Katherine Hawley has rightly remarked that "analytic metaphysics is in resurgence; there is renewed and vigorous interest in topics such as time, causation, persistence, parthood and possible worlds".
The object of this thread is to discuss what metaphysics is (what topics it covers, what notions are most debated and by whom...) and also what justification we might have for preferring one metaphysical notion to another.
Here are a couple of resources which give the bakground to traditional metaphysics and to its revival in the last quarter of the 20th century :
Wikipedia (general introduction for the newcomer to metaphysics): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics
Stanford (for those who want an update on more recent trends): http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/
I'll try and regroup our earler debates on the various points under the new topic heading!
Well, we don't want the philosophers of science to have it ALL their own way now, do we?
A related question: If Metaphysics is based on non-empirical character on the *nature* of existence, it is logical that it is ALSO based on 'natural laws', i.e. the principle of the uniformity of nature, law of causality, principle of induction etc. Is there not a danger in being so presumptious in metaphysical studies? I mean, what if the tide DOESN'T come in tomorrow??
What is the status of a "natural law"? A good topic for a thread, perhaps...
An aside: should we repatriate the "philosophy of mind" thread here? For me, "mind" is a metaphysical problem...
Ok. I'll write it up.
On Philo of Mind: place it here only if we can debate its constitution - it's difficult to give meaning to signs in propositions though. I mean, 'philosophy of mind' appears to be a two-termed predicate, yes? But it surely can't be a genuine proposition as I'm not sure 'mind' is at all one-type level lower than philosophy or vice versa. 'Mind' in my view, although appearing metaphysical for the sake of its extension, doesn't quite *exist* on its own or 'due to..' or 'because of..' wouldn't you think? I think it more or less hits the spot if it's the 'phenomenology of mind'.
I couldn't resist coming back on this - yes, of course we can. What do you think I'm doing?
Couldn't help myself, with apologies...
DH: "there is renewed and vigorous interest in topics such as time, causation, persistence, parthood and possible worlds".
Time, infinity, possible worlds - seem better suited to theology or epistemology. Ditto when causation is categorical or ultimate. Even I can be nominalistic enough to see that.
Of course it is quite heretical.
Nat: "If Metaphysics is based on non-empirical character on the *nature* of existence, it is logical that it is ALSO based on 'natural laws', i.e. the principle of the uniformity of nature, law of causality, principle of induction etc. "
I will prefer it is we rephrase it like so: Nature and natural laws express the same principles that metaphysics seeks to 1) understand and 2) interpret as paradigms capable of templating empirical reality whereat the comparison and contrast suggests avenues of further development. One reason why this is preferred is that the use of metaphysics to demonstrate a three-fold logic as an expression of empirical nature, i.e. truncating the informing four-fold under-girding paradigmatic structure(s), for if metaphysics is 'based' on the natural laws, and if by those we assume the empirical three-fold property exposition, then logically we are dismissing the natural laws expressed through what metaphysics itself suggests. Of course that requires that one admit at least the possibility that my argument bears merit, and maybe that is also heretical for the time being.
"Nature and natural laws express the same principles that metaphysics seeks to 1) understand and 2) interpret as paradigms capable of templating empirical reality whereat the comparison and contrast suggests avenues of further development."
Read as
THE LANGUAGE USED TO DESCRIBE "Nature and natural laws" expresses the same principles that metaphysics AS CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS seeks to 1) understand and 2) interpret as paradigms capable of templating empirical reality whereat the comparison and contrast suggests avenues of further development.
This reformulation makes no sense. Of course. And why? Because Charles has reified the complex term "nature and natural laws", and because Aristotle wrote a book after his "Physics".
And why should Ms Hawley not give a nominalist gloss to "time, causation, persistence, parthood and possible worlds"? I know I do...
(actually, I must say that she's far too nice a person to be in the piratical world of contemporary philosophy)
DH: "THE LANGUAGE USED TO DESCRIBE "Nature and natural laws" expresses the same principles that metaphysics AS CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS...."
David, that is moronic, sorry. Talk about category errors! Since when does the "Language used to describe 'X' have diddly-squat to say about the products of metaphysics? How do we know that any given language adequately conveys the principles of anything? The logic of correlated thoughts is what we are after and the chore is to bring language into templated equivalence therewith. Once we have identified the adequate correlation of linguistic faithfulness to the ordered arrangement of thoughts in turn reflecting, hopefully, nature and her laws, we can then attempt to employ language to faithfully describe what metaphysics gleans from nature and thus what it imputes as to its laws. Language is always an afterthought, always a handmaiden who is a little ignorant and untutored, always in need of oversight. To suggest that your stated reformulation of my remarks bears any remote internal logic is vapid.
Allow me to rephrase my own words since logic has apparently rendered you all but incapable of such:
Nature is a fourthness, an apparent evidence of deductions originally enabled, we presume, from the operation of natural laws as we understand them - quite apart from any interference of language, I might add. We say to ourselves, "Selves, what we have as phenomenological givens (a la Lewis) are perception's rendering of what we deduce to be the result of natural laws." Call that a composite of Descartes and Kant. Blame them, not me.
We decide to be philosophical regarding these perceptions, Oh dear. But let's abide the notion all the same...
We have a corollary deduction from the first, namely that nature's laws reflect universal (likely, at any rate) principles, for we allow that the term "law" is really only a convenient way of delimiting an instantiation of a universal principle (if you wish to go that far - logic doesn't of course require it) - or instead that a subset of said principles derives what we call the laws under consideration, in order to assert a logically valid background aback what we call a legal process culminating in what we perceive to be reality.
And we say, in order to denominate our philosophical approach (note I had not said philosophic), that metaphysics denotes the understanding that permits us to model the perceived reality in such a manner as to permit a constructive comprehension of some aspect of reality, such knowledge that we attempt to attain to a testable point for purposes of empirical validation. Again, language is beside the point except as a descriptor, a handmaiden. But the same principles giving rise to reason likewise give rise to language, which is why we argue that there is a reasonable basis why we should expect language to reasonably reflect what the mind thinks.
Now if we do not presume the reasoning above, we risk presuming that what we allow logic to deduce from perceptions of reality is, say, the syllogistic aspect, which actual metaphysics either puts the lie to or demonstrates as inadequate because incomplete. Language has pitifully little to say about matters, whence your entire thesis begins to appear as a category error writ large. I should perhaps just pity you, my friend.
Now say that without using language. If you can, then I'll grant that the terms you're using might have some extension; until such time, I'll consider them to be terms, and therefore linguistic entities.
There are too many unanalysed givens, Charles; too many terms used with an implicit, intuitive scope I refuse to accord: "thought", "nature", "law" - and, of course, "reality". You might see things - I see terms, and the way these terms figure in linguistic behaviour.
Show me "reality" without using the word "reality"...
What is metaphysics?
According to Aristotle, there are three levels of abstraction.
The physical sciences abstract from this matter to matter in general.
Mathematics abstracts from matter to the quantities underlying substance.
Metaphysics abstracts from both matter and quantity to being.
DH: "Show me "reality" without using the word "reality"..."
Irrelevant argument, David. I think I shall tell your company to stop paying your salary because you can only ask for it with the word "salary". That is how ridiculous that remark is. It is specious, even though superficially it is indeed a truth. Yes, to utilize communication we require a vehicle. Geez, how brilliant of you! You are better than that, David. Please stop attempting to undo your betters with cleverness. Take me on man to man, don't keep giving me reason to talk to you as a child. If you can't deliver words to accord with understood reality, go back to university teaching where that crap flies well.
Here you are dealing with human beings, frail though they be. They require language not because it exists but because of what it enables as a vehicle, and that in turn requires a context that you apparently do not much comprehend and so apparently choose to ignore or degrade and/or dismiss. Intelligence doesn't often degrade or dismiss realities that have to be a part of constructive engagement. Your boss wouldn't have hired you if they thought you'd deal with them as you deal with us here.
I have been in business for thirty years in various capacities, including a $1,000/week consultant twenty-five years ago. If I treated my employees or bosses with the vapid one-liners you toss out here I would have gotten nowhere. So I have to assume you reserve the nonsense for here and use a very different set of guidelines speaking to them. I think you should consider using the same criteria and modalities of explication and delivery for all occasions.
Ref: Israel Sadovnik Socratus
The God spoke in the darkness: “Let there be light !”
......................
But we know, that according to Quantum Physics a virtual
energetic particles can ..........
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Plato’s Timaeus [ 53 B ] reference [Loeb classical library]:
....when the work of setting in this Universe was being undertaken, fire and water and earth and air ,although possessing SOME TRACES of their own nature, were yet so disposed as everything is likely to be in the absence of God; and inasmuch as this was then their natural condition, God began by first marking them out into shapes by means of forms and numbers. .....
Panagiotis Stefanides
There is a good book on language, ***Aristotle in China; Language, Categories and Translation*** by Robert Wardy, University of Cambridge.
"In this book, Robert Wardy, a philosopher and classicist, turns his attention to the relation between language and thought. He explores this huge topic in an analysis of linguistic relativism, with specific reference to a reading of the ming li t'an ('The Investigation of the Theory of Names'), a seventeenth-century Chinese translation of Aristotle's Categories. Throughout his investigation, Wardy addresses important questions. Do the basis structures of language shape the major thought-patterns of its native speakers? Could philosophy be guided and constrained by the language in which it is done? What factors, from grammar and logic to cultural and religious expectations, influence translation? And does Aristotle survive rendition into Chinese intact? His answers will fascinate philosphers, Sinologists, classicists, linguists and anthropologists, and will make a major contribution to the existing literature."
http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/isbn/item1116198/
"...God began by first marking them out into shapes by means of forms and numbers. ....."
This is the proper sphere of number theory. It is also a formidably complex aspect of what must be understood as metaphysics. Number, in the context of the actual generation of reality, generates its own language. Why is eight so important a number for the Chinese (speaking of whom - Bill O.). Eight is a completion number. What is a completion number? Why would it be relevant to metaphysics? Physicists understood shortly after Pauli's work that even numbers spoke the language of structure and odd numbers the language of force. Today's academic dupes don't much refer to such mystical stuff so enamored are they with all the impressiveness of formal logic. A study of the Fibonacci series will demonstrate a cyclic relation in which eight and one coexist as a composite unity prior to existing as related units. How on earth can that be? Logic knows of no such thing. Human reason does know of such things. The great physicists were aware of these oddities and were unashamed of them. Why does one have to be great in order to be either honest or intelligent?
Let the David Hirsts of the world inform the Charles Herrmans of the world why this must all end poorly or not at all. The latter will finally speak, and when they do, what Quine himself suggested as possible will indeed take place...a profound new simplicity will upend the world built by formal logic. I am going to presume the positivists are capable of looking that up. I have elsewhere quoted it, of course.
I apologize to all here for being somewhat of a stinker. If not me, then, who?
On my Facebook page I state my finest expression:
"Aristotle (his son, actually) seems to have meant simply that it subtends or transcends apparent reality. I would add: the method best modeling metaphysics best explicates reality."
I stand by those words. Let anyone else upend them if they can or as they will. Peirce understood that metaphysics *requires* what today we term "soft" philosophical realism. He strenuously argued its case, and at that at a time when nominalists were rushing like roaches to overtake the world with their scientism. Only difference between Peirce and myself: I am on drugs.
Bill - I'm no relativist - you must be thinking of Haris. And as for Charles - well! Such ad hominems, Charles, from one so honourable (and inexpensive!) - I'm almost impressed. OF COURSE I couch my suggestions to my clients in terms that address their intuitions and assumptions: however, I don't base my own philosophy on such intuitions and assumptions. I doubt that you do, either. However, as I have no particular fact of the matter to grind, I can adapt myself to whatever their implicit theory might be – my role isn’t to impose theories, it’s to help with description and with the collective determination of sense. What do I care what the ‘sense’ might be, as long as it allows coherent, end-oriented collective action? It’s their sense, not mine...
What I can’t accept are insufficient tools, and integrated models that aren’t. I’ll let others weave tapestries of colourful words; what matters to me is the fundamental incompatibility of certain descriptions of the organisation. Happy little theories of corporate and collective responsibility are all very nice, but it DOES help to have an idea of what kind of thing is supposed to exemplify such ‘moral qualities' (and of their just use in strategies of influence, institutional communication, internal management policy, image management, stakeholder policy etc etc). What I’m looking for is a tool that can, from a stated strategy, generate an integrated process-driven policy covering everything from recruitment to reporting... and that can, if generalised to long-term environment-based planning, also suggest integrated strategic solutions. What I need is a general theory (in the motivated sense) that, when interpreted by one axis of description or another, yields as its ‘models’ the special theories of this or that aspect of corporate or collective action.
Charles would certainly reject the claim that this is a “metaphysical” approach, but then Charles and I have very different ideas about metaphysics. As my claim need only be defended with respect to the academic community, Charles is – by his own remarks – not really concerned.
And what has all this to do with the primacy of our language over our metaphysics? Well, I treat entities as conventionally-determined , theory-dependent posits, not as theory-independent essences. Therefore, I hold that however an agent chooses to describe the world, that description determines some world-version. There’s no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ about her world-version with respect to the world, just ‘predictive success’ and compatibility with rival world versions. And (to goad Bill a bit), even though on the ‘private, personal’ level, we know by acquaintance that we live in ‘this’ world, given the total indetermination of any act of ‘internal deixis’ (‘intention’, in Husserlian terms), we don’t know ‘which’ world this world is.
All this huffing and puffing, Charles, falls on my brick-clad ears as ‘first philosophy’ and ‘categorical essentialism’. As you’ve pointed out so charmingly, I have certain habits of thought inherited from my positivist forebears – one of them is to take the various epistemic systems around me as parallel, concurrent accounts of this or that aspect of the world. My interest as a philosopher concerns the internal coherence of the various accounts, their pragmatic success, and their compatibility with other areas of knowledge – the role of the philosopher is not to establish yet another rival theory of the world, but to examine the implications of what and how we know about the world.
And, strangely enough, all the work I do is a matter of manipulating conventional symbols and performing linguistic actions... I imagine Charles works by direct invocation of the Higher Powers.
...for surely, the sails of rhetoric are woven from words. Language is a good sertvant, Charles, but a vey poor master.
Let those who will proclaim that they hold the key to reality; when people ask me what I do in life, I can only say "I think about language". I may not be modest as a person, but my claims make up for it.
DH: "What I’m looking for is a tool that can, from a stated strategy, generate an integrated process-driven policy covering everything from recruitment to reporting... and that can, if generalised to long-term environment-based planning, also suggest integrated strategic solutions."
Admirable. Not many there are willing to tackle that broad and open-ended a thesis. I can only wish you the grandest success in that endeavor.
Thank you Charles - you must indeed have Special Powers; it appears your wish is in the course of being granted. If we can set aside our theoretical differences, I think that we could certainly work together on practical applications - as I've already remarked, I believe the approaches are compatible. My job is to show HOW they can be compatible...
What a chameleon he is, this David... but it's all in the spirit of Good Clean Fun and being a Difficult Bugger!
DH: "My interest as a philosopher concerns the internal coherence of the various accounts, their pragmatic success, and their compatibility with other areas of knowledge – the role of the philosopher is not to establish yet another rival theory of the world, but to examine the implications of what and how we know about the world."
I concur with the first phrase and wonder why with your experience studying Peirce you don't consider similar systems in close relation to his -- unless you decided that Peirce was off-base.
I question the second phrase, and in two regards. Alternate systems will arise when existing systems appear to be insufficient. And then, there's the restriction of the endeavor to 'implications'.
And lastly, you appear to have the impression that the system I utilize, despite retaining excellent aspects of Peirce, Weiss and Whitehead, must suggest I divine matters from the source in direct fashion? Me, an atheist. Oh well, we shall let David have his fun, after all, I certainly have had mine...
(I do the last really well, though I says it as shouldn't)
By the way, has anyone seen Holmes? He should be here by now...
Whitehead indeed had some useful insights - though I prefer the developments of Goodman. And I can't say I'm an atheist, either... I just don't think it likely that the term 'God' has a sense.
If you don't start from language, you start from something "expressed in" language. Call me a persistent and consistent (even insistent) nominalist if you will, but I can't see any difference between the two... if you can, then you have greater powers than I, Professor.
(and don't think I can't see Bill Overcamp creeping up behind me with the air rifle...)
I thought you did, Colonel Moran... I mistook juxtaposition for sequence. What a silly consulting detective I am!
Well, Bill, if my views are correct, no-one - not even you yourself ;-)
ANYWAY, lads - this is all great fun, but we risk frightening the Solid Burghers who drop in from time to time to gawp at our antics...
To get the thread back on topic, a question to Charles: you remark "Time, infinity, possible worlds - seem better suited to theology or epistemology"
Why?
...and how would YOU distinguish between 'metaphysics' and 'epistemology'? (the god-botherers can go take a running jump for all I care; they have nothing of interest to contribute)
My prior remarks come from two lines of thought:
1) What metaphysics ought to be and what it cannot be as a consequence;
2) What theology and epistemology are or perhaps instead should be.
The second first: Theology has to my understanding been taken as if a branch of metaphysics if only because both have tended to be defined as explications of Being. But theology, even when a study of being, implies an agency that metaphysics cannot dare presuppose if it is to be honest. Weiss and Hartshorne were badly served by their collaborative cupidity in this regard. Now that of course doesn't mean we can't talk shop across the parking lot. Tillich has some exceptionally good ideas of metaphysics. If he wishes to apply them to a god, that's his mess, not mine. Just don't be telling me that what theology declares a possible god must dictate my thinking as a metaphysician -- until or unless I determine they actually have a point. When they appear to have a valid point that is also not invalid metaphysically, I will probably kill myself out of curiosity just to see where I screwed up.
The moment epistemology is infected with theology there is risk of an issue metaphysically, for if idiots determine that we have a god gene (please) it rather once again presumes by inference to dictate to metaphysics: if epistemology says we can know god, well....does it not now complicate how we can know what metaphysics arrives at?
The correct relation of epistemology to theology is governed by what epistemology should be in the first place, which also dictates that it stay clear of metaphysics. If epistemology is the determination of how we can, as also how we arrive at, a condition of knowledge, we can, if we wish use metaphysical findings or even methodology to assist in the search and elaboration of answers. That is fine. Philosophy has, I believed, proved C. I. Lewis an idiot and Bergson as a genius -- philosophy can and indeed must utilize empirical reality as a substrate, likewise epistemology metaphysics. And if epistemology finds an understanding that has implications for how we likewise understand metaphysics, again fine. But how we understand metaphysics need not compel metaphysics to comply.
And here the nominalists balk as is their wont. Let them. The issue us whether we succumb to Berkeleyan nonsense or not. Even Peirce fell for it. Metaphysics, if it is to correctly apprise reality requires principles in common with reality. If we trust anything about the syllogism we must allow homoioussic status as between reality as it is and as metaphysics says it is wherever we elect to agree that they share normative relations to principle, by definition in the former and via trust in methodology in the latter.
That being said, metaphysics follows reality independent of anything resolved via epistemology, even where we can tentatively agree with a doctrine of the latter in contradiction with our presumptions regarding the former. Gentlemen will agree to disagree from time to time. David and I will doubtless manage agreement on at least that.
Reality is what it is, it requires no metaphysician with a big ego to determine what it must be, for this commits in an even more egregious way what theology presupposes, that is to say, what I personally find impossible to force upon metaphysics. Doesn't mean I don't leave room open for being wrong, just that what reality presently offers by way of grist for our mills offers nothing capable of validating real belief in a god. Religion as a transcendental belief system would be honest were it to acknowledge itself based on a hunch the belief in which might possibly sway ethical existence in a positive direction. That viewpoint seems not to be in the cards. What these folks believe they likewise presume to dictate to reality. Oh my god... (to borrow, if not to take seriously, a locution from the enemy).
What has been said with respect to theology applies in extenso to time, possible worlds and that entire ilk of nonsense. Nominalists are now having to hold their noses. I am sooo sorry to spoil their supper, but here goes. When I say that Aristotle is correct to demand questions that beget answers, I don't talk just to hear myself talk. He was serious, as am I. And if he decides to say that IF there be a god this is what metaphysics declares it must be, that does NOT deny either what I have said above or his own dictum. Please think that through before offering a silly knee-jerk response. I didn't stumble upon metaphysics yesterday. [And when I say things that glib folks presume to be glib, well, that's because they are glib and I am not. And now you have still another reason why I go ballistic at glibness in philosophical discussions. It also tends to make me less than comfortable at one-liners that cannot hope to offer, literally or figuratively, sufficient self-justification to satisfy any pretense to reason or otherwise oblige my assent -- unless, that is, such one-liners meet the criteria for epigrammatic communication -- which is one reason I take that department as seriously as I do, btw. And which, furthermore, positivistic methods are utterly useless I should add -- just to be complete].
Now what about this dictum "Don't ask questions that don't beget answers." It isn't a demand from on high, simply a methodological rule to prevent cupidity or at least keep it to a dull roar. The idea is otherwise approached by the admonition against "spinning the wheels". It is otherwise what good thinkers presupposed when decrying what they considered "speculation". I doubt Kant had a problem with what I would term rational speculation. I presume he had a problem with speculation defined as a violation of the dictum I am speaking of (though at any rate I think in some respects he treated Swedenborg very badly).
Now here is the problem, gents and good ladies -- I happen, on metaphyscial grounds as also what I take for rationality (not to get taken up with a priori considerations), that the ultimate understanding of time, possible worlds and the like qualify as incomprehensible except to those who have ego structures capable of determining what reality is because they say it ought thereby to be, whereat they play god and presume what god would deign to think. Now here is where a tricky line in the sand requires to be drawn, and I doubt not that it is as I just said, tricky. I only assert the line can and ought to be drawn...
It is one thing to say, as philosophically considered (in some cases even, pray don't send me to hell for so saying, LOGIC), that a conditional may be posited such that -- If there be god, THEN metaphysics says it should or must be such and so, and ditto for all such similar notions, of which I obviously consider time, possible worlds, etc. It is a very different matter to allow the conclusions of such speculation to be presented as arbiter dicta. No knowledge is final until it be the product of long-considered world-wide consent, of which the species par excellence is evolution -- and even then intelligence suggests a wary eye.
The problem as I envision it is that once we allow belief to treat speculation as settled fact we risk destruction of metaphysical independence -- free will if you like. Errors in any discipline are not good, in metaphysics they are death. Sorry David, metaphysics is so far in front of language it isn't even funny. As time describes spatially contained occurrences, so language describes what metaphysics prescribes and/or predicts. Only because we permit nominalists to have opinions that are by convention permitted to be as genuine for their stupidity as the others, do we have reason to quarrel at my suggestions. I like to think that offering Hitlerism as just another option for political science is in all regards a parallel to my point here. We can know something intelligent about space, time is the problematic. We can know something about relations that existed prior to language even if language be required to communicate the ideas. To argue otherwise is to become instantaneously religious and theology-bound, to wit: And GOD said: -- and such there was. A nice piece of anthropomorphism, that. And you, David, permit yourself to fall for it. And you wonder why I call you on it? Good god, man. Get a grip. This stuff needn't be rocket science. But when you violate reason for idiotic agendas that is what you suffer, the likes of me calling you on your nonsense. To say that language precedes reality is what you are really implying and I for one will call that a piece of frail humanity if ever there was such to speak of. You may as well defend Hitler as excuse yourself for such solipsisms. In maintaining a doctrinaire position arguing against everything reason and empirical presence suggests is the very definition of an agenda rather than an impartial inquiry. You have nothing to stand on. Except ego and nonsense. You might as well just tell us all that common conceptions and applications of two and two aren't valid for what practicality requires of a definition of "validity".
It is to prevent exactly what I rail at you for that Aristotle's dictum is vital. Space we can ask questions of and beget answers, not so for time. Metaphysics we can use and obtain answers where the ideas dealt with are likewise in obeisance, and not otherwise. If we desire to go beyond these limits, that is our choice, of course, but in making that choice we obligate ourselves to some responsibilities not otherwise required or incurred of/by philosophical discourse. We require that the conditional be treated for what it is and not allowed to be given equal place on the pedestal of knowledge, which would, as I say, be like granting Hitler equal time. The lot of human beings, even atheists, is to adopt or elevate the results of conditionals to the status of declaratives. We turn inquiry into agendas so very easily that we must adopt rules in our methodology to check these tendencies.
I do NOT say we can't discuss origins of being, or time, or space, or worlds, or gods. I am saying we utilize methodologies that minimize tendencies against rational discourse for being antithetical to what philosophy must be. NEVER, EVER must we be glib or indulge in agendas and doctrinaire take-it-or-leave-it rules UNLESS VERY widely acknowledged to be agreeable with accepted understanding of reality, and even that will require the caveat this we can be wrong. And while the vast majority are ready to agree that time is as IMPORTANT an idea as space, I question if they really do consider it as agreeable with principles of actual reality as they will recognize of space. I simply prefer to play it safe. Wherever we have reason to so much as *suppose* time to be descriptive and not substantive we should follow the rule exactingly, and ditto for notions that place language before reality (it is essentially religious in any case) as also notions of multiple universes, other worlds and god knows what else nominalists can conjure. And I have an extra sharp razor at the ready for realists who cross that line, hey hey. :).
In fine, where descriptives are utilized in explicating fundamentals of existence they risk havoc for all that metaphysics stands for. Yes, study these possibilities as you will, but by god you take a back row seat. Too smelly to be any where near me, my nose is sensitive. Once the speculation (a la Kant) actually demonstrates me wrong, BEAUTIFUL. In such instances I can LOVE to be wrong. GO for it, dudes. Put language on a pedestal, just don't get all bent out of shape with agendas. The only agendas we tolerate are methodological, and these are done simply to protect ourselves from ourselves.
My cats are demanding my attention and doubtless you have had your fill...
Peace for the moment and a respite for tired eyes and minds beckoning quiet repose from manic philosophers.
DH: "if my views are correct, no-one - not even you yourself."
In some sense, I do not know what I am thinking. For I know myself in much the same way that I know others, by observation.
On the other hand, some say that god sees what I think.
What is theology?
Well, according to Thomas Aquinas it is the science of what is above reason...
"It is written (2 Timothy 3:16): 'All Scripture, inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice.' Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e. inspired of God."
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1001.htm#article1
But who am I to say?
I don't know that anyone is challenging the putative utility of religion. I myself question its metaphysical credentials and as defining what metaphysics is I think we are all better off keeping religion/theology distinct if also related. Suppose, for example, that all the attempts of philosophy to establish normative ethics came to naught. In theory it is certainly possible on principles of behavioral science that religion could, again I say in theory, come to our rescue. Freud might even agree to the extent that religion frames a species of superego.
CH: "I don't know that anyone is challenging the putative utility of religion. I myself question its metaphysical credentials and as defining what metaphysics is I think we are all better off keeping religion/theology distinct if also related."
I certainly question certain approaches to religion. The First Vatican Council seems to have claimed that there is a logically impeccable proof that there is a god. They conveniently didn't tell us what that proof might be.
Thomas Aquinas didn't seem totally pleased with any argument for god's existence. That's why he gave five such arguments. His thought was much more like a tapestry, than a single irrefutable argument.
In my humble opinion, the only convincing arguments are 'ad hominem' arguments... that the concept of divine providence is meaningful in a man's life.
Metaphysics is, of course, part of life. It can certainly tell us something of what god is not. The Greek Church, I think, is happy with that. The Roman Church is, well, Roman. They invested in metaphysics long ago. It is understandably difficult for them to separate themselves from their past. On the other hand, I see a certain willingness for them to come to terms with the Eastern churches... and their negative, apophatic theology.
But who am I to say?
Have to agree, Bill, with your summary. Wish it were otherwise -- meaningful in a man's life -- but to what end...
Regardless how my last comments will be regarded, I suspect that the rough treatment I gave to brother time seemed unwarranted. So in anticipation let me offer an overview that I could not earlier for constraint of time.
Space can be treated, shall we say ideally or purely, as an empty set, or it can be thought derived from considerations of what we understand of empirical reality: a populated set. Linguistically we have words that hope to denote categories of possible states within the concept of either: in space, or through space. Time, as it seems most frequently to be viewed, is a measurement more than an event. It indirectly says something of an event, seeming to measure the *time* it takes to traverse space. Or, motion through space. Where we speak of time for items “in” space we require the additional concept of periodicity, for now we suppose that one or more detectable occurrences are spaced by a mensurable quantity of *time*. Thus, to an onlooker, it might seem as if we had horizontal time through space and vertical time in space. The first is continuous and phenomenal, the other discontinuous. And of course we can at least envision how both processes could coexist. This scenario is, shall we say, the particle-based rationale of space and time.
When space is either occupied or defined by/as a field, where by field we permit wave forms, it is conceivable to have both continuous and discontinuous elements of space-time relation transpiring from a single structure, which itself can either be a member of a set or conceivably define the space qua set itself. In this, the ‘wave’ scenario, we can conceive of wave travel with and within a wave, and we can further imagine a particulate quasi-existence coming into being along the wave periodically. This combines the two modalities that came and went separately and distinctly in the first scenario. In one sense the concept of time -- as a measurement – remains unscathed, but the notion of time itself undergoes considerable duress.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, we allow the second scenario to provide us with EMR, and the first, just to have some fun, with dark matter and energy. And now, let’s put the two systems together, for clearly that is how the universe must be. We know they both exist in and through time, presumably in and through space (my interpretation of Whitehead suggests he allows “in” time at Secondness and “through” time at Thirdness, but I am sure others might have varying interpretations).
Note what changes throughout each scenario. The considerations by which to define the essence of what time is seems possibly to vary in a way that relations of space, again as we conceive the concept, does not. Because we are still simply utilizing a measurement, we don’t get to thinking that the background considerations might be of relevance, but Einstein’s space-time notions could in my view put the lie to that otherwise comforting thought.
We also have the Bose-Einstein condensates to comprehend in the space-time continuum, as modified by the presence or absence of heat energy. Does it not fairly stand to reason that if we take the composite scenario as the basis for discussion, that the interaction of the two component scenarios can be both or either influenced by energy fluxions so as to enable such condensates to form within, perhaps travel within, but certainly to exist within the field as quasi-packets only to be redintegrated whole, as if out of whole cloth. And again, the duration can be considered as time. But here again, what does time represent precisely? We can make reasonable guesses as to what space consists of, as also how to measure it, but it seems to me impossible without a great deal more empirical data to be so certain what time is, or even that we are capable of knowing the answer to that question.
What we do reasonably know, of course, is that motion is inherent to the universe, and we can presume that time is intimate with that relation with respect to space. I am not saying that time is a needless concept, indeed I fully acknowledge the utter necessity of the concept if only in order to communicate ideas as to what we are thinking of when considering relations of time. I also consider that space and time are paradigmatic which, for me, means they are required to be defined and understood with respect to one another such that alterations in the state of one presuppose the increased likelihood of perturbations in the other, such perturbations themselves displaying the potency to manifest as mensurable particles that come and go, travel as condensates, and so forth.
None of this is idle speculation, and none of it rocket science. And I don’t blame anyone for being bored, insulted or both. All I ask is that you consider the argument being advanced, namely, that by the variables and variations implied, time does not appear so stable and knowable a matter as does space. If we can imply time by the fact of space and change/motion, that does not entitle us to place time at the same level of existence as entities, for example. I will hold that time is largely, perhaps even entirely, descriptive insofar as it pertains to mensurables that we otherwise know so little about that only the spatial relations are apt to be determinable to any accuracy, and then often but probabilistically.
One item of possible interest theoretically is that the first, or particulate, scenario, may have had more influence early on than at present. The more relevant aspect in regards of a theory of time will, it seems to me, concern periodicity of occurrences. Now Pascal’s great discovery demonstrated that polynomials describe probability states and functions. The eight-part paradigm I developed can be shown to have enough similarity to the third degree polynomial as to arouse some suspicion. More suspicion still is raised when evidence is adduced to the effect that the structural organization of the periodic table of elements can be accounted for from manipulating from Pascal’s triangle.
It may even be possible that the motion of mass in space that we so frequently refer to when speaking of time is a somewhat more recent occurrence, but that intensities and interactions therein of the initial first scenario generated the second and third scenarios and eventuated in stable particulates. All of which I feel should give pause to rethink how certain we are of our god-like scientific judgments upon a reality we confessedly know so little about.
Now as for how we should consider time with respect to metaphysics, obviously it is a critical element. My chief concern is that we be far more humble than we are prone to be. Time, so far as we truly know much about it, is not so very different from considerations presumed of theology. That also should, but of course does not, give pause. My position is that the metaphysical speculations on time be taken in a mixed bag with epistemological considerations of the same concept, for a cross-fertilization I believe would be healthy. I see no reason to devote a substantial chunk of metaphysics to the problem if only because, absent advances in the physical sciences and number theory, we are not going to achieve much. Well, let me rephrase that. We will do little other than raise much ado over very little. Thus time, while supremely important, as important to me, for example, as is god to so many others, is not an intelligent topic for metaphysics qua metaphysics.
What we can do to advance our role as philosophers with regard to physics and mathematics is to increase a billion-fold the interest and study of number theory. THAT is where many answers repose awaiting our visitations. Advances in number theory will surely redound to our understanding of space and time. Folks who have their careers or stars set to a consideration of time are welcome to continue such, but within the constraint of reason, which dictates two points.
First, our ignorance as to time offers no rationale for the self-importance I so often hear of those specializing in recondite matters, of which time is admittedly on of the very most recondite, whence my concerns.
Second, some perspective: Is any one of our local high-minded geniuses prepared to tell me that we have materially advanced our understanding of time in the last 500 years save the exception of a brief Einsteinian spurt? And yet we are to conceive a good chunk of metaphysics as devoted to the continual repast over a bout of fasting? We have learned about particle physics and to some extent about field mechanics. What this has to tell us of time is quite beyond me, and certainly I have not heard anything in the popular press to raise one hair of an eyebrow. I have heard tell of things moving backwards in time, of wormholes and heavens knows what…all of which is relevant precisely how???
To put it differently, but in regard once more of perspective. There is a lot of work to be done in and by metaphysics. It would be worth our effort to spin fewer wheels and be a lot more open to worthwhile methodologies. It would be especially worthwhile to understand that Peirce’s consideration, independently arrived at by Whitehead – that of archetypal hierarchies – as being the most important metaphysical advance since Aristotle. That this is not a widely recognized fact is admittedly owing to some poverty of expression and delivery on the part of these two forebears, as also the rather riddled presentations of Zgunagzi and Laozi. And, let it be confessed, I myself have not been nearly as helpful as necessary to the task. Continually I work to invent ways to better express and present these ideas. All I can assure you is that they are worth every ounce of my or anyone else’s effort.
Time certainly is a mystery.
"Would it, then, be sound to define Time as the Life of the Soul in movement as it passes from one stage of act or experience to another?
"Yes; for Eternity, we have said, is Life in repose, unchanging, self-identical, always endlessly complete; and there is to be an image of Eternity-Time- such an image as this lower All presents of the Higher Sphere. Therefore over against that higher life there must be another life, known by the same name as the more veritable life of the Soul; over against that movement of the Intellectual Soul there must be the movement of some partial phase; over against that identity, unchangeableness and stability there must be that which is not constant in the one hold but puts forth multitudinous acts; over against that oneness without extent or interval there must be an image of oneness, a unity of link and succession; over against the immediately infinite and all-comprehending, that which tends, yes, to infinity but by tending to a perpetual futurity; over against the Whole in concentration, there must be that which is to be a Whole by stages never final. The lesser must always be working towards the increase of its Being, this will be its imitation of what is immediately complete, self-realized, endless without stage: only thus can its Being reproduce that of the Higher."
~ Plotinus; ***The Six Enneads;*** III; 7; 11
I understand that there are certain descriptions of physics which completely avoid references to time. I understand that. Children do that when they say something like "the big hand points to 4 and the little hand points to 6." I have no problem believing that physicists can do the same sort of thing in a more sophisticated manner.
On the other hand, time has proven useful in physics, as well. I suspect that the use of time in various equations is a great aid to calculation. Thus the notion that physics can be described without time does not mean that time doesn't 'exist.'
What I can't understand is the notion that time is simply another spacial dimension. With due respect to the work of Hermann Minkowski, it just doesn't make much sense. First of all, in order to convert time into space he had to use the speed of light as a conversion factor. Secondly, physicists don't really use space and time in exactly the same way. For example, when calculating the space-time distance between two 'events' they don't just plug time multiplied by the speed of light into the Pythagorean theorem. Instead, they use a strangely twisted version of that theorem...
s^2 = Δr^2 - c^2 Δt^2
Without a doubt, the minus sign is necessary and useful. Yet it is clear that time is treated differently than is space, something which is frequently denied or glossed over.
My thinking is that if we can teach physicists to think properly, with good methodologies, we can leave the matter of time to them and gradually introduce their results into our work as the evidence suggests they are on to something. I wouldn't be holding my breath on that. Philosophers who aren't fully trained in math and with a good background in chemistry and physics don't need to embarrass themselves by dabbling in what they know not. Sorry to be crude, but really, the egos in philosophy are simply monstrous. My only worry is that physicists have not shown themselves willing to think outside certain well-defined boxes.
I simply refuse to waste my time on the topic. Really, there are better things to do, for Pete's sake. Nice parlor game for the philosophic egos, but that's about it. I could give a call in to Robt. Fuller and ask about philosophers doing time work but I really don't need to have him laugh me off the hone.
In consequence, Bill, in all honesty I really am ill-equipped to address your question, which I am not even entitled to judge as competent or not. Good luck getting some answers. At least here (R-GATE) you can reach a bevy of folks whose work in the area is at least worth hearing--not in this room, more than likely... and most certainly not this fellow.
Cheers
't
BTW, Bill - if I could press "I like this" ten times, I would. Why do you think people NEED God?
DH: "if I could press "I like this" ten times, I would. Why do you think people NEED God?"
I am not sure which comment you would seem to be referring to. The one comment where you did press 'I like this!' doesn't seem relevant to the following question.
Why do people need god? Augustine of Hippo wrote, "for You have formed us for Yourself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in You."
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/110101.htm
About "needing God" so that we know what we think, Bill... it struck me as one of the most telling 'explanations' for why people need an omniscient God I've ever heard.
As for the good bishop of Hippo, he also wrote “…if any fraction of time be conceived that cannot now be divided even into the most minute momentary point, this alone is what we may call time present. But this flies so rapidly from future to past that it cannot be extended by any delay. For if it is extended, it is then divided into past and future. But the present has no extension whatever” (Confessions, Book XI, Ch. XV)
If he speaks nonsense about time, I doubt he can make sense of the eternal...
I do not wish to argue. It is good that you do not need god. I wish you well.
I have a special fondness for all things chameleon, David; I mean, what is my paradigmatics but the attempt to prove the capacity to template reality, i.e. the paradigm must truly become the grandest of all chameleons, so you are more than welcome to join in the fun and I will likewise change tones here and there (in both senses?).
DH: "you mean that you DO? Well, I would never have guessed!"
Such a non sequitur!
DH: "As for the good bishop of Hippo, he also wrote “…if any fraction of time be conceived that cannot now be divided even into the most minute momentary point, this alone is what we may call time present. But this flies so rapidly from future to past that it cannot be extended by any delay. For if it is extended, it is then divided into past and future. But the present has no extension whatever” (Confessions, Book XI, Ch. XV)"
This quote, reminds me of what C. S. Peirce said about the present moment... that it is impossible to nail down the present.
He considered the past, present and future to be related as Second, First and Third. The past is Second in that it represents brute force. The future is Third in that it is known through our ability to predict future events. The present, however is First... to the extent that we know it it 'merges' into the past... to the extent that we think about the present it 'merges' into the future.
And now perhaps you two will understand why I couldn't take any more Peirce (I know, a one liner, but I shouldn't be here at all...)
DH: "And now perhaps you two will understand why I couldn't take any more Peirce..."
I suppose you mean that you do not agree.
We must recall that Peirce was bipolar and focused a lot of manic activity upon categorizations and expansive, even fanciful, correlations, as well as obdurately refusing to entertain the simplest arguments against a strongly held conviction raised to the power of agenda, namely his prefigurement of Gamow's 1,2,3...infinity.
What I am saying is he screwed up despite himself, so we less criticize than pity. Being on drugs I lost out on that excuse , i.e., for pity. Anyway, this business of past present and future was one of those manic areas that we can as well dismiss, likewise for a great deal of the vaunted reclalssification of the universe and its study, etc. And finally, we can discount aspects of his belligerent opposition to a fourthness.
For the same reasons we use critical discretion in evaluating Nietzsche.
Note, however, none of this diminishes what his real achievements were. You just (JUST!!!) have to know how to tease what is correct from what not. That requires three things: 1) helps to independently arrive at the same things, indicating you can understand his thought process; 2) understand the bipolar tendencies of thought, got that covered, and 3) have a good mind for critical evaluation and structuralism.
Most folks do not understand Peirce. It's just that simple. If folks would listen to me they would avoid a good bit of dross and get a far keener and appreciative liking and admiration for his work. Such is life.
"Being on drugs I lost out on that excuse , i.e., for pity."
Yeah, it does that to me, too ;-) What a pity...
I agree with teasing stuff out of Charles S. - I'll take the semiotics... that's what put me on the road to a criticism of Frege-Russell
CH: "Most folks do not understand Peirce. It's just that simple. If folks would listen to me they would avoid a good bit of dross and get a far keener and appreciative liking and admiration for his work. Such is life."
I understand Peirce somewhat differently. I always go back to ***On a New List of Categories*** where he lists five categories: being, quality, relation, representation, and substance. It is not clear to me why he ultimately dropped being and substance, but he did. Perhaps they somehow are reflected in your Fourthness.
Personally, I think he is much more to the point than either Hegel, whose triad certainly affected Peirce, or Kant, whose twelve 'categories' can be quite naturally combined into Peirce's three.
I am not worried about the details of Peirce's system. He had some very interesting ideas. His efforts to explain how he derived his categories seem to depend on a key idea, that the categories are arranged in a kind of sequence, with each category adding something to the previous one.
I find it interesting that Peirce's reasoning fits perfectly into Newton's "Great principle of similitude," allowing my simplification of Aristotle's categories into six: quantity, space, affection, time, action and material form.
But as for Peirce's categories, I have never understood them as somehow categorizing anything. They seem to be transcendental predicates, instead.
As the crow flies:
Peirce's system is intended to be practical, though not quite as James would understand it. The whole idea is to determine whether a label can be validated, thereby indicating whether or not we have correctly labeled a referent (substance in that list), from which we deduce whether we have said what we meant and meant what we said, or not. Thereafter you can apply the system to the now-validated referent for that label and check various attributes in much the same manner. You build up a corpus of knowledge about the substance/essence.
To do this requires two things above all else: 1) soft realism, and 2) an archetypal hierarchy. Once these are in place you give flesh and muscle to the structure. It is here that Peirce faltered as to process, but of course the absence of fourthness was owing to the fact that he didn't take his own stuff seriously enough. You can't take his systemic approach and still think as well of triadics when all is said and done, and THAT is uncommonly allowed regardless of system, so there's no surprise that Peirce's understanding suffers in part because folks can't comprehend his system as flawed but workable. I myself use it all the time. It has its uses, they are just too narrow, and all because he made some oversights.
Charles - I really do agree that Peirce has a lot to offer if only one can wade through the fragmentary (and sometimes apparently contradictory) writings. As I said, I think the semiotics is far superior to Saussure, and that alone requires further exploration - and he has a lot to offer to those of the realistical stripe in metaphysics and epistemology.
Of course, we all re-read him according to our own agenda...
(though whether it's possible to re-read him from a nominalist agenda is a moot point ;-)
CH: "The whole idea is to determine whether a label can be validated, thereby indicating whether or not we have correctly labeled a referent (substance in that list), from which we deduce whether we have said what we meant and meant what we said, or not."
I see that. The 'categories' are ways to know, not categories of things known.
"The 'categories' are ways to know, not categories of things known."
And this, of course (consistent AND persistent, I think you said) is where I amend... "the categories are descriptions of ways to know, not categories of things known"
"Not categories of things known" - this is where the ontology of Charles (and perhaps Bill) parts company with mine... not that I hold that ontologies are of 'things known' (this is the error of 'applied ontology'), but that ontologies concern the extensions of concepts. If we can allow for an instant the classical first-order understanding of "ontology", a variable “x” bound under existential quantification is not ‘the thing determined by the predicate’, but rather some thing that satisfies the predicate (“it can justly be said of x that x is F”). Determination – in the sense of **individuating** “x” – requires some form of unique designation (definite description, conjunction of individuating properties, anaphoric chains-of-reference, deixis...). In common with Husserl’s account, there’s no question of x being individuated by some ‘essential quality or property’, as any essential quality or property is predicated of x. Given classical first order ontology, all we can say of x’s ‘essential qualities’ is that x=x. However, no description or set of descriptions can give any essential quality of x, and this includes categorical descriptions and their intersections. The distinction is between *concepts* and *extensions of concepts*. We can say nothing of the extensions of concepts – we can only pick up the hammer, or eat the bread, or listen to the music, or duck the explosion. Often enough, where concepts meet their extension is where words give way to action.
Whatever “x” is, is ‘out there’. To Peirce-the-realist, this ‘out there’ was the dynamic object; to me this smacks a little too much of noumenalism. The ‘out there’ should be examined not as an object, but as a *sign* - and an utterance of “out there”, if used non-metaphorically, is invariably accompanied by some conventional ostensive (a gesture, a movement of the head or the eyes). Semiotically, such signs are only complete in use - the putative object is determined contextually and normatively. ‘Out there’ is not a vague reference to the world outside our heads (outside language), but to the interface between language and the pragmatic ends of language (much as Peirce describes the end of semiosis as being “the development of habit”). OF COURSE the hammer and the bread and the music and the explosion are “real” – the actions of picking it up, eating it etc. correspond to our usual understanding of “real occurrences”, and our usual understanding of the world allows that hammers, bread, music, and explosions are among the things that can be described as “real”. We can devise tests for the “reality” of some utterances (the famous “there isn’t a hippopotamus in this room” incident has Russell devising tests like mad before a sceptical Wittgenstein), and we accept that – for pragmatic ends – such tests suffice. Language isn’t distinct from the world, it’s an intricately interwoven part of the world (the word “world” is a term, too). You can’t say that – for instance – the Crab Nebula is a part of the world distinct from language, though you can say that there is some thing that is this utterance and the Crab Nebula, and deduce that there is some thing that is the Crab Nebula.
All reference is pointing at things. Some ways of pointing are more sophisticated than others, but – if we effectively pick out some individual in the world that is x – whatever determinations we give provide a unique sense (a unique ‘orientation of behavioural patterns’, if you will), but not ‘the reference’. Reference is an action, not a matter of the putative contents of concepts. But what are we referring TO? Not, I think, some ‘dynamic object beyond all semiosis’ – such things are unknowable, so why postulate them? Nor, do I think, are we indicating some ‘essence’ – if the essence were of the thing, it would be unknowable; if it were in the apprehension of the thing, then the thing is indistinguishable from a mental impression. As far as words allow us to describe such things, it would seem rather to be some part of ‘the world’ that is determined functionally with respect to some other part – language, in at least the sense of concrete utterances or inscriptions, is part of the world; the putative referents of language are also part. When we describe the Crab Nebula, we’re giving a consistent theory which accounts for observed phenomena by correlating them with similar observations made with respect to other phenomena; the individuality of the Crab Nebula depends on measurement-based determinations. When we tell the joiner that his hammer is over there on the table by the window, the individuality of the hammer is determined by the ‘referential apparatus of language’, but successful reference depends on some action by the joiner (picking it up, saying “ah yes”). Putnam and Kripke employed a lot of ink over the possibility of accidental reference to some other thing leading to identification of the thing about which we were ‘actually talking’, but in most cases the only thing that counts is that the pragmatic ends of communication were met. If I say “this bread is stale”, my understanding of the formation of beliefs from observational evidence is such that I would expect that my interlocutor, on eating the bread, would assent to my statement. But assent to one’s statement isn’t the pragmatic end of such an utterance in, say, a restaurant: I expect action, and prompt action at that!
Reference doesn’t just bump into the world and stop like a toy car against the wall – it’s part of a process (Peirce understood this).
Hell, I must write an important mail – well, just some remarks from the Twilight Zone... I was going to wax lyrical on the assumptions underlying “x=x”. If the bloody morsels can still write after Charles hacks me to pieces (with Bill tickling the soles of my feet with his delicate irony the while), I’ll see if I can, remember what I was saying a bit later on...
Byeee!
DH: "And this, of course (consistent AND persistent, I think you said) is where I amend... 'the categories are descriptions of ways to know, not categories of things known.'"
In my statement I enclosed the first occurrence of 'categories' in single quotes, but not the second, to emphasize a difference in meaning. The first instance refers to Peirce's categories, the second to the general concept of category.
Indeed, I believe that there are six categories of things known: quantity, space, affection, time, action and material form. In addition I recognize transcendental predicates, including Peirce's 'categories.'
So I suppose I would part ways with you and Charles.
See what I said? You are indeed the most delicate of men, Bill Overcamp (and that was a compliment)
Regarding the distinction between essence and accident, I believe that men have an imperfect, but very real knowledge of such things. Thus for example, though I do not know exactly what man is, I do have a very good idea of what man is not.
“I see. And when do students get to paint freely, on a blank canvas?”
“You sound like one of my professors! They were always going on about expressing
yourself and your feelings and things like that—really way-out-there abstract stuff. I’ve got a degree in Painting myself, but I’ve never really worked much with blank canvasses. I just use the Paint-by-Numbers kits supplied by the school board.” [from Lockhart, A Mathematician's Lament, http://www.maa.org/devlin/LockhartsLament.pdf.
If you want to know what's wrong with metaphysics, just treat language and logic as equivalents to formal education in so many disciplines where actual understanding has little need for scales and all the linguisitc equivalents we insist on shaking sticks at. Metaphysics should wear a saying on its forehead ( a little realist nonsense for your pleasure):
There's no substituting brains.
Metaphysics requires the tools of thinking, not speaking, of comprehending all manner or relations and only afterwards approaching the means to mean what we say and say what we mean. Wasting brains on language as a precondition to metaphysics is like teaching form before function. I am a structuralist but I avoid this stuff like the plague and I recommend to every wannabe philosopher to steer as far clear of logic as humanly possible. It has use only to a few advance students in computer languages and a couple or three recondite subdiscliplines.
"There's no substituting brains."
(x) x is an organ of cognition. "Brain" would substitute perfectly well.
Charles, I'm sorry. If the end of your philosophical activity is self-aggrandisement, you're welcome to it. You seem to have a blind spot concerning the distinction between concepts and the putative physical correlates of concepts ("naive semiotic realism").
You can't argue against the first step of my rebuttal, as any argument you might offer WILL BE LINGUISTIC. We should be concentrating on the second step : "as all purported 'manifestations' of thought, concept, metaphysical category or what-have-you are linguistic, why shouldn't we reduce such notions to their 'linguistic manifestation' ?"
So far, all I've heard are (and self-contradictory) denials of the first step, from which I can only conclude either that you believe that you possess magical powers of unmediated brain-to-brain communication or that you are so lost in the enchantment of language that you are unable to distinguish between language-as-behaviour and the putative correlates of language-as-model.
So, let's take it that the first step stands self-evidently. Charles' "thought" is a theoretically-determined linguistic correlate of observed behaviour. To accept this, we must accept the theory of which it is a model - and, of course, all our views are theory-dependent. If we take for the sake of argument that all our various theories account equally well for what can be observed, no appeal to observation can help us develop a preference for one or another. So, we can only develop preference from the basis of of *theoretical* criteria. Here, I'd appeal to parsimony. Charles' theories are consistent, but very, very profligate.
I think the fact that you feel this response necessary is indication enough you got my point loud and clear. And that, dear one, is the first object of language. Complaining of truisms or colloquialisms on the grounds that they communicate meaning but violate a logical agenda is part of the reason I employ them.
What you failed to rebut was the meaning referred to, and until you are capable of doing that, you have little to offer.
The arguments I might offer are NOT linguistic. They are, in the first instance, of reason, metaphysical ideation and etc. Linguistics studies the use of words to convey those thoughts. That the surface is linguistic needn't require that what those words describe is the same, for one relates symbollically (the words), and the other (the ideation) communicates through language as the signified.
It sound like you are having trouble understanding fourthness because you are trapped in traidic reasoning, the reasoning of formal and/or relational logic. You are thus more than likely incapable of understanding much of what people communicate despite being a self-considered expert in linguistics, logic and the relation of each to metaphysics. Peirce made his fundamental mistake in the same way, which is why I have elsewhere remarked, perhaps inappropriately, that I had at once though wayward realists (which Peirce was) to be the culprits of this sort. Apparently others are still better at it.
Unless I mistake your argument you not to want to conceive a fourthness as other than language, i.e. the sign at that place as opposed to what the sign represents, which is ideation, which Peirce went too far in assigning the label of sign for in that he freely permitted all such errors we are here turning over. When everything is art, there is no such thing as art. Ditto for signs.
I possess the powers of reason; the magic is present, true, but it is nature's magic to which I simply apply words that hope to convey what I attempt to divine of that magic. That is how research methodology is done and it helps to account for why some have made contributions and others endless disputations regarding what they dislike of successful methodology. If utility is the gravamen of a positivist I suggest you follow through on it.
CH: "What you failed to rebut was the meaning referred to..."
I'm with you, Charles!! Without meaning the finest language is just so much babble... blah, blah, blah, blah, blah....
No, I don't want to "conceive a fourthness as other than language". I'm interested in metatheory, not just another theory. How you formulate your theory is the only 'fact of the matter' to be had.
"What you failed to rebut was the meaning referred to"
How does one 'refer' to a 'meaning'?
"How does one 'refer' to a 'meaning'?"
First, by imagining yourself a babe. Something about a dude named Jesus. You have so intellectualized what is human that you have turned ratiocination into a machine - devil ex machina. And, in so doing you trivialize much humanity as also metaphysics.
You refer as a babe to your mother's face not with words but with the mechanisms of identification and projection. Words come later. How about using your head rather than your effete logic?
Your theory of language is a theory of religion. I spoke and worlds (especially other worlds) come mystically into being. You, dear boy, are the real mystic here, and the hidden wayward realist I might add. That we use words is absolutely no argument as to their priority. When you can convince anybody that a baby uses words to identify its mother prior to language acquisition, I will defer to your nominalist nonsense. Good luck on that one, fella.
DH: No, I don't want to "conceive a fourthness as other than language". I'm interested in metatheory, not just another theory.
You sound like a cry-baby, David. I want this and so there!! Translation for those otherwise incapable of thinking: I am not interested in anything but what I am interested in. Anything that doesn't salve my ego or serve my personal utility is not worth my bother.
You might consider how you phrase your speciousness. I can't believe you said what you meant. Only bipolars are so obtuse, and they require meds, not agendas.
How about 'preferring' metatheory to others as your core support? Of course I could just assume you meant that, but hey, I expect a nominalist to know something about communicating with words.
And as for 'metatheory', well, I don't know where you grew up, but according to most workers in philosophy, metatheory is actually what I, not you, practice. Oh, but another sloppiness. You really meant 'logical metatheory'. Well, say so then. Most human beings understand metatheory the same as meta-anything else. If you are going to so criticize how others think of language I should think you could at least employ it serviceably.
Charles - I get the feeling that I'm hearing Aristotle trying to refute Galileo from Aristotelian principles. All you're saying is "my theory's better than yours because my theory says so".
Well, yes, I do prefer Tarski to Husserl. And I think that formal ontology reduces to a facsimile interpretation of quantified first-order. These follow from a preference for what is public over what is private and for what is third-person over what is first-person. My view is consistent enough, and accounts for observation. But it's still 'only' a theory.
What allows us to choose between theories?
And so you did.
The serious, as opposed to ornery, answer to your question is not a simple matter, as I think you would agree.
Part of it is quite literally aesthetic. Dirac and many since noted the relevance of aesthetics in evaluating certain kinds of equations. You yourself value parsimony which is just a variant of the same, no?
Here is the gravamen as far as I can see to clearly address your question, which to be fair is a supremely good question...Aristotle would be proud...
There is first the matter of metaphilosophy of methodology as it applies to metaphysics, and that of course presupposes the requisite respect for metaphysics as a valid tool for arriving at the answer to queries such as you here propose. This is where Aristotle, Peirce, Whitehead, to some extenct Royce, Dewey and Hartshorne all essentially agree and are in the critical parts all on the same metaphilosophical page. It is also where Laozi and Zhuangzi came from. So first you determine your metaphilosophical approach. You clearly go the Ryl-carnap-Quine etc. route and that's fine in the "per se" perspective.
Now from either of these approaches we will discover respectively our own interpretation and our own methodology by which we fashion our unique but grounded methodology. in terms of which we are, if you will, in a contest with the other camp to show "results". That is, once we have begun from grounded metaphilosophical approaches and once we also utilize satisfactory metaphysical methodologies, we now have a contest to see which does a better job BOTH at accommodating reality, that is the predictive aspect of the methods are aggreable with observation, AND we are able to analyze reality into metaphysical substrates and build it back up again, a somewhat more difficult procedure.
For example, suppose we find that we can adopt an approach that offers a good system for understanding authority, specifically within the context of an office, and we then discover that billions utilize effectively the same structure in establishing and formulating their metaphysical religious beliefs. Or we find that in accommodating to concepts of identification and projection mechanisms and of dominance and submission, and so forth, we also arrive as a way of assessing whether how a person thinks is actually paradigmatic.
Of course the possible examples are legion, I select a couple I have found especially entertaining and useful, given that one of my goals is to demonstrate practical utility for philosophy and for metaphysics in particular.
Another test is whether a methodology works across wide expanses of knowledge and of the empirical universe. I find that I can work my system in evaluating the theories of Sankara and Eckhart as easily as the logical structure of Weber's principles, etc. Then I can deal with social and psychological structures and then piece together designs demonstrating the paradigmatic facets of law and where legal systems follow closely to the predicted relations and where not. And then there is physics and number theory, as medical nosology and lord know what else. A tool that is useful in a universalistic sense has an edge over locally successful tools.
After all, at the level of metaphysics we are necessarily, as if by definition, dealing with grand theory as it is often pejoratively termed these days. I have recently even applied the stuff to the method of methodology itself with regard to designing experiments that investigate dimensional binaries in social science work. In that field they are especially skeptical of grand theory and I made it a point in that article to suggest that is largely what accounts for the dearth of advances in the area. Grand theory is a requisite, but it requires competent hands on the rudder if you will permit a pedestrian analogy.
Those are some thoughts I entertain on the matter as they would pertain to your query.
And you were expecting me to reach out to Mars for an answer? How about stacking up other methodologies with my success rate? That will ultimate in a lapidary.
Show me your successes or, as they say, put up or shut up. At this point things ought to get very clear, very quickly. You can try to run from me but you will not get far. If that is arrogance, show me yours, I won't be offended. But the answer I gave you is an adequate answer and the pudding is ready to be tasted.
"You refer as a babe to your mother's face not with words but with the mechanisms of identification and projection."
Magical thinking yet again. Intention.
All we have is behaviour and putative neurophysiological correlates of behaviour. 'Internal' mental qualities are assigned in a process of interpretation; you treat them as prior to interpretation. That's your privilege. But when you point at 'em, all one can see are the words you use...
Can I help it if the reglementary structures of society are based on metaphysical misapprehensions?
(anyway, legal definitions are entirely based on assignment of intention, not on "intentions in themselves")
#H1-98. I have completed reading this thread, and the following are my gleanings/ questions. I think threads should be like this, active and offering lot of reading, so that we [less knowing] can learn.
The list of professional names intensively participated does ask me of my trespassing; any way i trust mine are only innocent questions and no pretensions, so may be forborne if possible.
1. Nov 17, 2010 12:37 am BO.
Do the basis structures of language shape the major thought-patterns of its native speakers? Could philosophy be guided and constrained by the language in which it is done?
@*. I think the limitations of language used, as well as, the structure and vocabulary limitations of the thinker, constrain his output of philosophy.
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2. Nov 20, 2010 11:43 pm DH.
@* I would want to wonder: have we yet given any separate dimensionality/-s to "action" or things like that. We had been treating any "event" as "accumulation of happenings through time duration". Have we [the population!] gone beyond [after all spacetime not mere time], and found a fundamentality in action or action-element?
I think i tried once ot twice internet search months/year/s back, but couldn't exactly get.
ie why action does not need something "fundamental" [more than the Plank action quantum]. [something similar to "matter" though need not be material, some "non-material fundamental"]. [energy is material, information as yet non-material, like].
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3. Nov 18, 2010 1:27 am CH.
"what does time represent precisely? We can make reasonable guesses as to what space consists of"
@* Is there any reason why our present "observations of time" isn't sufficient to conclude time is approximately such?
There is no such animal as "an intention in itself". You are the realist here. The closest you can come is to posit what the variegated aspects of intention share as a commonality in the usage context, where the critical term is 'motivation'. Intent will refer to addressing outwardly what motivation urges from within. There will be species of intent at Secondness, Thirdness and Fourthness. Motive will be Firstness. BTW, David, this is called a successful methodology.
Charles, I never claimed that there were - I just pointed out that you do.
SN: Is there any reason why our present "observations of time" isn't sufficient to conclude time is approximately such?
In colloquial language, yes, in technical, not probably. We "know" what time is. As philosophers we by and large have no clue.
#H1-99.
1. Nov 22, 2010 3:28 am CH.
"Dirac and many since noted the relevance of aesthetics in evaluating certain kinds of equations. You [David Hirst] yourself value parsimony which is just a variant of the same, no?"
@*. You find aesthetics and [density]/parsimony similar [analogous?]? That means freeing me to find many more things similar to that? In fact, almost anyting we seek to optimise [not even maximise]?
Broadly, yes. And to the extent E=mc^2 -- a very parsimonious formula -- are both simple and effective, yes, it constitutes an aesthetic quality.
Be careful in what some audiences may construe from your selection of terms. Economists will free associate "optimize" with Pareto optimization which is the economic equivalent of witchcraft to any liberal. As long as optimization is restricted to a form-content-utility fit that also implicates aesthetics, you have what the doctor ordered. Hope that helped.
Liberals are the people who favor billionaires at the expense of millionaires, while pretending to support the bourgeois, whom they really despise.
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