[I know we shouldn't really cross-post; though I posted this in the "Bell" thread, I think it's perhaps worth reposting in a new "time and space" topic where we can thrash out the different terms of the various debates rather than dealing with 'em piecemeal]
I'd point out that the following are PHILOSOPHICAL problems with time, and that they thereby concern our everyday use of "temporal notions" as much as, if not more than, our scientific notions; I'm also respecting classical philosophical practice in recognising a real distinction between the philosophies of time and of space save where the theories accept a "spacetime". I'll add one or two links to resources which deal with the interface with scientific notions (though Callender's http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/ccallender/Time'sOnticVoltage.doc is a good example)
So, the areas of debate are:
Is there any difference in the ontological status of "past", "present", and "future" entities? This debate opposes two main views: presentism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presentism_%28philosophy_of_time%29), the view that only "the present and the things of the present" are real; and eternalism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternalism_%28philosophy_of_time%29), the view that "past", "present", and "future" are at best local distinctions, and that the distinction between "now" and "other times" has no more ontological force than the distinction between "here" and "other places". (there is a third, intermediate view, known as "the growing block", which holds that the present and the past are real ("actualised"), but that the future is not). Many presentists hold to a "3+1D" view of space and time in which there is a real distinction of "kind" between space and time; those who accept the spacetime account have the difficulty of explaining why any instant (hyperplane) should be the sole, universal present. The vast majority of eternalists prefer the four-dimensional view of spacetime.
Persistence through time - do entities persist by having all their parts at each instant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endurance_%28philosophy%29) or do they persist by having a part at each instant? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perdurantism)
The passage of time: are the temporal properties "is past", "is present", and "is future" fundamental, or can they be reduced to the temporal relation "earlier than - simultaneous with - later than"? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-series_and_B-series)
Is spacetime a substance, or does it reduce to the relations obtaining between physical entities? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_space_and_time#Absolutism_and_relationalism)
What is the status of verbal tense? This is, for my money, one of the most interesting areas at present, as it examines the relation between language and time. There are two areas of investigation: the first examines whether there are "tensed propositions" or whether tense modifies propositions in the way alethic modal operators modify propositions (this debate bears a great deal of resemblance to the de re/de dicto opposition in alethic modal logic and has certain links with both the eternalist/presentist and the perdurantist/endurantist oppositions). The second examines verbal tense as the expression of an "irreducible temporal perspective", and is linked to the A-series/B-series opposition and to the whole question of "the experience and perception of time" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-experience/). This second area also examines representation of verbal tense and its correlations with other representations of time (for example, the timeline representation of events lying in a given speaker's local "past" and "present" bears striking similarities to light-cone representation of causal structure in a spacetime diagram. Is this merely coincidental?)
What is the evidence from our best physical theories of time? Special relativity – which is our best theory of local conditions at our order of magnitude – contradicts our intuitive understanding of time, but can we find "human time" in general relativity or in quantum mechanics? (cf. the Callender paper I quoted in an earlier message, also http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-bebecome/)
Does the thermodynamic arrow found the temporal arrow, and the other time-asymmetric relations (knowledge, causation etc.)? http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-thermo/
These are the main areas; evidently, I haven't given the details of the various view or the arguments for and against; if anyone wants any clarification, I'd be happy to give it!
For a further development, of the basic oppositions, I'd suggest Ned Markosian's http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/
Thanks David.
Believe it or not, I have downloaded all the links to read through in my very limited pockets of time and even more restricted connectivity. Although I am only on point 2.2. in his paper of 'Time's Ontic Voltage', I thoroughly enjoy Callender's wit. However, I may not entirely be cured of existence-obsession yet; or as easily assume that existence simplicter makes sense...but DO see it's *value* more than it's *validity* in the light that there may be no better theory of reference - yet. But wait, there will be more ;)
If there is no relative simultaneity then half of the philosophy of time has to be abandoned.
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