No doubt we are all aware of a vast pluralism of social and cultural differences, both at home and around the world. What is wrong with relativism, I submit, is that it fails to take such diversity quite seriously or realistically. What doctrinaire relativism tells us is of the unreality of the preconceptions, existing mores, beliefs and convictions of others--and consequently, that it is quite o.k. to ignore this in any majority. One social and cultural configuration, we are told, is no better than any other. In particular, the moral constraints of any particular group are little more than self-serving conventions which can be ignored at convenience. Thus, it appears moral constraint on the part of the advocate of relativism is at best an instrumental affair: what really counts is "playing the game," and politics of various sorts is to trump morality on any needed occasion.
As I see it, this lack of moral constraint is an opening to unholy alliance with anyone, whatever their purposes or means, connection with whom, promises some advance in power. The relativist becomes a hired gun, willing in any situation, in the style of the sophists, to always make "the better argument appear the worse." This is because the purpose of the game is to seek power. Relativism is a "power philosophy" (to use Russell's term) and the tolerance of it is playing with fire. An open discussion of differences is the last thing that is wanted. The followers of relativism become, ultimately minions of the powers-that-be.
Dear Bonaccini & Alexis, First of all, I think that the idea of relativism as a "power philosophy" fits together quite well with the impression of it as "wishy-washy." As, I think you see, Alexis, the wishy-washy can serve to cover unexpressed deference to powers-that-be. I should have mentioned, I suppose, that I am thinking of what Russell had to say about "power philosophy" in his History of Western Philosophy.
You are right, Bonaccini, that versions of relativism are prominent in cultural anthropology and some related fields. Much more could be said about that, but in any case, it appears in the early 20th century in the American literature, though always mixed, as it seems to me with a certain amount of confusion regarding the logic of relations and the reality of relations, Early modern philosophy if chock full of the idea that relations are imaginary or creations of the mind, and this contributed to the long-held notion of relational expressions having a kind of logical, second-class citizenship in contrast to monadic predicates or properties.
Thus, perhaps, the notion that what differing groups make of each other is not worth thinking through --being a mere exercise in mind-spinning.
Another source of moral and cultural relativism is non-cognitivism in meta-ethics. What I take to be true is that the cognitive problems found in productive comparison and evaluation of alternative mores, presuppositions and cultures are very serious indeed--and nothing to be properly ignored. So, I think of my stress on the reality of differences here is a version of pluralism. Significant cultural pluralism, within a single polity, requires an accepted set of norms for settlement of conflicts, and that, I take it, is quite important. But this is far short of universalism, since I suppose that different polities may, quite properly, have different means and procedures to deal with conflicts--consistent with their own political traditions. Attempts at universal means and procedures have, to this point, usually been much weaker and often ineffective.
Similarly, if there are no universally approved and accepted epistemological standards, it does not follow that there are no accepted and useful standards within various intellectual and moral traditions. These, too, I think of as useful realities, and the differences should not be ignored--if there is to be hope for intelligent reconciliation. The prospect of the better should not be the enemy of the good.
Intelligent mediation is not impossible, then, though it is often very difficult; and substitution of power-political means is often extremely destructive. It is somewhat like "cooking the books," as a "solution" to financial problems. Sooner or later, it destroys the mutual trust and understanding needed to more productively address outstanding conflicts and problems. Frequently, power-political means simply serve the purposes of insiders without address insider-outsider conflicts in any productive or positive manner. Why go to the trouble of thinking through problems and conflicts in depth, if you can simply have your own way by ignoring the differences?
As you suggest, Bonaccini, this may plausibly lead on to a competition of power political means and the most dire consequences --a one-upsmanship in the lack of moral constraint.
H.G. Callaway
Very astute observations, H.G.! Thank you for supplying me with more diplomatic and less judgmental terminology ("power philosophy") than "wishy -washy" to describe those who "when in Rome, do as the Romans do"!
Gwen
I think you may be right. It definitely has to do with the game of power in real politics and policies. The politicians fit wery well in your account, at least the ones I know, and I suspect most are like them. I also agree that we cannot make as if mores and values and "preconceptions" would be simply unreal. We cannot ignore them as a matter of mere convenience. People simply cannot ignore what they believe and think, and sometimes cannot even tolerate what other do and think!
Yet, to take pluralism seriously is different from taking it realistically. I think many people and groups who fit in your schema take it very seriously, indeed. "Realistically", depends on the evaluation we might bear in mind by analysing the available data. For instance, I wonder what kind of relativism we are talking about.
We use to speak of respecting differences, minorities and other cultures as an imperative of educated people and developed countries and social groups in democratic societies. This sounds good and we all, or almost all of us, agree with that, but this implies a certain kind of "relativism". I don't think this kind fails to take diversity realistically, or seriously. I do think we do not realize that this imperative of democratic societies commits us, because of either a moral ideal of "democracy"', or a political normative constraint, to a certain kind of relativism. The problem for me seems to be that social and political pluralism, which is the base of contemporary advanced democracies, amounts to relativism. This is apparently OK, but it confronts us with diverse, often precluding values and justification patterns. From the epistemic point of view, to justify universalism is a well known problem, not seldon considered as an impossible task. And relativism has been accused of being self-defeating since at least Aristotle. Nowadays, however, non-foundationalist epistemologies and cultural antropologists defend explicit relativism or sheer conventionalism. I can accept we have no unique meta- theory of science and knowledge that is able to be justified as the only true one. I can accept pluralism is a political necessity of modern democracy. But I cannot agree with two things: 1) that every culture or society have the same value or should be taken only as different, as cultural relativism in anthropology defended, all the same with the values of different group or minorities (although I understand that within the domain of modern democracies the state has to warrant equal rights and equality of oportunities, no matter what you believe, what beliefs you hold and what faith you might profess); 2) that there are different ethical patterns and theories and no universalism can be accepted. I think, ethical relativism means to me that I can use a certain approach to justify my wrong action : I desagree with the Nazis beliefs and policies, and educated people do it in western modern democracies; but if there is no universal pattern for what is to be considered as wrong, then they can also say they disagree with me, then can say they do not agree with my ethical criteria and can find another to justify the Holocaust (as Marcel Conche remembered).
Dear Bonaccini & Alexis, First of all, I think that the idea of relativism as a "power philosophy" fits together quite well with the impression of it as "wishy-washy." As, I think you see, Alexis, the wishy-washy can serve to cover unexpressed deference to powers-that-be. I should have mentioned, I suppose, that I am thinking of what Russell had to say about "power philosophy" in his History of Western Philosophy.
You are right, Bonaccini, that versions of relativism are prominent in cultural anthropology and some related fields. Much more could be said about that, but in any case, it appears in the early 20th century in the American literature, though always mixed, as it seems to me with a certain amount of confusion regarding the logic of relations and the reality of relations, Early modern philosophy if chock full of the idea that relations are imaginary or creations of the mind, and this contributed to the long-held notion of relational expressions having a kind of logical, second-class citizenship in contrast to monadic predicates or properties.
Thus, perhaps, the notion that what differing groups make of each other is not worth thinking through --being a mere exercise in mind-spinning.
Another source of moral and cultural relativism is non-cognitivism in meta-ethics. What I take to be true is that the cognitive problems found in productive comparison and evaluation of alternative mores, presuppositions and cultures are very serious indeed--and nothing to be properly ignored. So, I think of my stress on the reality of differences here is a version of pluralism. Significant cultural pluralism, within a single polity, requires an accepted set of norms for settlement of conflicts, and that, I take it, is quite important. But this is far short of universalism, since I suppose that different polities may, quite properly, have different means and procedures to deal with conflicts--consistent with their own political traditions. Attempts at universal means and procedures have, to this point, usually been much weaker and often ineffective.
Similarly, if there are no universally approved and accepted epistemological standards, it does not follow that there are no accepted and useful standards within various intellectual and moral traditions. These, too, I think of as useful realities, and the differences should not be ignored--if there is to be hope for intelligent reconciliation. The prospect of the better should not be the enemy of the good.
Intelligent mediation is not impossible, then, though it is often very difficult; and substitution of power-political means is often extremely destructive. It is somewhat like "cooking the books," as a "solution" to financial problems. Sooner or later, it destroys the mutual trust and understanding needed to more productively address outstanding conflicts and problems. Frequently, power-political means simply serve the purposes of insiders without address insider-outsider conflicts in any productive or positive manner. Why go to the trouble of thinking through problems and conflicts in depth, if you can simply have your own way by ignoring the differences?
As you suggest, Bonaccini, this may plausibly lead on to a competition of power political means and the most dire consequences --a one-upsmanship in the lack of moral constraint.
H.G. Callaway
One needs to distinguish moral relativism, linguistic relativism (e.g., Sapir/Whorf), from ontological relativism, but in general the problem with it is that one cannot consistently maintain the relativist thesis itself. If "everything is relative" (whatever that might mean exactly) then relativism itself is relative, and hence relativism as a thesis is false. So one cannot consistently maintain the doctrine as a doctrine, with refuting it. This argument was in Plato's Theatetus.
A second problem is that it offers no real explanation for anything. How does saying, e.g., all morality is "relative" advance discussions of moral actions? How does it help us discern good from bad? Or deciding what to do? It doesn't. It is a splendidly useless thesis.
Relativism has a bad habit of turning up once a generation at least. It was around in the time of the Greeks as I mentioned. The Sapir/Whorf doctrine attempted to resuscitate it in relation to language and meaning (Indians literally lived in different "world" than us because their words had radically different relative ontological commitments); and it turned up again when Feyerabend argued that physics was no better than astrology (I mean ... really!?). It was around again when Derrida and the like claimed that "everything is text". First year philosophy students find the relativist menace to be interesting, until--that is--they are educated to think otherwise. As a doctrine it has a life-span roughly equivalent to the thesis of Cartesian dualism. Not long. But it is certainly persistent.
Relativism is like a bad smell at an otherwise nice dinner party. It turns up every few decades, stultifies discussion, and causes embarrassment for all those present when its implications are fully spelt out.
This is a good question and the observations made in the explanation of the question are incisive.
There are aspects of relativism that deserve to be consider further. Consider, for example,
K. Puolakka, Reconsidering Relativism and Intentionalism in Interpretation:
Donald Davidson, Hermeneutics, and Pragmatism,
Ph.D. thesis, University of Helsinki, 2009:
https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/19407/reconsid.pdf?sequence=2
Puolakka observes:
The attempt to formulate an approach to inquiry which is not dominated by the dualism of foundationalism and relativism is connected with the strand in contemporary philosophy which insists on the need to give relativism a new hearing. As noted in the introduction, support for granting relativism this kind of opportunity is drawn from the assumption that an attitude dominated by some form of foundationalism is no longer a compelling stance to have on the world, given the fractured nature of our contemporary condition, populated by seemingly irresolvable conflicts. The problem has been how to balance between these two ends, that is, how does one do justice to the plurality of world views, cultures, and religions our world contains, and which we are becoming increasingly aware of, without falling to the view that comparative judgments could not be made between the values and conceptions they embody (p. 153).
Dear Peters, Thank you for your interest in this question. I would, generally, be reluctant to comment on Puolakka's dissertation. So, I will leave this to others. Thank you, too for your good words, above.
Regarding the text you quote, directly above, I can say that I am equally skeptical of the "dualism of foundationalism and relativism." and I would caution that these concepts typically play off of one another, the "foundationalists" being chiefly unspecified, and the "relativists," playing both sides of the field. I do not believe for a moment that typical "relativists" give two hoots about "the plurality of world views, cultures and religions our world contains." It is, as I said above, a "power philosophy," and the hidden agenda is to get some of the power that more established positions enjoy.
This is less a philosophical debate than an exaggerated play-off of academic factions. The relativists encourage the idea of their outsider and unorthodox status, and their rejection of accepted standards of morality and judgment facilitates an intensive polemical style. While overtly twisting the lion's tail of more established positions, the polemics are chiefly directed against more serious critics of established views--thus winning academic recognition from the more conservative opponents of reform. The overall effect is to encourage unprincipled polemics and disregard for serious criticism or alternatives. These polemics are typically marked by violations of relevancy conditions. The premium is usually placed on aggressiveness based in intensive group cohesion.
In general terms, relativism does not take moral-intellectual alternatives seriously or realistically, and in consequence it contributes, not at all, to mediation of differences. Serious consideration of differences is the last thing wanted by relativism, and these are instead, typically reduced to academic-political power plays. Relativism exploits the genuine and deeper differences to gain favor with existing factions, by means of polemics directed against more reasonable proposals for reform.
H.G. Callaway
Dear Raikowski, Many thanks for your frank and forceful view of the matter. For now, I would only emphasize that I think genuine pluralism does take differences and diversity seriously and realistically. Of course, that makes it fairly slow and deliberate rather than fast and quasi-political. But, I think this "fast and political mode" of interaction only stores up problems which may result in catastrophe, sooner or later. The genuine problems are being ignored or avoided.
H.G. Callaway
Dear Raikowski, Thanks for your further thoughts on this question. I want to add a few comments in reply.
I would stipulate that there is sometimes a "revolutionary" tinge to relativism, though not always, certainly. The ideas of "whatever it takes" or "anything goes," are much more broadly distributed, though, and well beyond the proponents of relativism. The commonality with the history of revolutionary ideas consists chiefly in a lack of concern with the better and worse in existing societies. Or, sometimes it is thought, perhaps, that before things can improve, they first must get worse, hit bottom, or what have you. These notions have their resemblance with the idea that only a revolution can make any real difference, reform is futile, etc. In any case, this is chiefly a radical "tinge," as I say, a kind of protective coloring which makes little difference in practice--except to disguise an effective alliance with (usually local) powers-that-be (the more aggressive the better), in opposition to any more liberal positions. Relativists are typically institutionalists, and aim to control the power of large-scale institutions, including universities, to the advantage of their own favored in-groups.
"Multiculturalism" is something distinct, though sometimes found in alliance with doctrinaire relativism. Multiculturalism is generally more likely to take cultural differences seriously or realistically. With relativism, this is purely opportunistic and instrumental. (That is why relativism discourages open discussion.) In fact, over the last 20 years or so, multiculturalism has lost political prominence in just about every European country --in favor of views placing greater emphasis on integration of difference. This is more akin to pluralism. (One might argue, however, that "Europe-as-a whole" is still an example of the multicultural notion, though in the case of Europe, this borders on a mitigated version of ethnic nationalism.) The E.U. is more like the U.S. under the articles of Confederation than it is like the U.S. under the federal constitution of 1789 and subsequent amendments.
The general idea of multiculturalism, I submit, is basically British in origin, and the most important historical model is the four ethnically defined countries of the U.K. The attempt was made to extend this model to the new immigrants, but since these people lacked an historical "homeland," in the British Isles, it didn't work well, and this idea eventually lost popularity in the U.K., too. NB: Canada is still officially multicultural, bilingual, etc. (This configuration didn't come up from the south!)
I suspect that the separation into "homelands," in South Africa under the old system, was also inspired by the British model of England, Scotland, Wales and N. Ireland, all within the U.K. If so, that is the most outstanding example of the failure of multiculturalism as a policy of ethnic sub-polities. Generally, though, what I say here is not designed to tell people in other countries how to organize themselves, but the contrast is of interest, since we have never had any official, ethnically defined sub-polities in the U.S. (Not that we don't have our own problems, of course!)
The Europeans are, no doubt, more organized in term of ethnic groups than is plausible in any democratic country built up through immigration. But on the other hand, my sense of the matter is that European integration will eventually give a greater role to individuals than has been traditional in Europe's ethnically defined nation states. There is no going back to ethnic nationalism in old Europe. There is much pressure for integration of recent immigrants, and that, too, argues against ethnic nationalism. European integration, and the need of it, is a very powerful force.
I hope some of this may prove of interest, though it does get away from the opening question and the subsequent thread in degree.
H.G. Callaway
Dear Raikowsky, You wrote:
I try to explain everything in terms of physics which by necessity requires the use of a very broad brush. In search for what we have in common with the rest of the physical world, all nuances of difference disappear. As a result I tend to talk about dominant patterns and conveniently overlook local variations.
---end quotation
That is indeed a reductionist thesis, if I've ever heard one. While I've never quite believed the traditional proverb, to the effect, of "While in Rome, do as the Romans," I do think that human individual and social differentiation is a key to understanding the human world. You give, in fact, a rationale for treating social and cultural difference as unreal. However, to act and think, always uniformly, without regard to social and political differences is an invitation to local and general catastrophe. Any society with social self-respect, retaining respect for integrity and awareness of its own history, will reject the idea.
H.G. Callaway
Dear Raikowski, Many thanks for your clarification. I am glad to know that you reject the idea of social and cultural differences as unreal. We agree as well that societies are just as real as individuals. It is more than a difference of scale, I suppose, though. Different forms of society react upon individuals in differing ways. Given your prior note, however, I am still much inclined to emphasize that though physics may tell us much about specifically physical commonalities, it doesn't tell us a great deal about social realities--either their differences or their commonalities.
It strikes me as misleading to say, as you do, that relativism privileges difference, on the contrary, it is much more likely to privilege its own academic-ideological in-group and discount everything and everyone else--as maintaining unreal positions, values, mores and beliefs. If you don't see that point, then I expect that you don't understand relativism.
Observe the effect of its discounting of moral constraint. Who stands to gain from this? The man on the street trying to make a living? Hardly. Its a game for second-class academic insiders. More generally, the idea that this strange variety of in-group academic parochialism has, or will have, any genuine or deeper effect upon existing societies and cultures of long standing, seems to me merely the relativists' own wish-dream--and not any social or political plausibility. It lives in an academic dream-world, and self-maintained hothouse, which seems to chiefly consist of maintaining the stance that it has already answered all the questions that the rest of the world needs to debate --so that debate, and mutual respect in discourse, are unneeded. It measures your ideas by your "connections."
Pluralism, in contrast builds upon respect for the reality of social and cultural differences --and the genuine need to engage with them. This contrasts with extensive efforts to exclude the possible competition and to marginalize those who may disagree.
Are there also important human commonalities that we need to attend to here? I would not deny this, and I think, in fact that the pursuit of natural science is a prime candidate. This, I believe, is not an actual universal of human cultures, but it is about as close as we get.
H.G. Callaway
Dear Raikowski,
You wrote:
This description seems to fit just about anybody. We all are guilty of defending our academic-ideological groups (if we have one) and discount all other views. This is an essence of being a member of the group which defines itself by a particular way of thinking. For this reason I look for differences in the way relativists tend to think. And there is one marked difference.
---end quotation
This is simply false. The self-absorption of the proponents of relativism is out of all proportion to that of other groups. I have heard this excuse a thousand times, and it is simply not convincing. It is however an essential element of the hot-house dream world that relativism spins around itself. The excesses are most evident in the explicit rejection of normal mores and moral constraint which encourages every excess of aggressive self-promotion together with denigration and marginalization of others.
Though you tell us that you reject the idea that the values, mores, beliefs, etc., of others are unreal, you have not, so far, contested the idea that this belongs essentially to relativism.
H.G. Callaway
Dear Raikowski, Many thanks for your further thoughts.
Indeed, evil generally will not "disappear in a puff of smoke," though that is not a reason to oppose it less. It seems that people may have different experiences. My experience of relativism is of an institutionalized dogmatism which replies, never with arguments or reasons, but only with systematic exclusion and defamation.
I would warn that it requires only an accidental crossing of purposes or objectives to elicit such a response. What is wanted is continual deference and "amiable" evasiveness. Those with any sort of moral firmness are viewed as natural opponents and enemies.
I think I will pass on your further comments, though others may find them of interest of course.
H.G. Callaway
Philadelphia, PA
Dear all,
Here's the link to a new paper, "What's Wrong with Relativism, anyway?" partly based on the discussion under this question:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275041797_What%27s_Wrong_with_Relativism_anyway?showFulltext=1&linkId=553125d90cf27acb0dea4b77
Have a look. Comments invited.
H.G. Callaway
Research What's Wrong with Relativism, anyway?
Philadelphia, PA
Dear Brassard,
It seems to me you are coming along. You wrote:
No it does not follow that we can equally do anything and count it as justice. That would remove any meaning to the word justice. The turn of the moral universe depends on what we do and it is exactly because of this that what we cannot do anything we please if our intent is to bend the moral universe towards justice.
---End quotation
This is close to the idea in King and in Theodore Parker, as I understand it. It is not the case that something is just because we agree that it is, though we need to eventually agree about innovations regarding justice in order to implement them. So, as I argued above, no amount of agreement on the idea that the pre-Civil War constitution was just would suffice to render it actually just. There could not be a viable nation, half-slave and half free, a "house divided against itself" which nonetheless stands (at best you'd get a long, slow decline), or a nation "conceived in liberty" yet maintaining a pernicious economic interest in human slavery.
Its very much like an old Platonic or quasi-Platonic question: Does God will that so-and-so, because it is just or good, or is so-and-so just or good because he wills it? For many people, I think, this kind of question is hard to answer. That is because moral goodness and justice are implicitly wedded to authority for them. Yet, regarding any earthly authorities, we know that their view of moral questions may be unsatisfactory, limited, contentious, biased or worse. In those terms, one can understand why it was so hard for mid-nineteenth century American to change.
There is a very simple argument involved. All human beings "are created equal," and have "certain inalienable rights." The country was wedded to these founding words. Yet, everyone knew that black Americans were human beings. It is a very short inference to the conclusion that something is wrong with slavery. One might say, it took a Civil War to put through the inference and institutionalize it. That is because of the obvious economic motivation of the slaveholders, but also because both North and South accepted the constitution of 1789--and its compromise with slavery. It also maintained the prosperity of the North.
This is a kind of paradigm case argument, to put the matter in more philosophical terms. The better and worse of moral rules and of law cannot be identified or defined by reference to prior social or social-political agreement. Improvements may be possible in spite of the most intensive social-political resistance. I take it that there is always a more or less objective question of what would count as an improvement and what would not, given the full array of pre-existing values of a given society and the particular problems it may face.
H.G. Callaway
"The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice." ? - ResearchGate. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_arc_of_the_moral_universe_is_long_but_it_bends_toward_justice/2 [accessed Apr 19, 2016].
Mainz, Germany
Dear all,
I see that Paul Boghossian has a new paper on moral relativism, which I would like to call to your attention:
https://philpapers.org/rec/BOGRAM?ref=mail
I quote the abstract:
Abstract Many philosophers and non-philosophers are attracted to the view that moral truths are relative to moral framework or culture. I distinguish between two versions of such a view. I argue that one version is coherent but not plausible, and I argue that the second one can’t be made sense of. The upshot is that we have to make sense of at least some objective moral truths.
---End quotation
See: Paul Boghossian "Relativism about Morality" In Katharina Neges, Josef Mitterer, Sebastian Kletzl & Christian Kanzian (eds.), Realism - Relativism - Constructivism: Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg. De Gruyter. pp. 301-312 (2017)
Comments invited.
H.G. Callaway
Mainz, Germany
Dear Brassard & readers,
It appears that your note confuses Peter Boghossian with Paul Boghossian.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Boghossian#Controversies
http://as.nyu.edu/faculty/paul-boghossian.html
I don't know of any actual relationship between the philosophical views of the two figures. So, it seems that your criticism of Peter Boghossian misses the mark.
In any case, the argument against moral relativism, as a general matter, would seem to be comparatively independent. In principle, an atheist could reject moral relativism as could a non-atheist. or theist --even on the same grounds.
As I've argued, relativism is a kind of "zombie doctrine," which continues to circulate in a web of confusions and repetitions, since it serves certain entrenched and aggressive purposes, though it is pretty clearly socially destructive and logically incoherent. Its chiefly functions to inhibit people seeking common ground and the criticism of moral and epistemic excesses and dysfunction.
I am disappointed to see you making an argument ad hominem --to a person, rather than one directed at an issue or doctrine.
H.G. Callaway
Is liberal democracy in decline?. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is_liberal_democracy_in_decline [accessed Jun 29, 2017].
Mainz, Germany
Dear Brassard & readers,
On the contrary, your prior note was chuck full of ad hominem and fault by association. I think I see several other flaws of argument as well.
What, for example is the charge of "scientism" supposed to amount to in this context? You never say what this is, but you seem very sure that it must be a defect --associated with Dawkins, Sam Harris and Peter B.
Philosophy, as you know, belongs to the liberal arts and the humanities --and it includes everything from philosophy of religion to political philosophy to the philosophy of science. The implication would seem to be that if someone knows a bit of science, then they are disqualified to comment on political and social themes? One may suspect an instrumentalizing variability in the concept.
This is an idea which I have often enough encountered but which I am yet to see clarified. One point I am aware of, though, is that it is convenient for some to classify unfamiliar criticisms of social and political dogmas as "scientistic." While, as I have often insisted, in Aristotelian style, the results of a given field should not be expected to yield more precision than the field is typically capable of. Does that sound "scientistic" to you? As for my self, I wrote a dissertation on the philosophy of mind and language --and subsequently proceeded to a criticism of "scientific" behaviorism --arguably, taking on the crowning jewel of the social sciences during the Cold War. (By the way, the reaction against this was predominantly political--both in Germany and in the U.S.)
If you are "not sure exactly" where you stand on relativism, then why should you aim for a criticism of an argument against it?
In any case, Paul Boghossian's related views are not difficult to find. He lists an entire page of writings on his home page, linked above. For example:
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/the-maze-of-moral-relativism/?scp=1&sq=boghossian&st=cse
Perhaps the new paper will eventually become available, too.
Also, see my related review:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260742684_Fear_of_Knowledge_Against_Relativism_and_Constructivism_-_By_Paul_Boghossian
H.G. Callaway
Is liberal democracy in decline?. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is_liberal_democracy_in_decline [accessed Jun 29, 2017].
Article Fear of Knowledge, Against Relativism and Constructivism – B...
Mainz, Germany
Dear Brassard Lersow & readers,
Thanks for your encouragement.
This seems a good point to return to the theme of corruption in my home town. I have found that over many years, whenever I have finished up some work and might expect a modicum of recognition or advancement, I have been hit with what I call "just-in-time prejudice." Often, this could only have come from Philadelphia.
Consider the recent editorial from the Philadelphia Inquirer, after the conviction of the sitting Philadelphia District Attorney (city prosecutor) on federal corruption charges:
http://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/editorials/williams-guilty-plea-changes-little-in-phillys-corruption-climate-20170629.html
I think that what is especially significant in this piece is 1) the point that the city's Democratic leadership seems unwilling or unable to break the prevalent pattern of corruption among elected officials. The city has been essentially a one-party polity over the last 65 years, and the Democrats have no one to blame but themselves. Secondly 2) there is emphasis placed on the massive passivity of the electorate. (Ah!, he politicians, they're all corrupt! So, you might as well vote for the Democrats again.)
It is my conviction that many in the major institutions of the city, public and private have simply adapted to the corrupt political environment, and in return, the politicians ignore whatever the institutional insiders do by way of self-interested, self-promoting shenanigans --read: dirty tricks against possible competitors.
As long as this situation persists, it disadvantages the city generally. Who is going to invest in such a place, knowing of the prevalent corruption? It hurts the poorest people in the city most, who often go wanting for good paying jobs, suffer destruction of families, and, often enough, end up living on the streets. I suppose many people simply leave for greener fields. It hurts professional people, since they very often fail to benefit in a system rigged to benefit insiders.
The Inquirer editors remark:
Voters say there are too few good choices, and they’re right about that. Philadelphia tolerates being a one-party town. Enough Democratic officeholders have been convicted in recent years to fill a cell block.
---End quotation
Also see the political cartoon:
http://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/signe/20170630_Daily_Signe_Cartoon_06_30_17.html
The inclination of the "great and the good" in the city is to turn a blind eye toward the prevalent corruption. Their status depends specifically on positions within larger-scale institutions--which national Democrat candidates have frequently lined up to visit. It is worth remarking that the city would be even worse off without vigorous prosecution from the federal prosecutors. But when it comes to self-serving denigration of outsiders, a free hand is the rule. Once anyone is marked for criticism by institutional insiders, in my impression, armies of social predators will line up to salute the result. Notice that the doctrines of epistemic and moral relativism are quite prominent in the city's colleges and universities. What better way to empower aggression on the part of the gate-keepers of a corrupt political environment?
H.G. Callaway
Is liberal democracy in decline?. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is_liberal_democracy_in_decline [accessed Jul 1, 2017].
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