Kierkegaard's definition of "truth": "An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for the individual."

--It is not so much as what is believed as it is how it is believed. Truth is an idea paradoxical for finite reason, requiring both a risk and a "leap of faith."

--Truth comes about through the teleological suspension of the ethical. I.e., ethical codes do not embody the truth of religious faith. Ethical obligations are sometimes superseded by truths of subjective existence.

--The difference between objective (or Socratic) truth and subjective truth is the appropriation process of making the paradox one's own. Thinking about it doesn't get in the way of arrogation.

--Kierkegaard's "paradox" is a precursor of the notion of the "absurd" in later existential thought.

--Three main characteristics of subjective truth include that it is paradoxical, concrete, and not universal.

Kierkegaard's passionate inwardness is not equivalent to just an emotional state; it is the involvement of the whole of one's person, a commitment or dedication as a matter of consciousness in thought.

Examples of truth as paradox (or subjective truth) include God, Christ (the God-man), immortality, and death. Christ is the "Absolute Paradox."

Eternal truth is not, Kierkegaard says, itself paradoxical but instead is only paradoxical in relation to us.

http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/kierkegaard_phil.shtml

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Is_truth_subjective_or_objective

Dear Subhash,

relativism since its inception has been the subject of dispute. Now, I’d like to share some thought remembering ,first, some previous interventions on RG.

The modern relativism denies the existence of objective truth that human intelligence can know..

We can distinguish five types or degrees of relativism : 1) the ' individualistic relativism ' of the sophists and Greek skepticism , so , every single man " is the measure of all things" ( Protagoras ), i.e. for each individual is true and what is appearances and judgments are various and conflicting ;2)  the ' historical relativism ' , which already has a precise formulation (Montaigne), for whom there can be no absolute science which is  certain, it is shown by the continuous succession of different physical doctrines , which destroy each other ," while in ethics " all the moral sentiments vary according to people" ; 3) the ' empiricist relativism ' ( Hume ) and 4) the ' pragmatist relativism ' , according to which knowledge can only be , respectively , more or less likely and more or less useful ; 5) Kantian relativism , that while admitting that a universally valid knowledge of the sphere of phenomena, guaranteed by the constancy of the a priori forms and categories of the ego , consider the unknowable " thing in itself ", the cause of the phenomenon .

 Among the philosophical ideas that challenge relativism , even starting from opposite points of view , there is - for example - spiritualism that appeals to the absoluteness of metaphysical truths and moral principles guaranteed by the Revelation ; postmodern thought has developed various concepts that are based on relativist positions : for example, the theory of weak thought .

Now I’d add some consideration that came to my mind inspired by your intervention.

To the subjective reason of Enlightenment has historically opposed the vision of a realistic reason, that is the logos as a principle of interpretation of the Universe.

This is a reason anchored to the reality principle, which does not deny what can not  explain, that is not closed to the spiritual dimension of man: the last step of reason is to recognize that there is an infinite number of things that are beyond it. A non "constructivist" reason, but "cognitive" (does not want to create reality, but to know it).

The realist reason recognizes that there are values and objective truths. The concept of "truth" identifies not an abstract idea, but just the correspondence between knowledge and ‘being’, reality. The difficulty in defining the truth shows a limit of our capacity for knowledge, but may not lead to deny its very existence (otherwise it confuses the ontological with the epistemological level).

Neither one cannot deny the opportunity to tap into the truth, to know it, because this has an irreconcilable contradiction. In fact, those who claim that things are not knowable as they are, but only as they appear, to know the difference between things as they are and things as they appear should know things as they really are, not just as they appear.

Even without forwarding us in the philosophical-logical path, we can see that the existence of truth - in different fields - emerges from our shared experience and from the evidence of reason.

This applies above all in the field of the truth of the facts, of the events. It can be difficult to rebuild them exactly; but the lie, slander, are always means to subdue, not to know and free.

The iconoclastic fury of relativism came even to question the existence of objective realities in the field of physical and natural sciences.

Popper said that science - despite having discovered that it could not assert definitive certainties - progresses to the truth of nature by increasing approximations.

Recognizing the opportunity to understand the "true" or "objective", because adherent with a certain approximation to reality, is not to say that there is a knowledge "complete" and "perfect".

Such an ability to tap into the truth about man with rational methods is found in the metaphysical sciences and humanities in which we identify the moral truths which are the constant component, universal, natural values. The "law of Hume", the physicist claims that there is only one rational thought - the scientific one - able to reach objective knowledge, has been disproved by the crisis of the traditional scientific thinking, which led to open science - still with rigor: reproducibility, falsifiability, etc. - to a plurality of methods, and to seek an ever greater interdisciplinarity.

Thank you for your patience in reading .

Best regards,

Gianrocco

Dear Gianrocco,

Here is a short answer.  Humanity has paintaskingly learned to constructed more and more realistic stories about reality and this is progress.  The downside of this success story is that we lost the difference between fiction and reality.  Scientific stories about reality are to some extent true story about aspects of reality.  But the truth of a story do not change it into the reality about which the truth is told.  This is the ultimate confusion of loosing this distinction.   The second downside of this success story is that we are creating a cultural story that deny the reality of what did not enter the scientific story and will never enter it.  There is a fundamentalism associate with all story telling style.  The scientific story telling style has its own ayatollah who denies any value to any other story telling style.   And all the fundamentalists try to unite people behind them against the other one who do the same.  THere is in visual art a realistic perspective period  in the renaissance which lead some naive people to think that the value of visual art is in its degree of realism.  This movement continued and has contributed to understand how optical system of the eyes works and this lead to photopraphy which outperform visual artists in realism.  Then the romantic impressionists questioned what is the purpose of visual art and they like the poets of the time argue that real realism what not photographic and this lead to a long series of non realistic search of visual truth.  But more recently we created other forms of realistic visual art in the form of films, computer generated animation and more recently virtual reality and against some are loosing the difference between fiction and reality.  The reality of the poets of all ages and all artforms always had to fight the practical and concrete fundamentalists of all styles.  Realistic forms of history has always tried to displaced fictional forms of history.  All the fundamentalists are created by imbalanced of the psyche created by the over development and monopoly of one psyche style.  Only a pluralism of artistic and rational and practical activities can balance a human and a society.

Relativism is an ideology that can contribute to the destruction of man, more easily than other ideologies of the 20 century.  Relativism proposes nothing concrete to man, like the writers of the absurd.

Truth is not a creation of humans but  is the actual happening and properties of a concept or natural phenomenon and what we do is to ascertain what those truths are, not to create truth. Truth exists regardless of what we say or think about it, but we can represent truth with approximations and these approximations enable us to make proper use of the concept of reality. The fuzzy reasoning system helps as  in getting closer and closer to the actual truth, which make our representations of reality some how work.

For instance the concept of gravity (that exists regardless of what we think), what it is and its effects on material objects is established as scientific truth but approximation, with that relative/approximation  truthfulness, we can ascertain our conclusion by empirical tests, making things fly off the ground. What amount of energy per weight is required to make an object lift  off the ground or eject out of the earths atmosphere and those with a power less than a certain amount will not get out. That is what a closer approximation, which we call it  scientific truth, to what the actual truth of nature is.

Therefore approximations of truth that are validated through  binary or fuzzy logical reasoning that work perfect,  to our understanding, representation and effective utilization are  what we call scientific truth of the actual truth. 

Dear Dejenie,

Gianrocco wanted to emphasize the general human – historical - approach of truth and usual falsification attempts that many lie even themselves and we live in a net of continually changing and prefabricated deceptions.

Truth is very powerful

http://quotlr.com/image/2422

Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is a perspective, not the truth.

Marcus Aurelius

I am agree with Prof. Krishnan. Truth is pOWERFUL.

Gianrocco again asks us a complex question, and I doubted whether to write something being not a narrow specialist in the field.

In short,  I agree with Cesar that relativism is destructive to human, and with Louis that we are losing the difference between fiction and reality. It is also true that "truth"exists even in natural phenomena without human participation.

There is philosophical problem about difficulty to approach absolute truth, even for natural sciences. As for social truth, it depends on ideology. Marx gave an extreme view that truth is different for every social class. Still we have observed humanists even among rich men of the past. On the other hand, not all poor today are humanists.

I agree with Gianrocco that for some groups of people today it might be useful when the society loses the general orientation in ethical questions. The easiest way to do it is to promote relativity.

What is good and what is bad? Simple answers are often given to children in corresponding books. Fairy tales gave us simple and generally correct answers to those questions. But indeed there are cases with not obvious answers but we should not absolutise them.

Yes, Krishnan. Truth is powerful but often it is difficult to forecast the consequences.

Many were hanged, imprisoned, humiliated or made ridiculous because dared to pronounce the truth. Despite truth should be articulated.

Dear  Gianrocco Tucci,

Henri Poincarè developed a philosophy of science  in the tradition of Kant trancendental philosophy which has been forgotten by most but which still inspire a few including myself.  It distinguishs what in the scientific theories is just metaphysical clothing of the theory and will soon evaporate with further scientific progress from what will not change (because true) and thus is rock solid and which will survive all future scientific paradigmatic changes.

SCIENCE AND HYPOTHESIS (1905)

BY H. POINCARÉ

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37157/37157-pdf.pdf

CHAPTER X.

THE THEORIES OF MODERN PHYSICS.

Significance of Physical Theories.—The ephemeral nature

of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of

the world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he

sees them abandoned one after another; he sees ruins

piled upon ruins; he predicts that the theories in fashion

to-day will in a short time succumb in their turn, and he

concludes that they are absolutely in vain. This is what

he calls the bankruptcy of science.

His scepticism is superficial; he does not take into

account the object of scientific theories and the part they

play, or he would understand that the ruins may be still

good for something. No theory seemed established on

firmer ground than Fresnel’s, which attributed light to

the movements of the ether. Then if Maxwell’s theory

is to-day preferred, does that mean that Fresnel’s work

was in vain? No; for Fresnel’s object was not to know

whether there really is an ether, if it is or is not formed

of atoms, if these atoms really move in this way or that;

his object was to predict optical phenomena.

This Fresnel’s theory enables us to do to-day as well

as it did before Maxwell’s time. The differential equa-

the theories of modern physics. 179

tions are always true, they may be always integrated

by the same methods, and the results of this integration

still preserve their value. It cannot be said that this

is reducing physical theories to simple practical recipes;

these equations express relations, and if the equations

remain true, it is because the relations preserve their reality.

They teach us now, as they did then, that there

is such and such a relation between this thing and that;

only, the something which we then called motion, we now

call electric current. But these are merely names of the

images we substituted for the real objects which Nature

will hide for ever from our eyes. The true relations between

these real objects are the only reality we can attain,

and the sole condition is that the same relations shall exist

between these objects as between the images we are

forced to put in their place. If the relations are known

to us, what does it matter if we think it convenient to

replace one image by another?

That a given periodic phenomenon (an electric oscillation,

for instance) is really due to the vibration of a

given atom, which, behaving like a pendulum, is really

displaced in this manner or that, all this is neither certain

nor essential. But that there is between the electric oscillation,

the movement of the pendulum, and all periodic

science and hypothesis 180

phenomena an intimate relationship which corresponds

to a profound reality; that this relationship, this similarity,

or rather this parallelism, is continued in the details;

that it is a consequence of more general principles such

as that of the conservation of energy, and that of least

action; this we may affirm; this is the truth which will

ever remain the same in whatever garb we may see fit to

clothe it.

Many theories of dispersion have been proposed. The

first were imperfect, and contained but little truth. Then

came that of Helmholtz, and this in its turn was modified

in different ways; its author himself conceived another

theory, founded on Maxwell’s principles. But the remarkable

thing is, that all the scientists who followed

Helmholtz obtain the same equations, although their

starting-points were to all appearance widely separated.

I venture to say that these theories are all simultaneously

true; not merely because they express a true relation—

that between absorption and abnormal dispersion. In

the premisses of these theories the part that is true is

the part common to all: it is the affirmation of this or

that relation between certain things, which some call by

one name and some by another.''

Dear Louis,

I am grateful for your contribution that will allow me to consult a literature, indispensable.

Thank you and best wishes,

Gianrocco

Dear Gianrocco,

The following text: ''L’h´eritage de Poincar´e : de l’´ether `a la mod´elisation

by Michel Mizony

IREM de Lyon et Institut Camille Jordan (UMR CNRS 5208) UCBL

Vaulx-en-Velin Novembre 2005

http://math.univ-lyon1.fr/~mizony/modelisationPoincare_04.pdf

also explore this question.

Dear Stefan,

thank you for the opportunity  you give me to express myself on the naturalistic fallacy.

The philosopher Diego Fusaro, illustrating the ethics of Moore, emphasizes that "the improper operation which joins the ‘good’ with an extrinsic property that defines it (e.g," good is pleasure "), is labeled by Moore as "naturalistic fallacy": it consists in "confusing the ‘good’ with a natural or metaphysical property ", unaware that the goodness of a thing is not separable from the thing itself, and for that, is never definable. The error lies in pretending that good has property and they are configured as parts distinguishable from good itself: the further illusion is that relationships can be established between the good and its parts.

Such a "fallacy" can be naturalistic in the strict sense, if ‘good’ is defined as an object of nature (for example, "the good is the pleasure"); but it can also be metaphysical, if ‘good’ is defined the good as a supersensitive object (e.g. "good is justice" or "good is what God commands"): in the first case, it follows an ethics reducible to empirical science : an emblematic case is that of utilitarianism, which identifies the good with pleasure. In the second case, it follows a metaphysical ethics: exponents are religion (for which the good is what God commands), as Spinoza and Hegel (for whom the good is in reference to the perfection of the universe) or Kant (for whom the good is what reason commands).

The absurdity in which slips the fallacy (in its dual role, metaphysical and natural) are reportable according to Moore with a logical criterion: that of the "open question". It consists in showing how the choice of a solution can not completely exclude the others: so, why pleasure should consist in the order of the universe rather than the word of God? And why in the Word of God rather than in the prescriptions of reason? By opting for a solution, it does not explain why it could not be true the opposite. To this contradiction it escapes by adopting the intuitionistic solution of Moore whereby the good is sensed like the yellow: in this way, you will know what it is and there are no alternative solutions.

Moore soon realized that his solution, by virtue of intuitionism that animated it, could lead to subjectivist drifts: he avoided this risk by focusing on the fact that the good is ‘absolute’, expresses an intrinsic and universal value. In this way, any possible subjectivism is reset at the start. It appeared, however, a new problem: given that the good is universal, absolute and independent, which is its nature? Certainly can not have empirical nature, because if it did it would fall into the naturalistic fallacy; but neither can it be metaphysical, because otherwise you would re-awaken the metaphysical fallacy. The solution by Moore is then in recognizing that good has ontological status equal to that of Platonic ideas and numbers, which are absolute and objective without being either empirical or metaphysical: in this sense, good is, but does not exist, right as number four. In later writings, Moore will soften its position, coming to support the good depending on the intrinsic nature of things: in this way, he will go from Platonism to Aristotelism ... ".

In the explanation of the onset of the 'naturalistic fallacy', the Encyclopedia Treccani moves from 'having to be' which is the term used by Kant to indicate what is required by the moral law, regardless of any condition of fact and the entire order of nature. The moral law is an expression of reason in its practical use, that is, determining for the will. The duty to provide what the law says the man, be reasonable but finite, then exposed to the empirical influences of subjective motives and subjective inclinations, is expressed in the imperative form. The 'you need to be'. therefore indicates "the relationship between the objective laws of the will in general, and the subjective imperfection of the will."

Since then the moral imperative is not subject to any purpose, or is placed by the faculty of desire, it addresses man in categorical terms, that is unconditional, and then is formulated as "because you have to." and it is under this duty, that is deducted the possibility of action properly human: not the physical possibility to act, which for Kant belongs to the order of cause and effect, but the moral chance to fulfill the law or not, that qualifies man as moral entity. Between the world of being - that is what it is as it is, according to the laws of nature - and the world of 'having to be' - that is of what is required by the moral law - opens therefore an absolute hiatus, the same as Hume had pointed out, denouncing the naturalistic fallacy consisting in taking prescriptive propositions, that is related to having to be, from descriptive propositions, related to what is .

Philosopher Luigi Baldi, while illustrating the problem of the relationship between judgments of fact and value judgments, one of the thorniest contemporary thought, asserts that the ‘good’ can not be considered an external object, "as any natural object, describable by physics or metaphysics. "It is a simple concept that can not be described through a list of quality (pleasure, happiness, duty) that good things should have: to explain it in this way means to solve it in other words, reduce the notion to others that indicate natural entities. "If you ask me: what is good? My answer is that good is good, and nothing else. Or if you ask me: how must you define good? My answer is that it can not be defined, and that is all I have to say on the subject. But as these replies appear disappointing, they are of the utmost importance. "

Baldi, sharply notes that "the problem of Hume's Law and the naturalistic fallacy should be considered in the light of the notions of nature and reality that you are taking and, more generally, of the physical and metaphysical conception in which they are part. The Scottish philosopher assumes in a typically modern style and, in his case, empirical, that the intellect must programmatically preclude knowledge of any truth that goes beyond the essential information resulting from sense experience, just having the opportunity to revise the latter to formulate concepts that are reduced to be only names, conventional signs, devoid of ontological  consistency as such (the pen is just a name with which we indicate the countless individuals who write, because for obvious reasons of convenience and utility can not cite them all every time that we need to talk). This means that you can not know as certain no law both physical and metaphysical, as universal and necessary, being able to reach at the maximum assessments based on probability.

This obviously applies even more to ethics: I can not get with the rational tool a moral law, a concept of ‘good’, that should be considered certain, that is precisely universal and necessary.

 All the best, Gianrocco

We swallow greedily any lie that flatters us, but we sip only little by little at a truth we find bitter.

- Denis Diderot

The truth will set you free, but first it will piss you off- Mal Pancoast

@ Andras, you are right, as the way of conveying matters more than the blatant truth.

Dear Krishnan,

I did not mean that to be hanged for the truth is a preferable way for anybody.

 Wilhelm Windelband  May 4, 1894 at the Kaiser-WilhelmsUniversität Strassburg.

''General laws do not establish an ultimate state from which the specific

conditions of the causal chain could ultimately be derived. It follows that all

subsumption under general laws is useless in the analysis of the ultimate causes or

grounds of the single, temporally given phenomenon. Therefore, in all the data of

historical and individual experience a residuum of incomprehensible, brute fact

remains, an inexpressible and indefinable phenomenon. Thus the ultimate and most

profound nature of personality resists analysis in terms of general categories. From

the perspective of our consciousness, this incomprehensible character of the

personality emerges as the sense of the indeterminacy of our nature—in other words,

individual freedom.''

http://philpapers.org/archive/giloww-2

Even a word relativism often has a negative connotation. N. Berdyaev (1924) in his fundamentalist “New Middle Ages”: What is humanistic democracy? It is the proclamation of the right for misleading and false, a political relativism and sophistry, a transferring the fate of Verity to the decision of the majority of votes.

A truth that’s told with bad intent beats all the lies you can invent.

- William Blake

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Tucci et al,

Readers of this thread may find the following paper of interest. (Comments and criticisms invited.)

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275041797_What's_Wrong_with_Relativism_anyway?

In very general terms, I am much inclined to the view that doctrinaire relativism is basically the political form of contemporary sophistry and sophism--to which we should contrast political forms based on respect for truth, truthfulness and the willingness to tolerate a widening range of contrasting or conflicting interests within a single polity. In Russell's sense, its the ultimate "power philosophy," seeking political and institutional domination without regard to means employed and general consequences for others. Moral self-constrain is, at best, simply a sometime convenient tactic in an on-going campaign for dominance.

Moral values exist in living human traditions, and such living human traditions often contrast or conflict with each other. But this is not a reason to discount or disregard alternatives. Resolutions of the contrasts and conflicts can be found, given the need and given sufficient interrelation and interaction between representatives of the various traditions. But this is a very slow and often painful process which many would rather avoid. It is not a path to immediate power or position. It can't be done quickly or on demand.

To arrive at this view of the matter, I think one need only reflect that for any existing configuration of values, in a given tradition, as it encounters novel and problematic situations, there will be better and worse among alternative modifications, generally respecting the pre-existing configuration in question. This is to say that reform or melioration of value-systems is always possible, in light of particular difficulties and problems encountered.

Originally, what is "natural" contrasted with what is "conventional" or "artificial":  as "physis" contrasted with "nomos" and "techne." But obviously, there is a strong, general tendency to extend the concept of the "natural," e.g., Aristotle's "All men by nature desire to know," in the direction of what is merely customary or expected within a given moral tradition. The reformist perspective on these things is that this tendency to extension is unobjectionable, so long as it is treated as an opening to examine and evaluate the prospects of "technical" innovations in values --and not as an invitation or endorsement of simple, uncritical acceptance of the customary and expected by the lights of pre-existing values and culture.

Theoretical reflection along these lines, however, is something quite distinct from social acceptance of particular conclusions or directions of reform, just as what we think or come to believe may contrast with deeply rooted sentiment and feeling. Sentiment and feeling tend to lag behind any proposal for reform of value systems --no matter how reasonable or clear the proposals may be.

H.G. Callaway   

Research What's Wrong with Relativism, anyway?

Dear Callaway, thank you for your great contribution (and special thanks for the reminder about “Does Language Determine our Scientific Ideas?”).

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Laguta,

Many thanks for your kind words --and for your reminders--very thoughtful.

Readers of the present thread may also find the following paper of interest for the question under discussion:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/230362760_Does_Language_Determine_Our_Scientific_Ideas*

Again, comments and criticisms are welcome. The particular focus here is the constraints of language on evaluation and innovation.

H.G. Callaway

Article Does Language Determine Our Scientific Ideas?*

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Motaru,

You wrote:

The root of relativism is the human mind.

---end quotation

Perhaps I could agree, with this in some sense, but my impression is that your claims needs some expansion. I wonder if you are being quite specific enough for your claim to be very informative or helpful to the discussion. Speaking of the "root of relativism," one might suspect that it is something which, taken hold of, might provide a means of control of the phenomenon of relativism--which certainly seems to involve some dangers. But if the root of relativism is simply "the human mind" itself, then it may seem that there is no possible control of relativism open within human possibilities.

Reflecting a bit on your claim, it strikes me that this amounts, or might amount to the idea that relativism is "natural" for human beings, and therefore not to be avoided? But, as I see it, what is regarded as "natural" is often enough conflated with what is conventional or perhaps prevalent and expected in particular cultural groups. It may be, then, that the root of relativism is in some particular development of the human mind, and not the human mind as such. 

It seems clear that there are developments of the human mind, in various cultures and societies which strongly contrast with relativism, viewed as itself a specific cultural development. (Otherwise, there would be little point in anyone advocating relativism.) I would suggest that the commonality is the idea, or variations on the idea, that limitations on our means and ends in thought and action are necessary to general human survival and well being.  We must constrain or limit ourselves in various ways, and that this begins with the concern with truth and truthfulness. The notion that "Truth is subjective," that is, a "free creation of man in his individuality," is then rejected.

So, then, is the root of relativism, "the human mind" itself, or instead certain doubtful, sophistic cultural developments of the human mind?

H.G. Callaway

In his autobiography "Out of My Life and Thought," Dr. Schweitzer wrote:

"Having described how at the beginning of the summer of 1915 he awoke from some kind of mental daze, asking himself why he was only criticizing civilization and not working on something constructive.". He relates how he asked himself the question:

But what is civilization?

The essential element in civilization is the ethical perfecting of the individual as well as society. At the same time, every spiritual and every material step forward has significance for civilization. The will to civilization is, then, the universal will to progress that is conscious of the ethical as the highest value. In spite of the great importance we attach to the achievements of science and human prowess, it is obvious that only a humanity that is striving for ethical ends can benefit in full measure from material progress and can overcome the dangers that accompany it.....

The only possible way out of chaos is for us to adopt a concept of the world based on the ideal of true civilization.

But what is the nature of that concept of the world in which the will to the general progress and the will to the ethical progress join and are linked?

It consists in an ethical affirmation of the world and of life.

What is affirmation of the world and of life?....[3]

For months on end, I lived in a continual state of mental agitation. Without the least success I concentrated - even during my daily work at the hospital - on the real nature of the affirmation of life and of ethics, and on the question of what they have in common. I was wandering about in a thicket where no path was to be found. I was pushing against an iron door that would not yield....[4]

In that mental state, I had to take a long journey up the river . . . Lost in thought, I sat on deck of the barge, struggling to find the elementary and universal concept of the ethical that I had not discovered in any philosophy. I covered sheet after sheet with disconnected sentences merely to concentrate on the problem. Two days passed. Late on the third day, at the very moment when, at sunset, we were making our way through a herd of hippopotamuses, there flashed upon my mind, unforeseen and unsought, the phrase : “Reverence for Life”. [lang|de| Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben] The iron door had yielded. The path in the thicket had become visible. Now I had found my way to the principle in which affirmation of the world and ethics are joined together!” 

Dear H.G. Callaway,

I read your paper  ''What's Wrong with Relativism, anyway?'' .  Your are touching on one of the most relevant social question, a question that most academic will not touch but that is so necessary to be openly discussed.  As an exile quebecois, this question has a lot of resonance.  It even had a lot of effect in the last canadian federal election where the pary I favored, the NDP which had for the first time in its history a chance to be elected by being the most popular party in the poll two month ago.  It finished third and I think that its drop in popularity was triggered on one single issue that was instrumentalized into the campaing: one single muslim woman  insist on her right to conceal her face for receiving her canadian citizenship ceremony and claim her right in court.  THis happen twice over 200 000 cases this year.  A very very important social issue!!! Quantitatively it is insignificant but it shocked the french population of quebec which had many long battle in the past ten years on the question of social values.  The last election one year and half ago has been won mostly about the controversy on the introduction of a charter of values and the debate centered on one question:  the removal of the right to wear a veil, a significant religious symbol and a significant women suppression in the public sphere, in public jobs.  The debate splitted the french canadian population but unified all minorities, especially the muslim ones against such a charter.  About five years previous to that we had an intense social debate with a public commission (Bouchard-Taylor commission) about the reasonable accomodations towards cultural minorities that could be done to our laws.  It splitted the population.

I am still struggling with this question , I am not in favor of a charter of values because of its authoritarian approach .  I am rather for a permanent inter-cultural forum of discussion that would on a constant basis propose acceptable social practices.  Most importantly we have to discuss this.

Regards

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Brassard, 

If women want to wear veils in the U.S., then, as I understand the matter, there is a great deal of official tolerance for this. I am not up on all possible details just now, so I won't go much further than that. Protection of religious practice is the first element of the first amendment in the Bill of Rights. It comes even before the freedom of speech. Your question strikes me as a Canadian question, and I would not attempt to answer it for Canadians--whose constitutional system, history and traditions are somewhat different.

My point, against relativism, was not an attempt to answer every related question of cultural conflicts within diverse countries and traditions, but simply to argue, on general grounds, that such problems are theoretically soluble, however difficult in practice--if and when there is a will to solve them. I think that point sufficient to my purpose in the paper and in this thread. Generally, I think the specifics of the problems will differ with the character of the traditions involved; and likewise, so will the character of the solutions. What solutions anyone is likely to come to as a matter of practice, as I've argued, will depend on where the people in question start--the configuration of pre-existing values. 

This approach bypasses questions about getting from "is" to "ought," because it starts from the assumption that everyone already has some values or other. Its a cognitive approach to the development or evolution of values in the face of problematic situations encountered. But the character of my argument does not depend on what particular values may be in play in any given situation. This is to suggest that it is you in Canada, or in Quebec, who are best suited and positioned to deal with the problem you describe--those who actually belong to the relevant living traditions of values.  I think, too that you would need to muster a great deal more detail about the overall situations that concerns you.

Again, a viable solution is one thing, and bringing people along something else again. In this way "conservatism" in ethics is much deeper than conservatism about established positions in natural science. Humanity is always subject to a kind of "weakness of the will," when it comes to instituting or establishing an accepted social reality for theoretically viable solutions. 

H.G. Callaway

Dear H.G. Callaway ,

Your paper containts several aspects of the issue of the relativist of value and the one that I pointed out, that had a lot of political relevance in the last decade in Canada and particularly in Quebec is the central one although it is here appearing in a very specific social context with peculiarities to this context that a good deal of history is required to understand.  SInce I grew up in that context, it is intrinsic to what I am and most relevant for me and I see its general relevance for the whole planet. 

The separation of societies and cultures is diminishing at a rapid rate.  Modern multicultural cities in developed economies are more and more integrated together into a single economic system whose main imperative value is money.  This cannot be taken out from the discussion on values because this is the ethical attractor and destructor and so all still existing cultural traditions are in the same boat under the destructive effects of this new culture of money. It is not one that needs to claim its value or convinced of its value since it is the mean to eat, to shelter , to survive.  But this is another issue that your paper leaves aside.  

You touched on the question of scientific relativist and as you know I am very much in tuned with Poincare on this issue: a pluralistic theoretical viewpoint.   Poincare insisted on the two aspects of theories: a relativistic side and a conventional side.  Te relativistic side (the meaning of relativist in this context is totally opposite to its meaning with value) mirrors nature as seen from a particular point of view and the conventional could have been constructed differently and will be constructed differently in the future but even that side is not arbitrary.  Not all conventions would be appropriate.

 In biological evolution, it is certain that the scenario could have been differents in many ways but it does not mean that the main feathure of the only scenario that unfold would have been different: unicellular, plants and animals, multicellular animals and plants, eyes, bilateral symmetry of land animal, trees, central nervous system that are more and more about the future, etc, etc, all of these probably would have appear in all scenarios.  In fact they appeared several time in independent fashion in the current scenario.

The question of the ''wil'' is the main difficulty and it is related to the central social values because the ''will'' stems from the way we are enculturated, how our attention is culturally oriented. We are a plastic biological being whose nature is enculturally forged.  The will is  a by products of this enculturation and it is extremely difficult to move our attention away to what we have been enculturated programmed as the stereotype behaviors are a testimony.

And to the question: ''What is at the root of modern relativism?'' It is its societal function: clear the way for the new ethical value system: MONEY. It was founded in t694: the creation of the bank of England which was also the creation of the new modern money based on debt creation as Philip Goodchild has expressed in his book: Theology of Money.  Rousseu's social contract would nowadays begin like: ''MAN is born free; and everywhere he is in chains/debts''.

Tocqueville,  in Democracy in America. said that future democracies will probably be milder and more mediocre than aristocratic societies: there will be less brutality and brilliance, as we all drift toward a vast, undemanding median. In the book’s second volume, he warns that modern democracy may be adept at inventing new forms of tyranny, because radical equality could lead to the materialism of an expanding bourgeoisie and to the selfishness of individualism (whereby we turn away from collective political activity toward the cultivation of our own gardens). In such conditions, we might become so enamored with “a relaxed love of present enjoyments” that we lose interest in the future and the future of our descendants, or in higher things, and meekly allow ourselves to be led in ignorance by a despotic force all the more powerful because it does not resemble one: “It does not break wills, but it softens them, bends them, and directs them; it rarely forces one to act, but it constantly opposes itself to one’s acting; it does not destroy, it prevents things from being born.”

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Brassard,

You really ought to write a paper putting together your various thoughts on the present issue.

As the proverb has it, "Where there's a will, there's a way." The development of the will to resolve cultural conflicts certainly depends on adequate representation of diverse interests in appropriate forums or facilitating contexts--as with joint work and common efforts regarding common problems. Discussion alone won't fully resolve the problems. Creating sufficient commonalities of a political society is something we do--or, unfortunately, something we may leave undone. Again, it is a slow process, and it can't be hurried for the advantage of extraneous interests.

The determined quest for institutional power (including institutional power over money) often results in exclusion and denigration of perceived opponents--or even the mildest critics. Whatever is distinctive, local or particular will tend to resist a general trend toward homogenization and thereby (possibly) exacerbate the problems; but there is an opposite tendency to be co-oped by dominant forces and interests, joining in projects of exclusion--under the cover of "difference."  As ever, much depends on the pursuit of truth and our loyalty to truthfulness. Will the pre-existing population hear out, or exclude, the immigrants, e.g.? Will the immigrants accept the perspective and accomplishments of the value-traditions of a new home country?

Measured representation and encouragement of join participation are two keys to the problems. The tendency toward ever greater inequalities in countries around the world, under globalization, is a threat to the potential for local integration. Radicalization of contending interests and perspectives is no solution, but instead part of the problem.  

H.G. Callaway

Dear H.G. Callaway,

Thank you for your encouragements.  It is the second time on researchGate that I received such encouragement.  The last one, 6 months ago, was about writing a paper for a conference on Embodied Cognition and Art.  I am working on it.  So I will get working on this topic .  I would appreciate if you can tell me what could be an appropriate publication target: journal or conference. 

A forum on nation building is one thing but as you pointed out it is not sufficient, it should only be the first step for establishing new social practices.  But how to encourage them?  In our society there are laws which discourage extremely wrong social practices.  But Laws and prisons are not the way to encourage positive social practices necessary for integrating society.  Integration today cannot mean what societal integration used to mean fifty years ago: integration to a mainstream monoculture.  We cannot and should not attempt to aim for mono-culture but we should not neglect societal integration, nation building, improving the living together.  Any culture is an inculturation into a living together.  How to achieve harmonious various multi-level living together?  That cannot be answered in a definitive manner as the laws have to continually evolving.  A permanent forum on the living together is necessary.  What I am looking at is a new core societal institution of the living together.  Our judiciary and penal institution are authoritarian institution protecting the living together from extreme social behaviors.  Those are necessary institution but not sufficient.  We have to realize that the massive immigration in a world of instant communication change the problematic of the living together in the big cosmopolitan cities of the new international order.  But the current situation is complicated by the total institutional neglect of the living together  since the many hundred years in the west.  The idea of progress and the process of secularisation in the last few hundred years has been a long process of substitution of the traditional religious institution of the living together by economic relations mediatee by money and these undermining of the traditional ideologies of the living together.

 Money,Entertainment, Law, Penal institutions and Polices are not sufficient for the new living together of the major cosmopolitan cities of the new international order.  We do not have to re-invent the wheel.  The old tradition of the living together are still alive but crystalized, afraid of the future, besieged, frozen in the past.  We now have to create the parlements where they could converse with each other about their very down to earth living together in this cosmopolitan cities. 

But some sub-community might not want to talk in order to maintain a high level of  autarcic cohesion and that can create a lot of problems with those outside and also those inside these autarcic communities.  There is a certain level of coercions that will have to be applied in some extreme cases.  So the living together forum would have to receive some form of societal power.  I do not think it should be a legislative power. What should be the nature of this power? I think that it should not be authoritarian but enticing, a strong enticing power?  What is this? I do not know. A new parallel form of money, but not one to buy something?  This is a good speculating topic.

I think that all children should receive an education that should not be totally controlled by specific sub-communities.  My reflection is not very advance on this.

  I remember Kennedy phrase:  ‘’ My fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.’’  This is the spirit of the living together.   This is the spirit except for the word ''country''  (patriarchy) that should be replaced by ''each other'' (matriarchy) .

I am personally totally allergic with extreme nationalism that erace all cultural differences and all dissents and I am allergic to flags. I am afraid of flags; all of them are a grave menace to our humanity.  They provide a protection in exchange of freedom.  All such high symbol of the living together lead to an authoritarian type of living together blindly following the flag holder.  This is the age old patriarchal betrayal of the living together.  I am for a feminine living together, egalitarian one in spirit based on care and the focus on removal of suffering.  This is my Christian heritage.  Not one that the holder of the cross on the battle field , but one inspires by one carpenter  on a mount. The sacred texts should stay out of the parlements of the living together but they should speak through the heart of the participant in concrete ways.

‘’Will the pre-existing population hear out, or exclude, the immigrants, e.g.? Will the immigrants accept the perspective and accomplishments of the value-traditions of a new home country? ‘’

This is the function of discussion forum of the living together to have dialogue in multiple directions.  A new spirit of innovation has to be re-establish in the ancient traditions of the living together.  They cannot freeze themselves in the face of the fast moving money culture.  The future of this planet and of our children is at stake.  If we do not agree, money will decide and it does not care about our children , the planet and the future. 

Regards,

Dear Barbara,

when, as between men that make up a society, prevails the idea that everyone has to worry about the proper sense, since life has no sense derived from a transcendent reality, the fundamentalist proposal shows, for them, the highest degree of anachronism and irrelevance. " In all areas of culture and contemporary life relativism is the "dominant culture" to the point of exercising a kind of "dictatorship on thinking." Thus, in the field of philosophy, it is denied any value to the "strong thought", that is to metaphysics and, on the other hand, it is emphasized the "weak thought", skeptical and nihilistic, stating that the human intellect can draw only what is empirically attainable (Hume-Kant) and scientifically verifiable; so terms like truth, good, spirit are words of "nonsense" that say nothing. How many winds of doctrine have we known in recent decades, how many ideological currents, how many ways of thinking. The small boat of thought of many Christians has often been tossed about by these waves - thrown from one extreme to another: from Marxism to liberalism, even to libertinism, from collectivism to radical individualism; from atheism to a vague religious mysticism; from agnosticism to syncretism and so forth. Every day new sects are created and it occurs what St. Paul said about human trickery, about cunning which tries to draw into error. Having a clear faith based on the Creed of the Church, it is often labeled as fundamentalism.

In the mean time, relativism, that is, letting oneself be "swept along by every wind of doctrine", seems the only attitude that can cope with modern days. A dictatorship of relativism is built up which does not recognize anything as definitive and which leaves as the last measure only the self and its desires.

Best wishes, Gianrocco

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

I wonder if we could not achieve some sharper focus in this discussion by bring it around to the topics of justice and equality. The possibility of justice and equality before the law are basic presuppositions of organized political community; and to deny that these concept make any objective sense, or can have any rational and binding force on society tends to undermine community--specifically by the implication that these ideas can only be biased or one-sided opinion. Without equality before the law, the protection of all cannot be extended to each of us; and indeed, the relativist thought seems to imply that an adequate politics of personal safety and attainment can only be effected by an exaggeration of political expediency.

Now most of us, I suppose, would not tend to think that perfect justice and perfect equality exist in any political society. There are always some miscarriages of justice and various forms of inequality to deal with. Yet, on the other hand, we reasonably assume, in accordance with our various histories and cultural backgrounds, that greater justice and equality can be attained by our good efforts.  If the law and the administration of justice are not perfect, still they can be improved, and we can meaningfully evaluate proposals for improvements, by reference to pre-existing values, as better or worse in relation to problems encountered. This is the reformist impulse, which attempts to preserve what is best while making needed and possible improvements. But, in accordance with relativism, this reformist impulse can only be a kind of delusion and  even a ramification of pre-existing bias, since there can be no objectivity or genuine and binding rational force attaching to our conceptions of justice and equality. 

Relativism, I submit, undermines common commitment to the attainment and accomplishments of any political society while also making non-sense out of the attempt to improve them. It is the extreme exaggeration of the (perfectly reasonable) observation that we are never going to get full and perfect agreement and all encompassing consensus on controversial moral, social and political topics: since absolute "perfection" and total agreement will not be attained, anything less can have no rational or compelling force or binding power. "right" and "good" can only mean the power and bias of the stronger in any given society. This is the thesis of the ancient sophists --to which all Western philosophy has objected since the time of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.

Since our conceptions of justice and equality are essential to any viable society, our very conception of the common good  implies a rejection of doctrinaire relativism.

Comments invited.

H.G. Callaway

Dear Gianrocco,

I was born into a very catholic society of Quebec of the 1950's.  We were like a small village of Gaulois into a see of protestant English ruling a modern world.  Although we were beginning to have some of the technical commodities of the modern world we still mentally live into a pre-reformation world.  All that change started crumbling by the time I was teenager.  I was watching in pure fascination the astronauts landing on the moon and the marverlous world science and technologies was opening.  But althoug I was very young, naive in both scientific knowledge and religious knowledge I felt these two world clashing into my young mind, the tension that had clashed in the religious war during the reformation and that led to the fall of the bastille were battling in my young mind.  Although I did not really knew where these forces were coming from, they were concretly clashing in my young mind as a constant headhake.  I was compelled to take one side: either clings to the old world values and reject the modern values with modern science or to clings to the modern science and reject the old world values.  I did not understood those things intellectually but emotionally they were concretly there and pushing me to choose.  I did choose for a few months to gave up my religious practices and stop thinking about it and I emotionally realized that it solved the conflict but it left me in a state of emotional emptiness.  Nothing painfull but a central nothing in the hearth.  It is then that I realized that the modern world values had nothing to offer except this emptiness but I did not want to give up the modern world science and technology and I made a commitment, an emotional one, to hold to the two world view , to accept the emotional tension and intellectual incompatibility and headhache because I made a commitment to the faith that deep down both world cannot be wrong although they appear as conflicting and opposite.  This has guided my life ever since and that it lead me and gave me a compass to see below the appearances of both religious visions and scientific visions because I was always looking for interpretation that satisfy both, not at the superficial level.  I realized very young that all is a matter of interpretation and we have something within us that can see emotionally where all ideologies lead deep down. It is why people such as Pascal, people who had experience this high tension, where  guide along the way.  Relativism relies only on the intellectual side and those that only relies on the intellectual side cannot resist it because the intellect is not grounded.  The only way to be grounded is to follow our emotional instinct when these are oriented towards understanding what is going on at the center both of ourself and society.  Then the intellect cease to be relativist.

Diderot, in his “Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville,” tells us that the Tahitian is mild, innocent, and happy while civilized people are corrupt, vile, and wretched; the natives live according to customs and rules that vary greatly from the Western ones. They do not possess private property or operate their affairs based on egalitarian principles, and they exercise sexual freedom not accepted in ‘civilized societies.’

Diderot is opposed to the European mission of civilizing the natives. Despite his belief that a common human nature is the foundation of trans-cultural norms of morality, he advocates the relativistic sounding maxim to “be monks in France and savages in Tahiti. Put on the costume of the country you visit, but keep the suit of clothes you will need to go home in.”

relativistic sounding maxim to “be monks in France and savages in Tahiti. Put on the costume of the country you visit, but keep the suit of clothes you will need to go home in.”

Montesquieu’s Persian Letters presents a further instance of this proto-relativism. In this fictional conversation and correspondence between Persian visitors to Europe and their friends and relations in Persia, Rical, one of the two characters, echoing Xenophanes, says, “it seems to me, Uzbek that all our judgments are made with reference covertly to ourselves. I do not find it surprising that the Negroes paint the devil sparklingly white and their gods black as coal.” He concludes that if “triangles had a god, they would give it three sides.

https://www.academia.edu/231031/A_Brief_History_of_Relativism

Reading the paper 

https://www.academia.edu/231031/A_Brief_History_of_Relativism

questioned what I took to be relativism.  I had so far took it an a purely negative/undermining thesis against any thesis.  I had also took it as being the critical philosophical attitude developed in the enlightment but push to a limit that since that everything is not absolutly true than everything become as valid as everything else.  This kind of message leading to a kind of apathy and destruction of the hope in the different forms of search of truth.  It is why I never classified as ''relativist'' conceptions that undermined other conceptions by pointing out that they are only valid within certain assumptions which are not universal.  I saw these later philosophical positions are searching more solid and arbitrary basis and not a projects whose purpose is to undermine in principle the search of truth.  Even the position which denied the existence of an absolute truth are not relativist in my way of seeing as long that the quest of truth in principle remain worrthwhile.  Knowledge is always contextual and valid to a certain point in this context.  I find any claim of absolute  universal validity of knowledge as dogmatic as claims of absolute invalidity of knowledge or claims of equivalence of all knowledge.  The former are fundamentalist and the later are nihilism and they are effective allied by hiding all the numerous reasonable non-absolutist position positing no absolute knowledge or absolute lack of knowledge.  Even people previously identified as post-modernist in science such a Bruno Latour who were seen as being very skeptics about any objectivity of science are , I think, converging towards more positive thesis.  They were previously focused on criticising instead of constructing and now some of them like Latour are moving towards contructing thesis. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruno_Latour :

In a 2004 article,[32] Latour questioned the fundamental premises on which he'd based most of his career, asking, "Was I wrong to participate in the invention of this field known as science studies?" He undertakes a trenchant critique of his own field of study and, more generally, of social criticism in contemporary academia. He suggests that critique, as currently practiced, is bordering on irrelevancy. To maintain any vitality, Latour argues that social critiques require a drastic reappraisal: "our critical equipment deserves as much critical scrutiny as the Pentagon budget." (p. 231) To regain focus and credibility, Latour argues that social critiques must embrace empiricism, to insist on the "cultivation of a stubbornly realist attitude -- to speak like William James". (p. 233)

The key word in the above ''constat'' by Latour  is for me ''relevancy''.  It provide me with the distinction between what I will term ''relativism'' and what is not ''relativist'' but is ''relevant''.  If a view is ''relevant''to help us out in our current human situation then it should be welcome and I would not call them relativism.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

Well, part of my thesis is that relativism is predominantly committed to power within institutions. The objective there is, in part, to control access and opportunity and to use these resources to support its own position. From any such perspective (and recall that we have to do with a peculiar kind of cultural development, or degeneration), no one will be quite qualified to make criticism of reigning doctrine, unless they are part of the institutional establishment. The safe course, for institutionalists, is always to ignore effective criticism not engaged by and caught up in the institutionalists' battles and conquests. That is what we call, hereabouts a "Catch 22."

Those who wish to play the "Catch 22" game, are, of course, welcome to do so, so far as I'm concerned. But let us look briefly at the scope of this particular episode or inning. To the claim that relativism is inconsistent with any viable conception of the common good, justice and equality, there has been no reply or comment.

Why would this be? Is it a lack of concern with the common good, justice and equality? I have argued that relativism makes non-sense of the impulse to reform. But is reform an inevitable delusion? Is there nothing good to be preversed from our various cultures and backgrounds? Apparently, these argument are good ones, and they amount to a reductio ad absurdum.  We have certainly seen some reason to think that this may be the case. See above.But relativism, I submit, is a "zombie doctrine," it continues a deformed, quasi-life for extrinsic reasons --no matter the refutations and rejections. As I say, it is not so much a philosophy as it is a quasi-politics of exaggerated expediency.

On the other hand we have a new reference to a paper on the history of relativism, coming from Dublin --to be published, I read, in a volume edited by Michael Krausz--long a close associate of doctrinaire relativism, here in the local area. See the following, e.g.:

http://www.amazon.com/Relativism-Contemporary-Anthology-Michael-Krausz/dp/0231144113/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1446215607&sr=1-1&keywords=Michael+Relativism

and,

http://www.amazon.co.uk/372/dp/0268016127/ref=sr_1_fkmr1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1446215880&sr=1-3-fkmr1&keywords=Michael+Krausz+Relativism+Rodopi

It may appear, then, that the institutionalized relativists are planning to have the final word on their topic, and claim a right to do so, just because they are institutionalized, and have won past innings and episodes of their various battles, and conflicts. That this may have involved any amount of skulduggery, intrigue, defamation, insider dealing, etc. is apparently not to the point? As if to say, "We stole the privilege fair and square," by relativists' lights, of course--what others would be relevant? Lack of moral constraint on ends and means, when it comes to academic gaming, is quite alright, after all! The proof is in the pudding! But this configuration is deadly to any vibrant society and culture.

Who stands to gain by all this? Well, it seems pretty obvious that the folks with the most to gain are precisely those (perhaps much more conservative?) who also claim the privilege of ignoring what they will and favoring who they will, as a means of controlling access and opportunity (on purely legitimate grounds, you understand!) --with which to feather their own academic nests. With whom does the doctrinaire relativist "twin," to obtain support? Its would seem to be the very conservatives or, better, perhaps, the very insiders, regarding whom they pose as the opposites and opponents, and the over throwing of which, builds the basis of their "conscientious" and socially engaged support!  What a marvelous slight of hand. How clever! (How detrimental to intellectual honesty!) Its the "inevitability of oligarchy," in another guise, and democratic scruple or procedure be dammed.

This phenomenon has reached back and forth across the Atlantic for at least a decade now. It found fertile ground on the institutional left in Europe, and now attempts to bring home the lesson--of the effective politics of scapegoating. Whether radicalization is good for society or no, we see that it is sometimes good for the institutional insiders--who paradoxically, want to claim a moral lesson for their own further propagation? Disregard your supposed opponents, and act without restraint! A lesson for radicals of every background and orientation. But does this radicalism actually create a better world? Well, you already know what becomes of the conception of the common good by relativist lights. 

If anyone, is willing to take up my claims in the paper I wrote on the topic, I'd be glad to hear of this. My own view is that someone needs to cut this Gordian knot. But I must warn you that debating with relativists has somewhat the character of  engaging intellectually with a vast and swiftly mutating array of smoke and mirrors. I can't honestly recommend this course to anyone, though I am aware that many within respectable institutions suffer the consequences of the academic gaming and determined infighting which results. Which sort of world do you really want to live in?

H.G. Callaway

Dear H.G. Callaway,

In your paper ''What is wrong with relativism, Anyway?'' , you wrote this sentence ''evoking the tolerance of its own intolerance.''  For a while now, this is core of my concers with''multi-culturalism'' as we live it in Canada since 45 years as promoting sometime tolerance of intolerance.   You are using this sentence in the context of your critic of the  ''extreme ethical relativism''.  In the canadian multiculturalism context, there is sometime alliance between home grown extreme ethical relativism and some extreme ethical conformist of some sub-cultures.  About ten years ago in Ontario there was a movement for the adoption of a Sharia court as a option for settling mariage issues among canadian muslims willing.  That  movement was stopped and did not go through but that it went as far as to be seriously considered as an option shows that there is a tendency to tolerate fundamentalism for subgroups and even a readiness to weaken our justice system whose universallity  is a precious protection against extremist . The separation of the religious with the judiciary should not be compromised, even for sub-culture for which it is this separation is wrong.  

A faith and unreserved commitment in the existence of paths in the direction of a common societal good should be promoted.

Regards,

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Brassard,

We should certainly avoid engaging in, or kowtowing to, "tolerance of intolerance," in any generally "liberal" society --any which sees the advantages of integrating diversity. How exactly this will work out may well depend on the specific value-traditions of a given society. For example, though the first amendment to the U.S. constitution prohibits establishment of religion (in contrast with several European countries) and protects the freedom of religious practice, not just anything counts as a protected religious practice.

There is a long series of court decisions which fills in the details, deciding matters case by case. Though it was once claimed to be a religious practice, polygamy for instance, is not protected, and is in fact prohibited by state law. The prohibition was contested in the courts and lost the claim long ago.  Again, ritual human sacrifice, say, could hardly count as a protected religious practice. There are clear cases, as we'd expect, and also cases which are more problematic; but it is a matter of established law which has long kept the peace and reduced the tendency toward sectarian, ethno-religious strife --in a society of great religious diversity.

This legal process and tradition might be regarded as constitutive, so that violations of it are generally not looked upon kindly. It belongs to the general temperament of the people; and this is one element of the common good--we are not to fight about religion or give one denomination public preference or status over the others. It belongs to the common good that every denomination can have its place in society, in accordance with the resources of its members, and that no denomination be given any official preference. Nor do religious people have any official preference over the non-religious or even the anti-religious. Like anyone else, we are far from perfect, but that is the ideal and the usual standard.

Governments, it is said, "derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," and given world-wide variations in values, factual value pluralism from place to place, we fully expect that there will also be variations in the governmental powers to which people are willing to consent in various localities and countries.

It would be a strange kind of "representative government," indeed, I think, which would up-end established law and sentiment, continually, for the sake of every new group to arrive and make a demand. "The consent of the governed" depends on the general temperament and persisting values of the people. In consequence, the radicalism of demanding and accommodating whatever is demanded is anti- democratic, and inconsistent with the first principle of representative government --that government is government for the people.  A state without boundaries to its political values will simply sacrifice its identity. 

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

Readers of this thread and discussion may find the following new entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy of interest. 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/

This has just come out, and I am yet to read it, but in general terms, I think highly of the Stanford entries.

On the other hand, as a matter of social-political observation and analysis, I am inclined to say that "relativism," has, of late, been riding the roller-coaster of globalization, under the influence of the political forces supporting the general lack of moral constraint on markets and enterprise. Doctrinaire relativism, as I understand the practice, will not impose substantial regulation or moral constraint, and refuses the impulse to reform. There are powerful people and institutions which like things just that way. They have refused, over decades, to admit any need for moral and legal constraint on the power of economic expansion. 

Instead, the inclination is to make pleasing noises in the direction of unworkable Utopian ideas, so that an unworkable, ideal "best," a thousand times defeated, becomes the enemy of the better. Radicalism and materialism are, then, preferred to liberal reform. Globalization of the world economy continually brings diverse people and peoples into ever closer contact; and it is much easier to engage in purely economic activities than it is to resolve the cultural conflicts which arise in consequence. Again, it is much easier to destroy than it is to create, in part, because the latter is a slow process.

As I say, where there is a will to overcome differences in cultural values and perspectives, there is a way. This is no quick fix, however, and instead a slow effort of many. But it seems perfectly obvious that instead of solving problems and meliorating conflicts, some would rather exploit them for personal gain and advancement: take sides and see what you can get out of it, the more conflict the better. Far from being a thesis of tolerance, relativism foments conflict, IMHO, in order to attempt to gain from it.  It does so by portraying factual cultural differences as things not subject to rational and moral mediation.  

H.G. Callaway

There is no doubt that the extremes of adaptation to any situation or of obstinacy in his own conviction are risky. Yet both of these behaviors have in them a dose of truth. In the first case it is certain that the human reality is of a changing nature and therefore it is proper to update. In the second case it is easy to understand that you can not compromise on principles, you can not change the values according to the conveniences or distort the real truth. That said, once again emerges in all its strength but also in its delicate balance the practice of equilibrium to avoid any drift of relativism and any dullness of fixity. The balance is not necessarily the wisdom of the people nor respectability. It is, in truth, a grace and a commitment, a result of human wisdom. Being able to discern what is permanent and what can change, not crystallize in the ideological narrowness and not go overboard in the superficial inconsistency are, a virtue and an art

H.G. Callaway,

Thanks for pointing to: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/

I will go through it since while participating in this thread I gradually became aware that even ''relativist'' was relative in the sense that there is no consensus on what it means.

I also think that ''relativist philosopher'' are those that prefer ''breaking'' and do not involve themself in ''constructing'' and I tend to think that this breaking passion is subserving the agenda of the regulation of societies by purely economic values by destructing all the moral traditions which have tempered/resisted the economic values.

A philosopher is a thinker.  I would call a philosopher ''relativist'' if his/her philosophy tend to undermine the usefullness of thinking in general and discourage thinking, projecting the idea that it is useless and hopeless.  If a part of a philosophy's purpose is to do that selectively of some kind of philosophy and from there project some hope on other types then it is not a relativist philosophy because it is only a re-orientation of the possibility to think, a renewal of the hope in the activity of thinking and not its destruction.

Maybe after reading the Stanford entry I will come up with a better view.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

I've found a short passage from Professor Baghramian's 2004 book, Relativism, which I think may help to better focus the present discussion, see her "conclusion," pp. 303-304:

The power of relativism stems from its correct diagnosis of the significance of irreconcilable diversity and contingency; its failing is its response to this.  ... However, the accusations of incoherence and self-refutation, ...have not really diminished the popularity of the doctrine. They fail in part because they are seen either as irrelevant to one of the main aims of relativism --the denial of absolutist an monist conceptions of truth, goodness, reason, etc.--or as presupposing the very absolutist and monist viewpoint that the relativist wishes to deny. Still the cost of countering absolutism by relativizing truth and goodness is too high. The price is either intellectual and moral paralysis--the inability to compare and evaluate what lies outside our immediate cultural and conceptual surroundings--or the very predicament that the relativist wishes to avoid: parochialism and ethnocentrism. 

--end quotation

In general terms, I agree with this conclusion. I have a short email out to Baghramian to see what she may have to say to my own short paper--and the prospect of cutting this particular Gordian knot. More on this later, perhaps. The failing of relativism, she says above, is in its inadequate response to its own diagnosis of the significance of "irreconcilable diversity and contingency." The failing, I submit, is to announce the impossibility, though the actual plausibility is that the genuine difficulties prohibit short-term or directly advantageous approaches--within the context of academic career advancement, say. Reconciliation of deeper cultural differences and interests is simply a slow and long-term endeavor--as I believe any diplomat would tell you. On the other hand, if all the world's diplomats would throw in the towel, in view of the relativists' own response, then what kind of human world would that be?

Where there is a will, a way can sometimes be found. Short-term and isolated interests and perspectives cannot be allowed to block that insight. "The cost of countering absolutism by relativizing truth and goodness is too high."

H.G. Callaway