My answer: Being able to reliability communicate, with relative ease, a correct and good summary of a lot (a rather large "amount" -- covering or "containing" much) of verifiable phenomenology (somewhere(s), clearly appropriately, with a foundation(s) in [overt] directly observable events, as proximate cause(s)). This would be associated with a series of communications and investigations, propagating more about this AND of this nature -- a "series of indicators" : such is the continuing and continuous nature of good science. (This is what is really the scientific method -- no mere form, but substance BASED IN DIRECT OBSERVATION, with continuations of related inquiries and findings.)
[ Does any established science violate this definition? Is more absolutely (always, necessarily) needed in a general definition? I could have noted "timely", "place-ly" experiments, but I believe this is covered IN the definition above, and I do not want to ONCE AGAIN overemphasize this hypothetico-deductive "bent" -- a great, often-arrogant, distracting bias, which skews behaviors away from good science (e.g. see: models, analogies, homunculus/ homunculī (of the 'theorist'/'researcher' and not of the Subject, and absolutely never for-certain -- or even likely -- the best we can do)). ]
RE: Does any established science violate this definition?
The answer to this question depends on what you want to say about string theory, which so far consists of largely mathematical frameworks and generates speculative hypotheses that either can’t at present be tested or no one knows how to test. Because so much of it is ostensibly unverifiable or unfalsifiable experimentally, some would describe it as more of a fundamental conceptual framework, in which case it would be akin to metaphysics. However, string theory does seem to have an "established" presence -- a following, as it were -- within physics and it would be odd to say that physics is not an established science.
The American philosopher W. V. O. Quine thought there was no sharp distinction between philosophy and science, that they are merely at opposite ends of a spectrum. Thus, philosophical theories are not different in kind from those of science, but we might reserve the term “philosophical” for those theories that are sufficiently general, abstract, and remote from observation and experiment. Of course what counts as “sufficient” is itself problematic and there is no general agreement on the part of scientists about this.
In my opinion there is no such thing as 'good science' per se, rather there are scientists that make good reports. I think the best thing you can hope for from a report is an explanation of what was tested and why, with a thorough examination of the process concepts. In other words, the methodology should be clearly detailed. This is more important than the details of the investigation because it lends weight to the final hypothetical framework. Biases and preconceptions tend to belay progress in many reports.
Dear Nick Michael
Much of my points (of the Question/my Answer) were to indicate or state how important it is that all relevant context be clear and [(relatedly)] claimed-phenomenon therein be understood (i.e. demonstrably 'seen-the-same' by all and replicable). To the extent that there are clear contexts (or "is clear context") and some key clearly-related DIRECTLY observable empirical foundations -- to that extent an instance of "science" (via these 2 aspects) can be 'good' or 'bad'. I think you DO find a lot of variability on these aspects, with some models having (at best) ONLY indirect evidence -- which to me is so 'bad' as to be unacceptable (there must be clearly _related_ directly observable environmental aspects _and_ behavior patterns, associated with one's findings).
[ It seems possible that research could lack one or both of these necessary aspects and still fulfill the requirements you mention (or claim and seem to fulfill them). ]
I would agree that "process concepts" end up being very important plus methodology most certainly needs to be detailed, but the above-described aspects (in the Question) are more fundamental/foundational and important (though both the aspects you note are also clearly important and essential). Also, I would like to say: as important as 'process' is, we cannot afford to pretend OR indicate we understand that more than we do (I truly wonder if we can ever clearly, fully understand biological/behavioral processes (those involving behavior patterns) or other processes seen in our sciences, for that matter).
A good science entails "a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results" (B. Lonergan, MIT, p. 5). Competent scientists are clearly required for good science to exist- an adequate foundational understanding, which is clearly and developmentally identified and articulated, and transmitted/engaged enables good scientists. Disagreements about/around foundational understandings would suggest the possible emergence of a science, but not yet an established science.
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