The perfect action that has its end in itself is called by Aristotle: final act or final realization (entelechia). While the movement is the process that leads gradually to acting what was only potential, the 'entelechia' is the final term (telos) of the movement, its perfect conclusion. But as such, 'entelechia' is the accomplished realization and therefore the perfect form of what is becoming; it is the species and substance. Then, the act identifies itself in each case with the species and, when it is a perfect act or final realization, it coincides with the substance. This is the same reality under way and its principle. In front of it, the matter considered in itself, that is as pure material or raw material, absolutely deprived of actuality or form, is indeterminable and unknowable and is not substance.
Thus, entelechia is the term used by Aristotle in opposition to "power" to describe the reality that has reached the full level of its development; it is sometimes identified with the word 'act', but the two terms are different as the latter indicates the active realization of power, and the entelechia, instead, constitutes the perfect reached implementation by the substance. It is therefore not to be confused with the ‘endelechia’, term initially used by Aristotle and transmitted by Cicero, which is used to indicate the human soul understood as the ‘fifth nature’ (different from any other known to us), immortal, common to the gods and the heavens (divine beings).
The term entelechia was revived by Leibniz to indicate the Monad, as it has in it the perfect organic end of its development.
Now, in other words, the term ‘entelechia’ was coined by Aristotle to describe his particular philosophical conception of a reality that has registered in itself the ultimate goal toward which to evolve. It is in fact composed of en + telos, which in Greek means "inside" and "purpose", to mean a kind of "inner purpose".
Speaking of entelechia’ Aristotle opposed the Platonic theory of ideas, to assert how each entity develops starting from a final cause internal to it, and not by external ideal reasons as, instead, Plato argued by locating them in the hyperuranium sky. Entelechia is therefore the tension of an organism to realize itself according to its own laws, passing from potentiality to action.
It is known, in fact, as, according to Aristotle, ‘becoming’ can be considered fully explained when its four causes are identified: Material Cause, Formal Cause, Efficient Cause and the Final Cause. To designate the accomplishment of the purpose Aristotle used precisely the term entelechia that indicates the state of perfection of something that has reached its end.
Neo-platonists came in part to the Aristotelian concept that the shape of a body should also be immanent to it and not only Platonic transcendent, but found reductive the identification of the soul with entelechia, since the soul is something prior to the body and still independent of it.
A synthesis of the Aristotelian and neo-Platonic conception is in Tommaso Campanella, for whom nature is a complex of living realities, each animated and tending to its end, but then all unified and harmoniously directed toward a common goal by the same universal ‘Anima mundi’.
Leibniz also conciliated the Aristotelian entelechia with the Neo-Platonic vision, making it an essential property of the Monad, that is, of every "energy center", capable of developing independently towards their goal or destiny: each monad receives no impetus from the outside, but all together they form a single complex, regulated in the inside by a harmony preset by God, the supreme Monad. They are, in fact, equal to the coordinates of so many clocks, functioning on their own but synchronized with each other.
In the twentieth century the term ‘entelechia’ has been recalled by the philosopher and biologist Hans Driesch to designate the ‘vital energy’ which he considered immanent to embryos and responsible of their development, as opposed to mechanistic theories which they saw as a "machine."
In the light of the Aristotelian distinction between entelechia, as an action, a realized term of the action that contains no further progress, and ‘energeia’, that is the action understood as actualization of entelechia in the making, the misstep is configured as an impasse, a slip out of 'energeia’, out of the direct realization of ‘entelechia’. On the other hand, the concept of the raid of entelechia takes to a deviation whose subject is the ‘entelechia’ itself. The totality of the act is not only the purpose in the pure state, but a purpose enriched by all outings that can branch from it. The ‘real’ is the product of an ongoing process of experimentation, and "the rare flower of the event comes from a multiplicity of attempts and a renewal of evidence". A world without baroque deviations would be poor, schematic, unable to realize all the possibilities contained in the entelechia. The energeia has an ontological weight greater in a nature and in a story that integrate the missteps ".
Mainz, Germany
Dear Tucci,
Your opening discussion strikes me as a very nice treatment of the themes, and it is also quite suggestive. My sense of the matter is that much could be made of the general theme and question; and I continue to think, in the background here, that Aristotle makes up a very substantial philosophical background to the common sense of the western world.
Of course, we naturally think of Aristotle in contrast to his teacher Plato. Yet, one element I find bothersome in Aristotle and Aristotelian philosophies is the theme of "perfection" or "perfectionism," as the capstone of development. In a sense, this is an anti-puritanism, on my part, though consistent, with much of Aristotelian moral philosophy, as I see it.
You wrote:
Speaking of entelechia’ Aristotle opposed the Platonic theory of ideas, to assert how each entity develops starting from a final cause internal to it, and not by external ideal reasons as, instead, Plato argued by locating them in the hyperuranium sky. Entelechia is therefore the tension of an organism to realize itself according to its own laws, passing from potentiality to action.
---end quotation
We may reasonably doubt that human beings or human societies, can "realize" themselves, fully, merely in accordance with anything fully internal--however important internal elements may be. This is not to suggest, however, that drawing on things "external" must mean drawing upon what is already present or pre-established in Plato's heaven. The contrast is instead more a matter of self-realization in interaction with a world we never comprehend completely and which we encounter from a variety of perspectives. The point is to introduce a greater emphasis on empirical and pluralistic aspects of development.
Reading Aristotle's ethics, one comes across the supposition that each human organ, say the eye or the ear, has some particular end, purpose or telos, and the further suggestion that in this light, it would be very strange if human beings, themselves, lacked such an end, purpose or telos. It is in relation to end, purpose or telos that we can judge of fitness or virtue. People who lack purpose, as it seems to me, are less than ideal configurations of human potentialities; yet, in spite of that, some reasonable variation is to be expected. As Aristotle himself has it, we should not expect more precision from ethics (or from political science) than the subject-matter is capable of achieving.
H.G. Callaway
I think that while Plato points out to realism, Aristotle to nominalism. However, both confluence in the ontological and metaphysical assumption of intrinsic nature or self of things. Buddhist doctrine about non self or emptiness, and the Wittgenstein approach to problem of universal chalenge this Plato-Aristotle tradition.
Mainz, Germany
Dear Roach,
The usual contrast is between "Platonic realism" and a more moderate or Aristotelian realism. Certainly, "Aristotelian realism" is no contradiction in terms, and is rooted in the "naturalism" of Aristotle, his study of nature and concern with definition and classification, etc. When we ask about the "nature" of something in English, this has a very Aristotelian ring to it. (Cf. say, Arthur Eddington's book title, The Nature of the Physical world.) There are contrasting historical roots of "nominalism," which are often displayed in the rejection of Aristotelian "essence," or accounts of definition which respond to empirical-theoretical developments and changes.
Wittgenstein is only nominalistic, if we over emphasize his idea of "family resemblance." But his general responsiveness to linguistic usage is quite empirical in character, and closely related to the practice of lexicographers --those who actually write dictionaries. It is just that we will not always meet traditional expectations of definition by consulting usage, and there is a corresponding Wittgensteinian warning against over-idealization of meanings. "Ordinary language" philosophy, often taking off from Wittgenstein (who himself bridges German and English in his books), can be looked at as an up-date of more traditional common-sense philosophy.
So, I would pose the question, in reply, as to how you propose to understand a concern with the "intrinsic nature of things or self." Such ideas may indeed be objectionably metaphysical, if put beyond all empirical and innovative theoretical constraint, and held rigidly, or dogmatically, come hell or high water, so to speak. I imagine that similar objections or criticism might be leveled at Buddhist doctrines as well. Do they offer sufficient intellectual and moral resistance to power and authority to give us confidence in the possibility of an emerging "Buddhist democracy?"
H.G. Callaway
Dear Gianrocco,
I happen to be working on a manuscript dealing with entelechy and telicity in Leibniz at present and it is interesting to see your comparison of Aristotle with Plato here. I think Leibniz makes use of both - he says he prefers Plato, but he is clearly building on Aristotle as well.
The issue of interest to me is 'failure of attainment' in telicity. Leibniz ssts up a paradox. He says that the monad has its entire biography within itself from the outset. (Since this biography is a reflection of the universe, whether we think of it as internal or external may be moot.) That should mean that its end, qua terminus, is entailed as a certainty or necessity. Yet he admits that a monad may only partially achieve its end. Here 'end' is clearly not a token terminus but a type of ideal terminus that may or may not be actualised for this monad.
One reading is that Leibniz only takes 'end' like Aristotle as 'purpose' or desired terminus. Entelechy may therefore fail, although it may be that Aristotle has some trouble with the same paradox. In this case the entailment of token terminus in the monad is a coincidental feature. However, this seems to miss a very important insight that Leibniz has about the nature of truly indivisible dynamic units - that they are terminus-entailing from outset. I think this insight is important because it has proven to be fundamental to our understanding of dynamic indivisibles in modern physics - they are indeed terminus-entailing in a remarkable way.
There are a lot of issues that derive from this but I would be interested to know how much Aristotle considers the possibility of failed entelechy - thwarted attainment - and where I might find this in his texts.
Dear Jonathan,
what I can only say which might have a connection with what you are interested to know, is the following:
We have to bear in mind the Aristotelian distinction between entelechy, as an act, a realized term of the action that contains no further progress, and ‘energeia’, that is the action, understood as actualization of entelechy in becoming; the misstep is configured as an impasse, a slip out from ‘energeia’, from the direct realization of entelechy.
(As a Ref. See Aristotle (De Anima, II, 412, a27-b1)
The Aristotelian entelechia is the substantial form of a living substance and as such is intrinsic to the essence of every living substance. This is opposed to the Platonic theory of ideas which affirms FORMS only as subsistent and transcendent and not immanent to material things as Aristotle does. Aristotle affirms the forms of material things but as immanent to each material thing and the entelechia is the form of a living substance; i.e. natural principle of substantial actuality for a living being.
Dear Gianrocco, do you know Pierre Aubenque's interpretation of the Final Cause as Desire? In the book "Le Probleme de L'Être Chez Aristote"
Dear Alfredo,
unfortunately, I don't. I'll search for it. Thank you for your useful suggestion and have my best wishes. Gianrocco.
According to Joe Sachs, Aristotle's entelechy is a form. He considers entelecheia, a word invented by Aristotle as a combination of the words endelecheia, enteles and telos. Therefore, he translates entelecheia as being at work staying itself or as being at work staying complete or as being at an end, The being at work staying itself,(endelecheia, persistence) is for the sake of staying complete (enteles, complete or perfect) in the confrontation with deprivation and corruption. Completeness is the completed achievement of telos, the inner purpose. Thus, entelechy is "being at work staying itself for the sake of preserving the completed achievement of the inner purpose". The soul is the entelechy of an organism, motion is the entelechy of a potentiality of being somewhere and thinghood is the entelechy of a material. The difference between Aristotle's hylomorphism and Plato's ideas is that Aristotle denies the separate existence of the forms.