The difference between, for example, metaphysics and ethics is the difference between decidiing what "is" the case and deciding what "ought to be" the case.
Imagine that John ought to be honest, but that he is not. How can we reconcile "John ought to be honest" (which we can hold as true) and "John is honest" (which, in the terms of the example, is false)?
According to Socrates, there are four natural virtues which men ought to pursue: wisdom, self-restraint, courage and sound judgment.
Unfortunately, words change in meanings and are often twisted into pretzels as men use them for their own ends. Two of these virtues in particular have changed meanings.
Wisdom simply means knowledge. We ought to seek wisdom, the knowledge of the world about us and about men in particular.
Sound judgment refers to our ability to choose among the other virtues to select the best outcome. Thus, there are times when self-restraint and courage are in conflict. Should we restrain our anger or express it? Should we study or work? Should we study or join the army? Sound judgment is required to resolve such conflicting obligations.
Cicero argued that the virtues establish natural laws which we ought to obey.
As to authorities... We ought to honor those to whom we owe debts which we can never repay. Thus we ought to honor our parents and our nation, for we owe our very lives to them. A times this honor implies obedience.
Parents and statesmen ought therefore to exercise sound judgment in regard to their subjects.
It’s just about the ‘right time’ of year to ask THAT question David! I mean, individual New Year’s Resolutions are being made in most places - being an expression of what “ought to be” – being largely based on what “is”. I reflect on Tristan’s questions as to what exactly is the authority or yardstick in this all too familiar individual responsibility and collective dilemma.
My thinking is that, individually, knowing what ought to be can only be imagined based on what Is. While collectively, knowing what Is can only be formulated while knowing what Ought To Be.
Let’s look at your “Honest John” and “John-Who-Ought-To-Be-Honest”: On a personal level, John would know that he ought to be honest – only if he knows he was dishonest *now*.
Socially, John knows that people ought to hold virtues, such as honesty - so he determines whether or not he holds such a virtue.
My problem with the social aspect of “what is” is that the future may mistakenly be *determined* instead of being *dependent* on it. The distinction of these two is important – ‘determination’ holds unwavering implications, offering up personal responsibility to authoritative ones, while ‘dependency’ rather implies a reliance and a promise of personal flexibility.
More back to the point: the commonality between both these states is – ‘Knowing’ (Tristan touched on it in his comment on ‘evolution’). Perhaps, in attaining some progress in answering whether or not we can pass from “is” to “ought” we would need to understand what we know about our current situation progressing to an ideal situation, individually and collectively, and how to leverage this knowledge responsibly and optimistically.
Now being responsible and optimistic is easier said than done. It would indicate a level of critical reflection – and by default, lead to questioning nature of knowledge and authority.
https://www.researchgate.net/group/Philosophy/board/thread/3960_AUTHORITY_JUSTIFICATION_AND_CLAIMS_TO_PRIVILEGE
In the above thread, the notion of ‘authority’ in terms of traditional sources of knowledge as authoritative is under scrutiny. There may be a subtle implication of questioning authority which may be translated into positivist revolt.
I would like to think that such scrutiny may result in a more constructive conclusion that *criticism* is rather the order of the day when it comes to questioning authoritative notions. Yet, Criticism in itself has implications of judgement in cases, for example, of plausible theories that may be dropped from the shelf by way of being criticised [by an authority] as opposed to being well-defended by a theorist. The lack of optimism in authority applying criticism could therefore affect the transition from “is” toward “ought to”.
The critical rationalism of the Greeks (not pure rationalism or intellectualism mind you) comes to mind and its implication of *moral knowledge* leading to the role of Authority in ‘Ethics’. Kant, in his ‘Principle of Autonomy’ asserts we don’t accept any form of authority as a basis for Ethics, relying solely on our personal application of critical judgement of morality. But what does this say for the social state of where we collectively “ought to be”?
NVR: "I reflect on Tristan’s questions as to what exactly is the authority or yardstick in this all too familiar individual responsibility and collective dilemma."
As I see it, the question of authority ought to be the last question to consider. First we ought to come to terms with the virtues. The virtues give us an internal authority which resonates with the laws of nature.
In the case of Venezuela and other Latin-American it´s very important to bear in mind that most people have at least two "cultural registers": one, concerning the so called "model of representation", that are verbalized. Those "model of representation" are only formal (for example, I said "I strongly believe in democracy" or "I am very respectful of laws" or "Corruption is very bad and must be punish". But,on the other side are "model of action", that are opposed and even antagonistic with "model of representation", but are those "model of action" the true ones that guide the behaviour of people. So, they really are no very democratic -even at home-, they don´t respect laws or rules -that´s only for silly people- or they strongly believe that corruption could be good if you take a piece of the cake. So, "is" and "ought" are very complicated to decide.
GV: "So, 'is' and 'ought' are very complicated to decide."
There are, at times, conflicts among the several virtues. If Mamma tells her son to go out and steal from the rich man, what should he do?
Sound judgment is necessary to resolve such conflicts.
Knowing David --- and his comment about little squares and diamonds --- I suspect that he would restrict the matter to mere formalism.
I wonder what Diogenes of Sinope would think about little squares and diamonds...
TV: "Is the speaker just a media, expressing a higher authority's desires? (as in 'we ought to honor our parents and our nation')"
In my humble opinion, one must resolve the question of what one is seeking before one considers the question of authority. If Cicero is right, that there is a natural law governing man, then we ought to try to learn that law... for even supposed 'authorities' (one's parents and nation) would be ruled by it.
If there is no such law, then it would seem that we are simply considering some sort of compulsion... 'might makes right.'
DH: "Imagine that John ought to be honest, but that he is not. How can we reconcile "John ought to be honest" (which we can hold as true) and "John is honest" (which, in the terms of the example, is false)?"
What is there to reconcile? The two propositions have different predicates. If we must reconcile them, must we not also reconcile such propositions as "John is tall" and "John is fat?"
I am not sure what it means to 'pass from is to ought.' Perhaps we should pass from 'ought' to 'is.'
As I recall, Peirce believed that logic is a normative science, along with aesthetics and ethics... beauty, truth and goodness.
(A) "John is tall", (B) "John is fat", (C) "John is honest" and (D) "John ought to be honest"
"All these sentences express a something about John. And that thing can be true or false. Without a word about when or how these sentences can be true or false, what David notices is that (C) is false when (D) is true.
I have no idea about any *connexion of that kind* between (A) and (B)"
1. (∃!x) x is John & (fat, x & tall,x)
2. (∃!x) x is John & ¬honest, x
3. ◊[(∃!x) x is John & ¬honest, x]
4. ¬◊[(∃!x) x is John & (honest, x & ¬honest, x)]
Deontic force should allow that (2) can be true even though
5. □[(∃!x) x is John & honest, x]
But (5) is
5*. ¬◊[(∃!x) x is John & ¬honest, x]
How should we read the operators?
Careful, Tris - "C) is false when (D) is true" means "C ⊕ D" or "¬C ↔ D"
TV: "In other words, someone asserting John ought to be honest, also asserts implicitly that John isn't. And if he asserts John is honest, he implicitly asserts John doesn't have to be honest."
I suspect that Diogenes (who was looking for an honest man) would have said that everyone ought to be honest.
Who do you think ought to be dishonest?
Tristan - I'm being deliberately provocative ;-)
On the technical level, I think we CAN use some form of PWA to give the semantics of "ought" sentences: it'd be a question of specifying a set of worlds at which the modified sentence is "true". If we approach it from a pre-formal POV, we have the basic problem
1. "John ought to be honest" is true
2. "John is not honest" is true
Our first conclusion is that there is a difference of sense between "ought to be" and "is". This is shown in the lack of any inferential relations between (1) and
3. "John is honest" is true
It would seem that "ought" introduces an additional value such that if John is honest, he is assigned the value"1" and if he is not honest he is assigned the value "0". Thus
4. If John ought to be honest, then if he is honest, then he is 1 and, if he is not honest, then he is 0
from (4) and (2) we can derive
5. John is 0
We just need to find a quality that can replace the values 1,0 in (4) above.
As for modality - let's use "O" as the operator "ought"
1. O[John is honest] → ◊[John is honest]
2.¬◊[John is honest] → ¬O[John is honest]
3.¬◊¬[John is honest] → ¬O¬[John is honest]
DH: "That, dear Bill, has the true Scholastic stink!"
Insult will get you nowhere. I see no such implication. In my humble opinion, everyone ought to be honest. I'm sure Diogenes of Sinope would agree with me. Saying that does not imply that no one is honest. Certainly it does not tell me that Tristan is dishonest. Clearly he ought to be. Who am I to say otherwise?
Nor do I see any implication in "And if he asserts John is honest, he implicitly asserts John doesn't have to be honest." Perhaps it is simply John's nature to be honest... his DNA requires it. After all, David, doesn't your DNA require you to be honest?
The second is common sense; the third implies that if John must be honest, there can be no obligation for him not to be honest. This is interesting with respect to the distinction between "free will" and "compulsion".
Bill - that was a compliment, not a criticism - and a quotation from "The Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man", spoken when Dedalus came up with a truly Aquinian philosophical puzzle.
"Who do you think ought to be dishonest?"
From my last argument: only those who are under no compulsion to be dishonest.
DH: "From my last argument: only those who are under no compulsion to be dishonest."
I think they ought to be supremely honest... For they would have no excuse for dishonesty.
If I may quote myself:
"As for modality - let's use "O" as the operator "ought"
1. O[John is honest] → ◊[John is honest]
2.¬◊[John is honest] → ¬O[John is honest]
3.¬◊¬[John is honest] → ¬O¬[John is honest]"
To continue [still using "O" as the undefined operator "ought"]
In the earlier message, I started from the trivial observation that, if an agent John "ought to have" some property F, then it is at least possible that John have F: if it is not possible for John to have F, then there is "no obligation" for John to have F. If , necessarily, John has F, then there can be no obligation for John ***not*** to have F. All this is common sense – if John "ought to be honest", it is at least possible that he be honest; if it is impossible for him to be honest, he can be under no obligation to be honest; and if John cannot be dishonest, there can be no obligation for him to be dishonest.
A "deontic" modality is thus coordinated to alethic modality insofar as an obligation to do some thing is subordinate to it being possible to do that thing (there can be no obligation to respect an obligation that cannot be respected). While this is informative concerning our moral obligations when faced with a Caligula – that is, with an obligation to do something we cannot do, as if Caligula were to command Claudius to be a pot of geraniums, it doesn't give the force to our obligations concerning what ***can***be done. The obligation to honesty is such that following condition should hold:
M: ◊[John is honest] → O[John is honest]
"M" states that, if John can be honest, he ought to be honest – and this is, I think, the classic understanding of a moral obligation. However, if we hold that both "M" and
1. O[John is honest] → ◊[John is honest]
then it follows that
4. ◊[John is honest] ↔ O[John is honest],
and thus
5. ¬◊[John is honest] ↔ ¬O[John is honest]
6. ¬◊¬[John is honest] ↔ ¬O¬[John is honest]
It thus follows that
i. if there is no obligation for John to be honest, then there is no possibility that John be honest
and
ii. if John is not obliged to be dishonest, then John must be honest.
(ii) elaborates on (3) – not only is it the case that if John must be honest, he has no obligation to be dishonest (in which case he is absolved if he is "forced" to be dishonest), but it is also the case that when he acts of his "own free will", he "must" be honest. This describes the "force" of moral obligation, but doesn't explain why (6) should hold when "John is dishonest" is true – if the "must" of (6) is usual alethic modality, then John cannot be dishonest; if he is actually dishonest, then it would seem to follow that it is possible that he be dishonest.
There's obviously some limitation on the force of "must" when co-ordinated with deontic modification. For my part, I think(i) and (5) give us an interesting clue: there is no obligation for John to be honest iff there is no possibility than John be honest. Under the usual rules of modal logic, (5) should be equivalent to
5*. □¬[John is honest] ↔ ¬O[John is honest]
(5*) implies that John has no obligation to be honest iff he is necessarily dishonest. Does it also follow from (5*) that
7. □[John is honest] ↔ O[John is honest] ?
which states that John is necessarily honest iff he is obliged to be honest: if John is necessarily honest, then he is obliged to be honest; and if he is obliged to be honest, then he is necessarily honest.
Maybe I ought to become a gymnosophist and go in search of an honest man...
Hang on a bit and I'll tell you which worlds you might find him in - if they're accessible.
Squares and Diamonds: got it. Tristan: Thank you. David: Forgive me :)
Tristan
Forgive me for replying so tardively - as you know, things are rather hectic!
"David, you seem to have started at the step 3 without explicitely telling how you arrived there."
Looking back over what I wrote, I gave no definition of "O" - I take it as bearing the same relation to "ought" as "◊" does to "can" and "□" does to "must". I am indeed presupposing alethic modal logic, but - as you remark - this is just the "baggage" I bring to consideration of "deontologies"...
a. "O(A) → ◊A"
I think this has to be taken as an axiom, and I'd say it's the "degree zero" for the notion of obligation - that if one ought to do something, then it is possible that one can do that thing. However, we must avoid reading this as a relation of dependence - the ability to perform A is independent of its deontic status. (a) merely avoids the case of being obliged to perform an impossible action. In fact, my (i...iii) are a series of simple (logical) ***constraints*** on obligation.
DH: "Looking back over what I wrote, I gave no definition of 'O' - I take it as bearing the same relation to 'ought' as '◊' does to 'can' and '□' does to 'must.'
Perhaps we should consider 'ought' to be an undefined term?
Perhaps we should consider 'can' to be undefined?
"First we define a frame, which consists of a non-empty set, G, whose members are generally called possible worlds, and a binary relation, R, that holds (or not) between the possible worlds of G. This binary relation is called the accessibility relation. For example, w R v means that the world v is accessible from world w. That is to say, the state of affairs known as v is a live possibility for w. This gives a pair, ."
~ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_logic
Well, I have a real problem understanding what a 'possible world' refers to. I understand possibility in a somewhat different way. Real possibility is different from merely logical possibility. It is founded on the potency inherent in real substances.
Secondly, even supposing that 'possible worlds' really refers to something meaningful, it is far from clear to me what 'accessibility' refers to.
Finally, even supposing that both 'possible worlds' and 'accessibility' are meaningful concepts, it is far from clear to me that there is a set defined in the way described. For such a definition looks like naive set theory to me. I am sure you understand the grave logical problems inherent in that...
Bill - I can treat "can" as defined, following Tristan's statement of the definition. The whole point of this exercise is that I'm trying to construct "a deontic logic" from alethic logic while lknowing nothing of "deontic logics".
Tristan : Given my last on your comments, we can see how my (ii) and (iii) follow from (i), which is an evident constraint on the notion of "obligation". This being said, it follows that (i) and the derived expressions don't actually give the notion of "deontic force" – and here, we can only appeal to our intuitions concerning "moral obligation". Foremost among these is the intuition that, if in a given situation one CAN be honest, then one SHOULD be honest.
"M" is therefore an interpolation of my own – and as I say, I've scrupulously avoided looking at anything on deontic logic. For "experimental reasons", I prefer to use the resources of alethic and classical logic to see whether we can pass from "can" to "ought".
If we analyse the deontic intuition that "if one CAN be honest, then one SHOULD be honest", this would indeed correspond to "M". But, if we accept both (i) and "M", it would seem to follow logically that we're also accepting the far stronger view that, whenever an action is possible, it is morally obligatory.
So, there's something "wrong" or "insufficient" about "M" – but WHAT? From the PoV of alethic modal logic, it would appear to have something to do with the "kind" of proposition that could be substituted for "p" in the general scheme
M* ◊[p] → O[p]
And THIS is surely a question of "interpretation" – that is, a matter of the "worlds" over which the operator ranges – and this, as Bill has remarked, is a matter of accessibility.
Bill: we should bear in mind that we're dealing with something that is, to all intents and purposes, a matter of "quantification theory" – so, your question is a matter of what "domain" possible world analysis quantifies over. To cut a long story short – and one day I really will complete my defence of PWA – the domain is "states of affairs". The "real" or "actual" world is the domain of states of affairs which obtain; accessible possible worlds are the states of affairs which do not obtain in a given situation but which "could" obtain in that situation. Thus, if a ring is actually warm, it exemplifies an actual state of affairs. However, the states of affairs in which it is cold are ***physically*** accessible – that is, we can describe the physical conditions that would obtain were it to be cold, and the passage from its actual state to one of these "possible" states. Likewise, the ring might be actually made of gold, but we can imagine that it be made of silver – the worlds in which it is made of silver are ***metaphysically*** accessible (a nuclear physicist or for that matter an alchemist might be able to "change it into silver"). We can imagine that the ring might be or become a pot of geraniums – such a world is, as far as we know, neither physically not metaphysically accessible, but is perhaps logically accessible (a fairy might magically transform it into a pot of geraniums). A world in which a triangle had four right-angles is logically inaccessible to us – we cannot envisage ANY state of affairs in which a triangle could have four right angles.
DH: "Bill - I can treat 'can' as defined, following Tristan's statement of the definition."
I didn't see that Tristan defined 'can.' Perhaps you mean the following?
TV: "Perhaps we should distinguish the modal logic, and the actual situations of the world where we use 'can' and 'ought', in the sense we cannot 'know' what kind of facts or properties the word 'can' actually referes to, but we certainly can define (at least) one interpretative model for 'can'... and ought."
I took that to be an admission that he can't define 'can.'
◊ p ↔ ¬□¬ p;
□ p ↔ ¬◊¬ p.
The basic rule is *N* - that is that, if p is a theorem, then □ p is a theorem ; the basic axiom is *K*, which gives the distributivity: □ (p → q) → (□ p → □ q). The basic system, "K", can be enriched with further axioms.
If, however, you're asking about the "sense" of such a definition, it's a matter of semantics - which is where possible worlds come in.
Undoubtedly it is possible to toss meaningless symbols about. If that is what you are doing, its fine with me.
Bill, that was a remarkably silly comment. Ignorance is NEVER an excuse
And anyway, "ought" has no grammatical link to "is" - which is probably where the problem comes from. "Ought" is a modal auxiliary... it's like talking of the difference between "is" and "will"...
The "ought/is" opposition is rather a red herring... it should AT least be given as "ought to be/is"... introducing the copula leads us to examine states of being rather than states of affairs - thus, we've been diddling around with "John is honest" when we should be dealing with "John behaves honestly" (and hence my comment on quantifying over actions. We'd also have to qualify them).
Generally speaking, we assign moral qualities to actions...
DH: "Bill, that was a remarkably silly comment. Ignorance is NEVER an excuse."
I would say it was spoken as a mathematician. There is nothing unreasonable in one's making rules about manipulating meaningless symbols.
OK, so one can give a language syntactically. But it only becomes interesting when you give it an interpretation.
Tristan - the set of worlds over which a deontically-modified expression ranges would probably be defined as those in which either N performs A and is given a "positive" ("moral") evaluation or N doesn't perform A and is given a "negative" ("immoral") evaluation - therefore, those worlds in which N performs A are a subset of the "morally perfect worlds"
TV: "Tossing meaningless symbols is exacly what all mathematics do."
Quite so.
DH: "OK, so one can give a language syntactically. But it only becomes interesting when you give it an interpretation."
Quite so.
Personally, the interpretation given makes no sense. I am expected to believe in some 'possible world.' But if there is one thing I am certain of it is that I have no positive knowledge regarding any such 'world.'
I am familiar with the world about me. I believe that things change. I justify my ideas about change by saying that things have an inherent potency to change. That makes sense to me. I find myself capable of believing in such potency without reference to any imaginary 'possible world.' This world is all I need to believe as I do.
TV: "Bill [There is nothing unreasonable in one's making rules about manipulating meaningless symbols.]
i ought to be satisfied if the double negation "nothing unreasonable" had been a positive proposition. but now that tou chose the double negation, i ought not to say that i'm not satisfied."
In my humble opinion, there is nothing unreasonable in one's making rules about manipulating meaningless symbols.
Is that better?
DH: "Possible worlds are fictive constructs from counterfactuals."
Parsimony, parsimony, parsimony... why introduce the trem "possible worlds" when there is no need for it?
How would the great Bill Overcamp give the semantics of alethic logic, then ?
As I have pointed out before, I believe real potency is inherent in substances which change. There is no need to imagine possible worlds.
DH: "Can you show that anything "changes"? I somewhat doubt it."
Doubt all you want. It's not a problem. Just remember when you feel hunger, that eating is not going to ***change*** your state for the better. Keep telling yourself that, over and again.
So, Bill, you're suggesting that I found a metaphysics on solipsism? Tsk tsk tsk
DH: "So, Bill, you're suggesting that I found a metaphysics on solipsism? Tsk tsk tsk"
I am not suggesting anything about what you have or have not done. I am simply saying that I do not accept the notion that there are 'possible worlds' floating about. It certainly reminds me of Plato's ideal world.
i don't think that the possible worlds have anything to do with Plato's world of the forms. dear bill, would you mind elaborating on how you see the connection?
as regards change, i think that it's easy to show change, simply by pointing to a region of space-time and then throwing a banana to that region. there is change at that region of spacetime, since at certain points in time it had a banana in it whereas not at others. no?
HS: "as regards change, i think that it's easy to show change, simply by pointing to a region of space-time and then throwing a banana to that region. there is change at that region of spacetime, since at certain points in time it had a banana in it whereas not at others. no?"
There you go!!
"as regards change, i think that it's easy to show change, simply by pointing to a region of space-time and then throwing a banana to that region. there is change at that region of spacetime, since at certain points in time it had a banana in it whereas not at others. no?"
Haris - "at one time in a certain region of spacetime there are bananas and at another time there aren't". Where is the error in this statement, and what are its origins ?
shit! you're right. but that's an absurd substantivalist reification, you can't seriously maintain that there's no continuity and no change. you're inviting Moore type objections!
but then again, having said that, i don't want to get into a discussion of perdurance or whatever that stuff is.
Haris, I rather fear that you don't want to get into the discussion because you don't really understand it... the particular error you made is commonplace: you forget that, by discussing "a certain region of spacetime", you can't talk about that region at "different times".
The "change" question is one of mereology; so let's discuss mereology instead.
that's probably true, but i think i don't see it as a crucial puzzle for me to solve, the time stuff. i'd rather be a lazy idealist or otherwise block the assumption that we can know about that sort of stuff.
how is the change question is one of mereology? i'll let you ask the questions
An object x is F at T1 and ~F at T2. How can one and the same object have contradictory properties? A simple answer is to say that x has a part y at T1 that is F and a part z at T that is ~F. Problem solved.
How can your hands be hot and your feet be cold? If this is the case, can we say that "Haris is both hot and cold"?
***
I'm more interested in "weird objects" (like "the object that comprises the tip of your nose, the Eiffel Tower, and the Crab Nebula" - or, for that matter, "the human race"). Weird objects have parts that are either temporally or spatially (or even spatiotemporally) discrete... so, why SHOULDN'T we postulate that "there is" an object that comprises "the tip of your nose, the Eiffel Tower, and the Crab Nebula"?
no, i don't like your solution. i think that that's bad language, in the sense that in that case we're misusing language if we say 'haris is cold' when what we mean is 'haris's hands are cold'. and i think this answer covers your temporal parts too, without introducing them.
as regards the weird objects, i think the 'human race' should be treated more as a natural kind, rather than as an object. as regards unrestricted compositionality, i think you could come up with some sort of spacetime story to block the crab nebula. of course then a weird object comprising only of the tip of your nose and the eiffel tower would not be blocked. maybe it's time to consult SEP so that we get a better grip on what the issue is? though having said that, i'd be happy to take your word as i should have other fish to fry
Don't like my solution? Suggest a better, then...
Haris Shekeris, you are treating "physical objects" as if their "objecthood" were mind-independent... and as for "bad language use", is this the same defender of relativism we all know and love (well, tolerate)?
You might have the courage of your convictions, young man, but you don't have the metaphysics of said convictions - shame on you for being a secret logical positivist all these years!
oh no!! i've been exposed, besides it appears that Carnap was flirting with relativism too!!
well as a relativist i would probably think that metaphysics is ill-conceived right from the beginning. we can have a discussion on that if you wish, although i fear some of my metaphysical convictions will be exposed.
or i could just claim to be a fictionalist about metaphysics and this business of mind-independence. by the way, my relativism does not preclude the idea that there may indeed be a mind-independent world. it's actually agnostic and says that that world does not have any causal effect on our beliefs and everyday business.
Accepting that reality is "mind-independent" is a pragmatic rather than a metaphysical choice - one has such-and-such reasons to postulate mind-independence, and then one makes up the metaphysics to fit the choice
Does this make any sense to you?
well it does from my pragmatist-relativist perspective, but i can understand the tradition that says that one does metaphysics and then chooses to settle the question of mind independence so that it fits with their metaphysics.
yet you labelled postulating mind independence as a pragmatic rather than a metaphysical choice. i'm a bit puzzled
I was being particularly Machiavellian...
All the same, I'm not claiming that mind-independence is a pragmatic notion. Mind-independence is clearly a metaphysical notion. However, one's reasons for PREFERRING mind-independence are frequently pragmatic (and don't forget that one's pragmatic object might be to show that one metaphysical account is preferable to another).
If the world were entirely mind-dependent, then either (1) mind creates or generates physical matter/energy or (2) there is NO physical matter/energy, just "mind".
If (1) were the case, the capacity of generating matter/energy is constrained - if it were not, I could generate a cup of coffee here at my desk rather than being obliged to go and fetch one from the machine. Why should it be constrained, and by what? If it is constrained by any physical consideration, then we don’t have full mind-dependence; if it is constrained by some mental consideration, what is that consideration and how does it exercise an effect over our capacity to generate matter/energy? (I have no answer to this last point, and would welcome any defence of the idea that the world is mind-dependent and that the generation of matter/energy is mentally constrained.
If (2) is the case, we have “nothing but mind” (pure idealism). This raises more questions than it answers:
- How many minds are there? Each of us has direct access to his or her own mind and to no others – “other minds” might be as illusory as “other bodies”. Parsimony would suggest that we adopt solipsism (which is a philosophical black hole)
- If there is more than one mind, where are these minds? One mind can contain everything (including putative “other minds”), but if there are many minds, then each must be distinct from the others (otherwise we can reduce them down to one “universal” mind that is for some strange reason compartmentalised). How does this distinction work?
- Where do minds come from? If they’re not “eternal entities”, they must come into being and (perhaps) cease to be. But why should this be the case? If, on the other hand, they are “eternal”, why should they seem to be constrained to the history of some physical body?
Generally speaking, idealism leads either to solipsism or to God (and BOTH of these solutions are philosophical black holes).
So, I don’t like solipsism and I think God is the ultimate intellectual cop-out. These are solid pragmatic reasons for preferring a certain degree of mind-independence. As I think God is a cop-out, dualism is unlikely to attract me; therefore I would tend to hold that mind is physically dependent – that is, and with a large number of provisos, I would tend to hold that mind is a “causal result” of the physical world. Now, given that I believe that a tree falling in a forest displaces air whether or not the waves propagated by that displacement interact with some auditory system, it would seem that I believe that certain things can happen whether or not they are observed. In this respect, I hold to “mind-independence”: I believe that physical relations obtain as part of the “regularities of the physical universe”, and that these regularities are characteristics of the universe, not of “mind”. However, I would entirely refuse to accept that tables and chairs are “mind-independent entities”.
***
If we set aside the metaphysical oversimplification of the above, each of my preferences (against solipsism, against “many-mind idealism”, against dualism, for physicalism, for a “differentiated block of spacetime”, against the “mind-independence of artefacts” etc.) is the result of a general preference for explanations that avoid either solipsism or deism. Each specific preference reinforces my “justification” for the general preference, and thus serves my pragmatic object.
dear david, thanks for the thorough exposition, i agree with you that old-style mind-dependence is quite untenable. i'm worried sometimes whether communitarian epistemology presupposes deep-down some sort of mind-dependence or even Kantian things-in-themselves realms, but i've decided to probably leave such worries for later. in that respect, there's a huge appeal in realism, that just says 'what you see is what you get'. however, from philosophy of psychology there is a new wave of idealism, based on coupling and perspectivalism, drawing from the work of husserl and merleau-ponty in phenomenology. i know a bit about it and was greatly attracted to it. want some references?
I also like realism, but in a very nominalist sense.
I rather think that I'd prefer to be torn apart by wild horses than read Merleau-Ponty - you don't happen to have a few wild horses?
so i assume the dilemma between Merleau-Ponty and horses is very real for you? :)
read the dreyfus commentary and translations of him (and possibly husserl) they should be much more accessible.
it's funny because the americans are neutral on the continental/analytic distinction with the result of interesting crossovers, whereas the brits and the french are much less flexible.
as regards nominalism and realism, i think i just wouldn't get drawn in the debate. i think Kusch leaves open the possibility of our conceptual schemes actually mapping to reality, choosing instead to downplay the whole thing. (what matters is not the reality but the consensus)
I believe that the senses serve a natural purpose in promoting the survival of the species through the knowledge of an external reality.
Take away that reality and the whole structure of the animal form seems inexplicable.
"what matters is not the reality but the consensus"
Yeah, until the consentees get zapped by an unexpected asteroid...
If I am correct, that the senses serve a natural purpose in promoting the survival of the species... what natural purpose does consensus serve? Does mere consensus promote the survival of the species without supporting input from the senses?
Suppose that two starving men are sitting at a table in a dark room. There is a light nearby which they could turn on to see what else may be in the room. Now suppose the two men come to a consensus that there is no reason to turn on the light because there is no food in the room for them to eat anyway. They also have come to a consensus that there is no door to the room so there is no point in looking for one... that they have no choice but to die of starvation.
Are these two men wise, relying on their consensus, or are they fools in not employing their senses?
What is their justification for believing that there is no food in the room?
dear bill, sorry for getting personal, but do you get along with your wife? do you achieve that without consensus? i would even go as far as claiming that there wouldn't be people if the world if adam and eve didn't consent to going to bed together. (or whatever they had those days).
DH: "What is their justification for believing that there is no food in the room?"
Does it matter? Consensus is what is important.
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