Philadelphia, PA

Dear Turner,

No follow-up, I see. What exactly did you hope to accomplish by adding your question about Aristophanes to this thread? Perhaps it is something so obvious to you, that you think there's no need to develop it? But I'm afraid you have simply left people hanging.

In any case, I'd say that where people claim to be doing science (or conducting some specific scholarly inquiry), they should respond to scientific objections in terms of the specifics of the objections and the subject matter. Wouldn't you agree? 

Its a mistake to conflate any and every inquiry with politics. That's a kind of point standing in need of much emphasis where deliberation breaks down into frozen factionalism. 

H.G. Callaway

Better to concentrate on friendship only. Bringing oppositions together is an old trick.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear De Vuyst,

I suppose that, if its "a trick" then its as old as Aristotle and Western philosophy.

What are the relevant meanings of "tyranny" and "friendship"?

H.G. Callaway

Dear prof. Callaway,

I remember having been at the Topkapi palace as a young girl. I noted that all the magnificent exposed sultans' clothes were bloodstained. An easy conclusion is that much power attracts some enemy.

Without being a sultan, Aristotle was professionally a notable man. Thus, as he grew up and formed his discernment and convictions, he experienced many different types of friendship.

In my opinion the perception of unfair treatment, or of mismanagement, can arise because of one's unwillingness to compromise with his/her judgments. This may happen to everyone, even when there is no overt tyranny. If the disagreement lasts for a sufficiently long time, also sociability is compromised.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Vesely & readers,

Thanks for your comment.

Webster's defines "tyranny" as follows:

cruel and unfair treatment by people with power over others: a government in which all power belongs to one person : the rule or authority of a tyrant.

---End quotation

Let's see if this helps things along on this thread.

Certainly I think that power may attract its opposition or enmity. The point is to distinguish between opposition on the one hand and "cruel and unfair treatment by people with power over others"--on the other.

"Opposition" is, e.g., a matter of a position in debate. It does not amount to oppression or "cruel and unfair treatment." Some people may, of course, prefer not to debate, and that is certainly o.k. by me, in the general case. However, if such people, unwilling to debate or consider alternatives to their expressed opinions, want to make this out as some sort of higher morality or method, then that seems like a doubtful idea on the face of it. It is the person who refuses to debate, defend or criticize who is refusing to "compromise with his/her judgments."  

I wonder about your suggested distinction between "tyranny" and "overt tyranny." Covert tyranny is surely no better than overt tyranny if it has the same effects of "cruel and unfair treatment by people with power." The absence of "overt tyranny" is not, thereby, the absence of tyranny. 

Silent favoritism toward existing powers, in  the expectation of personal benefit, tends to glide, seamlessly, into support for oppressive behavior. That seems to be the basic mechanism of power politics, as contrasted with discourse-- and especially as directed against free exchange of informed positions and opinions.

H.G. Callaway

Dear Callaway,

Your question is essential and it recalls me another relative question asked by Thomas Korimort here in RG, “Is it meaningful to work out on old Aristotelian (metaphysical) models of science in order to get insight into modern research topics?”.

You are using a more direct approach revealing the meaning of Tyranny.  The adaptive property of human in stressed conditions – a Tyranny - in the absence of education and civilization, imposes a long-term slavery like adaptive character for the human being which imposes him to act as a “primitive hunter” with no social characteristics. His only focus is to survive.  The social relationship becomes dangerous and in tyranny we do not know who is friend and who is enemy. Tyranny is reflected in our days by the Capitalism.  This applies in many human activities including Science.

What I have said to Thomas is: “I think what is really missing in our days and independently of Aristotle, is the conception of Ethics in Science (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics etc.). I could not say Ethics in Science is missing but is certainly repressed. It is repressed because two major elements of Science – the freedom and creativity are not ‘in phase’ with the general conception of today’s established needs. We are living in a world of “imaging” rather in a word of “moral responsibilities”. Aristotle gave careful consideration to the aspects of human nature involved in acting and accepting moral responsibility. “

So, come back to your critical point, yes, we should restart to act with moral responsibilities so, to detach our life from the Tyranny. My short experience here in RG, suggests that this is more than possible. We are free!

Best, Vassilis

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Doucas & readers,

Many thanks for your kind and supportive comments on the present question. I would say that it is the excesses of capitalism which strike me as dangerous, though these are not unconnected with lack of willingness of overly clever politicians --refusing to take responsibility for needed regulation of big business and finance --preferring to stay on the "good side" of big money. My comment about the problem of silent or covert favoritism to great concentrations of power is a general comment.

To get at the other side of this question, I'd suggest some attention to Aristotle on "friendship."  To my way of thinking, Aristotle is the most eloquent author on this topic, and readers may want to take a look at the following, from the Stanford Encyclopedia:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/#Fri

Again, the following comes from Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII:

Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good-and goodness is an enduring thing. And each is good without qualification and to his friend, for the good are both good without qualification and useful to each other. So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other, since to each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or like. And such a friendship is as might be expected permanent, since there meet in it all the qualities that friends should have. For all friendship is for the sake of good or of pleasure-good or pleasure either in the abstract or such as will be enjoyed by him who has the friendly feeling-and is based on a certain resemblance; and to a friendship of good men all the qualities we have named belong in virtue of the nature of the friends themselves; for in the case of this kind of friendship the other qualities also are alike in both friends, and that which is good without qualification is also without qualification pleasant, and these are the most lovable qualities. Love and friendship therefore are found most and in their best form between such men.

---End quotation

I hope this will be a useful quotation regarding the ideal. A related idea in Aristotle is that friendships of evil or the bad are always breaking down as they find more convenient or useful associates. E.g., "There is no honor among thiefs." 

Friends depend on each other for contact and support, especially in times of need or emergency, but tyranny is jealous of all power of support or resistance to its own plans and aims, and seeks to make everyone and everything depend upon itself alone, and that is part of the reason that tyranny is destructive of friendship.

You wrote Doucas ,

So, [to] come back to your critical point, yes, we should restart to act with moral responsibilities so, to detach our life from the Tyranny. My short experience here in RG, suggests that this is more than possible. We are free!

---End quotation.

Among the first fruits of freedom, as we select our associates, is friendship. So, let us have friendships blooming, regardless of opinions and differences of background and creed. If we only listen to those who agree with our own sentiments, or who pursue our own ends and purposes, however, then this builds one-sided configurations which tend to favoritism and exclusion. 

H.G. Callaway

Tyrants are virtually all psychopaths or have marked Dissocial Personality Disorders.  One of the diagnostic criteria at DCR-10 (B(3)) refers to:

• Incapacity to maintain enduring relationships, though with no difficulty in establishing them. (ICD-10 F60.2)

Shallow and labile affectivity, another personality trait of the psychopath also interfere with an ability to form deep and meaningful relationships.  Aristotle had observed this and described it well.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Turner,

Interesting remarks. Thanks for your comments.

You wrote:

Tyrants are virtually all psychopaths or have marked Dissocial Personality Disorders.  One of the diagnostic criteria at DCR-10 (B(3)) refers to:

Incapacity to maintain enduring relationships, though with no difficulty in establishing them. (ICD-10 F60.2)

---End quotation

I wonder, though, how you would distinguish, in these terms, the "Dissocial Personality," from the victim of tyranny? If as Aristotle has it, "in tyranny there is little or no friendship" then the reasonable assumption is that tyranny, or conditions of "cruel and unfair treatment by people with power over others," "oppression" to put it in one word--under such conditions, friendship tends to be destroyed as an impediment to the concentration of power. After all, we expect that genuine friends will support each other in difficulties, and in consequence represent the potential of resistance to oppressive power.

The psycho-talk seems to get in the way here, if you don't mind me saying so, since it seems to ignore the possibility of wide differences in the facilitating or destructive social conditions of friendship--in given societies, e.g., but also, say, within particular institutions. If social or institutional viability requires submission to unreasonable demands of authority, then anyone of significant integrity is going to have difficulties, especially insofar as all social relations become public and open to manipulation. To put it in somewhat milder terms, if "going along" with the powers that be, "in order to get along" becomes, not simply "friendly" advice, but instead a standing social condition of relationships generally, then this is destructive of any other basis of social relationships.  Witness: doctrinaire moral relativism, which becomes, in effect a license for aggression.

Of course, we do not expect friendship to develop out of every chance encounter, and good friends will be few for the best of us. Yet openness to new relationships is of value where it facilitates new friendships. In more conservative cultures, I imagine, this might be mistaken for  "Shallow and labile affectivity," though this item of technical language is also a difficulty in your note, since we are given no indication of how to use it, or how, e.g., it contrasts with "friendliness."

Can you usefully expand your comments in more common-sense terms?

H.G. Callaway

I am a sceptic when it comes to the diagnostics of psychopathy but having spent many years dealing with this type of individual I have to agree with many of the observations on their behaviour.  Tyrants are notorious in their betrayal of their past friends and confidants.  Henry VIII is a spectacular case in point turning on those who had been his most stalwart supporters.  Interestingly many of them of course had been attracted to the Tudor court for the wealth and power in could bestow.  Where social interaction is about personal gain friendship will always take second place.

Another feature of personality disorder is glibness & superficial charm and this is a feature of shallow affect that is most dangerous in the psychopath.  It is indeed the gullibility of the psychopath’s target that is a major condition or variable in this.  The psychopath is not measured solely by their own characteristics but by those they interact with.

Many people may be attracted to the initial charm and apparent ‘devil my care’ attitude of the psychopath.  This can in the first instance hide the darker elements of their personality and draw the ‘victim’ in ever closer.

The history of the worlds major tyrants all point to the characteristics of the psychopath.  They use their intellect and glib charm, their superficiality to attract followers who seek easy answers.  While appearing generous, attentive and in tune with those they prey on they are super-manipulative.  The characteristic of the politician since the dawn of politics itself.

Put in the simple common-sense terms you requested no friendship with a psychopath will last and will usually end in disaster for the hapless victim. 

When groups of people of different positions or status are kept apart, feelings, pains and complaints are not transferred and shared within  groups of these different status as we humans have a natural tendency for empathy.

As tyranny is an extreme and mindless abuse of power of any kind, political  or economic, a social and psychological distance between victims and abusers should be created in order that structure to be sustained so that effects of bad actions,  emotions, pains and suffrage are not heard and shared and that distance is the purposeful elimination of personal or social nearness and friendship between the two groups.

It is surprising to see these behaviors in almost all economic structures, in companies and working places of all kinds. They intentionally avoid friendships if they intend to abuse some one and therefore Aristotle is it right. 

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Turner,

Many thanks for your expanded remarks. I agree, and I also take Henry VIII as a paradigm example among politicians. Among academics, it is the tendency to reduce every issue to politics and institutional-political advantage of personal relations which is telling --strongly indicative at least. I call this "political reductionism."

You wrote:

Put in the simple common-sense terms you requested, no friendship with a psychopath will last and will usually end in disaster for the hapless victim.

---End quotation

Right. Be wary of the "friends to all." "The friend of all is a friend to none," says Aristotle. One way to tell who is not a "friend to all," is that they make reasonable objections and will sometimes change their minds --taking a less popular or pervasively held view. Also, reasonable people will avoid sycophants like the plague.

H.G. Callaway

Callaway

It is not clear to me what your question is.

Aristotle is quite clear in NE 1161b1 and later. The friendship is absent in Tyranny because there is no justice and the other forms of friendship are not possible. Neither equality (in equals) not proportion (in unequal) are respected in Tyranny. Also in tyranny there cannot be friendship based on utility. In 1163a30 and further he states that in the friendship based on utility in unequal (friendship based on superiority, 1162b) there are problems with friendship since not only that none is satisfied with what h/she gets but in tyranny a tyrannt treat others as instruments and they have nothing in common, almost nothing in fact. And yet even in tyranny, there is a minimal friendship based on one common thing – the fact that all are human beings (1161b9).

In Eudemian Ethics (EE, 1241b31) he explains more about problems with tyranny and the other forms of unequal relations.

May be NE, the Ch. 9 contains the answer when it refers to the community, sharing (koinonia, 1159b25). Sharing with tyrannt is not something obvious... I doubt that in my comment there is an answer to your question.

Callaway

One word more.

I used the Bekker notation. My references are mostly for the book 8, ch. 11 (8.11), but Bekker is really more comfortable. I suggest you to use the translation of Roger Crisp who uses this notation or Perseus (Racham translation):

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0054

And Greek (Baywater):

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0053

Callaway

I made some corrections a minnute ago, some refernces were not correct. It is late, have to sleep.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pavlovic,

Many thanks for your comments and references. Perhaps you are too humble, regarding the question. Yes, oppression, and the other descriptions we've seen of tyranny amount to a lack of justice. Much more could be said, of course. We may want to know in detail how an overall lack of justice could affect various personal relationships. In Aristotle this is chiefly something rather abstract, say, "equals are not recognized as equals," or words to that effect. But that may, in turn, be understood in terms of an instrumentalization or manipulation of recognition --as you suggest. The phrase "imperial service" comes to mind.

We might also wan to look at Cicero on friendship, eventually.

H.G. Callaway

Callaway

Yes, Cicero is probably a good source to see the development of the ideas. All depends on what you are looking for or what is your aim. What relates to justice, the best and the easiest way would be of course to go directly to John Rawls and Amartya Sen.

There are two aspects that Aristotle just touches but which I did not mention. There is an aspect that Aristotle treats which is also quite modern, particularly in some developing democracies or the states that are abandoning some forms of dictatorship. This is the concept of timocracy (régime censitaire, in French), or the census of the rich (or of those the most capable to decide) in the Ch. 10 (1160a33 and later).

The other is that he mentions in the Ch. 9 (1159b25 and later) – and this is valid for Tyranny also (1161b9): people are a “community” of humans that need each other anyway. Even if justice is not satisfied, like in tyranny, some cohesion remains. In the modern societies, some justice and moral law are and should sometimes be readily sacrificed for the sake of personal relationships, sympathy and affections: “A society ordered entirely by the moral law , in which rights, duties, and justice take precedence over all interests and affections would alienate the mere human beings who compose it, and soon fall apart.” (Roger Scruton, Philosophy: principles and problems, Ch. 9. Morality; p. 113). (See also Rawls, TJ, VIII, 71) This pointing out towards the importance of our “concerns” in our moral decisions.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225090107_Ethics_of_concerns_and_life_cessation_decisions_when_emotions_are_all_what_remains

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256757097_Beyond_Paternalism_A_Moral_Theory_of_Concerns

Article Ethics of concerns and life cessation decisions: when emotio...

Conference Paper Beyond Paternalism: A Moral Theory of Concerns

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pavlovic,

Thanks again for your additional comments and suggestions. Basically, I am staying with the initial question, and the point here, so far as I am concerned is to answer the question posed, which I think reasonably clear, and to discuss various proposals toward an answer. I believe your references could also help things along.

One point you made struck me as particularly interesting. You wrote:

“A society ordered entirely by the moral law , in which rights, duties, and justice take precedence over all interests and affections would alienate the mere human beings who compose it, and soon fall apart.” (Roger Scruton, Philosophy: principles and problems, Ch. 9. Morality; p. 113). (See also Rawls, TJ, VIII, 71) This pointing out towards the importance of our “concerns” in our moral decisions.

---End quotation

I have approached the present question and discussion from a different textual background, as is perhaps evident in my suggestion of looking into Cicero on friendship and tyranny. Much in Aristotle remains to be explored, of course, and I do not think that everything of interest in Aristotle has yet been brought out in our brief discussions to this point. 

But it is interesting that you bring in Roger Scruton here, and perhaps you would be in a position to develop the related line of thought. Initially, I am inclined to reply that  "a society entirely ordered by the moral law" as I would understand this phrase, would naturally include attention to the moral interests of the members in the society, and that the "affections" of members of the society includes our theme of "friendship." So, in isolation at least, the contrast quoted seems to set up a false dichotomy of some sort.  (It is important to note that Aristotle's "friendship" is much wider than the contemporary English concept.)

So, if you follow my point here, I wonder what you might go on to say by way of a defense of the claim you quote. I think it is certainly a very interesting claim in the present context of discussion. It deserves some elaboration. I think I see the point he is getting at, yet it seems to me not well stated, or at least stated out of context. 

H.G. Callaway

Dear professor Callaway,

I am also not sure whether the particular line of thought that I introduced corresponds well to your question. Yet, I am not sure that I can elaborate much more on the question referred to by Scruton, here. Indeed, it is more or less something very much connected with my earlier writings.

About your objection. In principle if we declare that we would follow moral law or any other set of principles, that declaration does not determine in detail what we are going to follow and what we are going to do in some specific situation. In particular, some situations where a rational decision is not available, or when the two outcomes are equally unacceptable, there, I believe, that emotional concerns may be taken as justified.

In my cited papers, I tried to introduce some motives into the Moral status that are based on relationships, proposing a Theory of Moral Concerns. This includes also moral motivation based on emotions. This is where the position of Scruton is in accordance with my views. Similar aspects were suggested by Schopenhauer (in Uber die Grundlage der Moral; there is certainly an English translation) and recently by Simon Blackburn (in his “Ruling Passions”). The texts that I joined yesterday explain what I basically mean.

I will send you privately my draft as soon as I will put there some references (that was written in 2011 and that accompanies the PowerPoint presentation which I posted the other day). I hope to be able to finish it and publish soon.

If this is not what your question is about, we may have this discussion privately.

This what Aristotle writes is of course a puzzle because Aristotle’s friend was Hermias, a tyrant of Atarneus in Asia Minor, whose daughter or niece Pythias he married. After death of Hermias Aristotle compose even a hymn in his honour and dedicated a statue in Delphi. How can what he writes about tyranny be compatible with his personal experience? It may be that he was not aware that Hermias was a tyrant; or Hermia was not a tyrant of a kind Aristotle had in mind. According to what he writes in Politics (1295a1 and later), where he describes various forms of tyranny, it looks like that the third, the most extreme form of tyranny, is one that would not permit friendship.

If such an extreme  tyrant has no "share" of interest at all (koinonia, 1159b25), it seems that this would logically exclude having friends and that this my be an answer to your question - if this is what you were asking?

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pavlovic,

It strikes me that you propose a puzzle about Aristotle, the person. How, consistent with his strictures, could he have been a friend to Hermias of Atarneus? It may be that you already gave part of the answer, since both were, as you have it, closely related to Pythias.

Looking more deeply into Aristotle on "friendship," I would think to emphasize the degrees or kinds of friendship which Aristotle details in his discussions of the subject. Not every friendship is of the highest or idea kind --as between persons of virtue of equal standing or character--based in the love of virtue. In particular, Aristotle also discusses "friendships" based on common interests which may be limited to interactions concerning the common interest and  prone to breakdown when the common interest becomes less viable. Not every "friend" is then "another self."

This position seems perfectly compatible with holding that "in tyranny there is little or no friendship." (Plausibly, this is a generalization regarding tyranny and "philia" holding "always or for the most part.") In addition, of course, Aristotle was not living in Atarneus, but instead in Athens. We may imagine, in addition, that Hermias had the virtue of caring for the well being of his daughter, and this relationship, plausibly falls under the category of "philia," which extends, on Aristotle's account, e.g., to the relationship between mother and child. Even a tyrant may appropriately care for a daughter and her husband, I suppose.

What strikes me as of most interest in reply to your question is to get at the broader account of the varieties of "friendship" in Aristotle; and in this brief reply, I have only scratched the surface. I think that some quotation would be helpful, and perhaps I will get around to this later.  Or, perhaps, what I say above will suffice?

H.G. Callaway

Here was a repetition of the comment below.

Dear Callaway

I think that your worries are not justified.

First of all, the concept of friendship refers to the relations within a close circuit. Therefore I am certain that Aristotle does not use the concept of friendship in case of a tyrant for the relation that he may have with his people. He denies that a tyrant may have them, and yet he was a friend of a tyrant! My explanation is that either Hermias was not a tyrant in the eyes of Aristotle or he was not tyrant tout court, since he was also a philosopher – ruler, as Plato defined it – whose pupil he was also and was a kind of a just ruler, one that Aristotle also describes in his book 8 of EN, caring for the people around him as a “father”.

You wrote:

“Aristotle was not living in Atarneus, but instead in Athens.”

Aristotle and Hermias were close to each other for over 25 years, with some interruptions, from 372 to 347. Aristotle, after death of his father, moves as a young boy to Atarneus (372). From that moment on he is very close to Hermias. They both go to Athens to Academia (367). Hermias will leave Academia (probably in 351) and soon after become a ruler of Atarneus. Aristortle remains in Athens couple of year more but when Plato dies (in 347), he moves to Atarneus, i.e. Assos and Mytilene and will organize a school there. Hermias and Aristotle are again very close. Aristotle will then move to Pella i.e. Mieza, in (343), while Hemias remaining in Atarneus, will shortly after (in 341) be captured by the Persians and killed.

You say:

“Even a tyrant may appropriately care for a daughter and her husband, I suppose.”

It is obvious that Aristotle probably married Pythias when he returned to Assos in 347 or even later – “when she became of age’. Therefore the mentioned  friendship largely precedes his family connections with Hermias.

(Majority of the information is from Gauthier’s EN, Duering, Jaeger, Blakesley and number of other sources. More precision is superfluous. In my previous posts I probably insisted inappropriately with the references. I am sorry, it looks to me now that giving full references in this particular discussion will not be necessary.)

Dear Professor Callaway,

This strikes me as an excellent question.  For Aristotle, authentic friendship is a relationship between equals.  It is a relationship between those who are equal in merit, measured in terms of the moral and intellectual virtues.  Friendship is a human bond more fitting, other things being equal, to democracy as a form of government. The danger of democratic government is that in order to facilitate more general or widespread friendship among the citizenry, merit can become diluted.  Perhaps, this dilution of merit to achieve a common friendship-like bond/relationship among citizens is unavoidable.  Aristotle's examination of mixed forms of government may well be evidence that a democracy without elements of aristocracy, and perhaps even of monarchy, in its constitution is far more likely to descend into mob rule.

According to Aristotle's conception of distributive justice, a person's share of some valued commodity is proportional to the person's share of merit, understood as the factor(s) relevant to the distribution of that commodity, which may either be a benefit or a burden. Straightforwardly stated, determinations of justice are necessary for the establishment and sustainability of friendship (based upon equal or roughly equal merit).  Friendly relations engender discussion, rational persuasion, and respectful agreement and disagreement.  The relationship of the ruler to the ruled in tyranny (the corrupted form of monarchy) is ultimately based upon force, not upon wisdom, virtue, or rational discussion.  Thus, there is a fundamental disparity between the relationship of friends and of that which exists between the tyrant and his subjects.  Further, wider friendships (all of which require determinations of justice to become established) are often the basis for political opposition to and revolt against corrupt regimes, such as tyrannies.

From the vantage point of the 21st century, it can be seen that all totalitarian regimes grow from the seed of tyranny.  Aristotle could not have foreseen the technological developments which have made total governmental control over all aspects of life possible. But, the motivation for this total control is the same as every tyrant's opposition to justice.  The particular evil of totalitarian tyranny is that it not only prevents authentic friendships, but it goes further, and through secret police and other such repressive state apparatus, it fosters suspicion and animosity, the opposites of friendship.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pavlovic,

Let's take you points one at a time. First I take up the point concerning friendship in the relation of ruler to ruled. 

Aristotle writes, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 8, chp. 11:

Each of the constitutions may be seen to involve friendship just in so far as it involves justice. The friendship between a king and his subjects depends on an excess of benefits conferred; for he confers benefits on his subjects if being a good man he cares for them with a view to their well-being, as a shepherd does for his sheep (whence Homer called Agamemnon 'shepherd of the peoples'). Such too is the friendship of a father, though this exceeds the other in the greatness of the benefits conferred; for he is responsible for the existence of his children, which is thought the greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing.

(See:http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.8.viii.html) 

---End quotation

But you wrote:

First of all, the concept of friendship refers to the relations within a close circuit. Therefore I am certain that Aristotle does not use the concept of friendship in case of a tyrant for the relation that he may have with his people.

---End quotation

You are clearly and pretty directly wrong, when you say that "Aristotle does not use the concept of friendship in case of a tyrant for the relation that he may have with his people." On the contrary, what marks the tyrant is, for Aristotle, the lack of "friendship" to the people. He writes: "The friendship between a king and his subjects depends on an excess of benefits conferred; for he confers benefits on his subjects if being a good man he cares for them with a view to their well-being, as a shepherd does for his sheep (whence Homer called Agamemnon 'shepherd of the peoples')."

A tyrant is no friend of the people precisely because he rules purely with an eye to his own interests. Agreed?

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Risser,

Many thanks for your kind words. You make several interesting points, and I would like to focus, initially on one of them:

You wrote:

For Aristotle, authentic friendship is a relationship between equals. It is a relationship between those who are equal in merit, measured in terms of the moral and intellectual virtues. Friendship is a human bond more fitting, other things being equal, to democracy as a form of government. The danger of democratic government is that in order to facilitate more general or widespread friendship among the citizenry, merit can become diluted. Perhaps, this dilution of merit to achieve a common friendship-like bond/relationship among citizens is unavoidable. Aristotle's examination of mixed forms of government may well be evidence that a democracy without elements of aristocracy, and perhaps even of monarchy, in its constitution is far more likely to descend into mob rule.

---End Qoutation

In place of "authentic friendship," I would rather say, "ideal friendship." There are varieties of friendship in Aristotle, and there can be little doubt regarding those he prefers, but the other varieties are also "friendship," and no less authentic for that. 

Aristotle does say that friendship increases in democracy, but more generally, the possibility of friendship increases with justice, and with democracy, I would think, insofar as it increases justice. That there is some danger of "diluting" merit in democracy, or better perhaps "due attention to merit," has often been claimed, though it is more frequently claimed where one finds a working contrast between "democracy" and other forms, such as the representative republic --to take the most obvious case. 

In a sense, one might say that the American presidency replaced the role of the monarch, as the American states broke away from the British empire and came to a constitutional settlement, after the failures of the Articles of Confederation. But equally, the representation of the states in the U.S. Senate might be viewed as a replacement for the British, landed aristocracy. From that perspective, it might be argued, I think, that the suppression of the states, in favor of a national government is a kind of "Tory" development. I wonder what you might say on that point.

On the other hand, I think it unlikely that American democracy could degenerate into mob rule, assuming the rule of law, so long as the Bill of Rights is enforced against legal or policy subversion and as long as the states can make their own laws and policies --and contest federal law.

Am I getting at your points here?

Thanks for your comments.

H.G. Callaway

Dear Professor Callaway

You write: "A tyrant is no friend of the people precisely because he rules purely with an eye to his own interests." Yes, agreed, this is what Aristotle writes and what I confirmed in my very first comment.

On the other hand, Aristotle never writes specifically that the friendship of a ruler should be directed at the ENTIRE POPULATION of the ruled. On the contrary, he states that the condition for a friendship must be "to have something in common". As I commented above: “May be NE, the Ch. 9 contains the answer when it refers to the community, sharing (koinonia, 1159b25)“. Today also, we do not use the word “friendship” for our relations with the president of the US or with the president of France. We hardly ever have such concrete relations. What can a ruler have in common with a ruled that he even does not know to exist and he never meets?

In addition, the entire book 8 shows that the various aspects of friendship (which for example David mentioned above) cannot refer to absolutely all the ruled citizens but only to the closed circle of people who have shared interests and enter in direct contact with the ruler.

I think that you may be confusing, as David probably also does, friendship with common general social relationships. Your last comment above shows this too. Of course, the ruler in the ancient times (as well as the contemporary rulers) entered in those relationships with the ruled (or population), but this has nothing to do with friendship. In the modern totalitarian regimes, the reigning oligarchs alienate from the population, not as friends but become detached in more complex ways of various social interactions, direct or indirect, with the population. Those relations just resemble, but are not the same, and are on other level and different from the relations that Aristotle describes with the reference to the tyrant and his surroundings that he calls friendship.

If you think that Aristotle has in fact in mind not "friendship" but general social interaction that may be mostly indirect, social communication, public opinion, legitimacy, social stability and social cohesion or other components - well, this should be demonstrated separately.

Dear Professor Callaway

You probably see that my point is that koinonia (1161a32 – b10; 1284b6;1328a25-28) is not as it is sometimes assumed: something like homonoia (omonoia fainetai) EN, IX. 6 (1167a20; 1167a.25-1167b.15). Indeed, going so far as to ascribable to relations of a ruler and the ruled some characteristics of a friendship were probably acceptable in the ancient times. I think that Aristotle still does not go that far in the chapter 11 of the book VIII of EN, as some commentators imply. On the contrary, he is quite explicit in the book IX, 6 that I cite above, when he is discussing the “political friendship” (politike de filia fainetai e omonoia; 1167b1 and further) and there even states that this is not friendship (1167a27 or b11). An interesting discussion on the topic may be found in W.W.Tarn: Alexander The Great, volume II, part 2. 25 (1948). The concept that Alexander III tried to implement no doubt originated from Aristotle.

I have a feeling that my comments are drawing the discussion away from your original question.

I again corrected one or two references that I gave above. Sorry for this. Also, I think that the translations of EN vary and that of David Ross, which you probably use, is particularly good but does not mention the Greek expressions koinonia and omonoia, what sometimes makes us miss some fine aspects of those notions.

The Loeb Classical Library  edition (Harris Rackham translation) has not only Greek on the left hand side, but has also Bekker's pagination on those Greek pages.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Paviovic,

My intentions regarding this question are not so determinate that I can reasonably expect to foresee all the possibilities of its development; and you contributions are appreciated. You obviously have some considerable interest and have dedicated much time to the Aristotle texts. For this we should be grateful.

I believe that Ross' translation is perfectly adequate to our purposes here, but that is not to say that comparison to other translations might not also be helpful.

Have you thought to reply in more detail to Risser? I think he makes several interesting and congenial points, and I am yet to get around to all of them. Can you help?

H.G. Callaway

I'd like to say the following. Among the ancient Greeks, friendship was a most valuable relationship among humans. Greeks did not trust love. (For that the world has to wait for Christians, for whom friendship was not as worthy as a love-relationship).

Friendship both supposes and promotes democracy. Whence, tyranny hinders trust and loyalty, sincerity and morality.

In Aristotle friendship is probably the highest form of eudaimonía.

In the archaic period of Greece things were very different, though.

Dear Callaway

I think that David Risser offered very good, concise summary of certain (of course not of all) points that Aristotle expressed in EN. It may be too strong to say that “friendship is a relationship between equals” because Aristotle recognizes very well that unequal may be bound with a strong friendship based on number of other, very different, common, i.e. shared links (koinonia); and to determine what is “equal” is not easy.

The links of democracy and friendship is other difficult point. I do not think that Aristotle was particularly clear about this. Therefore to compare with modern friendship relations and types of governments is hard. The issue is complicated in the modern times with various forms of governments that combine even monarchies with various degrees of democracies, and various different forms of freedom restrictions, that may be very sophisticated and often invisible and very extensive in the most advanced democracies. I think this thread is not the place for such a discussion.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Maldonado,

Thanks for your comment. In some tension with what you say, though, I'm inclined to emphasize that the Greek "philia," chiefly translated as "friendship," in the discussion so far, is also often translated by the English "love." The word "Philadelphia," is a case in point, since it is most often rendered as "city of brotherly love."  William Penn gave the city this name, and the Quakers traditionally call each other "friends." This is just a bit misleading concerning what is covered by the Greek 'philia," since its also includes the love of a mother or a father for a child and the love of brothers for each other. 

Aristotle's "eudaimonia," conventionally translated as "happiness," might also be thought of as a matter of being of good spirit, or well spirited since "eu-" is good and "daimonia" or related words, covers, say the "demon" or "genius" of Socrates. In any case, Aristotle defines happiness, as "an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue." "friendship," he says, "is a virtue or related to virtue." So I take it that the activities of friendship contribute to happiness --and quite significantly. Even if we had everything else, we would not want to live without friendship. Still, I do not think that Aristotle holds that friendship is the highest form of happiness. There are many other virtues to consider.

Traditionally, there are said to be three varieties or conception of love in ancient Greek, "eros," "philia" and  "agape," and the last of these three is often though to express the Christian concept of love, or has been adapted for this usage. This has much to do with the new testament having been written in Greek. I am not sure that I would say that the Greeks did not trust love.

I agree with you, of course, that "friendship" both "supposes and promotes democracy," or good government generally, and that "tyranny hinders trust and loyalty, sincerity and morality." Perhaps you could say more about how you see these relationships. Its an interesting, engaging theme.

H.G. Callaway

We should perhaps be aware that Ancient Greece was as much a product of dolts as intellectuals and philosophers.  Many of the Greeks who laid the foundations that gave platform for Aristotle were simple soldiers who gave little thought to the muses.

Would Greece have left its imprint on over 2.500 years of civilisation it it were not for the Greeks who spent more time fighting than thinking?  

"In times of peace and prosperity cities and individuals alike follow higher standards because they are not forced into a situation where they do not have to do what they do not want to do.  But war is a stern teacher; in depriving them of the power of most easily satisfying them of their wants, it brings most peoples minds down to the actual level of their circumstances".  

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Turner,

No doubt the ancient Greeks were quite warlike. Military courage is surely a paradigm of virtue; and this idea came to the philosophers from a general social consensus. Yet the idea of virtue is generalized well beyond its original or background paradigms.

You wrote:

Would Greece have left its imprint on over 2.500 years of civilisation it it were not for the Greeks who spent more time fighting than thinking?

---End quotation.

However, I think we look more to the Greeks for their inspiration to civilization than for their warlike character.

Consider the following passage--which I found by hunting for passages mentioning "war." :

Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, chp. 7:

Now the activity of the practical virtues is exhibited in political or military affairs, but the actions concerned with these seem to be unleisurely. Warlike actions are completely so (for no one chooses to be at war, or provokes war, for the sake of being at war; any one would seem absolutely murderous if he were to make enemies of his friends in order to bring about battle and slaughter); but the action of the statesman is also unleisurely, and-apart from the political action itself-aims at despotic power and honours, or at all events happiness, for him and his fellow citizens-a happiness different from political action, and evidently sought as being different. So if among virtuous actions political and military actions are distinguished by nobility and greatness, and these are unleisurely and aim at an end and are not desirable for their own sake, but the activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in serious worth and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the activity), and the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the supremely happy man are evidently those connected with this activity, it follows that this will be the complete happiness of man, if it be allowed a complete term of life (for none of the attributes of happiness is incomplete).

(See https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/nicomachean/book10.html

Aristotle himself saw more complete happiness in the contemplative life, or the life of reason, as contrasted with any practical activity. This, too, has sometimes been criticized. But in considering the relationship between friendship and tyranny in Aristotle, it seems to the point to keep Aristotle's own ideals in mind. War, I think it fair to say, is a great generator of tyranny.

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Lakew,

You wrote:

As tyranny is an extreme and mindless abuse of power of any kind, political or economic, a social and psychological distance between victims and abusers should be created in order that structure to be sustained so that effects of bad actions, emotions, pains and suffrage are not heard and shared and that distance is the purposeful elimination of personal or social nearness and friendship between the two groups.

---End quotation.

Your analysis here is deserving of some elaboration, I think; but it struck me as relatively simple, concise and compelling when I first saw it. A separation between the tyrant and the victims of tyranny is essential to its structure. The tyrant is no friend of the people, as I've put the matter, but the tyrant may still have friends and associates who directly benefit from the tyranny. Those who benefit are in a sense the means of imposing the tyranny on the rest; and this directly implies a division and exclusion of the possibility of particular friendships.

Another way to put a related point is that the method of tyranny is "divide and conquer."  Sub-groups of the population must be set against each other, and in the usual case, members of each subgroup are enlisted as means to that end. So divisions are set up within each subgroup, and between them, effectively forbidding positive relationships which might otherwise arise. "In tyranny there is little or no friendship."

H.G. Callaway 

Dear Callaway, of course I know the distinctions you mention about love. However, in a larger scope let' s not forget Plato's Symposium, perhaps the most clear study about the relationship to love and friendship. (Aristotle cant be understood without the background of Plato).

We need to open up the window for our conversation. In the archaic period, love was much more meaningful than in the hellenistic period. Big changes have happen in between. Important as he is, Aristotle is just one "street light"in the ancient Greece.

Being as it might be, it is evident that Aristotle could not match tyranny and friendship. Both are incompatible. (I fully agree with Aristotle on this).

Under a tyranny anything rules but trust and confidence, openness and spontaneity. A regime of suspicion and prosecution is imposed. As a consequence, democracy is the framework that both promotes and corresponds to friendship.

I would even go as far as claiming that for Aristotle (and Plato, too) the rationale for democracy is friendship, and not the other way round. A crucial contrast when compared with contemporary political theories - f.i. institutionalism and neo-institutionalism.

Dear Carlos

I think you made a valuable comment although I think that I cannot agree with some details that you developed about both Greek thinkers. Please see again what Aristotle, and particularly Plato, wrote about democracy.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pavlovic & contributors,

I wanted to come back to something that Pavlovic had said about "commonality" and friendship, and I was not sure that I had understood what he was getting at. But I thought that the following passage might help. It concerns "concord" (or sometimes "unanimity," appears in the translations). In the following passage, I've adapted the source text by substituting "concord" for unanimity. What is in question, in any case is agreement as relevant to action. Aristotle writes:

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book IX, Chp. 6,

Concord seems, then, to be political friendship, as indeed it is commonly said to be; for it is concerned with things that are to our interest and have an influence on our life.

Now such concord is found among good men; for they are in concord both in themselves and with one another, being, so to say, of one mind (for the wishes of such men are constant and not at the mercy of opposing currents like a strait of the sea), and they wish for what is just and what is advantageous, and these are the objects of their common endeavor as well. But bad men cannot be in concord except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends, since they aim at getting more than their share of advantages, while in labor and public service they fall short of their share; and each man wishing for advantage to himself criticizes his neighbor and stands in his way; for if people do not watch it carefully the common weal is soon destroyed. The result is that they are in a state of faction, putting compulsion on each other but unwilling themselves to do what is just.

---End quotation

(See: https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/nicomachean/book9.html

This strikes me as a good description, short of tyranny, but involving the predominance of "faction." We can imagine that if one faction destroys the other, then the result will be tyranny. The lesson seems to be that when political actors put self-interest, say, security in office or personal benefit and favoritism to their supporters, above the common good, then they will be unable to agree about what is to be done.  " ...bad men cannot be in concord," Aristotle says, "except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends, since they aim at getting more than their share of advantages, while in labor and public service they fall short of their share; and each man wishing for advantage to himself criticizes his neighbor and stands in his way..."

This idea seems to be at the base when uniformity of the republic is insisted upon as necessary for good government. At the least it appears to me to point to limits of cultural pluralism within a single polity, though such pluralism has typically been counted as a strength of many societies, in spite of the warnings.

At the same time, I think we may see here something of the reason for Aristotle's concentration on "friendship," here "political friendship," in contrast with more generalized conceptions of "love." There is a more concrete element in "concord" which concerns plans for joint or agreed action and which is often missing if we think in terms of universal benevolence.

What do readers make of this passage in relation to our question? Clearly, something like "concord" is required for "political friendship."

H.G. Callaway

Dear Callaway

The expression “homonoia” was translated by Crisp, Reckham and Thomson by “concord” and your suggestion to adopt their translation, instead of that of Ross (unanimity) is reasonable for our purposes.

Here below are some parallel translations of some connected Greek expressions from the classical and more recent translators (in the following order: Bartlett-Collins, Crisp; Reckham; Ross; Thomson). I give Bekker's refferences and then in clamers, in a  less scolarly way that people on this thread apparently prefer.

Homonoia = like-mindedness; concord; concord; unanimity; concord

1155a24 (Book VIII, 1)

1167a22 (Book IX, 6)

Eunoia = goodwill; goodwill; goodwill : goodwill; goodwill

1166b30 (Book IX, 5)

Koinonia = community ; community; partnership; community; community

1159b27 (Book VIII, 9)

This list  may help make clear some points that get easily confused. If we do not comprehend the word in a way that is more likely to be the meaning of the word for Aristotle, we tend to add connotations that are culturally sensitive and may mislead us in interpretation of the Aristotle's intentions. This applies also to some words that we think are straight forward, like democracy. This is why I think that the above Carlos' comment took us a bit away from what Plato and Aristotle though about democracy and eudaimonia, which is very complex notion.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Maldonado and readers,

I am inclined to agree with Pavlovic above, regarding classical treatments of "democracy," which I think of as more critical than the English, contemporary usage. In spite of that there is positive usage of "democracy" in Aristotle, in relation to "friendship," as I believe we have seen. Perhaps it would be better to say that good government encourages and rests upon friendship and concord--as contrasted with enmity and  factionalism?

You wrote:

Under a tyranny anything rules but trust and confidence, openness and spontaneity. A regime of suspicion and prosecution is imposed. As a consequence, democracy is the framework that both promotes and corresponds to friendship.

---End quotation

In sympathy with your remark quoted here, I think that we tend, these days, to use "democracy," as a general term encompassing constitutional and republican forms, and also including respect for human rights. But the meaning in Aristotle contrasts "rule by the people" with monarchy and with "rule by the few," oligarchy or aristocracy. So we get some tension between interpretation of Aristotle in his own terms and an Aristotelian perspective on current developments and current affairs. This tension is quite natural, but requires occasional attention.

It strikes me, given Pavlovic's listing above, that it may be helpful to devote some due attention to Aristotle on "community." Agreed?

H.G. Callaway

Dear Callaway and friends,

Certainly the concept of community is crucial for understanding democracy. We could say that it is an extension of "friendship".

My own reaction against the contemporary concept of democracy lies in that, as Callaway rightly says, it is grounded on institutions - whence we get bot institutionalism and neb-institutionalism.

The Constitution, the State, the Law, and many others, then, are nothing else but "institutions". Throughout this way one easily ends by affirming, say, the sate and yet, however, denying life or nature.

Dear Callaway, Of course we must always distinguish between Aristotle himself and the Aristotelian tradition. A sound differentiation, indeed.

To be sure, both Plato and Aristotle show upon us wonderful ideas about politics, i.e. democracy and government. Their real achievements on the field is more than questionable, however.

That said, please allow me to remind a most necessary distinction, namely between politeia and politic. Aristotle, it seem to me, please help em and correct me, is much coser to politiké than to politeia. Of course I know that the every title of his Politics is Politeia. Exactly the same title as Plato's own Republic. Nonetheless, beyond the words, Aristotle's conception of politics - and hence democracy - is closer to politiké. If so, then: yes!: we end up embracing constitutional and republican forms, as it happens.

Dear Callaway

Yes, it looks to me also to be essential, although in Aristotle it seems that hardly ever a concept has a single denotation or connotation.

(Sorry, I corrected some references above again. For some reasons I permanently enter some false numbers!)

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Maldonado & contributors,

Many thanks for your replies. It strike me that your stress on the negative aspect of "institutions," is or should be a point well taken. It seems, too often, that our political societies are unfortunately not our communities. They have instead become abstract institutions apart from community, in significant degree. Thinking along somewhat similar lines, of late, I came to the concept of "aristocratic institutions,"  or rule by institutions become quasi-aristocratic.

Maldonado wrote:

My own reaction against the contemporary concept of democracy lies in that, as Callaway rightly says, it is grounded on institutions - whence we get both institutionalism and neo-institutionalism.

---End quotation

I'm inclined to say, though, that there is better and worse among institutions. The intended critique of "institutionalism and neo-institutionalism" needs some filling in here. But it seems clear that public institutions in particular need to act and appear to act as "friends" of the public --as contrasted with being friends of insiders and their supporting constituencies alone. Public agencies and publicly supported agencies should set a high standard in this regard.  There are, of course, many variations on this theme.

H.G. Callaway

The trouble with institutions, just to re-phrase the idea, is that we fall back into structuralism, in that structures and functions, apparatuses and institutions prevail and rule, living far behind the individual, friendship, groups and personal relations.

Lucky the Greeks did not have things such as: anthem, national symbols, and the like. No offence.

I think we should remain on Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics, book 8, ch. 9, or relevant matters.

For another question about Aristotle's weltanschauung see:

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Was_Aristotle_describing_human_evolution_in_the_Metaphysica

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Turner,

Perhaps you are a bit off topic with your suggestion of another question?

It is generally acknowledged that the Greeks failed to develop the idea of biological evolution, though there were suggestions of it among the pre-Socratics.  In Aristotle, we get, instead, the notion of the "eternal species," which is quite the contrary idea.  This is a traditional route for criticism of Aristotle. In spite of that, Aristotle does develop the idea of "telos," and this may be looked upon as a firm concept of biological development, as in the typical development of the acorn into the oak or of the child into the adult.

Though we think of Aristotle's natural science and his biology as antiquated, I have long thought it quite remarkable that his ethics has strong contemporary resonance. It is under study all around the world. Our conception of the world around us has certainly changed in many and diverse ways, so that we typically look to the Greeks only for the first glimmerings of science and development of rationality. Yet the conception of human nature which we find in Aristotle's ethics, seems to survive into the present to the degree that we can make good sense out of the study of Aristotle on friendship, say. In some sense, I'd go so far as to say that Aristotle represents the common sense of the Western world, and he remains a "master of those who think."

Though our accounts of the world around us have changed and evolved over centuries, and we assume that the biological species have also evolved, the human species seems much the same, in basic ways, or, at least, that is a plausible implication of the fact that Aristotle's ethics still makes sense to modern and contemporary readers. It would be very strange to encounter someone committed to Aristotle's physics as a position in contemporary science, but it is not too difficult to imagine the life of Aristotelian virtue. We know much more, but human relations have remained sufficiently similar.

In addition, Aristotle's ethics and his political thought are, in important ways, built into our social and political traditions and even into our contemporary institutions. One way to think about and reconsider them is to go back over classical figures such as Aristotle, or Cicero, e.g. This may lead on to reaffirmation of classical influences or, also to prospective reforms and new developments.

I believe that readers of the present thread are sufficiently self-critical to avoid being captured by any "Weltanschauung," old or new. The key to this, or one key, is to be able and willing to compare and contrast diverse approaches --as with our chief themes of "friendship" and "tyranny." This contrasts with the felt compulsion to all join the bandwagon of the ruling ideas of the particular time. The history of thought gives us some vantage and perspective on popular themes and movements. Agreed?

H.G. Callaway

Well, as we all know, in both real politics as well as in political theory everybody knows/has heard that in politics there are no frees, only allies.

Isn't that the same spirit as what Aristotle is saying? I think it it, indeed.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Maldonado,

I believe I would disagree with your bit of "wisdom" on offer. You wrote:

Well, as we all know, in both real politics as well as in political theory everybody knows/has heard that in politics there are no frees [friends?], only allies.

---End quote

The response depends, though, on exactly what you want to say here. Deeper friends, in the Aristotelian sense, are rare of course, as Aristotle stipulates. Friends based on "usefulness" more common, though such relations are less stable. Sometimes we only discover the difference by a bit of experiment. Relying on absolutely stable relationships alone, in an open discussion, is likely a sign of an overly conservative configuration. We expect that open discussion proceeds by changing configurations of participants.

It is often said, in some contrast, that "nations have no friends" but "only interests," though of course their common interests may make for long term commitments and alliance. By the same token, even common business interests sometimes provide ground for longer-term relationships--though based on usefulness.

Regarding government, we expect more, of course: "friendship" to the public based on commonalities and concern for the public good. A government which does not provide this friendship to the citizens is one declining in justice, fairness or both. This is especially true here in the U.S. where our commonalities are not racial or ethnic, but instead predicated on the kind of open debate which makes community and democracy vibrant and healthy. People naturally differ on policy questions, but agree on the need for debate and open contest regarding questions and problems of public concern.

No one is perfect, of course, but this is one way to sort the sheep from the goats.

H.G. Callaway

I do not see a reason for disagreement, dear Callaway. After a brief examen my remark and your comment point out to the same issue, namely, the reign of interests, alliance -which by definition is always temporary and changeable, unlike Aristotelian friendship-, and the ruing of abstractions (such as anthems, etc.) over real close dialogue and agape in friendship.

By and large, the world would be much better, had the Aristotelian principles of democracy triumphed. Which is, by far, not the case.

Dear Carlos

Could you, please, remind us of the place in Aristotle's “Politics” or some other work where he writes this what you say? Please give us the book, chapter and may be paragraph, or use Bekker notation, if possible. Thanks very much indeed.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Maldonado,

As a general rule, I'd say, be wary of the political operatives who work for the politicians (or hope to work for them). They often do the "dirty work," while preserving "plausible deniability" for the politicians themselves.

H.G. Callaway

The Greeks in general--Plato (friends of the Forms), Stoics, Epicureans, etc. valued friendship above all other "moral" virtues as opposed to "intellectual" virtues. Recall that for Aristotle, two books of the Nicomachean Ethics (VIII and IX) are devoted to ethics. Aristotle claims that friendship is a relation between two good men and further it is based on living together. Also in the Poliitics, A. holds that the best government is a monarchy and the worst government is a tyranny.  It follows that it is dangerous to be friends with a tyrant; the tyrants goal is power, not virtue.

Sorry, in the fourth line, substitute friendship for ethics..

Ben

Move your mouse over your text; up, right the little arrow will appear and there you can reedit your text, and then save.

And, please, for this claim: "The Greeks in general--Plato (friends of the Forms), Stoics, Epicureans, etc. valued friendship above all other "moral" virtues as opposed to "intellectual" virtues." - please remind us of the references, places where Plato 'supports' your claims. Please. Thanks a lot.

Dragan: I'm currently on vacation in San Francisco and so away from my  library. That said, in the Republic, Plato distinguishes between arguing with the Sophsts like Thrasymachus and Glaucon, his half-brother, who is truly interested in finding the truth about justice but is presenting an argument for an early version of the social contract. In the Theaetetus, by contrast, Theaetetus is a willing participant and is a Friend of the Forms. The Stoics were "cosmopolitans" and regarded all  men as brothers and that each man had a duty to all others (an early version of Kant's categorical imperative) and that no man is born a slave. The Epicureans, who were materialists and not religious, valued friendship above all as the highest virtue. As for Aristotle, I ever you to the penultimate two books of the N. E.

Ben

The famous very long sentence is here: EN, 1177b17 (book X, 7, close to the end of the chapter).

So, for Aristotle the highest is not friendship but the intellectual virtue.

What about Plato? I am not an expert for Plato, may be you are? So, where is for him, the ultimate value? For Stoics, Epicureans? The best would be to give precise reference, please.

After the big meal, of course, and after all the pleasures of tomorrow.

I wish you all merry Christmas!

And since it is Christmas... here it is:

(Reckham translation; It is in fact 1177b15 but as 1177b17 is easier to memorize.)

If then among practical pursuits displaying the virtues, politics and war stand out preeminent in nobility and grandeur, and yet they are unleisured, and directed to some further end, not chosen for their own sakes: whereas the activity of the intellect is felt to excel in serious worth, consisting as it does in contemplation, and to aim at no end beyond itself, and also to contain a pleasure peculiar to itself, and therefore augmenting its activity: and if accordingly the attributes of this activity are found to be self-sufficiency, leisuredness, such freedom from fatigue as is possible for man, and all the other attributes of blessedness: it follows that it is the activity of the intellect that constitutes complete human happiness—provided it be granted a complete span of life, for nothing that belongs to happiness can be incomplete.

Dragan: Yes, Aristotle distinguishes the moral virtues from the intellectual virtues. The moral virtes are grounded in choice, which is a combination of rational deliberation between alternative courses of action and desire as motivation. The choice is always about the means which vary but the end is always the same--happiness. Intellectual virtue is concerned with knowledge for its own sake and it is covered in Book X and is based in reflexive self-consciouas (Metaphysiccs, 1075a). The Unmoved Mover motivates us as an object of desire; contemplation is the highest virtue; to be like the   Umoved mover and know eternal truths is the highest virtue. If you access: ben mijuskovic ethical priniples criteria and the meaning of life on google,,you will get my article which provides an exhaustive matrix of all possible ethical principle in Western philosophy.

Dragan: Thanks for the reference. For  Plato, the Divided Line passage in the Republic outlines 5 levels of knowledge--opinion; belief (Appearance); understanding/mediate; and intuition (immediate); (Reality) and objects of knowledge; shadows/ echoes; physical things; mathematical objects; eternal Forms. The Good is the highest level; it is constituted as an all-comprehensive quasi-mystical grasp of the Good-True-Beautiful. Again see B M Journal of Thought (2005).

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Mijuskovic,

Good to see you positing to this thread. Thanks for your contributions. 

I wonder a bit about the idea of happiness as an end, and I hope you can clarify this somewhat. Since Aristotelian "happiness" is "an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue," it would seem that one would properly pursue the virtues, in any given situation, and that if successful in that, the result would be happiness. One would then pursue Aristotelian happiness only indirectly by means of the pursuit of the virtues. This seems especially compelling for the inexperienced actor, since there is then little assurance that the person is able to avoid the extremes, which are vices, and attain to the "golden mean."  Yet "an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue" can surely only be attained if the needed virtue is attained. So it seems we cannot aim directly for happiness, though happiness can be the result of acquiring the virtues and acting in accordance with them.

You wrote:

Yes, Aristotle distinguishes the moral virtues from the intellectual virtues. The moral virtues are grounded in choice, which is a combination of rational deliberation between alternative courses of action and desire as motivation. The choice is always about the means which vary but the end is always the same--happiness.

--end quotation

Surely there is choice involved in the exercise of the virtues, and moral deliberation as well. Yet Aristotle has it that we must practice to attain to the virtues, and in particular, it is important to avoid that extreme to which one may be more attracted. So while it is true, as you say that "The moral virtues are grounded in choice, which is a combination of rational deliberation between alternative courses of action and desire as motivation," it seems clear that not just any choice, given deliberation and motivation, will result in virtuous action. What you neglect to emphasize is the process in which the virtues are acquired. Yet emphasizing this process, it seems clear that we can only reasonably aim for happiness via acquisition of the virtues. In order to be happy, according to Aristotle, we must first aim at the virtues. Happiness, it seems is more a result than it is an end of action.

Might you have some quotations whch would be helpful here?

I have some questions about the distinction between the moral and intellectual virtues, too; but perhaps we can put these off for a time--given the holidays.

H.G. Callaway

The concepts of education and training are critical in both PLato (indeed Rousseau called the Republic the greatest work written on  education); and in the N E, Aristotle states in Book VI that the "intellect alone moves nothing; only the intellect animated by desire."  Aristotle 's over-riding concept of organicity (Marjorie Greene in A Portrait of Aristotle) leads him to fuse, synthesize , bind intelllect and desire into a unity and thus it operates in choice.  None of te ancient Greeks formuattel the concept of free will. That's a Christian invention. For A., as I say, choice is the means for attaining "well-being." The criterion whether we have chosen wisely or not is determined by his doctrine of the mean; nothing to excess, everything in moderation in controlling our desires. Thus, courage is the mean between two extremes: foolhardiness/rashness and cowardice.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Mijuskovic,

Many thanks for your thoughtful reply. I like your quotation that "Intellect alone moves nothing; only intellect motivated by desire." You might be interested to know that this claim is closely paraphrased in Emerson. It can easily be connected with contemporary rejections of the fact-value dichotomy, btw.

I am not inclined to dispute the idea that in Aristotle a fusion of intellect and desire operate in choice. But more strictly, my question concerned "happiness" as the end of action. It still strikes me as reasonable to consider it a result of virtuous action and an end perhaps indirectly achieved. At the least it seems important to emphasize the role of the virtues in Aristotelian happiness. Is choice "a means to achieve well-being," or is it more directly a means to virtuous action and a means to achieve an object of desire? I am inclined to dispute the idea that the virtues are ever acquired fully or completely, and this would mean that we are capable of ever learning them more fully, as our habits are refined.

It was not my intention in my question to you to bring up "freedom of the will" (which I sometimes regard as an unhappy phrase). However, the idea that this topic only arrives with specifically Christian thought has been doubted, and there are good grounds for this. You can find references and quotation for ancient sources at the following address:

http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/history/

This struck me as an interesting discussion, especially the opening, though I am not inclined to pursue it here. I do regard Aristotle on "accident" as important, though. What is perhaps more to the point of Aristotle's ethics, "friendship" and "tyranny," is the relation of these topics to social and political thought in Aristotle. This comes through very strongly in later sources. Tyranny is the absence of freedom or a kind of slavery. 

Welcome to the discussion.

H.G. Callaway

Dear Galloway (Irish ?): I'm in San Francisco on vacation so I don't have my library available but as I recall in W. D.Ross' Aristotle he states that the Greeks had no conception of free will. In Homer's Iliad there is a passage where the gods criticize Zeus for wanting to save his favorite son, Sarpedon, and they tell him he can do it despite the fact that Fate or Destiny had determined  that he die. Zeus doesn't do it. Possibly this is an example of "free will." In Plato's Myth of Er, those who are prepared to re-enter worldly life draw lots in order to choose what sort of life they will have for their return. Odysseus is the last to choose and he elects for an obscure, simple life. But the  choice is done on the basis of "knowledge" as the example of the soul who chooses a tyrant's life only to discover that he is fated to devour his own children. In terms of Christian free will, I turn to Augustine to understand it. None of the Greeks--not Pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Epicureans--believed in Creation ex nihilo. "Out of nothing, nothing comes." It is because Augustine wishes to sanctify the Will=Power of God that he posits an absolutely creative God who can create a contradiction. It is also Augustine and Descartes who separate the intellect from the will, which accounts for the doctrine of sin--a man can know that adultery is wrong and yet sin in his heart. For me, this is an analogue to God's creative power.

I  wrote an article, "Virtue Ethics," which appeared in the Philosophy and Literature journal. As I vaguely recall, I had something to say about Aristotle in it. It's a PDF.

Dear H. G.; Thanks for the reference. I'm reading through it. It will take some time. At first blush, it reminds me of Mortimer Adler's The History of Ideas Dictionary, which is the sort of stuff I like. I (I took courses from Richard McKeon, who was a colleague of Adlers, at the University of Chicago.) I teach Ethics so Leucippus' and Democritus' strict determinism is familiar to me (and I would distinguish physical from psychological determinism with Spinoza and Hobbes as examples of both). And I'm familiar with Epicurus "random swerve of the atoms. " In the twentieth-century, the Vienna Circle of philosophers, Rudolph Carnap (U of C), Otto Neurath, Moritz Schiick, used Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty as an argument in behalf of freedom but obviously it couldn't fulfill the conditions for moral responsibility. Again, as I recall, Aristotle's concept of chance is not "indeterministic" in the example which he provides of a man running into someone in the marketplace by chance to whom he owes money. I think it's helpful when you introduced the four causes in our discussion with the fourth, final one invoking a purposeful, teleological principle. I say its significant because the opposite of determinism is not only freedom but teleology, purposiveness as well. As soon as one introduces the possibility of purposive actions, then I think one has transformed or "enriched" the notion of "freedom" (Hegel). And I'm familiar with compatibilism, soft and hard determinism (erratically and indiscriminatively attributed to Hobbes, Locke, and Hume). But if the compatibilist grounds his distinction on the difference between external/physical causes versus "internal" ones, e. g., motives, desires, intentions, etc., then it seems at least to me that the hard determinist can always argue that they (the causes) are originally caused by heredity and environment, external factors. These issues are intrinsically interesting to me because I work on theories of consciousness in relation to universal human loneliness.  Speaking of Aristotle, as he states in the Politics, any man who does not seek the company of other men is either a beast or a god but he is not human.

I am very old but many, many years ago I had a wonderful young Platonist professor, Ronald Hathaway at the U of Cal, Santa Barbara, who left to teach at Temple. He was trained in the History of Ideas at Brandeis rather than Johns Hopkins, I believe.. Unfortunately, it's my understanding that he died early.

To be continued--Merry Xmas,I almost forgot.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Mijuskovic & contributors,

Thanks for your replies. Merry Xmas to you and a happy new year!

I believe the Greek concept of personal freedom is "autoexousion," or self-control, as we might put the matter. Related concepts are important in the Stoic tradition.This was translated by St. Thomas as "liberum arbitrium," and then further translated as "free will." But self-control is anything but arbitrary.

Of particular interest are the political conditions of self-control, friendship and a vigorous civil society. In tyranny, I'm inclined to say, "there is little or no friendship" or (solid affiliation?) --the last thing wanted is the influence of human virtue, which naturally  interferes with the workings of patronage, cronyism, political favoritism and other instrumentalities of narrowly self-interested, top-down control. 

No hurry with any of this, I'm sure.

H.G. Callaway

About the "free will"

Please see Aristotle EN, book 3 (1112b33 and further); but in particular the book 3. I would greatly appreciate to learn what exactly David Ross said about the Greeks and free will. The book 3 of Ethics of Nicomach gives extraordinary discussion that is very modern and points out at the absurdity of a search for "absolutely independent” deliberation. I think that the Greeks maybe were not in clear what the human rights are, but they knew what free will is. They may be did not believe that free will was possible, but this is the other matter.

Can we go back to Aristotle, please? EN (or NE), Book 8? And could we try to be straight forward and concrete - as Aristotle was?

Aquinas, when commenting 1112b33 writes that "homo est principium suarum operationum"(comment 479 in: S. Thomae Aquinatis In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio, Marietti Editori Ltd, Italia, 1964).

Well...

Dear Correspondents: H. G.'s reference to The Informative Philosopher is very helpful as a point and context of orientation. In Plato, temperance is one of the four key cardinal virtues and Aristotle certainly emphasizes moderation the N E. One critical remark in the Informative Philosopher article is a reference to one of two great distinctions. The first being to mind-body dualism and the second to will and intellect dualism. I will have to wait to get home to provide Ross' "free will" comment. The liberum arbitrium concept in relation to free will may be connected to William (or John?) of Buridan's argument of free will as "indifference.." According to the argument, if one places an ass or donkey equidistant between two bails of hay, so the argument goes, the animal will be unable to move either right or left because it does not have free will and so will expire. But man, because he has free will will be able to choose. ?Question? ousia meaning:  to be, substance, essence, in itself.

Ben

Really it is curious that you brought this example.

Jean Buridan (Johannes Buridanus) was a rector of the Sorbonne but Aquinas died probably 20 years before Buridan was born. Buridan certainly new the writings of Aquinas. I live on la Place de La Sorbonne and the waiters in the café below often know (or I tell them from time to time) about the l'âne de Buridan. They then sometimes tell the story to the tourists who hesitate what to order.

As far as I can tell, there are (at least) five possible first principles surrounding the free will determinism debate: (1) hard determinism, which claims conditioning by either physical and/or psychological causes; (2) free will, which essentially depends on an immaterialist but active paradigm of the soul and is rule-oriented, i. e. one is not "free" to be bad (Kant's categorical imperative); (3) soft determinism/compatibilism,  which distinguishes external physical causes from internal (mental?) ones, e. g., motives, desires, intentions  (Hume's perceptions); (4) Aristotelian choices, which are grounded in a combination of intellect and desire, reason and motivation; and (5) existential freedom, which is also immaterial and active as well as absolutely random, i.e. non-rule oriented (Sartre, Nauusea, Being and Nothingness).

My stake in all this is that I reject the current claim by "scientific" researchers committed to the principles of materialism, empiricism, phenomenalism, behaviorism, and the neurosciences that human actions are determined and caused by environmental, cultural, situational, and even chemical imbalances in the brain. 

Ben

"My stake in all this is that I reject the current claim by "scientific" researchers ... that human actions are determined and caused by environmental, cultural, situational, and even chemical imbalances in the brain."

It is very intriging what you say. The categorical imperative is neither some physical necessity nor it exists as human beings, human actions or practices do exist.

Or, forget this for a while: How human action then happens? Why there is human action at all?

Kant was both a subjective idealist and a rationalist--the two go together quite comfortably. Relatively few philosophers posit synthetic a priori propositions and judgments: Plato, Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Husserl, Sartre. The categorical (universal, necessary=a priori) imperative (command) is a synthetic principle and criterion telling us what to will and do. Always act so the the subjective maxim (your will) of your action can become a universal law legislating for all rational beings in any conceivable universe; always treat other human beings as ends-in-themselves having infinite worth/value and never as a means to your own selfish or utilitarian ends, e. g,, egoism or happiness; and man is free when he gives himself the law and self-consciously obeys his own law for then he is both sovereign and subject (Rousseau).

I approve of your Jean de Buridan philosophic joke. It's sad that waiters are more humorous than philosophers.

I'm from Montenegro. The Montenegrins are very poor but they are very proud of two things: that the Ottoman Turks were unable to ever to capture Cetinje, the old capital, and that they are lazy. They never seem to have realized there is a connection between being lazy and being poor. Ben (Lazo)

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

Here are a few short quotations which may help things along. I think we should definitely come back to "freedom" and "community," but here I want to provide a few quotations on "tyranny," --more directly related to the question.

Aristotle, Politics, Bk. III, part 7:

"For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only."

Book V, part 10:

"A tyrant as has often been repeated, has no regard to any public interest, except as conductive to his private ends; his end is pleasure."

Book V, part 11.

"Another mark of a tyrant is that he likes foreigners better than citizens, and lives with them and invites them to his table; for the one are enemies, but the others enter into no rivalry with him."

---End quotations

Here is an on-line version of the Politics, which may prove useful:

https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/a8po/

I think to add two key points from Aristotle. The first is the famous definition of "man" or the human species, as the "rational animal."  Much could be said about this, and it is worth emphasizing regarding this point, that however irrational people may be in fact, they are still potentially rational, and this, according to Aristotle is an ideal to be cultivated. Secondly, and of equal importance is that human beings are political animals. According to Aristotle, being both rational and political, the good for man (i.e. human beings) is to be pursued in a rational politics which aims to benefit the polity as a whole. 

Rational politics is that kind of politics which best facilitates the good for man, which again is "happiness," i.e., "activity of the soul in accordance with virtue." Since again, "no one would want to live without friends," and this is necessary to the good life, tyranny, being destructive of friendship, and generally, being destructive of the possibility of practicing the virtues in community, is destructive of the good for mankind.

Briefly,

RE: "freedom." "What lies in our power to do, it lies in our power not to do."

RE: "truth" and "community." "Plato is dear to me, but dearer still is truth." 

H.G. Callaway

H. G. Good points. For both Plato and Aristotle, it is clear that the good man can only be good if the polis is good. That's why the Republic is an effort by Plato to reform the current Athenian polis along the lines of Sparta. (By contrast, for Kant, the categorical imperative is purely subjective; the subject has perfect duties not to lie (to others) and not to commit suicide; and imperfect duties to be benevolent (toward others) as well as to improve himself (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. For Mill, utilitarians have no duties to themselves). Plato formulates 5 categories of government from the very worst, which is grounded in irrational lust and power (Thrasymachus) to the very best, which is based in reason and the philosopher king. Aristotle refines this somewhat and distinguishes 6 forms of government according to virtue and vice as well as number of rulers. The best is monarchy, the rule of virtue and one; the worst is tyranny, the rule of one; the next best is aristocracy, the rule of the few; next worst is oligarchy, the rule of wealth and the few; the last is democracy, the rule of the many and the worst is anarchy. Because the tyrant is a "many-headed beast," it is clear that only his desires will come to the fore and since friendship is based in sharing things in common, it follows that tyranny and friendship are intrinsically opposed.

Someone (Dragan?)asked me to give them the reference to W. D. Ross on the (correct) charge that there is no doctrine of Christian free will in Plato and Aristotle) The reference is t o Ross, A Complete Exposition of his Works and Thought, Meridian, 1961, 194-197.

Afterthought. As far as I can tell, there are 3 principles that the ancient Greek philosophers rejected--Pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, and Epicureans): creation ex nihilo; free will; and faith. Instead for them, the world was eternal; Plato posited knowledge (man cannot act against what he knows) and Aristotle promoted choice, a combination of deliberation and desire; and finally Plato posited belief (second level of the Divided line) and knowledge and Aristotle choice.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Mijuskovic,

Interesting that you turn from Aristotle's ethics to Kant and Rousseau. You come to an equation of  egoism with seeking happiness. It seems that doing one's duty is then always a matter of acting against inclination? But if so, this seems to leave out entirely the idea of working to train one's inclinations or cultivate the virtues to reduce the contrast between inclination and moral action. This strikes me as rather puritanical. I'm all in favor of moralism but draw the line at puritanisms.

you wrote:

Always act so the the subjective maxim (your will) of your action can become a universal law legislating for all rational beings in any conceivable universe; always treat other human beings as ends-in-themselves having infinite worth/value and never as a means to your own selfish or utilitarian ends, e. g,, egoism or happiness; and man is free when he gives himself the law and self-consciously obeys his own law for then he is both sovereign and subject (Rousseau).

---End quotation

I suspect there is a kind of rationalistic perfectionism in this kind of approach to morality and ethics. This seems evident when you write of "universal law legislating for all rational beings in any conceivable universe." I doubt that we have any very definite conception of "any conceivable universe" that would effectively constrain theorizing about moral law in the fashion suggested. But if so, then we will be left with the "subjective maxim" projected in one way or another by different people having differing conceptions of "any conceivable universe." This does not seem promising.

Also I notice that you reformulate Kant here, who doesn't say  "always treat other human beings as ends-in-themselves," but instead, words to the effect that we should never treat others merely as mean to our ends--leaving open the option that others may be treated as means to out own ends, as long as this is consistent with not treating them merely as means. This formulation is problematic, since it leaves open the question of what to count as treating others merely as a means, with the implicit danger of undervaluing their own capabilities and their own ends in view. You avoid that danger, but only at the cost, it seems, of making many ordinary interactions morally problematic. If I buy a hot dog from the vendor, I am treating him as a means to my end, say, getting something to eat. But am I also, in this case treating him as "an end in himself?" I am not sure I would know how to treat the vendor as an "end in himself," while merely buying a hot dog on the corner.  So while the Kantian formulation seems vague as regards the limits of using others as means, you reformulation seems almost impossible to practice since many common interactions are pretty much limited to utilitarian purposes--"friends" (of a lessor sort) based on mutual usefulness, to use an Aristotelian phrase. It would seem that you look to elevate all relationships to the level of the Aristotelian ideal of the friendship of the virtuous. But at the same time, the cultivation of the virtues seems to be left out. 

You also wrote:

My stake in all this is that I reject the current claim by "scientific" researchers committed to the principles of materialism, empiricism, phenomenalism, behaviorism, and the neurosciences that human actions are determined and caused by environmental, cultural, situational, and even chemical imbalances in the brain.

---End quotation

Here, I pretty much agree with what you say. We may yet disagree, though, about how to go about criticism of the kinds of positions you reject. I believe that Aristotle on freedom would be helpful on these topics.  I would suggest that we can only be both "sovereign and subject," in a free society which cultivates the virtues.

H.G. Callaway

H. G. My training is in the history of philosophy. I'm not a Kantian, nor a utilitarian, nor an egoist, nor a relativist, nor an absolutist, etc. My "task," as I understand it, is simply to add to discussions by making comparisons, contrasts, etc. I have an article, "Ethical Principles, Criteria, and the Meaning of Life," Journal of Thought, 40:4 (2005), 67-88, which I believe is a PDF. If not, I'll be delighted to mail a copy to your university address. It offers an exhaustive matrix of all possible ethical principle in Western philosophy. In terms of Aristotle's ethics, I also have an article on "Virtue Ethics," which was published in Philosophy and Literature, 31: 1 (2007), 133-141.

Because of my personal background, I avoid any and all groups, religious, natioanalistic, ethnic, cultural, political, etc. I see myself paradoxically, depending on my mood, sometimes as a rather disenfranchised "cosmopolitan," a "citizen of the world," and at other times as an existentialist. In the latter mode, I believe each of us creates absolute values for themselves alone (Sartre; he's in the ethics article). I'm off to sip the light fantastic.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Mijuskovic,

History of ethics is fine by me. Getting the interpretation right is important. So is getting the evaluation right.

Philosophy, often enough, aspires to being universal. Often, its a matter of particularities in universal attire. Meanwhile, our various localities and particularities go on in their accustomed ways--without needed criticism? Where the particularities are acknowledge, I think this much less problematic.

You don't need to be a "a Kantian, nor a utilitarian, nor an egoist, nor a relativist, nor an absolutist, etc." in order to respond to a criticism on offer.

On the other hand, we might just go on with the interpretation of Aristotle's ethics, friendship, community, freedom. etc. It seems to be something that interests you? Notice the topic question.

My view is that "practical wisdom" can't be made into an exact and universal science. It just doesn't work that way.  There are simply too many variables. But it is something of a wonder that Aristotle's ethics still make sense to us at all after 2,500 years. Surely, he was on to something. Right?

H.G. Callaway

I agree that he is very much "on to something." I'm currently teaching a graduate course on philosophy and it covers Ethics in one of the chapters. The way the textbook is set up (not my choice), the section on morals covers hard determinism; soft determinism; utilitarianism (hedonistic, Bentham; eudaemonistic, Mill; and agathistic, G. E. Moore); formalism (Kant); and egoism or self-interest (Hobbes). Nothing about Plato or Aristotle in the textbook. However, in my Syllabus I do say quite a bit about Aristotle's concept of choice. I believe he is right. Not only in terms of ethics is he right but also in terms of forensics; his argument on responsibility I believe is something we have justifiably incorporated into our legal system, e.g., the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions, "actions" done from ignorance of the relative circumstances involved etc. If you like, I can mail you a copy of my Syllabus. By the way. I just put my paper on Ethical Principles on the list of my publications. Hopefully it's been approved and available.

Speaking of Aristotle, he defines philosophy itself as the search for First Principles (arche). Whereas in Plato the dialectic travels toward first principles, in Aristotle we begin with a first principle: All men--and women too--desire happiness. And indeed, Aristotle himself points out that in the study of doing, praxis--unlike science, theoria--we deal with the variable, i.e. with choices. On that I believe we can agree.

Callaway, Mijuskovic

My best wishes about the great syntheses that you proposed. I think that it would be probably more secure to reduce our discussion to some smaller, single problems? Aristotle and other thinkers were apparently not ready for such enterprises, so why should we do this now and exactly here on RG which even does not permit profound, longer analyses?

Yet in addition, you both repeated the following:

“My stake in all this is that I reject the current claim by "scientific" researchers committed to the principles of materialism, empiricism, phenomenalism, behaviorism, and the neurosciences that human actions are determined and caused by environmental, cultural, situational, and even chemical imbalances in the brain.”

If you both really mean what the above citation says, I must admit that we COMPLETELLY and PROFOUNDLY disagree.

Or this is a misunderstanding?

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pavlovic, Mijuskovic,

One might look on the scope of the present discussion in a narrower or wider fashion.  Admittedly, there are limits to what can be accomplished in any on-line discussion; I often think of it in terms of papers one might write or that one ought to write. Looked on in wider terms, on-line discussions are a matter of exploring topics and seeing or finding out where the points of interest and controversy are located in relation to more or less standard topics. Its a definite plus to be aware of how the direct topic might develop or might be developed.

On the other hand, it is important to come back down out of the philosophical clouds, sympathizing with Aristophanes, perhaps, and keep to the straight and narrow of the stated question. I have tried to emphasize this side of the discussion with my recent note on "tyranny" from Aristotle's Politics. It would help things along, I believe, to see more directly related to Aristotle on "freedom" and "community" (and "commonality." These are complex and difficult topics. I think the great danger is to leave the actual texts behind and simply read in more recent conceptions. The best way to avoid that danger is to feature the key concepts in relation to the embedding texts.

H.G. Callaway

We may try to restrict ourselves to very specific and restricted issues and questions, in which case then our task would be essentially that of a research librarian providing references. The "Big Problem" in philosophy is: "What is consciousness?" Aristotle is in the middle of it. Consider the Greeks for a moment. Democritus and Leucippus are materialists, atomists. Parmenides is an idealist. Plato is a dualist, And Aristotle, although some try to present him as taking a middle course, i.e. as a "biologist," presenting the soul as the activity of body, e. g., Marjorie Greene, is actually a dualist. Consider his empiricist-oriented claim that the mind is like a blank table, a tabula rasa upon which sensations/experience writes.(De Anima, 430a). So John Locke, And then compare this with Metaphysics, 1075a, which clearly suggests that certain self-conscious, reflexive, circular thoughts are immaterial, like those of the Unmoved Mover. Now in order to fully understand his ethical concept of choice, we must first understand his theory of consciousness. This is what Plato called the Battle of the Giants and the Gods (Sophist, 245e-246e). Reality is not composed of individual, discrete scraps of paper; it is a compendious volume of interrelated principles and relations and arguments. And if we stray from the topic, that's the nature of thought.

Dear Callaway

This will be fine with me, although I am really puzzled what the above citation means to you. Is this a claim that human actions are "determined and caused" by some magical forces?

I also do not agree that “free will” was completely unknown as a concept to the Greeks, but this is not our topics here, so let it just remain as it is.

_____________________________

Nevertheless, I started my discussion with an example of tyranny contemporaneous with Aristotle (that of Hermias). There is another example: Alexander III. While being earlier his student, during the conquests in Asia, Alexander slowly developed in a tyrant that simultaneously advertised and practiced a “community” ( koinonia, 1161a32 – b10; 1284b6;1328a25-28) on much large scale, “brotherhood of nations” - homonoia (omonoia, EN, IX. 5 (1167a20; 1167a.25-1167b.15), that I mentioned in my earlier comments; see also, as I mentioned, W.W.Tarn: Alexander The Great, volume II, part 2. 25 (1948).

Why we do not have anything left from Aristotle relevant to Alexander the Great? Or this was all destroyed during the Macedinism (better known as Hellenism) that remained all over Alexander’s imperia, including Egypt up to the end of Cleopatra VII, who was the last Macedonian queen?

There are stories that after Callisthenes’ death Aristotle did not approve Alexander any more or even was behind a possible complot and even death of Alexander (in fact it is maintained by the experts that this was quite unlikely).

Aristotle in fact mentions various kinds of a just monarchies. Is a just dictator, a just tyranny almost the same as a just constitutional monarchy for Aristotle? Is it his ideal? I have my answers, but will keep them for a while unpronounced. What are yours?

Dear Ben

You are taking a risk to subscribe to a theory that I have proposed elsewhere, for sciences though, number of times: A Theory of the Effects of Everything on Everything. That "theory", if its philosophical variant would be true, may make all our “causes and effects” always bring multitude of results which, what a disaster! – would point in all possible directions.

We do not have to become diligent librarians if we try to discuss what is for example, that moral value that is contained in community, good will, friendship and similar that Aristotle thinks are a virtues that make a state or Polis good, as opposed to tyranny.

Just one point more, please.

I would like to discourage people who skillfully search Internet and Wikipedia or find ready-made reviews and offer the answers. In fact 3 good books on history of philosophy if skillfully used may supply anybody with all “good” answers on any question in philosophy, including Aristotle. Internet added to this, is just enough to kill any serious discussion by advancing very general judgments and even borrowed references. Operating that way it is possible to take part in the discussions on the subjects that are absolutely unknown to that comentator. Such discussions are then lost in advance. This is why I insist on precise citations (not the books – but pages and paragraphs given) from the genuine works. Could we do this, please?

I of course did not think on you two but on some “newcomers”. But you can also just give the example and help have a good discussion

In Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness, I discuss Brian Greene's The Elegant Universe (pages xii-xiii) in which he expresses his confidence that "string theory," a form of materialism consisting of a set of ten (or more) one-dimensional strings can explain it all. "For the first time in the history of physics, we therefore have a framework with the capacity to explain every fundamental feature upon which the universe is constructed. For this reason, string theory is sometimes described as possibly being the 'theory of everything' (T.O.E.) or the 'ultimate' or 'final" theory.'"

I don't think this will work. I don't believe it can causally "explain" loneliness, self-consciousness, intentionality, ethical and aesthetic values, empathy, intimacy, etc. But this is as far as I am prepared to go. I've been teaching philosophy at the university level since 1969 and I learned long ago when there is a difference between ultimate first principles all that one can do is state his case and leave it at that. Plato recognizes that limitation when he distinguishes Friends of the Forms as opposed to those who are not so friendly.

Ben

I am glad that we “now” started to communicate. You gave us an important example. Your last comment made me think that the real meaning must be - not in the text; the meaning builds in us up spontaneously after trying to comprehend various examples that he offers. Shell we go back to Aristotle?

I would like to know what Aristotle meant with the ‘homonoia’? (1155a24 (Book VIII, 1; 1167a22 (Book IX, 6). Is this the notion that signifies something much more universal as “community” (koinonia)? The translations of ‘omonoina’were certainly in all English versions that we have false (like-mindedness; concord; unanimity).

Did Aristotle think that Alexander grasped the meaning? I do not think Aristotle ever mentioned the “brotherhood of mankind”, but he must have heard stories from Asia, received letters from Alexander and Callisthenes, heard of gymnosophists and must have realized that the cosmopolitism of Alexander sprung out of his own ethical teaching. Gauthier tells us that NE was probably finished before Macedonian expedition to Asia (334) and afterwards, during all that time, Aristotle was in Athens (from 335 to 322). Do we in really just do not have anything that Aristotle must have thought and is it possible that the Asian expedition did not influence his ethical writings at all?

Therefore we should, I think, examine again the notion of community and see for related meanings more closely.

Aristotle and Alexander die within a year of each other, 323-322, BC. I don't know how close their personal contact was after Aristotle tutored Alexander as a boy. I imagine a lot depends on that. As I recall, Alexander's soldiers brought biological specimens to Aristotle for study. What Aristotle might have thought of Alexander's political ambitions for world conquest, I don't know. What I do know is that Plato believed the ideal Republic, polis, city-state would be relatively small, 5,444 citizens with every one knowing every one else (slaves excluded). (That is why Socrates' trial was presumed to rely one personal knowledge of the accused.) I believe that Aristotle, like Plato, envisioned a small city-state. By contrast, Alexander's goal was probably doomed to fail in Aristotle's eyes since it was too large to be "organically" unified. The polis was in fact dead as a viable political unit and my guess is that Aristotle foresaw the same fate in Alexander's future to which later the Roman republic succumbed when it rushed into the Empire; its institutions, laws, language, mores, customs, etc. could not be  in-corpus- unified. As Georg Sabine has pronounced, after the fall of the city-state, men were forced to make souls for themselves; hence the entrance of the Stoic, Epicurean, and Skeptic philosophers..

Dragan, I think one of the things you might consider looking into is Plato's Republic. It's essentially a search for the meaning, the universal definition of justice. The first disputant is Thrasymachus, a sophist, who defines justice as power, "might makes right,": and to do as one pleases. It's basically an argument in behalf of tyranny. The second responder is Glaucon, Plato's half-brother. He recounts a myth, The Ring of Gyges. Gyges is a shepherd and one day after a violent storm he comes upon a deep crevice. He climbs into it and discovers a naked giant lying dead. On the giant's finger there is a ring, which he removes. Every year, the king's shepherds come to the court to report on the status of the king's flocks. As Gyges sits with his fellow shepherds, he happens to turn the bezel of the ring and is surprised to see that his fellows begin to talk about him as if he weren't present. In short, he finds out he is invisible. Now the question is what will he do with his unlimited power?  What is human nature really like. (Conrad's Heart of Darkness and Golding's Lord of the Flies follows a similar theme. Tolkien's Hobbit also has a magic ring.) What he does is manage to be chosen to go to the king and report on the flocks. He goes and murders the king and seduces or rapes the queen. This proves, according to Glaucon, that the best thing in the world is to injure others with impunity and the worst is to be injured by others without any recourse to justice. According to F. M., Cornford, this is the earliest version of the social contract theory. Justice is a contract, an agreement,  a compromise not to harm others if they will promise not to harm you and there has to be an independent power to enforce the terms of the contract (Gough, The Social Contract). By contrast, for Plato justice is grounded in knowledge, in the principle that "Virtue is Knowledge (of the Good)" and that no man willingly/knowingly harms himself. Lust and irrational power only makes one a many-headed beast and that is Plato's definition of a tyrant. So to ask whether it is better to be a tyrant or a Socrates is foolish.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pavlovic, readers

The actual experience of the discussion so far has been that participants do not respond to references to paragraphs and page numbers in the corpus of Aristotle. Far better, IMHO, would be to quote the text that one may wish to emphasize. The practice among Aristotle scholars does not recommend itself to open discussion on the Internet, and I assume that this is because those reading along may not be inclined to make use of it. It is possible to get the general ideas out and to form opinions on the topic, but an open discussion is not going to turn out to be a a scholarly paper on the topic.

You wrote:

Just one point more, please.

I would like to discourage people who skillfully search Internet and Wikipedia or find ready-made reviews and offer the answers. In fact 3 good books on history of philosophy if skillfully used may supply anybody with all “good” answers on any question in philosophy, including Aristotle. Internet added to this, is just enough to kill any serious discussion by advancing very general judgments and even borrowed references. Operating that way it is possible to take part in the discussions on the subjects that are absolutely unknown to that commentator. Such discussions are then lost in advance. This is why I insist on precise citations (not the books – but pages and paragraphs given) from the genuine works. Could we do this, please?

---End quotation

I think, on the contrary, that it would be useful and helpful to have "all the 'good' answers" on Aristotle, assembled regarding friendship and tyranny that may be available to participants. Once the answers are compiled and come under discussion, they may or may not evoke further discussion and comparisons. That's the chance one takes in open discussion. Again, the open discussion may result in papers written or published elsewhere, and distantly inspired by the discussion. Basically, no one can predict such things. Philosophy is basically a long-term undertaking, and there is no way to confine it to present purposes. It is a definite plus, however, if people are inspired to explore the various approaches and perspectives on the topic.  Some of these may indeed already be available on line and usefully summarized in various locations.

I believe that you would do much better to actually quote the sources that you have chiefly mentioned or cited without quotation. This can be a lot of work, of course; but I suspect it would help bring the discussion forward.

Again, if I may say so, it strikes me that the specifics of the relationship between Aristotle and Alexander are likely to remain chiefly a matter of speculation. Since Aristotle left Athens after the death of Alexander, it seems likely that there was some public perception of Alexander being a protector of Aristotle. Aristotle left, famously saying that he would not allow Athens to "sin twice against philosophy." But the reality of this perception may be doubted. What is reasonable to assume, I think, is that there was opposition to both Alexander and to the teachings of Aristotle in Athens. To what extent this may reflect on the actual value of Aristotle's teachings would be very difficult to determine--or so it seems to me. We may easily imagine that the political upheaval at the death of Aristotle brought unruly elements to the fore in Athens and elsewhere--a simple struggle for power.

Selected quotations on "community" and "freedom" could be very helpful, I believe, and you seem to have good access to them. Might you be willing to help in this way?

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pavlovic,

You wrote:

I would like to know what Aristotle meant with the ‘homonoia’? (1155a24 (Book VIII, 1; 1167a22 (Book IX, 6). Is this the notion that signifies something much more universal as “community” (koinonia)? The translations of ‘omonoina’ were certainly in all English versions that we have false (like-mindedness; concord; unanimity).

---End quote

Here you pose an interesting question and, as it seems to me, you take up a significant burden of proof. "The translations of ‘omonoina’" you write, "were certainly in all English versions that we have false (like-mindedness; concord; unanimity)." But why should we believe this, and what difference does it make to our question and discussion?

What does Aristotle say? What are the reasons for thinking that the translations are all false? How could anyone evaluate your claim except by looking at the actual texts? What would count as a better translation? Why? It would be helpful if you could bring your fuller experience of reading the texts into the discussion.

H.G. Callaway

Dear Callaway

I find that you really manage this thread quite skillfully.

Academic level. My experience is that if there is no some subjectively imposed framework, the discussions on RG are useless. I will find this discussion interesting if people who take part have at least read and studied themselves the NE – and NOT just read ABOUT it, even if the materials read were by the best experts on the NE. This must be the entrance criterion. Such an approach would discourage people who often produce excellent comments or even reviews, without really ever being involved with the subject they are writing about. This is quite often the case on the Internet. This is hard to discover during the discussion, but is a source of endless disputes that are “just slightly” besides the core problem – but all the time. If you would disagree, I may come from time to time, but with not too much interest and involvement.

Translation. Although I have little understanding for other concepts of Derrida, some his positions about the problems of translation look to me reasonable. On the other hand, the common sense problems of translation are generally known. I think that to broaden the discussion in those both directions will take us too far away.

Not all the meanings of the words that Aristotle uses are to be easily revealed by reading his texts, although the knowledge of Greek would be useful. My Greek is insufficient to undertake that large enterprise. But I have an impression that there are some meanings that if uncovered by studying various translations might help us see more of what Aristotle had in mind by those concepts. Being conscious that the original meanings may not be revealed by the translations I think is useful. This is all.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pavlovic,

Its often said that "It is better to light a single candle, than to curse the darkness."

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

RE: "exousia," = freedom, power, authority.

Here, I chiefly borrow from the "Glossary" of Terrance Irwin's translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), p. 330

Aristotle's "exousia" is not the legal status of the free citizen as contrasted with a slave. The word is derived from "exeinai," "to be open, possible." This power or freedom is indicative of the situation of someone who enjoys open options. Because the position of the ruler often involves more than one option in how to treat others, "exousia" often indicates the position of the the ruler over the ruled, i.e., "power" or "authority."

Where human beings enjoy power over nature, or power to act in society, in order to obtain what they desire, then "exousia," corresponds more closely to "freedom" and "liberty."

The Aristotelian ruler, of course, ideally acts in accordance with reason and acts for the common good. Thus, we would expect that decisions taken should be informed by deliberation and consideration of the interests of all those concerned. In modern times, we embody this insight in the conception of representative government, making laws after deliberations by our representatives; and equally, in the conception of the administration of justice, depending on courts, judges and juries, deliberating on particular cases, in view of the relevant evidence, and deciding issues of law, fact and justice on that basis. In the selection  of our representatives, we hope and expect that the public decides on their qualifications on the basis of the open issues publicly debated. When the public is well informed concerning the issues and the candidates for office, we naturally assume they are in a better position to select among the candidates.

H.G. Callaway

Callaway

"In the selection of our representatives, we hope and expect that the public decides on their qualifications on the basis of the open issues publicly debated. When the public is well informed concerning the issues and the candidates for office, we naturally assume they are in a better position to select among the candidates."

This is very optimistic. May be too optimistic. In fact I think that we have a terrible system but... But this is not the place for this discussion either.