Dear H.G. Callaway,

To understand the essence of things, let's take the extreme case: let the selfish groups consist of only moralists. It is not clear to me why egoistic groups arise, even if they consist of moralists alone. In fact, Reinhold Neibuhr argues that absolute moralists inevitably degenerate into egoists if they are grouped together. The question arises: "Why is this happening?" The answer of Reinhold Niebuhr is essentially the following: "Only the egoist can guide the mob of moralists". But this egoist can be nominated from his environment only by moralists who only exist in the group. Hence it follows that in reality there are no groups that are composed of some moralists only. In fact, groups are made up of egoists. These egoists and put forward from their midst the most powerful egoist for successful struggle against other groups. Hence it follows that there is no supernatural law of the degeneration of individual moralists into egoistic groups, invented by Reinhold Niebuhr. In my opinion, the apologetics of the fatal use of force between selfish groups that consist in the extreme case according to Reinhold Niebuhr from moralists is nothing more than the conscious justification of any behavior of any authority, which, incidentally, is always represented by individual individuals, usually bright, and as a rule bright egoists. Such strong egoists can only be found in a crowd of egoists, but not in a crowd of altruists.

Best regards,

Vladimir Egorov

Dear H.G. Callaway,

To understand the essence of things, let's take the extreme case: let the selfish groups consist of only moralists. It is not clear to me why egoistic groups arise, even if they consist of moralists alone. In fact, Reinhold Neibuhr argues that absolute moralists inevitably degenerate into egoists if they are grouped together. The question arises: "Why is this happening?" The answer of Reinhold Niebuhr is essentially the following: "Only the egoist can guide the mob of moralists". But this egoist can be nominated from his environment only by moralists who only exist in the group. Hence it follows that in reality there are no groups that are composed of some moralists only. In fact, groups are made up of egoists. These egoists and put forward from their midst the most powerful egoist for successful struggle against other groups. Hence it follows that there is no supernatural law of the degeneration of individual moralists into egoistic groups, invented by Reinhold Niebuhr. In my opinion, the apologetics of the fatal use of force between selfish groups that consist in the extreme case according to Reinhold Niebuhr from moralists is nothing more than the conscious justification of any behavior of any authority, which, incidentally, is always represented by individual individuals, usually bright, and as a rule bright egoists. Such strong egoists can only be found in a crowd of egoists, but not in a crowd of altruists.

Best regards,

Vladimir Egorov

Dear Callaway,

Group have always been in conflict by necessity of their own preservation.  And ethic has always distinguish intra group versus extra group relations.  Killing is usually prohibited within group but allowed in war with other groups.   Smaller group within bigger group have often a sophisticated culture of separation garantying the surviving of the small group into the bigger group.  But in large empire such as the Persian empire where a large diversity of cultural group had to bring together novel cultural strands started to be disseminated for facilatating peacefull/respectfull inter-group relations. Here the notion of an universal God first took its prominence.  The large empire in India also had a needed of a way where a large varieties of culture could all meaningfully related to each other. Religion such as Buddhism and Christianity and Islam allowed very different culture to engage with each other.  The notion of equality of all humans was fundamental to all these universal religions.  And Judaism, Chistianity and Islam had special respect with each other .  In India, bridge between Islam and Induism were built with suffism.  So I mostly disagree with Reinhold  because I think that the construction of pluralistic form of religion with bridge towards other do exist all over the world.  

I see all religion as encouraging humans to escape the pulling power of their superficial self through their union with their deep self which is in union of the other deep self of the larger community.   Within all group there is a competition of power are usually drien by the superficial self and control other through the hold on their superficial self.  War in between group are mostly driven by the power of the superficial self.  Fear, hate,competitiona and greed increase the hold of the superficial self wich either dominate or submit and does not understand any other form of relations.

Your interpretation of Reinhold Niebuhr on collective egoism is right on the money.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Egorov & readers,

Historically, the most monstrous group leaders (Hitler, Stalin, etc.) are directly associated with the most intensively collectivized social groups. I think there is no great mystery in this, and  there is no question here of a "supernatural law of the degeneration of individual moralists into egoistic groups" --which you read into Niebuhr without the slightest hint of argument or justification.

My point in contrast was that collective egoisms are more dangerous than the individualist sort, and that the the individual sort may, in fact, inhibit the building of more dangerous egoistic groups. What is to be avoided, in any case (and I certainly intend no defense of individual egoism) is the demand of total conformity to prevalent ideas on pain of exclusion. Groups benefit from their internal diversity of opinion and attitude, though when groups are under duress of conflict, there is a strong tendency to demand conformity.

Niebuhr is no doubt a kind of political realist, as contrasted with the idealism of the expected results of total group unity and collective determination of the individual. But, I suppose that (almost) no one believes that any political society can be organized without a monopoly on the legal use of force in the hands of the government. Again, (almost) no one believes that a larger country can do without its armed forces. This is quite different from Niebuhr justifying just "any authority" as you have it. On the contrary, Niebuhr warns against the excess authority of the group over the individual. This is consistent, and in fact implied by the freedom of speech, expression and religion, etc. Individual rights function to inhibit through-going uniformity of society--headed by a tyrannical leader who enforces and forms the group opinions and attitudes --the uniform "party line."

Your little exercise of imagining a group made up totally of altruists seems beside the point. As you later stipulate, there are no such groups. But insofar as any group is made up more prevalently of people inclined to to submissiveness and to "go along" for the sake of social peace within the group, such groups will tend to be victimized by powerful, self-regarding leaders.  Pointing to foreign dangers then becomes a means of consolidating power over the group and organizing it for inter-group conflict. This cements the power of the leader over the group.

Part of the appeal of committed individual reason and rationality--loyalty to one's own insight-- is that it is better capable of resisting the collectivization process just described. Civic virtue in the citizens is required to resist tyranny.

H.G. Callaway

Mainz, Germany

Dear Jacono & readers,

Niebuhr was writing during the 1930's at a time when democracy was threatened from both the right (fascists) and the left (Stalinism).  It belongs to his position, that these threatening movements were not going to be persuaded by reason or religion to give up their aims and programs of action.

Consistent with your point, we might well ask how many were the pure opportunists who jumped on the Nazis or Stalinist bandwagon in order to get ahead in their respective societies. That is part of the mechanism of conformity to official doctrine which can thoroughly collectivize a society. What is to be avoided is a group of sheep following a depraved and egotistical leader. Whatever you may think of President Trump, there is plenty of evidence that Americans are not a group of sheep following him. 

More to the point of Niebuhr is to understand the character of societies which could produce and sustain a Hitler or a Stalin--and their respective systems. Other examples come to mind, of course.

H.G. Callaway

Mainz, Germany

Dear all,

Here is a very short retrospective review of Niebuhr's Moral Man and Immoral Society, from the pages of Foreign Affairs (1997):

September/October 1997 Issue Political Development

Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics

by Reinhold Niebuhr

Reviewed by Francis Fukuyama

Christianity is, at first glance, not a religion optimally suited to guide foreign policy. With its doctrines of universal love, humility, and turning the other cheek, Christian thinkers since at least Augustine have struggled to reconcile their moral vision with the reality of international life. In this book and others like The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (1944), Niebuhr played an invaluable role during the tumultuous 1930s and 1940s by bringing Christians to terms with participation in the Second World War and later the Cold War. The Christian doctrine of sinfulness and the Fall meant, according to Niebuhr, the ever-present possibility of evil, which was all too evident in spreading fascist and communist doctrines. Moral action did not imply passivity in the face of sin, nor were leaders of communities bound by the same moral constraints as individuals. Though now primarily remembered for its tough-mindedness, Niebuhr's book bears rereading to remind us that a realistic morality is not the same thing as amoral realism, that power, even in the service of justice, must recognize its own limitations, and that democracies were capable of their own kind of hubris.

---End quotation

See:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1997-09-01/moral-man-and-immoral-society-study-ethics-and-politics

The warning from Fukuyama against "hubris" of democracies is of particular current interest, I believe. But think a bit further. Fukuyama wrote:

Christianity is, at first glance, not a religion optimally suited to guide foreign policy. With its doctrines of universal love, humility, and turning the other cheek, Christian thinkers since at least Augustine have struggled to reconcile their moral vision with the reality of international life.

---end quotation

If one believe that "turning the other cheek" is always obligatory, then that would seem to make of you a pacifist. Again, if you believe whole-heartedly in Christian humility, how could you aim for the high ambition of finding the truth or setting the world aright? Further, isn't the doctrine of "universal love," an invitation to domination and exploitation--if it allows us to take no precautions in the face of evil? 

Niebuhr, says Fukuyama, helped bring Christians to the support of WWII and the Cold War. But did he get these ethical and political questions right?

BTW: Niebuhr's book is still in print and still much read, see, e.g.,

https://www.amazon.com/Moral-Man-Immoral-Society-Theological/dp/0664235395

H.G. Callaway

Mainz, Germany

Dear all,

Well, I must say you are all very silent out there. 

The fundamental strategy of "one thing hiding behind another" is that vicious particular interests hide behind universal good will to humanity in general--but to no one in particular. In that way loyalty and public acclaim can be shifted with the varying media and political winds. 

Right?

H.G. Callaway

Dear Callaway,

Yes, I agree that the effect of collectivization can be very strong, as, for example, in the case of German fascism, which appeared to the world as a huge monster. But after all, the seed in the form of a German burgher was essentially a monster, though possibly a very small monster. If the Germans were "ordinary" egoists, then this would not happen. However, I think no one can point out where the boundary between the "ordinary" egoist and the very small monster goes. Take a look at modern Ukraine, where this boundary has already clearly blurred.

Vladimir Egorov

Dear Callaway,

I do not know many Christians, including myself, which have been struggling with ‘’turning with other cheek’’, in practice we don’t turn the other cheek’’ and I have never seen a christian nation turning the other cheek nor even debate if they should.  In general,  Christian nations and peoples that get puch, puch back and sometime regret it or not.  So I disagree with Niebuhr that Christianity is not a religion optimally suited to guide forein policy.  None is and it was never a problem for those in politics.  Maybe theologians like Neihmur would have had difficulties coming up with a theological justified position but no nation would consult theologians for their foreigh policy.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Brassard & readers

In spite of what you say, "turn the other cheek" belongs to Christian teachings as do strong teachings on humility. But it is not Niebuhr you are disputing but instead Fukuyama. It was Fukuyama who said that Christianity was not obviously optimal for world politics. The implication is that traditional teachings are too idealistic. Niebuhr then provides a less idealistic teaching.

Contrary to your suggestion about consulting theologians, Niebuhr was taken quite seriously in the U.S. during his life time, and their continues a school of "Christian realism." Niebuhr's book, Moral Man and Immoral Society made quite an impression, since it attempted to separate interpersonal ethics from the norms of politics. He argued that political conflicts will never be finally settled by reason, persuasion and not even by religion. The manner in which human societies form themselves, according to Niebuhr, is essentially self-regarding, and not typically open to wider discussion or interventions. (We see something of this in traditional concepts of national "sovereignty.") This sets up conflicts which are also not easily amendable; and the nations, in particular, depend on force or the threat of force in their relationships. Individuals may be persuaded or socialized into conformity with their own societies, but this only sublimates individual egotism into collective egotism--which are all the more powerful for their influence over individuals. It would then follow, as a reasonable expectation, that those societies which are most thoroughly collectivized--those having the greatest power over individuals-- will be the most aggressive.

Take a look back at your own religious or quasi-religious statements above. You might ask if your own view of the development of human relations is not excessively idealistic.

You wrote:

I see all religion as encouraging humans to escape the pulling power of their superficial self through their union with their deep self which is in union of the other deep self of the larger community. Within all group there is a competition of power are usually driven by the superficial self and control other through the hold on their superficial self. War in between groups are mostly driven by the power of the superficial self. Fear, hate, competition and greed increase the hold of the superficial self which either dominate or submit and does not understand any other form of relations.

---End quotation

According to Niebuhr, given the terms you provide here, religion (or reason) lacks the power to liberate the "deep self" from the "superficial self." It would seem, on the contrary that the socially formed "superficial self," substantially triumphs in the operation of each group and brings differing groups into continual conflict --requiring the use or threat of force in political affairs. There are other, more optimistic elements of Niebuhr's thought, and consequently I want to recommend some further exploration.

Niebuhr was especially concerned to limit the influence of overly idealistic estimates of the outcomes of human development. Given the power of a Hitler or a Stalin in his own day, you can perhaps see the force of his argument. We have to wonder what may hide behind dreamy advocacy of universal humanity and ultimate human reconciliation --insofar as such idealism may seek to prohibit or inhibit political precautions.

H.G. Callaway 

Mainz, Germany

Dear Egorov,

I think the point in reply might be that because collective egotisms are more dangerous than the individual varieties, we should likewise prefer small "monsters" to great ones like Hitler and Stalin. How? Naturally, by domestic facilitation of a greater play of individual differences --and then letting them freely compete. In that way they tend to control and limit each other.

However, political cronyism tends to subvert the needed competitions.

H.G.Callaway

---you wrote---

Yes, I agree that the effect of collectivization can be very strong, as, for example, in the case of German fascism, which appeared to the world as a huge monster. But after all, the seed in the form of a German burgher was essentially a monster, though possibly a very small monster. If the Germans were "ordinary" egoists, then this would not happen. However, I think no one can point out where the boundary between the "ordinary" egoist and the very small monster goes.

---End quotation

Mainz, Germany

Dear all,

I came across the following short review of a newer edition of Niebuhr's Moral Man and Immoral Society, This review is written from an explicitly Catholic perspective.

I quote from the review:

Though not written from an explicitly Christian perspective, Moral Man and Immoral Society (MM), is one of the most, if not the most, influential works of Christian ethics in the 20th c. Originally published in 1932, from it springs the ethical, philosophical, sociological bases for Niebuhr's "Christian realism" fleshed out further in his more explicitly theological works. The most telling illustration of its significance, especially in Protestant circles, is that Christian ethicists from one level of appreciation of Moral Man to the other—from Niebuhr's fellow Christian realists to John Milbank in his essay "The Poverty of Niebuhrianism," along with many others somewhere in the middle (e.g., Martin Luther King, John Howard Yoder, Stanley Hauerwas), have had to engage Niebuhr and Moral Man in carving out their own positions. Catholics as well have sought to integrate Niebuhr's insights into their work, although Michael Novak's use of the egoism highlighted in Moral Man in his apologia for capitalism undoubtably would have Niebuhr "turning over" in his grave.

---End quotation

The review was written by Stephen Martin of Seton Hall University in N.J.

See:

http://catholicbooksreview.org/2003/niebuhr.htm

I think it may be reasonably taken from this review (In light of Fukuyama's review)  that Niebuhr's book, and his broader writings, have had a wide influence --not only among people of obvious or open religious commitment--and not only among people of Protestant background.

In addition, here is a short review article on Niebuhr, published in 2017 by "Christianity Today":

http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2017/may-web-only/reinhold-niebuhr-five-things-you-should-know.html?start=2

Comments invited.

H.G. Callaway

Dear Dr. H.G. Callaway,

In my opinion any evil if it exists due to collectivization nature is dangerous to society because of its formation in the form of compound; difficult to break and analyze. After long time it becomes a tradition and culture in the society. 

Mainz, Germany

Dear Ahmad,

Thanks for your supporting comment on the present theme.

Generally, what the people of any country become habituated to tends to become a kind of second nature --and so much taken for granted that it is invisible to them. In your phrase, it belongs to the "tradition and culture" of a given society. Such things tend to be quite resistant to change or evaluation even if they become dysfunctional with changing circumstances.

I think this one more reason to be wary of the modern tendency to discount, forget and disregard history and our various histories. We want to have them available in order to preserve what is best and to weed out the sources of great errors. Viable reforms require a place to stand.

H.G. Callaway  

Dear Callaway,

Here some comments on the introduction of the question.

‘’a sharp distinction must be drawn between the moral and social behavior of individuals and groups, including nations and economic classes. Individuals are able to overcome their egotism and transcend themselves and their interests and consider others. Groups, however, lack this capacity. This is a result of collective egoism in which individuals sublimate their individual egos into the group, but the group re-expresses this egoism at a higher level causing intergroup conflict.’’

Distinctions must be made between group’s behavior/morality/interaction and individual ’s behavior/morality/interaction but also Links must be made between individual and their group, the are intimately related and thus group relation with be intimately linked to intro group individual relations.  If a group has extremely hierarchical intra group relation then it will tend to engage into hierarchical inter group relations because individuals in that group see relations that way.  If a group has egalitarian intra group relation then it will tend to engage into egalitarian inter group relations because it is natural for members of that group to see relations that way.  If a group see a sharp distinction between them and the other groups then it will be because of a certain culture within that group and this will have a major impact on the type of relation this group will try to establish with other group. That belief of seeing its group as very different will have to be based on the belief that the intra group relation are very different and so on certain beliefs about the intra group of other group.  Again the intra group ideologies are determinant into the inter group ideologies/beliefs.

I also oppose the the thesis of necessary egoism of groups towards other groups.  I do not deny the obvious that we observe a lot of egoism of groups towards other groups.  Multicultal empires of the past that have lasted a long time have all developed cultures that favored inter-group harmonious relation, diversity and also a certain kind of unity within the empire.  It did not results into hyper aggressive empire. Yes, an empire is originally created through some form of aggressive expansion but those that last and encompassed a lot of cultural diversity have created original cultures that falsify the theis of necessary egoism.  Yes an empire has to control its border, resist invasions and so have to maintain a culture of self-preservation but not necessary one of egoism.  Maintaining borders is not egoism, unless we consider any act of self-preservation as egoism.  I would measure the egoism of a country or empire as any lack of consideration of the other welfare and as a foreigh policy that do only consider the short term interest of the country without any other considerations, absolutely no sympathy with the other, only self-interest.  I would think that a market mentality is exactly what will create this type of absolute egoistic foreigh policy. So the promulgation of a kind of intra group greed individualism will promote a inter group greed individualism.  This is the type of individual intra group belief that created inter group egoistic behaviors.  WWI and WWII and most of 20th century wars. 

‘’Niebuhr, thus, aims to engage in a polemic against moralists, those thinkers who think that the same resources that allow individuals to transcend their egos in their personal relationships, rationality or religion, can also be used in order to establish harmony between groups. Niebuhr argues that the moralists do not realize the limitations of rationality and religion to check the overwhelming egoism and self-interestedness of groups. They also do not realize the way in which rationality is bent in order to serve group interests’’

Yes Niebuhr is righ if he speak about the first degree literalist Christian predicators but if we more to second level above that primitive level as I have been trying to do here then he is wrong.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Brassard & readers,

Let me see if I can get at what you are claiming, in criticism of Niebuhr, in your first comment. This strikes me as quickly written and not extremely well focused.

You wrote.

Distinctions must be made between group’s behavior/morality/interaction and individual ’s behavior/morality/interaction but also links must be made between individuals and their group, they are intimately related and thus group relation will be intimately linked to intra-group individual relations. If a group has extremely hierarchical intra-group relations then it will tend to engage in hierarchical inter- group relations because individuals in that group see relations that way. If a group has egalitarian intra-group relation then it will tend to engage into egalitarian inter-group relations because it is natural for members of that group to see relations that way. If a group sees a sharp distinction between them and the other groups then it will be because of a certain culture within that group, and this will have a major impact on the type of relations this group will try to establish with other groups. The belief of seeing its group as very different will have to be based on the belief that the intra-group relation are very different and so on certain beliefs about the intra-group [relations] of other group. Again the intra-group ideologies are determinant [of]? the inter-group ideologies/beliefs.

---End quotation

(I've made a few corrections and interpolations, but you can correct me if I misread you. )

This passage is put forward as a criticism of the opening gloss on Niebuhr. But it is not exactly clear to me how this is supposed to be a criticism. At best it seems to suggest merely that the moral and the political aspects of group relations interact. I don't see that Niebuhr will need to disagree.

I think it worth emphasizing that a distinctive situation arises, if we consider groups which are subject to the same political authority. The political authority may be able to manage the relationships, even of antagonistic groups, by setting up a particular system of law and incentives for integration --which encourages peaceful and produce inter-group relationships among individuals. This would be a policy of integration for mutual social and political benefit.This will not be effective, however, if one of the antagonistic groups maintains overall political control--and arranges the law to its own exclusive benefit.

However, it is also possible to imagine law and policies which encourage the separation and distinctness of the groups--and discourage any individual departures or augmentations of the attitudes and behaviors typical within the distinctive groups. This is more or less the difference I have stressed between traditional American pluralism and neo-liberal multiculturalism. Clearly, the group-to-group relations may be expected to run differently under the two different approaches. Under a policy of integration, the group-to-group moral relations are regulated by their positive political relations.

But let's suppose on the contrary, that the groups in question have no common political authority over them, and they interact on the full supposition of their own autonomy and self-defining sovereignty. This will amount to group-to-group interaction more akin to international relations. It is in this case that Niebuhr's argument concerning collective egoism will be fully felt.

Members of each group may be expected to be persuaded or socialized in accordance with the self-defined conditions of their own group's persistence and survival.  Lacking significant incentives for productive person-to-person relationships between members from the distinctive groups, people will conform to the inter-group norms and the egoism of individuals will be "sublimated" into group-egoisms and a resulting conflict. The more hierarchical the groups may be, the greater is the force of the distinctive internal norms of the groups. But, on the other hand, in the case of a more hierarchical group interacting with a more egalitarian group, though individuals from the more egalitarian group may be more flexible and adaptive to individual differences, they will tend to also be more open to exploitation by the folks from the more hierarchical group given its firmer, better enforced norms and relationships. Looking for help, the members will likely turn back to the members of their own group--thus reinforcing the prior inter-group self-definition and group egotism.

I don't see that your opening argument against Niebuhr is very effective in disputing his thesis of group egotism. This is especially so in contemporary application--insofar as we may fairly regard neo-liberal multiculturalism as the "trickle-down economics of the left." Those selected for inclusion in elite structures will of course be mollified, but where this leaves the great majority out, we may expect a reaction against the related policies --popular discontent. That is just what we are seeing.

H.G. Callaway

Mainz, Germany

Dear all;

Quotations from Niebuhr,

Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932)

Man is endowed by nature with organic relations to his fellow men; and natural impulse prompts him to consider the needs of others even when they compete with his own.

Reason is not the sole basis of moral virtue in man. His social impulses are more deeply rooted than his rational life.

Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study of Ethics and Politics, Charles Scribner's Sons (1932)

This insinuation of the interests of the self into even the most ideal enterprises and most universal objectives, envisaged in moments of highest rationality, makes hypocrisy an inevitable by product of all virtuous endeavor. p.45

The stupidity of the average man will permit the oligarch, whether economic or political, to hide his real purposes from the scrutiny of his fellows and to withdraw his activities from effective control. Since it is impossible to count on enough moral goodwill among those who possess irresponsible power to sacrifice it for the good of the whole, it must be destroyed by coercive methods and these will always run the peril of introducing new forms of injustice in place of those abolished. p.21

Man is endowed by nature with organic relations to his fellow men; and natural impulse prompts him to consider the needs of others even when they compete with his own. p.2

Reason tends to check selfish impulses and to grant the satisfaction of legitimate impulses in others. p.29

The measure of our rationality determines the degree of vividness with which we appreciate the needs of other life, the extent to which we become conscious of the real character of our own motives and impulses, the ability to harmonize conflicting impulses in our own life and in society, and the capacity to choose adequate means for approved ends. pp. 27-28

While it is possible for intelligence to increase the range of benevolent impulse, and thus prompt a human being to consider the needs and rights of other than those to whom he is bound by organic and physical relationship, there are definite limits in the capacity of ordinary mortals which makes it impossible for them to grant to others what they claim for themselves. p.3

Reason is not the sole basis of moral virtue in man. His social impulses are more deeply rooted than his rational life. p.26

The will-to-live becomes the will-to-power. p.1

The individual or the group which organizes any society, however social its intentions or pretensions arrogates an inordinate portion of social privilege to itself. pp.6-7

The society in which each man lives is at once the basis for, and the nemesis of, that fullness of life which each man seeks. p.1

The hope that the internal enemies will all be destroyed and that the new society will create only men who will be in perfect accord with the collective will of society, and will not seek personal advantage in the social process, is romantic in its interpretation of the possibilities of human nature and in its mystical glorification of the anticipated automatic mutuality in the communist society. ...In all these prophecies pure sentimentality obscures the fact that there can never be a perfect mutuality of interest between individuals who perform different functions in society... Man will always be imaginative enough to enlarge his needs beyond minimum requirements and selfish enough to feel the pressure of his needs more than the needs of others. Every society will have to maintain methods of arbitrating conflicting needs to the end of history; and in that process those who are shrewder will gain some advantage over the simple, even if they should lack special instruments of power. pp. 194-196

Human beings are endowed by nature with both selfish and unselfish impulses. p.25

The extension of human sympathies [toward ever-larger communities] has... resulted in the creation of larger units of conflict without abolishing conflict. So civilization has become a device for delegating the vices of individuals to larger and larger communities. p. 49

All social cooperation on a larger scale than the most intimate social group requires a measure of coercion. p.3

The inevitable hypocrisy, which is associated with the all the collective activities of the human race, springs chiefly from this source: that individuals have a moral code which makes the actions of collective man an outrage to their conscience. They therefore invent romantic and moral interpretations of the real facts, preferring to obscure rather than reveal the true character of their collective behavior. Sometimes they are as anxious to offer moral justifications for the brutalities from which they suffer as for those which they commit. The fact that the hypocrisy of man's group behavior... expresses itself not only in terms of self-justification but in terms of moral justification of human behavior in general, symbolizes one of the tragedies of the human spirit: its inability to conform its collective life to its individual ideals. As individuals, men believe they ought to love and serve each other and establish justice between each other. As racial, economic and national groups they take for themselves, whatever their power can command. pp. 8-9

The naïve faith of the proletarian is the faith of the man of action. Rationality belongs to the cool observers. There is of course an element of illusion in the faith of the proletarian, as there is in all faith. But it is a necessary illusion, without which some truth is obscured. The inertia of society is so stubborn that no one will move against it, if he cannot believe that it can be more easily overcome than is actually the case. p.221

See:

https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Reinhold_Niebuhr#Moral_Man_and_Immoral_Society_.281932.29

H.G.Callaway

 Dear Callaway,

I tend to agree with your post.  It is not opposed to what I am saying against Neibuhr’s thesis of collective egoism.   

I agree without any reservation with: 

‘’ In the introduction to this work Niebuhr states his thesis clearly and succinctly. His overarching thesis is that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the moral and social behavior of individuals and groups, including nations and economic classes. Individuals are able to overcome their egotism and transcend themselves and their interests and consider others. ‘’

I disagree with :

‘’ Groups, however, lack this capacity. This is a result of collective egoism in which individuals sublimate their individual egos into the group, but the group re-expresses this egoism at a higher level causing intergroup conflict.’’

I would agree if it woud begin  ‘’Very often in history groups have lack …  ‘’

But here Niebuhr make it a general rule in history.  I disagree because there are instance of historical success of inter-group relations within empires and in between empires and countries.  These success of low inter-group egoistic relations were promoted within empire or nation by government policies as you mentioned in your last post.  In between countries/kinddom and empires they were also instances of low egoistic relations that were promoted by cultures promoting respect and sympathy of all humans.  There are also some type of culture that rather promote egoistic intra group and inter group relations.  The modern age being based on such cultural: promotion of individual greed and market relationships and gradual dissolution older cultural aspects getting in the way of this. 

I do agree the more big and powerfull and culturally uniform is a group and the more likely will the culture of that group will tend to lead to an high egoistic level.  It is not necessarily the case, it can be prevented, but it is harder for such a group to escape this trend. 

‘’ Niebuhr, thus, aims to engage in a polemic against moralists, those thinkers who think that the same resources that allow individuals to transcend their egos in their personal relationships, rationality or religion, can also be used in order to establish harmony between groups. Niebuhr argues that the moralists do not realize the limitations of rationality and religion to check the overwhelming egoism and self-interestedness of groups. They also do not realize the way in which rationality is bent in order to serve group interests and how human being lack the moral imagination to sympathize with others outside of their personal interactions.’’

I agree at one level with Niebuhr.  Religion views that only look at the level of personal relations are not sufficient for guiding behavior at the higher level of inter-group relation.  I am not saying that they are not crucially important for building a higher level inter-group relation, simply that they are insufficient.  Not all religious views are equally effective in transcending personal egos.  Some, especially in advance capitalist countries have made more easy for individual to comply with the gospel of greed of the modern age, dissociating their economic behavior from their personal behaviors. Notice that in most advance capitalistic societies, churched depended on direct financing of the rich patrons.  This financing market in the long run will promoted breeds of Christianity that are not in the way of the gospel of greed.  Here Neibuhr criticism is usefull for raising a concern towards this blindness.  But I think Neibuhr does not see that christinanity in general was not so blinded in the past and was more effective in the past towards diminishing inter-group egoism.  Neibuhr seems totally blind to the eroding of the gospel of greed on christemdom itself.  Yes he insists on the sins of Christendom but he does not see the main culprit, the main historical trend, the center of the modern age ideology.  He lived in a age of disillusion about socialism and its failure into the communist countries and he assisted to the transformation of the US into a world egoistic empire but he was at this point without any resource to counter that trend at the end of his life.  I do not base this opinions on a lot of evidences given my minimal knowing of Neibuhr thought but this is the impression that emerges from this minimum.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Brassard & readers,

Thanks for being so forthcoming regarding the recent exchange. I'm glad to know you do see something in Niebuhr after all. I would agree that the tendency toward group-egotism is just that a tendency --but it is a very strong tendency in many circumstances. These are circumstances better avoided.

Its like the philosophy of the ethics of lifeboats. The best approach, of course, is to keep out of lifeboats. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Similarly for the question of how politicians should deal with excessive concentration of  economic interests and unlimited financial influence on their election campaigns.

More on this later. For now, I'll just say that I think our politicians, in their enthusiasm for globalization, have allowed big business to kidnap the American free enterprise system. It stands to reason that if you believe in equality of opportunity, then you are not going to allow excessive concentrations of wealth and power. The idea that there remains anything like a level playing field under just any extremes of economic concentration is pretty absurd--in my estimate. Globalization encourages economic concentration and consolidation on the largest possible scale--these firm escape political control: "policy capture."

We may take from Niebuhr that the growth of concentrated economic power requires political control. Looking back at Niebuhr, we look back to a time when ethical thought and religion were still a restraint upon the accumulation and use of economic and political power. Part of the explanation of the prevalence of anti-religious attitudes and polemics in our own times is simply that principled moral constraint does indeed get in the way of economic and institutional daring-do.

H.G. Callaway

Dear Callaway,

I agree with your last post.  There should be ways to limits economic concentrations.  It is complecated by the fact that if a country limit it within its juridiction, other countries will not necessarily do it.  More and more international giants are not US base.  The US is certainly the country that has most international power and cloud but any move in this direction would require a certain number of agreements among the major powers.

And now we have a new source of extra territorial power: Internet.  When it was only about information, it was not a problem but when merchandises are bought and sold on this territory, when hotel room are rented, taxi are operating on that territory and that all escape from the government juridiction , we have a big problem.  Traditional shopping malls are gradually being phase out in Canada. Maybe the US is benefiting right now because most of the big players are US corporations but it is a problem for most countries and China is going to push a lot of its own corporate players on that territory.  Borders are basically being dismantled and so democratic control.

Dear Callaway,

You in vain hint at my "political  cronyism". If I'm not talking about the Soviet system or Stalin, it's not because I'm a supporter of either, or even more so of the other. The fact is that we are discussing collective egoism. In the Soviet Union, especially at the initial stage of its development, violent collective altruism was imposed. Your proposal, as I understand it, boils down to essentially allowing the collective altruism to compete freely with collective egoism. I exclude this possibility. And not at all because of some of my political preferences. (I will tell you a secret that the mentality of the West is much closer to me than the mentality of the East, although for some reason my mentality is automatically viewed as oriental, apparently because of my geographical location, but this is also an overly simplified perception of me.) So I exclude the above competition for a very simple reason: by definition, only selfish people can compete with each other. Altruists, by definition, do not compete with each other, nor with egoists. Competition in its meaning should lead to the improvement of something. In a military clash between Fascist Germany and the Soviet Union, in essence, there could not be any competition by definition. One system had to either destroy the other, or absorb it. So it happened in practice. But when the idea of collective altruism, inherent in the communist idea, was essentially let down by the political leadership of the Soviet Union, the entire system of the altruistic reborn into an egotistical one. And only then began the very competition that the Soviet Union could not stand. Please, an example from the rage of the day. How, for example, can the US compete with North Korea? This is impossible due to the fact that they are in different "coordinate systems". They can only try to destroy each other. What actually these and others are striving for in political practice. In political practice yet. And here the question is not which of them will win. This is so clear. The question is, can this be called a competition. I would call it annihilation.

Vladimir Egorov

Mainz, Germany

Dear Brassard & readers,

I would say that a corporation which escapes political control or regulation, by "policy capture" is no benefit to anyone--except perhaps the people who run it and the stockholders-- and that in an important sense it is no longer specifically a U.S. corporation. In fact, most large international corporations are "multicultural" --they do not carry any specific cultural imprint for fear of being less than international and thereby less than acceptable somewhere or other. It requires no international agreement to diminish market share or to regulate.

Whether Chinese corporations fit some similar description, I could not say. But if China were to sponsor excessive international concentrations of economic power, I think the world will know how to deal with it. The question of the fairness of competition from Chinese sources is already receiving much attention.

H.G. Callaway

Mainz, Germany

Dear Egorov,

There was no personal implication concerning "political cronyism" regarding you or anyone else--nothing of that sort stated or intended. If you return to my earlier note with that point in mind, then I suspect you may better understand it. Good to know you are a critic of Stalin and Stalinism. I am well aware that many in Russia are.

I find your usage of "to compete" and "competition" very unusual. Could it be that you are translating some other concept? Even altruists, I take it, could compete, say, in their generosity. A certain amount of competitiveness, leastwise within descent limits, is pretty much universal. Its "win at any cost" which strikes me as egotistic.

H.G. Callaway

Mainz, Germany

Dear all,

Niebuhr's 1932 book, Moral Man and Immoral Society is available on line, and it can be downloaded from the Internet archive:

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.275372

Have a look, if you do not already own a copy of the book. As we have seen, its a classic of 20th-century political realism.

H.G. Callaway

Dear Callaway,

It seems to me that any competition, even in generosity, is a manifestation of selfishness. God does not compete with anyone, he simply generously gives people life. Yes, in my opinion, altruists are godlike creatures. Just do not think that I'm hinting at myself. I'm just trying to reason.

Best regards,

Vladimir Egorov

Prof Egorov , is it !!! I mean generosity selfishness .... That hurts ...

If you compete with someone in generosity.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Egorov,

In my impression, you equate "competition" with its extremes, which is a mistake in usage. What you seem to have in mind, using the words "to compete" and "competition"  is something more like the English "enmity"? 

But, a phrase, such as "friendly competition," or "competition limited by rules" is no contradiction in terms. These phrases make sense. 

Webster's dictionary says,

Definition of compete

competed; competing intransitive verb

to strive consciously or unconsciously for an objective (such as position, profit, or a prize) :be in a state of rivalry, e.g., competing teams

Example of usage: companies competing for customers

---End quotation

The idea I expressed earlier, and which you initially responded to, was simply that (limited and law-governed) competition (say, in the marketplace) can limit or inhibit the emergence of a single, dominant (and perhaps egotistic)  player. But for this kind of limited and productive competition to succeed, the laws must be enforced. Thus political cronyism can upset fair and free competition.

One problem with globalization is that it seems to encourage a regime of politically favored "national champions," this in spite of the fact that international agreements are often designed  to prevent it.

H.G. Callaway

The positive moral is a limitation. The entirely positive ethics or moral is absurd, as long as each of us is endowed with positive/negative Unconventional/Ethics and moral, that we reflect either positively or negatively, according to the system or systems of reference. This is also valid for the freedom/constraint (Unconventional/Freedom). If we look around, we can notice people with negative morals, (drunkers, thieves), people with apparent only positive morals, criminals, impostors, cowards, etc.) The animals, the plants, or the planet have their positive/negative morals, reflected sometimes positive, some other times negative, according to the system or systems of reference. Selfishness is the limit of consciousness and, similar to any other limit, it is a flaw, not a quality. Kindness turns into stupidity, nonsense, at its limit. Interpreted in this way, these philosophical categories resemble the fence we build around ourselves, that prevents us from seeing the sunrise or the sunset and we come to believe that they do not exist.

Mainz, Germany

Dear Egorov,

In my impression, you equate "competition" with its extremes, which is a mistake in usage. What you seem to have in mind, using the words "to compete" and "competition"  is something more like the English "enmity"? 

But, a phrase, such as "friendly competition," or "competition limited by rules" is no contradiction in terms. These phrases make sense. 

Webster's dictionary says,

Definition of compete

competed; competing intransitive verb

to strive consciously or unconsciously for an objective (such as position, profit, or a prize) :be in a state of rivalry, e.g., competing teams

Example of usage: companies competing for customers

---End quotation

The idea I expressed earlier, and which you initially responded to, was simply that (limited and law-governed) competition (say, in the marketplace) can limit or inhibit the emergence of a single, dominant (and perhaps egotistic)  player. But for this kind of limited and productive competition to succeed, the laws must be enforced. Thus political cronyism can upset fair and free competition.

One problem with globalization is that it seems to encourage a regime of politically favored "national champions," this in spite of the fact that international agreements are often designed  to prevent it.

H.G. Callaway

Dear Callaway,

I read the introduction of ''For example, universals are real; and do

not exist: The existence is not real.''.  It is a 1932 book.  Full depression.  Niebuhr is sympathic with the socialist ideas of the time although from a christian point of view. 

(Last summer I read a biography of someone living in that era in my wife family who was a lumber contractor and farmer and who was militant in French canadien catholic cooperatives.  These ideas of social solidarity and cooperation were then very strong.)

I like Niebuhr's fighting tone.  He is not afraid to challenge Dewey and the moralists.  Most of the ideas that he expressed in the introduction are not really relevant for today's societies dominated by totally another mindset.  But I am on his side although I do not have a very clear vision of the peoples he is criticizing.  

Primatologists may provide us with relevant information. Dunbar's number (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunbar%27s_number) is averaged the number of individuals which a member of a group may have active sentimental feelings (both positive, like love, and negative, like hatred). It is a unction of the complexity of the cortex in the brain. If the number of individuals in a group is >> Dunbar's number, then the interaction of a single individual with the vast majority of her/his fellows is highly impersonal and purely utilitaristic. For man, Dunnbar number is about 250. I wonder if what we are used to call 'politics' and 'ethic' is concerned with our interactions outsied and inside our Dunbar-sized sphere of relationshios respectively. If so, laws of politics are only loosely linked with ethic norm, just like the chemical properties of an atom are only loosely linked with the properties of quarks inside the nucleus.

Dear Callaway,

I understand competition precisely according to the dictionary, and not as enmity.

Webster's dictionary says,

Definition of compete

competed; competing intransitive verb

to strive consciously or unconsciously for an objective (such as position, profit, or a prize) :be in a state of rivalry, e.g., competing teams

Example of usage: companies competing for customers

---End quotation

If you pay attention, for example, to the phrase above, where I say that God does not compete with anyone in his generosity: he simply distributes his gifts to people. Here, competition is understood as rivalry. God does not participate even in friendly rivalry.

As an example with God, I want to emphasize that competition, or let friendly rivalry, by definition, is peculiar only to egoists. I do not put any bad meaning into the word "egoist". Just our egoism is a direct consequence of our origin from the animal world. This is also not good or bad. It's just that way. We are at the highest level of the animal kingdom. Therefore, we often compete rather than enemies as animals. But let's return to the main question that is in your headline. I just want to emphasize that collective egoism is closely related to individual egoism, and it is its direct consequence, and not some supernatural degeneration of "good" individualists into "bad" collectivists according to Reinhold Niebuhr's thesis as I understood it.

Regards,

Vladimir Egorov

Mainz, Germany

Dear Egorov,

Thanks for your reply. Allow me a short comment for the time being.

I see nothing "supernatural" in this particular topic.

Niebuhr's thesis is that even the best individuals may be subverted to the cause of a collective egotism. He does, by the way, find something wrong with individual egotists. Excusing it on grounds our animal or evolutionary origin, I think he would also not approve. Niebuhr is after all a moralist.

The point is that while person-to-person relationships may often be managed by ethical means, relationships of groups resist this and are going to involve political means. Though we may be able to moderate even collective political conflicts and competitions, we won't be able to do so without political means. Moralizing in international relations has its limits.

Whether we should regard God as involved in competitions seems to me entirely beside the present point. None of us has any simillar character.

H.G. Callaway

"Moralizing in international relations has its limits." - This is what will lead us to a global catastrophe. You can not be a little bit of a bad person. Just like you can not be a little bit pregnant.

Dear H.G. Callaway ,

Reinhold Niebuhr is very attractive figure among 20th century American theologians. He thought of himself as a preacher and social activist, but the influence of his theological thought on the field of social ethics and on society made him a significant intellectual figure.

http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/bce/mwt_themes_770_niebuhrreinhold.htm

Regards, Shafagat

Dear Shafagat,

After two months of interruption, which, I hope, was not caused by my answer, but something else, you managed to restore the process of discussion on this issue. My congratulations to you.

Best regards,

Vladimir

First I've seen of this thread.

Coming at this from a point of complete ignorance, other than what HG Callaway wrote, I have to doubt that the egoism of the group necessarily depends, or mimicks, any possible egoism of the "group leader." I think one can make the case that even if the group leader is not a scoundrel, or even if every decision is truly a group decision, the group still behaves in egoistic ways.

Here's an analogy with RF communications. You take a transmitter connected to a single transmit antenna, and a receiver also with a single antenna. In many cases, you will experience "Rayleigh fading." The propagation path is often going to cause the received signal to fluctuate, as the signal strikes different objects along the way, reflects one way and another, gets twisted by transitional atmospheric effects, signal paths recombine, and so forth.

That's the analogy for individuals in the group. Not single-minded egoists.

Now, making no change to the receive antenna, you install many dozens of transmit antennas, in what is now called "massive MIMO." (MIMO means multiple in, multiple out.) So, the propagation path between each one of the very many transmit antennas, and the one receive antenna, vary slightly. The RF symbols transmitted by each antenna are affected in different ways, as they travel to the receive antenna, so they get distorted in different ways. (You can also have multiple receive antennas, but let's keep it simple. The effect I'm describing occurs regardless.)

The end result, with massive MIMO, is something called "channel hardening." It means that this huge number of transmit antennas, at the receiver, appears to be just like one, solid, no reflections, no variation signal path. Amost like the signal had been passed through a coax cable, with no obstacles and no atmospheric effects to deal with. This occurs because the propagation anomalies of any one transmit antenna will be countered, or compensated, by the anomalies of the other transmit antenna propagation paths. Given enough transmit antennas, you will experience channel hardening.

Enfin bref, my bet is, groups behave the same way, even if every decision is a group decision. I wouldn't attribute the effect to the scoundrel leading the group, necessarily, although a strong leader could achieve the same effect, or exacerbate the effect. From what HG Callaway explained about Niebuhr's thesis, I don't see that Niebuhr is insisting that the group is merely following the leader? This group egoism effect would occur regardless?

To me, this would make a far more interesting thesis! Massive MIMO didn't exist in the 1930s, so Niebuhr was at a disadvantage. He figured it out anyway!

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

New question:

https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_is_oligarchy_Is_there_a_present_danger_of_oligarchy

Please have a look.

H.G. Callaway

Disinformation operates on groups while the rational voice is shouted down.

Surveys show that nearly every individual self identifies as being above average on ethics and political savvy. Maybe it is true as individuals, but possibly not in groups where the individual is suppressed.