~~~ I have copied this reply from "Philosophy - Naturalism - Why a thread on Naturalism".~~~

The role of philosophers in the last century having changed from members of 'lower ranks' to joining the lines of scientists in academia as leaders of societal thinking was, in my view, pivotal in the advancement - and serious consideration - of philosophy and that never-ending question of 'Why?'. My thinking is that science and its role of being concerned with the workings and repeatability of items in existence have, in the 20th century, nicely - if not stubbornly & unintentionally - connected or rather co-existed with the workings of existensialism.

Oh and who could deny that the value of the advancement of modern philosophy is certainly achieved through the very beautiful and elegant focus of linguistics or 'linguistic analysis' (your area of focus too if i recall David?)

....And at the risk of practising what we preach ...:

I would have to disagree on Philosophical investigation being LANGUAGE. Would it not be more accurate to say it's STARTING POINT would be Existentialism (Religious and Humanist) as the main pursuit? Then Linguistics would be the analysis of language as a barrier in that pursuit?

Hello Tristan

You're adept at getting your point across.

Please forgive my use of language as a singular. I'm not an expert in the field of 'Linguistics' but certainly make use of the 'art' of Linguistics in the development of Learning Material for adult learners - which is a beautiful approach as our country has 12 official languages! (In South Africa I'm also not on that side of the Atlantic, England or any other Statue for that matter..).

To define my point further: I refer not to Linguistics as a practice/field/skill, but to PHILOSOPHICAL LINGUISTICS (which had its origin with Wittgenstein in the early-mid 20th century?) and that the view back then (between J.L.Austin at Oxford and Wittgenstein) was that the mysteries of this world remained mysteries largely due to the incorrect and confusing use of language in research/discovery/representation and that the proper analysis of CONCEPT/MEANINGS (not particulars) for each 'field' i.e. Evidence in Science vs Evidence in Law vs Evidence in Politics, etc. was essential if Modern philosophy expected to advance. This is now in agreement of your point on 'philosophical thoughts'.

I've been accused before of being a tautologian too and my verbosity can challenge any other philosopher/artist/politician, linguistic or not.....except I would have to surrender to David...his efforts represent true tautology!

I'll certainly get up to speed on Pascal's "tarabust".

I amaze and wonder, when reviewing various fields within philosophy, whether or not most, if not all, fields of activity today owe its value to the pursuit of the original question in Philosophy or the enquiry of evidence in Science.

About your mystery behind language: the Romantics seemed to have despaired in their experience of the answer. It appears to me that Language may very well carry the heaviest price tag of all...

Natasha

"I would have to disagree on Philosophical investigation being LANGUAGE. Would it not be more accurate to say it's STARTING POINT would be Existentialism (Religious and Humanist) as the main pursuit?"

This is a "seeing the wood for the trees" situation... we're so used to using language that we forget that any such enterprise is first and foremost linguistic - we use language to talk about it. Language is fundamental to the vast majority of our systems of knowledge; and it is entirely fundamental to philosophy.

BTW, existentialism was, from the point of view of the analytic tradition, a brief perversion of thought... but to take an example: the notion of "nothingness" as expressed by Sartre is the reification of a privative...

Tristan

“Using languages to discuss about languages, like we do in linguistics, has shown me that language is "not enough" to understand and describe language. This is really WHY i look at language through philosophic thoughts... To adopt a particular formalism, to choose between theoretics, and to use these models to describe languages and their uses is something that is can reasonably done without philosophical ability, but in the history of philology and modern linguistics, the epistemological issues were all solved by philosophic feedbacks... When B. Russel describes "levels" of language, that help to differentiate a set and an item. When Gödel adds formal languages over formal languages and proves that there will always be a language to describe another. And so on...”

Yet, as you remark in the following paragraph, we cannot escape from words when doing philosophy. I’m not talking here about the models of language proposed by the ‘science’ of linguistics, but rather the various philosophical accounts of language – they all attempt to open the box with the crowbar that is locked inside the box. For a long time, I had high hopes from a more seriously formalised semiotics (following from Peirce’s initial ideas, but cutting away the misdirections subsequent on Morris and the neo-structuralism of folks like Eco – Eco owes more to Saussure than to Peirce). But unfortunately the discipline has been so polluted by ‘Continental Philosophy’ that no-one serious wants to touch it…

We should also bear in mind that formal languages are extensions of natural language, not tools external to natural language.

We should be wary of words – they’re perhaps abstract entities, the reifications of ‘terms’ abstracted from spoken language. Numerous writers would place language on the level of the phrase or the proposition….

Tristan - you mean to say that there is actually such a thing as "non-western philosophy" ? Well, well, well, one learns something every day...

As a corollary to my last comment: why is it that Continental Philosophy is taken seriously by everyone except philosophers ?

It causes me real pain to see people talking about Freud, Derrida, Lacan, Sartre and the rest as if they had actually made some real contribution to anything other than literary theory (and who needs literary theory?)

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~~"I think that \"pursuit of the original question in Philosophy or the enquiry of evidence in Science\" is one of those tasks, like Graal Quest and so on."~~

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I like this. It represents elegantly a mix of words and feelings with concepts and actions in such conflict with each other.

Regarding the Romantics - I read somewhere (I would need to find it and may stand corrected) that their average life expectancy was in their 60s. Romantics were/are (?) heavily immersed in the mud of emotion, which make their struggle hugely purposeful, but their reality dissappointingly self-destructive. Expressions of Romanticism is also done through the use of language, laden heavily with emotion. A powerful mix. Lessons in the 'power of the word' as opposed to the more popular 'power of the pen'?

What is this, a literature group, that we’re discussing existentialism and the romantics already? Oy gevalt!

“it’s philosophy or not”.

Exactly. If it’s in the analytic tradition, it’s philosophy; if it isn’t, it’s uninformed opinion (I hope that you’ve got your irony detectors switched on)

“About Freud, Lacan... and poets... and literary theory... i know it's not science”.

My problem is that it isn’t philosophy, either…

“But is philosophy "only" a science? take words in account, even if there is not yet A theory that does better than those words, i think it is at least useful because it can ask questions to existing theories...”

And there’s the rub - philosophy isn’t science: I must post some more on this (it follows from the naturalism debate, so I’ll be posting it elsewhere).

Further to my last - I've posted something more under "naturalism"

The big question is, I think, "what is the relationship between 'language' and 'the world'?".

The problem isn't so much our definition of 'language' as our definition of 'the world'...

Two biggies - "what is meaning?" and "what is reference?"

brief comment on the staunch analyticism of david: david, what has analytic philosophy given to the world? at least the french produced active people, not people locked in their departments producing papers that two other people read and believe they're really clever because nobody understands them. obviously this dialogue is going much too fast for me.

Haris - I wasn't aware that the French had made any valuable contribution since Poincaré...

I take it we're talking about the same set of people who were shown up by Sokal? The ones who employ terms from science (and from serious philosophy) without understanding? The ones who claim social kudos and big money for sitting in their ivory towers suggesting changes that are pragmatically unrealisable ? The ones who fought tooth and nail against the exclusion of Freudianism from serious psychology (and who still resist its excusion from medical practice) ? The ones who continue to rehash Marx ? The ones who moderate their criticism of socialism because they don't want to miss out on a juicy job next time the socialists are in power ?

Or just the ones who have done everything in their power to exclude serious analytic philosophy from the French academic scene, thus making France the laughing-stock of the international philosophical community ?

The only people who take PoMo seriously are non-philosophers...

They favour an "anything goes" approach - until one starts underlining the self-contradiction and the general paucity of real thought underlying their own views, at which time they become savagely authoritarian... I take it you've never met anyone who worked with Derrida ?

(MORAL: don't get David started on Continental Philosophy. He has a deep and abiding hatred of it).

i've met Sokal, wasn't impressed at all by his views, plus i didn't get answers on my relativistically inclined questions. for example against evidence based medicine. plus his philosophical views on realism were a bit naive. for example you'll hear even James Ladyman talk about 'fundamental physics' being the stuff of the world, but nobody has the slightest idea how this physics is going to be or even if we'll ever get there. Realism is the new religion :)

(and Dawkal its high priest)

I won't repeat my comments on naïve realism - but I agree that both Sokal and Dawkins should review their positions. But I wasn't defending Sokal as a philosopher of science - he isn't - but rather as (if I may use the term) "an active person"...

And if a philosophical lightweight like Sokal can turn 'em on their ears, what might a philosophical sophisticate not achieve?

well, there are philosophical sophisticates on the latour side as well, no? pickering sort of knows what he's talking about.

Tristan - you quite rightly recall us to order.

The analytic-continental debate is certainly relevant to our discussions, but we should perhaps keep it for elsewhere (though I fear it will degenerate into a slanging match wherever we put it - perhaps better to shelve it entirely)

So, what ARE the big questions in the philosophy of language ?

One question to which Haris has made allusion is 'relativism'. In my initial comment, I imagined that "some might argue that our language shapes our beliefs about the world, and that in some way the world of objects, events, and the like is the *result* of the way our language is structured".

This view is illustrated by the 'Sapir-Whorf hypothesis': several comparative studies of various languages had noted the absence of certain classes of word, the non-alignment of certain schema (such as colour terms), and even the absence of certain verbal tenses from one languge to another. On the basis of this study, the hypothesis was put forth that the 'conceptual scheme' linked to each language was, to a greater or lesser extent, incommensurable with the conceptual scheme of other languages. This could, it was argued, even go so far as to disallow translation from one language to another; and even when a translation of general sense could be realised, it remains impossible to express the full range of concepts employed in one language in another language which is not directly cognate.

When generalised to the full range of cultural practices, this view effectively disallows us from making evaluative judgements concerning the cultural practices of cultures other than our own. As we do not share the same 'conceptual schemes' (that is, the same 'webs of belief' which underlie our worldview), we cannot make evaluative judgements concerning what constitutes 'knowledge' in these cultures; this being the case, we cannot submit their statements about the world to our criteria of 'truth'.

So, opinions - do you think that 'reality' is relative to our 'conceptual scheme', or is language determined by the way the world 'is' ?

Dear Tristan,

Thanks for your brave comment, it is good to point out to some of us (me especially) that the most important thing is to make ourselves understood, and that what seems obvious in our head may not be as clear outside. please feel free to interrupt whenever you want for clarifications! as regards david's question, i think it's an important one since it directly invites the question of realism (is there a mind-independent way of doing things or rather experiencing the world) which seems to be a thorn on everybody's side.

That's a very wise comment, Haris, and I second it.

There are, I think, two complementary areas of research in play here, and we should perhaps distinguish them so we know who's talking about what... on one hand, there's the language/thought question which is - unless I make a mistake - in the line of Tristan's research; and then there's the language/world question... though they're evidently related.

I tend to be an externalist about language - taking the view that we can best understand language when looking at the way it relates to 'the world' (either by description or by interaction). In one sense, we could say that 'Mind' is an abstraction from, or an emergent property of, human interaction; it is most manifest - or most accessible - in linguistic interaction.

On the other hand, this doesn't tell us anything about the "mind-as-self-conscious-experience" question, though we CAN learn a great deal about how we integrate personal experience of self-consciousness into our shared worldview. It also leaves aside the question of "thought": does language express thought, or does thought reduce to language? Should we see language as some kind of "prime modelling system" by which we co-ordinate a worldview that comprises various systems of representation?

Haris

"is there a mind-independent way of doing things or rather experiencing the world"

I rather doubt it. "Experiencing the world" requires an observer capable of experience, and "doing things" requires an actor...

The question is rather whether there *is* a mind-independent reality (in the realism vs idealism sense) and whether - and to what degree - this reality 'shapes' our language. I'll start a new thread along these lines on some of the questions I've been thinking about recently...

dear sid, what is your argument for the conclusion that mind is independent? and i thought what we were discussing was not the independence of mind (independence from what?) but the existence of a mind-independent reality, ie a reality independent of how we perceive it. no?

Haris - I'd understand it as the "is reality independent of how we perceive it?" question - or the "to what degree is reality independent of the way we perceive it"...

I'm looking forward to your further input on this !

How should i put this? I shall attempt to be as eloquent and precise as possible, in order to maintain the elegance of this thread -

Gentleman...there are connections in all your points:

Reality in my view is *IN-dependent* from our perception (requires a degree of effort to internalise)...

...our perception is dependent on our ability to *grasp* the occurrences or states in that reality

...meditation is an option to achieve a level of 'meaning' [or awareness] in the act of grasping

...which implies that Will and Desire are active ingredients in that interpretation.

...the non-/existence of knowledge [or perhaps intelligence] (and mind) in this mix helps to influence the level of 'mechanism' (i.e. to what degree we are perceiving *mechanically*/*automatically*)...

...which gives rise to the level of *curiosity* needed to keep our interest and vitality at a level that can sustain our perception AND reality.

So......the independent reality of an IN-dependent perception of meaningful insights, driven by the direction of our will and desire, influenced by our level of awareness and knowledge, provides 'higher-level' access to our need to sustain a perceived reality.

I will not attempt a logical formula for this.....any takers?

post haste

"So......the independent reality of an IN-dependent perception of meaningful insights, driven by the direction of our will and desire, influenced by our level of awareness and knowledge, provides 'higher-level' access to our need to sustain a perceived reality."

....and Language is a way to achieve sustainability in expressing that perception to and with others.....

Tristan - what do you understand by "metaphysics" ?

The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was the model for the Vienna Circle & Carnap's attack on metaphysics, but by the time of Quine (the 1950s) metaphysics began its comeback as a serious element of analytic philosophy - nowadays, analytic metaphysics is perhaps THE big area of development in the analytic tradition (largely thanks to David Lewis, whatever one might think of his 'modal realism').

Much of Russell’s early work was directed against the “British Idealism” of the late 19th century – people like McTaggart of “A-series/B-series” fame. The classic argument the logical positivists made against ‘metaphysical speculation’ was that the propositions of metaphysics could not be verified by any kind of empirical experience, and were therefore meaningless.

Ironically, it was pointed out (by Ramsey, if I remember rightly) that the positivists’ argument was *itself* unverifiable by empirical experience, and therefore as meaningless as any other metaphysical proposition.

The logical positivists’ programme, which made much of the difference between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ statements was largely undermined by Quine’s (1951) “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” - http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html

From the 60s onwards, investigation of ‘metaphysical’ questions became more and more mainstream in analytic philosophy, notably in the field of Mind.

As far as more recent philosophy is concerned, David Lewis is certainly one of the key influences – the ‘reality of possible worlds’ is an entirely metaphysical notion.

My pragmatic approach fits in nicely with the fundamentals of Logical Positivism in that the establishment of 'meaning' and 'truth/falsehood' in statements and activities and their observation in 'making a difference' are essential to my worldview.

I begin to depart from their formulation however, by their insistence on evidence and verification - a heavy drift toward science in over-analysis - which seems to defy Russell's initial intention of applying 20th century logic to the old philosophical ways of pursuing the nature of reality outside of ourselves. almost like the pursuit of a problem to be solved for the sake of the problem and not viewing the problem as a necessity and its role in the scheme of things.

didn't everybody abandon the Logical positivists because their criterion of verifiability couldn't pass its own test? that's what we're taught here. also didn't russel's project of the Principia (i've heard he spends like 1000 pages trying to show sth stupid, like 1+1=2) didn't his project get superceded as soon as the cheeky monkey Godel wreaked havoc everywhere or even before? faint echoes of liar paradox sentences

Exactly, for the first; true, for the second, but Godel's Infamy didn't really have much impact on the metaphysical question.

yeah, but didn't godel show that placing logic as the foundation of everything was not the way to go?

I'd say more particularly in what concerned the foundation of mathematics...

I don't agree on the abandonment as absolutely true. An entire WWII generation was influenced by Logical Positivism. It was *displaced* by Linguistic Philosophy/Analysis (Moore et al) on the basis that the verification process of scientific standards were too rigid to be applied to all forms of spontaneous expression. It's process of experience as a form of truth (and not the absoluteness of result) had value and served as foundation for the eventual development to linguistic philo (and Wittgenstein).

But then the "Everyday Language" school was overturned by the generation influenced by Chomsky - what goes around, comes around...

it's been abandoned in philosophy of science, or so i'm led to believe. and i thought this was about phil of science. of course, nothing ever really dies in philosophy, it's just put to the side, no?

Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.

dreamless people die majestically