Hello, i see it as the body of inquiry that umbrellas the epistemological structures from wich our consensus knowledge stems from.

this is a rather original answer, and imhop not bad, really.

nevertheless, I think it's a bit too broad, covering more then only scientific knowledge, which always carries also some methodological and some systematizing features with it.

e.g. mathematization is a standard topic in discussing the epistemic status of scientific knowledge.

while consensus knowledge will to some extent also be possible for pre-scientific and extra-scientific environments.

'Philosophy of science' is widely regarded as the most imprecise and controversial term among the (sub-)disciplines that reflect on science. The decision to include 'philosophy of science' in the usually triadic conception of science studies with philosophy, sociology and history of science will not go unchallenged, but it is important to consider the implications of philosophy of science.

The greatest demarcation problems of the term philosophy of science exist in relation to philosophy, ethics and criticism of science. In the discourses of philosophy and science, approaches can certainly be identified that want to dismiss the concept of philosophy of science in favour of philosophy of science. This process does not miss a certain logical consequence insofar as the philosophy of science has historically emerged from the philosophy of science or science theory (technical term since Bolzano). Philosophy of science - possibly as a more or less strategic counterpart to the formally structural or logically analytical philosophy of science - is characterised by an unmistakable metaphysically speculative tone. It is therefore not surprising that even today, the term 'philosophy of science' is still being promoted as 'metaphysics of science'.

For a long period of time, representatives of the philosophy of science were mainly concerned with epistemological and/ or logical explanations and justifications of scientific knowledge. In addition, the theory of science dealt in detail with specific structures and dynamics of scientific knowledge (Fleck, Kuhn, etc.). In the course of the further differentiation, diversification and specialisation of the theory of science, professional attention was primarily directed towards cognitive aspects of individual sciences, hybrid disciplines and scientific special fields.