Social identity model

Researchers Martijn van Zomeren, Tom Postmes, and Russell Spears conducted a meta-analysis of over 180 studies of collective action, in an attempt to integrate three dominant socio-psychological perspectives explaining antecedent conditions to this phenomenon – injustice, efficacy, and identity.[3] In their resultant 2008 review article, an integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA) was proposed which accounts for interrelationships among the three predictors as well as their predictive capacities for collective action.[3] An important assumption of this approach is that people tend to respond to subjective states of disadvantage, which may or may not flow from objective physical and social reality.

Perceived injustice

Examining collective action through perceived injustice was initially guided by relative deprivation theory (RDT). RDT focuses on a subjective state of unjust disadvantage, proposing that engaging in fraternal (group-based) social comparisons with others may result in feelings of relative deprivation that foster collective action. Group-based emotions resulting from perceived injustice, such as anger, are thought to motivate collective action in an attempt to rectify the state of unfair deprivation.[3] Meta-analysis results confirm that effects of injustice causally predict collective action, highlighting the theoretical importance of this variable.[3]

Perceived efficacy

Moving beyond RDT, scholars suggested that in addition to a sense of injustice, people must also have the objective, structural resources necessary to mobilize change through social protest. An important psychological development saw this research instead directed towards subjective expectations and beliefs that unified effort (collective action) is a viable option for achieving group-based goals – this is referred to as perceived collective efficacy. Empirically, collective efficacy is shown to causally affect collective action among a number of populations across varied contexts.[3]

Social identity

Social Identity Theory (SIT) suggests that people strive to achieve and maintain positive social identities associated with their group memberships.[4] Where a group membership is disadvantaged (for example, low status), SIT implicates three variables in the evocation of collective action to improve conditions for the group – permeability of group boundaries,[2] legitimacy of the intergroup structures, and the stability of these relationships. For example, when disadvantaged groups perceive intergroup status relationships as illegitimate and unstable, collective action is predicted to occur, in an attempt to change status structures for the betterment of the disadvantaged group.

Meta-analysis results also confirm that social identity causally predicts collective action across a number of diverse contexts. Additionally, the integrated SIMCA affords another important role to social identity – that of a psychological bridge forming the collective base from which both collective efficacy and group injustice may be conceived.

Model refinement

While there is sound empirical support for the causal importance of SIMCA’s key theoretical variables on collective action,[3] more recent literature has addressed the issue of reverse causation, finding support for a related, yet distinct, encapsulation model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA).[5] This model suggests that perceived group efficacy and perceived injustice provide the basis from which social identity emerges, highlighting an alternative causal pathway to collective action. Recent research has sought to integrate SIMCA with intergroup contact theory (see Cakal, Hewstone, Schwär, & Heath[6]) and others have extended SIMCA through bridging morality research with the collective action literature (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears[7] for a review).

In sociology

As an explanation of social movements, an inquiry into collective action involves examining those factors that cause the setting of standards of social integration, as well as those factors which lead to standards of deviance and conflict. An explanation of a collective action in sociology will involve the explanation of those things which are similar or dissimilar to collective actions at different times and in different places. Theories of collective action emphasise how group behavior can, in some sense, be linked to social institutions.

In political science and economics

The economic theory of collective action is concerned with the provision of public goods (and other collective consumption) through the collaboration of two or more individuals, and the impact of externalities on group behavior. It is more commonly referred to as Public Choice. Mancur Olson's 1965 book The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, is an important early analysis of the problems of public good cost.

Besides economics, the theory has found many applications in political science, sociology, communication, anthropology and environmentalism.

Collective action problem

The term "collective action problem" describes the situation in which multiple individuals would all benefit from a certain action, but has an associated cost making it implausible that any one individual can or will undertake and solve it alone. The rational choice is then to undertake this as a collective action the cost of which is shared. An allegorical metaphor often used to describe the problem is "belling the cat."[8]

Exploitation of the great by the small

Mancur Olson made the highly controversial claim that individual rational choice leads to situations where individuals with more resources will carry a higher burden in the provision of the public good than poorer ones.[9] Poorer individuals will usually have little choice but to opt for the free rider strategy, i.e. they will attempt to benefit from the public good without contributing to its provision. This may also encourage the under-production (inefficient production) of the public good.

Institutional design

While public goods are often provided by governments, this is not always the case. Various institutional designs have been studied with the aim of reducing the collaborative failure. The best design for a given situation depends on the production costs, the utility function, and the collaborative effects, amongst other things. Here are only some examples:

Joint products

A joint-product model analyzes the collaborative effect of joining a private good to a public good. For example, a tax deduction (private good) can be tied to a donation to a charity (public good).

It can be shown that the provision of the public good increases when tied to the private good, as long as the private good is provided by a monopoly (otherwise the private good would be provided by competitors without the link to the public good).

Clubs

Some institutional design, e.g. intellectual property rights, can introduce an exclusion mechanism and turn a pure public good into an impure public good artificially.

If the costs of the exclusion mechanism are not higher than the gain from the collaboration, clubs can emerge. James M. Buchanan showed in his seminal paper that clubs can be an efficient alternative to government interventions.[10]

A nation can be seen as a club whose members are its citizens. Government would then be the manager of this club.

Federated structure

In some cases, theory shows that collaboration emerges spontaneously in smaller groups rather than in large ones (see e.g. Dunbar's number). This explains why labor unions or charities often have a federated structure.

The paper whose title appear below that was written by colleagues and I might be of interest to you. The rejection-validation model of collective action we developed in that paper is not included in the 2008 meta-analytic review by van Zomeren and co.

"Why_Do_Members_of_Disadvantaged_Groups_Strike_Back_at_Perceived_Negativity_Towards_the_In-group"

A copy of this paper is available in RG.

See (because these papers constitute a kind of synthesis, and a proposition of methodology for analyzing psycho-sociological processes by which intersubjective relationships are transferred into individual minds) ; there are also a lot of publications in french that you could discover on alainm-trognon.com

Trognon, A., & Batt, M. (2012). Group dynamics and learning. Encyclopédia of the Sciences of Learning, 7, 1388-1391. Berliin, New York : Springer

Trognon, A., Batt, M., Sorsana, C., & Saint Dizier, V. (2011). Argumentation and Dialogue. In A. Trognon, M. Batt, J. Caelen & D. Vernant, D., Logical Properties of Dialogue (pp. 147-186). Nancy : PUN.

Trognon, A., Batt, M. (2010). Interlocutory logic. In Streek (2010), New Advantures in Language and Interaction.

Trognon, A., Batt, M., & Laux, J. (2011). Why a dialogical solving of a logical problem more effective than individual solving? A formal and experimental study of an abstract version of the Wason task. Language and Dialogue, 1 (1), 44-78.

Sorsana, C. & Trognon, A. (2011). Contextual determination of human thinking: About some conceptual and methodological obstacles in psychology studies. Human Development, 54, 204-233.

Trognon, A., Sorsana, C. (2011). Grasping both the normative facts and the social positions emerging from conversation. Human Development-Letters to the Editor, I, 11-17, November

Thank you very much! Very interesting to see sources from different disciplines and countries

Dear Natasha,

In our recent work, my colleagues and myself have been addressing sustainability-related bottom-up initiatives. We investigated motives of people to join such initiatives, and barriers they perceive.

Some of our findings might be relevant for you. We have published a study on an agricultural PV-initiative (see www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513005880); and we have a couple of studies in preparation / under review. I will be happy to share them when ready.

Regarding behavior change, there is a paper in press on an energy transition framework, and how it affects attitudes/behaviors of citizens (www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421514000895 - let me know if you don't have institutional access).

Thomas

Dear, Ms. Koustova,

You might find something you can use in a paper I just uploaded called "An Experimental Analysis of Social Traps."

And if you google on "Social Trap" you will find some information about individual verses social behaviors in environmental crises situations and other types of human behaviors.

Kevin

This question and its answers have been very instructive. I refer to them in a comment clarifying a proposal about "Community based climate collaboration via #tags and wikis"

This is the comment link:

http://climatecolab.org/contests/2015/climate-collaboration-in-boulder-co/phase/1314656/proposal/1327114/tab/EVALUATION#_message_1359738

perhaps this EMSICA paper might help you Wlodarczyk, A., Basabe, N., Páez, D., & Zumeta, L. (2017). Hope and Anger as Mediators Between Collective Action Frames and Participation in Collective Mobilization: The Case of 15-M. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 5(1), 200-223.