On FB, the good Elliot Bougis - who is of the Theistical stripe - recently remarked most wittily that “glorying in an immense body.... seems to be the gist of naturalism”. Setting aside the average pop-eyed God-thumping philosophically-not-so-Bright, we can, I think, allow a wry smile at the justesse of his remark – just what *is* it that naturalists embrace?
There are, as my good friend Henry Story recently pointed out, certain problems with the 'individual' that is the unrestricted fusion of 'absolutely everything' - not the least being that as it is every thing, it seems very hard to say that it is any thing (how could we individuate it?). As it contains 'absolutely everything', it should also contain its own complement... David Lewis has even suggested that "the fusion of absolutely everything" is the empty set. All in all, there's a very real problem if we think that naturalism is "about the world-as-a-totality".
I'd rather say that naturalism comprises (1) a certain account of our way of talking about the 'natural world', where "natural world" ranges over a series of integrated systems that found and permit measurement; (2) an epistemological preference for that account over "first principles" drawn from introspection; and (3) a metaphysical preference for extensional, rather than conceptual, ontologies. The *domain* of naturalism is restricted - that is, it certainly isn't Lewis' "unrestricted fusion of absolutely everything". Naturalism ranges, primarily, over those aspects of the physical world that correlate to certain systems of measurement; it therefore approaches aspects of the world susceptible only to vague or to qualitative description using the epistemic criteria of the quantitative approach. Furthermore, ‘naturalist’ theses not only range over ‘physical entities’ – they determine what these entities *are*.
So, there are two ‘branches’ of naturalist metaphysics: one branch considers the relation between physical theory and its putative domain; the other considers the relation between the primary domain of naturalist theory and the domains of other accounts of the world – traditionally, the distinction between the two branches would be illustrated by, on the first branch, the philosophy of physics, and on the second, analytic philosophy of mind [though more recently, developments in post- Lewis philosophy of time have underlined the blurring between these distinctions].
The conflicts between naturalism and doxastic systems are also of two kinds: those that concern the domain of physical theory (Darwinism, creationism...), and those that concern the relation between the domain of naturalist theory and other domains (the relation between the ‘natural’ and the ‘supernatural’; between intention, action, and the evaluation of action; between physical existence and reality...). The former are primarily epistemic conflicts (between rival theories of human origins, rival cosmologies...); the latter are more ‘’metaphysical’ insofar as they concern the limits of reduction of ‘non-physical’ to ‘physical’ domains, and the advisability of eliminating the one in favour of the other. As philosophers, I doubt very much that we would differ greatly over the epistemic value of most of predictive science with respect to “physical reality”, though we would probably disagree over what this epistemic and predictive values signifies. Our wider differences concern the relation of the domain of naturalist theory to other domains and, perhaps most fundamentally, our chances of founding any ‘universal’ standard by which we can evaluate conflicting theories. As far as I can see, choosing naturalism is choosing to live with unresolved indetermination; the challenge for naturalism is to integrate this.
So, unless they’re going to embrace the *theoretical limits of measurement of spacetime in however many dimensions we can fit it into with respect to the entire phase space of every point AND simultaneously of every theory-dependent particle (allowing for the apparent impossibility of defining the precise state and position of any such particle)*, the only body that naturalists can embrace is a body of symbols.
Well, that’s naturalism from the point of view of this nominalist, at any rate... I’ll let others be realist about science.
#H1-105. Reading David Hirst's post of Dec 4, 2010 10:23 pm.
"(allowing for the apparent impossibility of defining the precise state and position of any such particle)".
@*. Why are we giving so much importance to this? Are all "similar" level characteristics exhausted? [I don't know; i only want to know on efforts seeking such oppurtunities?].
I said "apparent"; whether of not there is a real "problem of measurement" doesn't invalidate the remark that the field of naturalism is delimited by what is, in principle, measurable and/or quantifiable.
#H1-110. On reading David Hirst Dec 5, 2010 12:50 am.
@* Let me admit that, i would not even know if asked to write the definition of naturalism (may be some circumlocutively), but i i wanted to learn about that through this thread. You may well say i can as well look it up myself. i read unsystematically. That is the reason using RG for my purpose [time passing? or passion].
In order to be able to post in "Naturalism Revisited" i used goggle; you may find i might have gone astray too. But some interesting gleanings i list below, below each, [what should be more interesting!] my questions. [I again wonder do i misplace question marks for fullstops? or.]
> = QUOTATIONS.
@* = QUESTIONS.
1. http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_travel.
@*. Can information BE independent of matter and energy. I think it is fundamental in ways similar the latter are so, but i think they all exist only together; ie there isn't some fundamental property which exists alone, only all such properties exist together.
2. @*. The twin paradox or any such two different clocks: will necessarily both [mechanical] clocks show different times? A time contraction is not coupled with space dilation?, or spacetime not subject to the coupled effect?
3.
@* Milliseconds or Megaseconds : I ONLY WONDER WHERE THIS COULD HAVE BECOME WRONG.
4.
@* HOW TO MARRY MANY A PARTIAL PROBABILITY TO A SINGLE RESULT. Why this different from throwing a dice, then resonance, then what is this new if it is there, or what if it is not there?
5.
@* Where are the ways of finding "a bird flying away [and stopping the undoable]" as "some logical force".
6.
@*. Anything is possible at the time of ultiverse, that is you could not further abstract are go farther back. In that case it appears to equal nothingness as well as everything. Ie anything is possible since nothing had been before. And everything is possible since everything was there. The arrow of time reduced the abstraction by introducing constraints [the very act of the incipient creation itself is introducing a constraint's instantiation] in the first case. The arrow of time introduced constraints on the exhaustiveness so that creation became a reducingness. However, since we feel that creation should have been preceded by nothing, we can take only the first path.
Creation therefore is reducing the omnipotential, so generalisation to become not to exceed the constraints introduced. This is good as far as a philosophical/philological universe can be. But is that compatible with the 11-12-10 2136. Physical universe. We seem to need multiverse, of multiverses, of multiversess, -sss,and so on. There quantity and complexity do get increased back in time. Can such thing be possible from anything is possible ultiverse. Or we shall say everything is possible. I think anything is philology and everything is physics, no more difference. Will the structure of multiverses ever reach homogeneity. I dont know, but seeing from a theoretical distance, philosophically it can be homogenous. Physically, we can say, since multiversesss shall be too large compared to the universe, we shall use the approximation of such homogeneity. We do know this need not necessarily be homogeneity, but we feel that we can use such an approximation. Or we should claim, things as they become larger, their structure can be mistaked with a lack-of-structure. Ie you could deal either way. Then, there is a relation between the number of parts and the size of the object. Irrespective of whether lesser or more or further-more parts, with a larger size, it is possible to mistake that the ensemble is homogenously composed. This is like saying, earth in a way is homogenous, whether as now it is, or is hollow.
In that anything/everything is possible, things/homogeneity/certainty/generalisation became subject to constraints, start getting eliminated. Therefore, each big bang isolates us from being part of multiverse to a universe. We do not know how many layers of multiverses-sss big bangs, and whether our universe has already become single [or unlikely]. If multiverse generating bangs are all over, then actually, if it is process of applying constraints, then we need to shrink? And there may not be sufficient constraints to ever reduce the world to nothing/?
I think, whatever that may have necessitated our multiverse anything/everything is possible, but i think, even though we discovered that as the ultimate general state, it is possible also to apply that as straight reached from mere one universe. From the integer-hundred-anything-possible probability, the freedom were just by the action of creation reduced so that creation can be born. The constraints we are calling as laws of physics. But, after all the hardwork, we are only in a philological cosmology, and no physical cosmology. Only in the hope, only some day some translation will become possible. All the intention of non-physical, is only to help correlate with physical, since that's which we can understand, since we are not nonphysical entities and we are only physical entities.
How will a man composed of philological or mathematical properties live?
I have already said i write what i fancy as fascinates me. I dont know when i will have mind to review the wrote out words, and paraphrase them towards use, or admit my shame for having written words mistaking them to meanings.
END NOTE: certainly i should have cause for definite shame: philological universe - what usurpation of words is this. could this clumsiness/vain talk be exceeded.
7. Wikipedia/Minkowiski diagram>>The known equivalence of the three space dimensions expresses itself especially through the possibility of rotations. Therefore the three dimensions are not predefined but can be chosen arbitrarily by definition of the coordinate system>>
@*. MAY BE THEN TIME CAN BE TREATED AS SPACE IN MOTION?
8. Wikipedia/Novikov self-consistency principle.
9. ibid.
10. Wikipedia/Modal realism. >
11. ibid.
@*. I would not understand this. What is the NEED, other than may be sense-gratitude, we have to transform "mathematical constructs" in to "[what]objects"?
12. Wikipedia/Cosmic string. >
@*. This also i don't understand. What are 0 or 1 or 2 dimensions? Where do they exist?
Or how to approximate 0 or 1 or 2 into 3?
13. Wikipedia/Chronology protection conjecture.
@*. I am interested in a revisionism: macroscopic and submicroscopic scales do not differ in their properties! with all the implications.
14. Wikipedia/Time travel.
AT LAST: @*. It is not necessary DH may feel considerate to respond to all the above. I wonder why RG still has insignificant number of contributors/attempters.
i am already developing a feeling i am making here RG a copy of wikipedia. If anybody shall raise more questions esp on the quotations 1 to 14 i have left unattended, i may be helped to attend such atleast then after. But why should anyone repeat my interests, they should have their independence. I hope some learning anyway makes this long posting anyway acceptable.
_______________
THE EDIT done: removing the unused lines at the end. [Thanks Bill, he did the space saving on my earlier occasions.]
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