go for new INF with china.

Pls. go through the article written by by Paul J. Leaf , available at the ink given below.

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/withdrawing-inf-treaty-was-easy-part-121146

A.G. Just to clarify, I also do not believe the production, deployment, and use of low yield nuclear weapons is the answer to the dilemma. But I can forsee that the existence of these weapons make their use all the more probable. As such, I am pessimistic. I fear that only AFTER a devastating nuclear exchange occurs will there be an appetite for nations (especially the U.S.) to come to an agreement to reduce, limit, and/or ban nuclear weapons.

David

Dear David C Benton,

Thank you for your valuable comment.

Piyal Aravinna

While I to think there are potentially legal and even moral applications for "tiny nukes" - I do not think there is much practical need for them in this century. The cost to field them is excessive and the risk they might be stolen or their technical designs may be stolen is higher than is well understood. As well, I don't think heads of state in "normal" countries with "normal" politics (which leaves out some small regimes formally classified as "undeterrables") will want to be the one who authorizes any use of nuclear weapons. It is not good to be known for that in history. The two examples where a decision had to be made (one Russian, one US) were both declined. The Russian case was particularly striking - the indications were Moscow was about to be hit by two missiles - and at that time NATO HAD a "decapitation" strike option in place. That is, nuclear weapons are not credible tools of statecraft, even in a crisis, for major powers whose leaders intend to survive and intend their nations to survive. The grave risk is that "tens" of small nations and "tens" of groups are trying to get these weapons - according to a 2018 brief by then CIA Director Mike Pompeo (which I can quote as it is declassified and indeed was televised). We ought to get serious about proliferation - and I don't think we will until AFTER some city goes up in an explosion. AFTER that, within days, we will take the issue seriously.

Fielding low-yield nuclear warheads is a new threat. it is a new open up for an arm race.

Russia slams US arguments for low-yield nukes.

news is avilable @

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-slams-us-arguments-low-171614683.html

I disagree that tiny nukes are a new technical capability. I first examined tiny nukes in policy in the 1980s. The smallest nuclear core ever built (as opposed to merely proposed) was done in the 1960s. In the 1980s, when the number of nuclear weapons peaked, and when the size of nuclear weapons was (as it is mostly today) in in the 80 - 300 kiloton range, tiny nukes seemed like a significantly better option to add to the mix. It was rejected because of assumptions about how ANY nuclear weapon use might be a trigger for a general exchange. In fact, I served with tiny nukes in the 1960's - they were common on must US escort ships. That is, widespread deployment of tiny nukes is historical practice, and did not lead to any use at all. [Note that megaton sized warheads fielded earlier in the nuclear arms race had already been abandoned because their effects were excessive to any requirements. The trend in reducing size had already begun and became general practice internationally.]

The process of negotiating the build down revealed a great deal of information about both capabilities and practices. The number of warheads declined by about 90% and the more likely to be used kinds were outlawed. Indeed, the nuclear warheads used on US escort ships were withdrawn from service as part of this build down. The biggest problem with tiny nukes is, if they are widely deployed again as they once were, that there is a risk of capture. Indeed, such an attempt was actually made, and only narrowly defeated. Tiny nukes have real advantages. Starting with they do less damage than large nuclear weapons do. Another is that under water use is even more damage limiting. They are the ONLY kind of nuclear weapon that might be able to be used inside the rules of the law of land warfare (that is, without causing "casualties wonton and disproportionate to any military necessity"). They should not be rejected out of hand. I no longer advocate them only because the missions for which they are appropriate can today be achieved by conventional means.

Dear Lawrence Trevethan,

According to the latest news, china would like to join nuclear talks if US reduces arsenal. This is the time to restart the dialog among major nuclear powers to establish a New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Likewise, a similar approach is essential   to form a new Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

news is available at https://www.yahoo.com/china-says-join-nuclear-talks-us-reduces-arsenal-084059569.html

I study China formally for a think tank, and nuclear weapons informally since I developed concerns about US nuclear policy when I was an engineer involved in their manufacture.

The link you provided is no longer working. The last I read, PRC had declined to join the talks. But it would be a very good thing if they did. The principle problem with the (just ended) agreements is that China was not covered by them. They were the most successful nuclear treaties of all time.