Achilles is in a footrace with the tortoise. Achilles allows the tortoise a head start of 100 metres. If we suppose that each racer starts running at some constant speed (one very fast and one very slow), then after some finite time, Achilles will have run 100 metres, bringing him to the tortoise's starting point. During this time, the tortoise has run a much shorter distance, say, 10 metres. It will then take Achilles some further time to run that distance, by which time the tortoise will have advanced farther; and then more time still to reach this third point, while the tortoise moves ahead. Thus, whenever Achilles reaches somewhere the tortoise has been, he still has farther to go. Therefore, because there are an infinite number of points Achilles must reach where the tortoise has already been, he can never overtake the tortoise.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeno's_paradoxes

Bill, it really IS time that you started reading a little contemporary philosophy...

It seems strange to me that men, even today, would use such arguments to deny reality.

Years ago --- I hate to admit it --- I actually spent real money on a book ***Chariots of the Gods?,*** by Erich von Däniken. The whole book focused on pointing out things that might seem difficult to explain. But he had an explanation --- creatures from outer space did it!!!

I think even then I saw through the fallacy he was selling... many irrelevant details can not add up to prove something.

Arguments against the 'arrow of time' would need to be very strong to change my mind --- very, very, very strong. I do not believe any arm-chair philosophy should shake one's confidence in the obvious... that there are past events and there may yet be future ones.

As to the present moment... I would suspect it is the most difficult of all natural mysteries to understand. C. S. Peirce noted the peculiar status it has in our minds. We think of the present as an instant, but when one examines it closely it is difficult beyond words to reduce it to its vanishing point. Mental activity takes time so our ability to identify the present is limited to the speed of the mind's functioning. But if we look even further into Quantum Mechanics there seems to be a narrow slice of time which is irreducible --- at least by experimental methods --- into anything finer.

At that level --- the Quantum level --- I believe we run into what Bernard D'Espagnat referred to as a 'veiled reality.' It is what Socrates referred to in the famous Myth of the Cave... mere shadows of something hidden from us.

Who among us is worthy to break the seal on the mysteries of time?

Really, Bill; this touches on the literary!

I won't spill my guts again - I hog far too much 'space' here already: just read through Ned Markosian's article at Stanford: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/ and tell me what you don't agree with.

I'm not being deliberately snotty - I have far too much respect for you for that - it's just that I really must get on with *doing* some philosophy of time (I've got a paper due, not to mentions the bills). There is indeed an argument that time is not a fit subject for 'descriptive metaphysics' (not to mention those who would argue against the whole idea of "descriptive metaphysics" - though this latter would perhaps best be discussed in the new thread "Does scientific naturalism exclude metaphysics?" - check it out folks!).

Anyway, if you have time ;-), check out the Markosian and tell me what you think.

Far be it from me to keep you from paying the bills... I will attempt to trudge through that article. I can't promise that I will do it very quickly.

Don't blame you... I've got a backlog of reading several yards thick, too...

Just to keep the pot simmering slightly: I'd tend to the view that 'instants' are "theory-dependent"...

The first point in the article...

1. Fatalism...

I see nothing ***fatalistic*** about 'Fatalism.' The claim is that in supposing that the future is already set in stone --- as it were --- we thereby suppose that there is nothing that any man can do to change it.

I would prefer to say that --- to the extent that the future depends on decisions that men make --- there are men who would bring it about. Thus our decisions have a positive effect on the future. We are not just victims of fate, but --- to some degree, at least --- its motive force.

It is an important distinction. The laws of nature do not work negatively. Suppose that two objects are moving toward each other and will collide. The collision is not due to the non-existence of something to keep them apart, but to real forces which set them on their course. Incidentally we may truly say that there is nothing to keep them apart. But that non-existence is not the cause of the collision --- non-existence isn't sucking the two objects together. It works the same way with men.

Please note that I am not asserting --- at this point, at least --- that the future is already set in stone. I am merely responding to the argument --- which is expressed negatively --- when the proper statement of the question needs to be expressed positively. The argument is confusing an incidental conclusion for the essential one. Incidentally, no man will prevent what will occur from occurring. So what? The argument is presenting us with a 'straw dog.' We should not be frightened by it.

The first point is closely related to the question of free will. Is man somehow free? Or is man merely a sort of robot, following deterministic laws to determined acts?

The question of what one means by free will is not simply answered. The naive view would be that man is either determined by forces inferior to him --- or that his acts are somehow without any cause. I think that is a false dichotomy.

As I have stated it before, I hold to what I call 'Hierarchical Hylomorphism.' Hylomorphism is the term applied to Aristotle's view that physical bodies are composed of matter and form. He believed that matter is mere possibility that something can exist. He believed that matter was ***created*** by a First Cause who set it in being. He thought it was eternal. He believed that matter in itself is not actual. It requires form to make it so. Form is the essential, definitional reality for physical bodies. There were forms for all natural bodies. Thus there is a form for man; a form for horse; a form for gold...

Aristotle's Hylomorphism is directly opposed to Democritus' view that bodies were composed of atoms moving through a void. Democritus' idea was accepted by Timaeus in the Socratic dialogue by that name. The five elements corresponded to the five Platonic solids. Earth was a cube; it was solid because cubes fit together. Water flows because it is an icosahedron; being very nearly spherical it rolls around. Fire cut because it was a tetrahedron with sharp points. Air was an octahedron; as such it flows like water but is light like fire. The heavenly element was a dodecahedron; thus there were twelve constellations in the heavens corresponding to its twelve sides.

Aristotle rejected Timaeus' views, supposing that the different qualities were due to the affective qualities of the elements. Thus earth is cold and dry; water is cold and wet; fire is hot and dry; air is hot and wet. The heavenly element was untouchable and shared none of the qualities of the earthly ones.

Aristotle's Hylomorphism eventually won out over Democritus' Atomism. It was in turn replaced by a revived Atomism which is almost universally accepted today.

I do accept the general idea of Atomism --- but in a Hierarchical, Hylomorphic setting. I believe that there are several different levels in a hierarchy: particles, atoms, molecules, plant and animal cells, and whole organisms such as man. The lower levels in the hierarchy act to give matter to the higher levels; the higher levels supply form.

This distinction is significant when it comes to the question of free will --- which is what motivated my bring it up. Unlike those who think of causation as something coming from the particle --- I postulate that at each level the form acts according to its own intrinsic dynamic --- with the higher level, the form, determining the acts of the lower level, its matter. Thus it is the man who acts through his body.

Given Hierarchical Hylomorphism, what is free will? It certainly does not mean that a man's actions are without cause.

Consider the following two examples...

In the first case, suppose a man is standing on a ladder, hammering a nail into a board. Suppose that his enemy walks up and seeing him, shakes the ladder. The man on the ladder is surprised, grabs for support and drops the hammer which lands on his enemy's head, killing him.

In the second case, suppose again that a man is standing on a ladder. He sees his enemy approaching him and filled with hatred for his enemy, he throws the hammer down, hitting his enemy on the head and killing him.

Now, going back to the question of free will, what is the essential difference between these two examples? I would argue that in the second case the man's act was caused by his knowledge of his enemy's presence --- while in the first case he had no such knowledge. Thus I credit an act to a free decision when knowledge is its cause. Otherwise it is not free.

As I see it, this notion that free will is action caused by knowledge lies at the heart of what men really mean when they use the term. It is --- more or less --- what English common law uses as its standard. A man is responsible for his illegal act who knows (or should know) it to be illegal and proceeds to act in violation of the law. It can be a rigorous standard when judging a malefactor. It is what it is...

Going back to the question of 'Fatalism' I see no contradiction between the idea that a man is predestined to do a thing and the idea that he acts freely in doing so. For freedom does not consist in an acts being somehow undetermined, but in their being caused by knowledge. Freedom is found where knowledge acts.

Once again, please note that I am not asserting --- at this point, at least --- that the future is already set in stone. I am merely responding to the argument.

In my humble opinion, men are often blinded by science. We do not see the forest for the trees...

Psychologists note the many nerves carrying signals to the brain. They see nerves carrying signals from the brain to the muscles. They note that the brain is complex beyond their wildest ideas and yet they pretend it to be simple... a mere Turing Machine clothed in flesh.

Yet the brain is anything but a Turing Machine. For it is the man who feels, thinks and acts by means of his brain and the many nerves passing through it. It is man who programs his brain, not the brain that programs the man.

Turing was wrong. Kurt Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem shows that. For there are mathematical theorems that can not be proven by a Turing Machine but which mathematicians such as Gödel have proven. There is something going on in man which simple-minded theory does not explain. That something is the 'forest' which we can not see.

Having mentioned Gödel, I might as well point out one result of his which pertains directly to the nature of time...

He and Albert Einstein were close friends. The two of them used to walk home together from the Institute for Advanced Study. The two of them had hours and hours in which they discussed such ideas as General Relativity.

Gödel was able to find that one solution for Einstein's equations was that a rotating universe might be caught in a time-loop. Thus the universe would endlessly repeat the same events over and again as the universe rotated. The 'future' would blend seamlessly into the 'past' over a time-scale that would be truly enormous.

From what I understand, Einstein agreed that Gödel's calculations were correct... but rejected the concept as counter-intuitive.

Yet Gödel found the idea aesthetically pleasing...

The whole concept of a rotating universe is difficult to define. If the whole universe were rotating, how would we know it? I suppose rotation might show up as a 'Coriolis effect.' Thus, I suppose one might need to refine Gödel's idea to say that a universe displaying a 'Coriolis effect' might be in a time-loop. Not being a physicists, however, I can not state the matter more precisely.

Bill: sorry not to have come back more quickly - also sorry for the brevity of the following replies: I'm afraid I'm overstretching at present, have too many irons in too many fires; and fear biting off more than I can chew.

(substitute other metaphors if preferred). My replies (in which I'll try and 'take position') will also presuppose the various details of the arguments between the points you mention; if anything's unclear, let me know.

1. Fatalism. There are two ways of approaching this. If we take the approach of traditional philosophy, the problem is "how can there be Free Will if 'future' events are 'already determined'?". THIS version of Free Will assumes Absolute Becoming and the determination of unrealised future possibilia by present action (that is, present events cause *and bring into being* future events). The foundation of this argument for Free Will is, as you can see, entirely ontological.

However, the problem of Free Will can also be seen as a matter of 'phenomenology'. This is the 'eternalist' formulation of the "problem of Free Will… Eternalism holds that there is no difference in the ontological status of 'past', 'present', and 'future' events, and therefore no Absolute Becoming. The ontological foundation of traditional arguments for Free Will is swept away. If this is the case, then perhaps the "problem of Free Will" is not a problem of the ontology of time, but that of mind. Our phenomenal experience of and our common notions about the world suggest that physical events can have 'mental' causes, and that these mental causes take the form of choices between different 'courses of action'. What we call "Free Will" is primarily expressed by counterfactuals – an agent Ned saying "if I had chosen to do A, then O would have occurred; THEREFORE, I chose to do B and O did not occur" (the negation can be placed variously, but you get the idea). If there's anything suspicious about this reasoning, it's the implication given by the capitalised " THEREFORE ". To my eyes, it doesn't express the 'concretisation of an intention' or whatever, but rather reflects Ned's local temporal perspective at the time of action T. FOR Ned at T, the 'future' *seems* more like a phase-space than a spacetime: it's a set of probable outcomes (note the theory-dependent ontology). Ned's apprehension of the future is *given in anticipation* – that is, he infers the 'probable form' of the future from present evidence.

THIS IS THE IMPORTANT POINT: Here, Ned is doing exactly the same for 'the future' as he does for 'the past': inferring a 'probable course of events' from present evidence. The 'evidence' for the past is memory (individual or collective), while the 'evidence' for the future is anticipation (individual or collective). Yet both are available to inference rather than given in experience (they are part of the cognitive rather than the perceptual component of 'present awareness').

The problem of Free Will is not a 'problem in itself', but rather a specific case of the more general problem of our 'apprehension of the future', and THIS is a specific case of the more general problem of our "local temporal perspective" – that is, the phenomenally real distinction between locally 'present', 'past', and 'future' events that is supposedly "given" in our awareness of the world and is apparent in the tense structure of our language.

More generally: classical philosophical accounts of Free Will assume a certain understanding of causation: that it is an 'event-generating process', and this 'event-generating process' itself presupposes Absolute Becoming. While certain theories (general relativity, QM…) resist *scientific* determinism in terms of outcomes from initial conditions, this is a matter of theory-dependent prediction and does not necessarily correspond to our everyday notions of 'events' being 'sufficient causes' for the Becoming of other events (and this reflects a tendency to remark that – as Carl Hoefer remarks (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/index.html#note-1) "the physical sciences to “neither philosophers' nor laymen's conceptions of events have any correlate in any modern physical theory – and the same goes for the notions of "cause" and "sufficient cause".

DH: "I'm afraid I'm overstretching at present, have too many irons in too many fires; and fear biting off more than I can chew."

Not a problem...

I place the emphasis on knowledge as the source of freedom. Freedom is knowledge in action.

I differ from those 'scientists' who think only of the parts of a thing, failing to recognize that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. For the whole is the form --- the actualizing principle which draws the parts together.

I agree more or less with Roger Penrose...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Penrose#Physics_and_consciousness

and John Lucas...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Lucas_(philosopher)#Free_will

I believe it is precisely because the whole is more than its parts that men such as Gödel have proven theorems which a Turing Machine can not. For being themselves a sort of whole, they are able to see the whole problem and thereby rise above the mere details to which Turing Machines are bound. It is that knowledge of the whole by which men transcend determinism to act freely.

And if 'matter is effete mind," (C. S. Peirce) that same freedom may show up in Quantum Mechanics, as well --- though stripped of its vitality.

Eternalism may work well enough for gods. But men are far from divinity. We must balance our views in the School of Hard Knocks.

Moving to the next heading...

2. Reductionism and Platonism with Respect to Time

Reductionism here refers to Aristotle's view, that time is a mere quality of substances. It has no independent existence.

Platonism here refers to the belief that time is itself a sort of substance.

If time is a substance, could it exist by itself? It is hard to imagine what a purely temporal universe could be. Given the prior existence of material forms it is easy to imagine how qualities might be associated with them. Given the existence of qualities it is easy to imagine change. Given change, it is easy to imagine time. But does it make sense to imagine time without anything else to give it support?

Again, if time is a substance, does it allow for associated qualities in the way that substances do? I think not. It is neither white nor black, neither hard nor soft, neither hot nor cold, neither sweet nor sour... Perhaps, then, it is curved in some relativistic sense? Perhaps --- but if that curvature is perceived only because material forms behave in certain ways then is it not equally valid to say that time is a mere quality of the material forms, themselves?

If --- as it seems to be the case --- time can not exist by itself and if it has no attached qualities of its own, then why call it substance? There would seem to be no good reason to do so.

The article goes on to present a thought experiment devised by Sydney Shoemaker to give some meaning to the concept of 'empty time,' time in which nothing whatsoever happens. The argument carries no weight.

Compare it to thought-experiments devised by Albert Einstein... Einstein's thought experiments were designed to demonstrate conceivable physical situations. They might be unusual ones, but they were not arbitrary in nature.

Shoemaker's thought experiment in contrast is quite arbitrary. I can conceive of no physical situation which it is intended to represent. I can imagine no alignment of real physical forces which could bring it about. It is an exercise in pure imagination. There seems to be no good reason to allow for his creation by fiat of the hypothetical situation he outlines.

As such the thought-experiment seems to be little more than hot air, as it were.

Even granting Sydney Shoemaker's creation by fiat of the 'possible world' he hypothesized, the conclusion that time is substance does not follow. One could argue against Shoemaker by saying that certain times may qualify some substances but not others. As long as there is some substance somewhere which is qualified by a time then we might speak meaningfully of that time.

Thus, for example, if Christmas were to exist as a real time in Christian countries, but as empty time in non-Christian countries one might meaningfully speak of it in non-Christian countries as something qualifying substances in Christian ones.

It is tempting to imagine time as a sort of container in which objects exist. Does this image imply that time is a substance?

One can imagine many things. But imagination does not imply that the thing imagined is substance or that it truly exists at all.

It may well be that imagining time as a container gives one a useful analogy that helps one organize one's thoughts. But mere usefulness does not imply substantial existence. Many mathematical constructs are useful without being substance.

VS: "hmm then what does time=?"

Right now it is 2:55 PM EST.

Hey lads, I'm really sorry not to be more reactive, but I really must prioritise. I'll get back to your remarks, Bill; but for the instant I'm trying to get a piece on possible worlds finished so I can complete a piece on propositions so I can complete a presentation on the possibility of B-theoretical serious tensing so I can perhaps start an investigation into the intuitions and assumptions underlying the representation of verbal tense as part of a wider investigation into the intuitoins and assumptions underlying the way we represent time.

Phew!

Not a problem!!

Moving on to the next section in the article...

3. The Topology of Time

Does time have a beginning? Does time have an end? Is time asymmetrical in the sense that it has direction (from the past through the present and into the future)? Does time loop seamlessly from the future back into the past? Are some substances getting younger even as others get older? Is time continuous, or are there breaks (or jumps) in its flow? Are there places infinitely far removed from us so that there is no causal connection between them and us --- so that our time is effectively disconnected from theirs?

Who am I to say? Most of these problems would seem to be more a matter of physical cosmology or even theology than philosophy. Thus I would yield to the physical cosmologists and theologians. Since the latter tend to adjust their views to match the views of the former, I consider them first...

(1) Does time have a beginning?

A question of perennial interest. From what I understand cosmologists generally say that the universe as a whole had a sort of beginning, the Big Bang.

There are alternative explanations, of course. I am just going by what seems to be the currently accepted consensus.

As to time, itself... There are those who would wrap the universe into a hypothetical 'multiverse' which may be imagined to have no beginning. I personally consider such hypotheses to be very likely unprovable under any currently existing technology.

(2) Does time have an end?

Another question of perennial interest. From what I understand, cosmologists generally expect the universe to expand forever, becoming cooler and cooler as time goes by. So it seems that time would have no end.

(3) Is time asymmetrical in the sense that it has direction (from the past through the present and into the future)?

Most of the fundamental laws of physics are invariant with respect to time reversal. The Second Law of Thermodynamics is an exception. I understand that certain processes involving 'CP violation' also seem to be exceptional. Thus there is physical evidence for time's being asymmetrical.

Biological processes, of course, provide the clearest example of the 'Arrow of Time.'

"The law that entropy always increases holds, I think, the supreme position among the laws of Nature. If someone points out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in disagreement with Maxwell's equations — then so much the worse for Maxwell's equations. If it is found to be contradicted by observation — well, these experimentalists do bungle things sometimes. But if your theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation." — Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (1927)

(4) Does time loop seamlessly from the future back into the past?

Kurt Gödel was fascinated by the concept. He showed that a rotating universe might, in fact, be in such a time loop.

I have never heard of physical evidence favoring Gödel's views. Thus I consider the idea unlikely.

(5) Are some substances getting younger even as others get older?

I have never heard any clear account of planets, stars or galaxies moving backward in time. From what I understand, the law of entropy seems to hold for the universe as a whole --- to the extent that man is able to know that whole.

Some interpretations of Quantum Mechanics seem to allow particles to move backward in time. Yet from what I understand, there are alternative interpretations of the same phenomena which avoid any violation of the 'Arrow of Time.' In any event, the processes involved are extremely short-lived.

(6) Is time continuous, or are there breaks (or jumps) in its flow?

Quantum Mechanics does seem to allow a certain fuzziness in the present 'instant.' The Plank time constant is approximately 5.39124 x 10^-44 seconds is a sort of minimum time interval. Does that mean that time is somehow discontinuous? Not really... It means that one can not effectively measure smaller intervals. Quantum Mechanics really can not answer the question of whether smaller intervals actually exist.

In any event, the interval involved, 5.39124 x 10^-44 seconds is far smaller than current technology can measure. Thus it would seem that time is essentially continuous.

(7) Are there places infinitely far removed from us so that there is no causal connection between them and us --- so that our time is effectively disconnected from theirs?

It would seem that what is infinitely far from us is simply unknowable.

VS: "hmm 2.55

so is it still

2.55pm or does it change ?"

It seems to have changed... I think the Arrow of Time has 'moved.'

And to the next section...

4. McTaggart's Argument

It is fairly obvious that the 'two series' are one and the same. They are described differently, but clearly do not differ. For they relate the same events in the same order.

As to the descriptions... the main difference is that the B description avoids the word, 'present.'

McTaggart's argument is not compelling. He proposes that he can raise infinitely many objections to any equally infinite series of replies. Now personally I do not know of any logical principle to resolve the matter... I believe there is none either in classical logic or in mathematical logic that states that an infinite sequence of incomplete arguments somehow leads to a definite conclusion.

So the only rational course for one to take is to ask scientists whether time exists. They say it does. That is good enough for me.

McTaggart's objections must therefore be classified with Zeno's paradox regarding Achilles and the tortoise. Like McTaggart's 'paradox,' Zeno's involves an infinite regression.

To show that an infinite series of propositions may lead to a paradoxical conclusion, consider the following series of false statements...

... There is a number π = 3.

... There is a number π = 3.1.

... There is a number π = 3.14.

... There is a number π = 3.141.

... There is a number π = 3.1415.

... There is a number π = 3.14159.

...

Following McTaggart line of thought might lead one to conclude that the number π is an illusion. But there are many mathematicians who would not accept such an argument.

Moving on...

5. The A Theory and The B Theory

Oops... more of the same.

As one who accepts the scientific understanding of time and rejects McTaggart's paradox the only thing I find even vaguely interesting is the reference to Special Relativity.

I have commented on Hermann Minkowski's views before. I would say that the universe from a sort of 'god's eye,' eternal view, might well be described as Minkowski proposed. There is, however, a danger in attempting to describe what a god might see in human terms.

Minkowski provided us with a mathematical description of space and time as he understood the matter. I have no particular problem with the mathematics. They allow physicists, such as Albert Einstein to make predictions which can be tested.

I think there are problems when we drop the mathematics and start to argue about things as if men truly were able to see reality from such a 'god's eye' perspective --- problems when we switch back and forth between the mathematics and everyday thought. I question, for example, whether such terms as 'absolute simultaneity' truly represent what the bare mathematics assert.

I suppose that my position would be, therefore, that while I would deny that time is an illusion, I might well agree that there are illusions connected with time.

Next!!

6. Presentism, Eternalism, and The Growing Universe Theory

As an aside, one might ask to what degree these ideas are presented as serious things to consider and to what degree they are just so much fodder for doctoral dissertations...

In my humble opinion, things are present in the way they are present; eternal in the way they are so.

Thus Socrates is present as a historical entity. I am present in the sense that I am typing this message; Midnight tonight is present in the sense that it potentially exists. As to eternity... it is difficult to express such matters in words. I suppose that in a 'god's eye' view of the universe, all of the above could be seen, eternally.

Presentism and eternalism are largely concerned with the range and scope of the existential quantifier.

"Things are present in the way they are present" and "things are eternal are in the way they are eternal". So, what is present is present; and what is eternal is eternal. Bravo Bill - you've discovered tautology. What are you going to do with it?

But what IS "presentness"? The presentist (drawing on A-distinctions) will hold that "being present" implies an ontological distinction: that which is past and that which is future doesn't exist. The following conjunction is, for the presentist, false:

i. (∃x) (∃y) x is a dinosaur & y is a computer

as the first conjunct is false: there is no x such that x is a dinosaur. The existential quantifier in (i) has its widest possible scope - it ranges over 'everything that exists'. For the presentist, 'everything that exists' exists in the present. To simplify, the presentist holds that (∃x) ranges over all of space at an instant T in time (and it is an assumption of presentism that it ONLY has extension when T = the present).

Now, the eternalist would hold that (∃x) ranges over all of space and time. If (i) holds at an instant, it holds at all instants. In order that (i) be "false" in the presentist sense, the eternalist would have to quantify over instants:

ii. (∃x) (∃y) (∃t) x is a dinosaur at t & y is a computer at t

(ii) is false if there is no instant T such that there are both dinosaurs and computers at T.

So, for the presentist the "is" of existential quantification is TENSED; for the eternalist it is UNTENSED. Further discussion of this point requires a solid theory of verbal tense; a solid theory of verbal tense requires that we examine the distinction between the A- and the B-series. I believe you've commented on that; I shall therefore continue my remarks by looking at your conclusions on the matter.

***

On a more general level, I regret to say that I find somewhat unseemly your comment "one might ask to what degree these ideas are presented as serious things to consider and to what degree they are just so much fodder for doctoral dissertations". As I'm sure you're aware, this is beneath you. Metaphysical theses are entirely underdetermined with respect to evidence - if they were not, they would be 'scientific' theses. This is as true of your own systemic approach as it is of my partial approach; perhaps truer. Even when a metaphysical thesis conflicts with a physical theory, there will be those who prefer to question the scope of the theory rather than the metaphysical thesis (which is why there are still a few classical, Augustinian-Newtonian, presentists) - and indeed, I would hold that they are right to do so. A scientific account isn't built of eternal stone - it's a makeshift way-station towards a (hopefully) better account. If a scientific account conflicts with phenomenal experience and common intuitions, the rôle of metaphysics is to examine BOTH sides of the gap and judge which - if either - should be given priority. HOW we do this is the whole point of metaphysics.

As to the validity of citing a scientific account as 'justification' for preferring a given metaphysical thesis and for the metaphysical assumptions underlying preference for a given scientific account: there's a whole group here on Research Gate dedicated to this very question, so I'll say no more here.

Bill: "Thus Socrates is present as a historical entity. I am present in the sense that I am typing this message; Midnight tonight is present in the sense that it potentially exists."

If I may reformulate with less room for ambiguity (and I shall use my own 'local present' as the temporal anchor):

"For me at the time of writing, "Socrates" is available to memory; my action of writing is given in perception; and midday is available to anticipation."

"Socrates" is a bad example, as we're uncertain whether the name is used as a rigid designator à la Kripke or a disguised definite description à la Russell. The context would suggest the latter, as a 'historical entity' is an entity for which we have descriptive evidence. However, the EVIDENCE is present - you make no reference to the past. The evidence is either available to immediate perception, or available to present memory. Insofar as we have no direct perceptual evidence for Socrates (we can't see or touch or smell or - thank God - hear him), we can only infer his reality from indirect evidence (the accounts concerning Socrates).

The future is available to us in a very similar way: as an inference from present evidence. "Potentially exists" is confusing as your formulation doesn't make it clear whether you're talking de dicto or de re. If you're talking de dicto, then a short but rather technical argument will show that you're talking about "anticipation"; if you're talking de re I'd challenge you to defend this addition to our ontology (in other words, what do you mean when you say "there are possible entities" using a modally-unmodified existential quantifier?).

Needless to say, "the things of the present" are an inference from perceptual 'evidence'.

***

To conclude, generalising (and taking into account Michel Treisman's remarks on the inseparability of perception and cognition in 'immediate experience'), you are remarking that

PP: at any instant, the "things of the past" are available to memory; the "things of the present" are given in perception; and 'the things of the future" are available to anticipation.

This is a statement of a general intuition of the "phenomenal present"; most would say that it's the point of departure for the philosophy of time (cf. Augustine's "Confessions" Book 11, Ch. XV).

"Presentism vs. eternalism" is primarily a disagreement over the ontological status of the "things" in the past, the present, and the future. There is no disagreement over PP as a statement of common intuitions supposedly drawn from a coincidence of phenomenal experience (no relativistic eternalist will say that a – living - dinosaur is contemporarily available to his immediate perception in the way that his computer is available).

The relation between eternalism/presentism and PP is the relation of rival theories to their evidence: in this case, presentists cite PP as justifying their theory despite any evidence from physical accounts of the "timelike qualities" of the world. For eternalists, PP is the expression of a "counterintuitive objection" to four-dimensionalism ("if the world is 4D, why should we experience it as being 3+1D?").

Our real task is to examine to what degree and to what extent PP is actually borne out in the way we talk about time.

A-SERIES, B-SERIES

Bill: "It is fairly obvious that the 'two series' are one and the same. They are described differently, but clearly do not differ. For they relate the same events in the same order."

Boy oh boy! This is all very useful – getting me to reformulate the fundamentals and all that. For the fun of it, I'm going to reply "under exam conditions" – all from memory…

The argument is NOT about their being "the same events in the same order", but about the priority between the series of A-properties "future", "present", "past" and the sequence of B-relations "later than - simultaneous with - earlier than". Both sides of the debate allow that, under certain conditions, there can be a locally-immutable order to events; their disagreement is about:

i. the ***sense*** we can give to that "order";

ii. to the universality of its immutability; and

iii. to the degree of generality of the governing conditions.

(i) is the fundamental point on which A- and B-theorists disagree; their understanding of (ii) and (iii) follows from their understanding of (i) and their other metaphysical assumptions or preferences concerning time (in the philosophy of time, one's preferences in one debate will often colour the arguments one gives in another debate).

I haven't read the Markosian in ages, so I don't know whether my presentation will repeat or recapitulate his, or whether it'll go off in a different direction. But anyway, the A-theory and the B-theory are different understandings of the apparent order of events in time.

1. Let us imagine three times, T1, T2 and T3 such that the sequence is ordered. Let us imagine three events A, B, and C such that

- A occurs at T1

- B occurs at T2

- C occurs at T3

The fundamental assumption (the assumption of sequence) is

AS : if an event E takes place at a time Tn, it cannot take place at a time Tk≠n.

Whether the order of "times" is fundamental to the order of "events in time" is, of course, a matter of preference with respect to substantivalism or relativism. But, whatever its metaphysical scope, the conjunction of (1) and AS is common ground to both A-theorists and B-theorists. As with the presentism/eternalism opposition, the question is rather what interpretation one gives, and the scope (local or universal) one would give to one's interpretation.

NOTE - the A-series are given as ***properties***, the B-series as ***relations***. This is fundamental to understanding the distinction between the views, and its import for other philosophical puzzles, such as the passage of time. Given (1) and AS, the B-series is simply the statement that

2. the sequence is ordered such that

- A is ***before*** B and B is ***before*** C

- B is ***after*** A and C is ***after*** B

[The relations ***before*** and ***after*** are transitive].

Furthermore,

- for any event E, if E is neither ***before*** or ***after*** B, then E is ***simultaneous with*** B

(2) is a statement which both A- and B-theorists will accept, as it follows from (1) and AS. However, B-theorists will say that (2) is a ***full*** statement of the local temporal relations between A, B, and C under certain specified conditions, and that other determinations (such as "past", "present" and "future") can be reduced to (2). Thus, for the B-theorist, while B is 'past' ***with respect to C*** but future ***with respect to A***. There's no paradox as 'pastness', 'presentness', and 'futurity' are always relative – an event E can at one and the same time be future with respect to A, present with respect to B , and past with respect to C.

So, while B-theorists won't necessarily deny an apparent A-series, they will say that this A-series can be reduced to a B-series. A further distinction concerns the nature of this reduction. If the reduction is grounded in ontology (that is, of the B-theorist is – as most are – an eternalist), then the B-theorist will say that (2) is all there is to say on the matter of temporal sequence – not all events take place at 'the same time', and the temporal interval between them can (allowing for an appropriate frame of reference) be given by a locally-fixed 'before – after' relation.

The A-theoretical position is

3. The sequence of time is such that each event A,B, and C is successively 'future', 'present' and 'past'. Thus

- at T1 A is present, and B and C are future

- at T2, B is present, A is past, and C is future

- at T3, A and B are past, and C is present

The sequence would, of course, continue. At no time is an event simultaneously 'past', 'present', and 'future' as each property is held uniquely at any time: indeed, for the distinction to work requires that if A is present then A is neither past nor future and vice versa. An A-theory also comports the notion of A being 'more in the past' than B when C is present and C being 'further in the future' than B when A is present.

A full-blooded A-theory has to show how the B-relations "before – simultaneous with – after" can be founded on or reduced to the simple A-properties 'past', 'present' and 'future' held successively by each event. This requires certain assumptions

iv. that each property is held simpliciter

v. that one property – that of "being present" – is held instantaneously, quasi-instantaneously, or for an extremely short interval

vi. that the properties of "being past" and "being future" are constructed from the present - the future being "that which is to come", the past being "that which has gone".

The series of B-relations, in which the past is 'that which is before the time that is currently present' and the future is 'that which is after the time that is currently present' is, in this an account, an abstraction from (vi). For the A-theorist, the observed 'before-after' sequence depends on the events under investigation having, or having had, A-properties.

If both (iv) and (vi) hold, and the 'future' and 'past' are conceived from the present, then 'being present' must pick out a unique instant or interval. If B is present, it must be present from a point of view that can take in the entire sequence and judge that B is the ONLY present event in the sequence. This rules out relativism: if every event P is locally present, then 'past' and 'future' are local determinations based on other events being 'before' or 'after' P, and the A-properties collapse to B-relations.

So, a strong A-theory must hold that

vii. only one time Tp and one set of events can be present

(vii) would have to hold for at least "the universe of events throughout space and time" as allowing local presents within our universe of space and time is a de facto return to relativism (though some A-theorists would argue over the evidence for this). So, (vii) requires either the universe of three-dimensionalist presentism (the events at Tp are the only events which exist) or some kind of 'moving spotlight' in the universe of four-dimensionalist eternalism. Generally, the 'moving spotlight' has been seen as untenable (why should some frame of reference or temporal perspective be privileged with respect to all others?), but this is of course a matter of ontological reduction. Furthermore, Dean Zimmerman's paper suggests some ways an eternalist could be an A-theorist (though to my eyes his solution collapses to a form of presentism).

As with those who argue for presentism, A-theorists frequently argue that their position is more acceptable to intuition than is the opposing view. Elsewhere, I gave the intuition underlying the notion of the "phenomenal present" :

PP: at any instant, the "things of the past" are available to memory; the "things of the present" are given in perception; and "the things of the future" are available to anticipation.

A-theorists argue that this intuition is manifest in our tensed talk about time. Thus, he believes that where an eternalist gives equal value to "there are dinosaurs" and "there are computers", her error lies in not distinguishing between "there ***are*** computers" and "there ***were*** dinosaurs". Verbal tense, for the A-theorist, is evidence for PP; furthermore, the distinction between "F will be the case" and "F was the case" is founded on a real distinction in our attitudes to F being future of F being past.

The view that verbal tense reflects a real distinction, and cannot be reduced to atemporal propositions true at times, is called "serious tensing". Until recently, "serious tensing" and "the A-theory" were used pretty much interchangeably; however, the debate has widened considerably from the initial ontological opposition. If the reduction from the A-series to the B-series is a matter of ontology, then the opposition is between a presentist (3+1D) and an eternalist (4D) ontology (I'll ignore the growing block for reasons of economy). We can, however, accept an ontological reduction – or reject it outright as meaningless – while refusing the epistemological reduction. From PP, it would seem that our sources of information about the world can be distinguished by their mode of access (memory, perception, anticipation); furthermore, these distinctions would seem to respect a basic intuition about our experience of causation (that a cause precede its effect). The eternalist might well hold that reality is a four-dimensional manifold of events, and that these events are ordered by local B-relations; she might also hold that each event is "locally present" at its time of occurrence T. However, she cannot deny that for a (human) observer O at T, PP would apply to O's awareness of and knowledge about the world.

So, we can hold that eternalist four-dimensionalism is the best, or preferable, or most appropriate account of our physical ontology, and that this militates for a B-theoretical understanding of the passage of time, yet still hold that neither four-dimensionalism nor the B-theory give a satisfactory account of a given observer's knowledge about the world at any given time. We can, therefore, hold that tense is "epistemically significant", whatever we might consider the 'physical status' of the supposed truthmakers to be – that is, we can accept that "serious tensing" represents an irreducible element of both individual and collective temporal perspective while holding to an eternalist, B-theoretical view on the nature of time and the things in time.

TEMPORAL SEQUENCE AND TEMPORAL PASSAGE

This follows from the A-theory/B-theory debate

Imagine a world W which consisted of

- three distinct times T1, T2 and T3 such that the sequence is ordered

- three distinct events A, B, and C such that A occurs at T1; B occurs at T2; and C occurs at T3

Now, the A-theorist holds that each event is successively 'future', 'present' and 'past'; this holds for W with the proviso that in W A can never be future and C can never be past. An A-theoretical understanding of W is that,

- at T1, A is present, and B and C are future

- at T2, A is past, B is present, and C is future

- at T3, A and B are past, and C is present

At any time in W, more than one other time can have the property of 'being past' or 'being future', but only one time can have the property of being present. If any T is present, then all times T-n will be past and all times T+n will be future.

Furthermore, each property is held simpliciter:

- at T1 it is a property of A that A is present, and it is a property of B and C that each is future

- at T2 it is a property of B that B is present, it is a property of A that A is past, and it is a property of C that C is future

- at T3 it is a property of C that C is present, and it is a property of A and B that each is past

At T1, A is present and no other event is present; likewise for B at T2 and C at T3. As each property is held simpliciter, we cannot hold that an event is present 'relative to itself' or past or future 'relative to some other event'. It follows that, if any event in W is present, it is the ONLY event that is present. W is a world made for the A-theorist, and therefore we can't fall back on supposedly 'more fundamental' before-after relations nor on the relation of 'past or future relative to', and as W has a 'beginning' and an 'end' – there is no event at any time T1-n nor at any time T3+n - first A is present and there is nothing before, then B becomes present, and then C, and then nothing.

We could hold that, while A, B, and C are only present at T1, T2, and T3 respectively, there is no reason why T1, T2 and, T3 should not persist – that is, that while at T1 no other event than A is present, this does not mean that at T1, T2 and T3 are not 'real' (present-in-themselves or 'locally present'). But then, if at T1 there is a T2 which is real "in itself", then there is at T2 an event B which is also 'present'. If, from the point of view of T1 we are going to give the 'presentness' of B as relative to T2, then we're going to have to explain how a time T2 can be real "in itself" with respect to T1 but how B can only be real "relative to T2" with respect to T1. This solution would require a form of substantivalism about time in W.

Depending on whether time in W is relative or not, we have either:

i. a universe consisting of an event A; followed by a universe consisting of an event B; followed by a universe consisting of an event C; or

ii. a universe consisting of an interval T1, T2, T3 in which the property of 'being present' sweeps first over A at T1, then B at T2, then C at T3

In both cases, the present sweeps through time, and it is this 'passage' which founds the sequence of time. The A-theory is not just a view concerning the absolute order of events in time; but is a view about the ***passage*** of time. (i) above is evidently the presentist understanding of this A-theoretical view: in W, the present is "all that exists" and there is a real becoming as first B, then C 'become present'. (ii) would give the equivalent for W of the problematic four-dimensionalist view of the B-theory.

DH: "On a more general level, I regret to say that I find somewhat unseemly your comment 'one might ask to what degree these ideas are presented as serious things to consider and to what degree they are just so much fodder for doctoral dissertations.'"

Please forgive me... I have been reading the article as you asked and been writing my humble thoughts...

McTaggart's argument depends on one's acceptance of a transfinite reasoning process. I know of no logical principle, classical or modern, which would lead me to accept it.

McTaggart's two sequences are in fact one and the same. Their descriptions differ. As I see it, the fundamental difference between the two descriptions is primarily that the second description avoids the word 'present.'

My concern about time is not about assigning a particular real number to an event as its absolute time. My concern is rather the validity of the category of time as real human beings use --- or ought to use --- the word. As such I reject McTaggart's argument. Time is not an illusion. There may be errors in the way men use time. To err is human. When men err, they ought to correct the error.

As I have said before, I agree with C. S. Peirce... there is a sort of fuzziness in the use of the word, 'present.' The more we try to identify the present the more it slips away from us. In some sense, our ability to identify the present moment is due to the fact that nerve signals --- which we use to think --- travel at finite speed. From what I understand, some travel at speeds up to one hundred and fifty miles per hour; others travel as slowly as two miles per hour.

Scientists can engineer electronic devices which measure times much more accurately than men can otherwise do. But even so, they are limited in precision. Thus there are events which even the best timing devices can not isolate.

And as such devices are refined to their ultimate perfection, Quantum Mechanics tells us that there are theoretical limits which they can not surpass, The Plank time constant, approximately 5.39124 x 10^-44 seconds. Thus it seems that there are inherent limits on man's ability to assign real numbers to time.

On to #7...

7. Time Travel

First of all, I would note that the fact that there are movies about time travel doesn't count in my opinion as giving any real support to the idea. That there may be no movies "in which two plus two are five, or in which there is a sphere that both is and is not red all over" is due to the simplicity of the logical or mathematical problems involved. Time travel, on the other hand is a far more complex conception. If there are conceptual errors in it, they depend on subtle enthymemes, not clearly stated in the movies...

I reject the argument presented in the article that if time travel were possible then a time traveler could do things that are impossible. Clearly one can not do the impossible.

For the sake of argument, let us suppose that it is absolutely impossible for one to kill his grandfather before his father was conceived --- the example mentioned in the article. Now let us suppose a time traveler went back in time to kill his grandfather. Clearly by the hypothesis, when he traveled back in time the traveler would fail to perform as planned. Perhaps he would miss the appointment; perhaps he would have lost the gun; perhaps he would kill someone else, thinking it was his grandfather; perhaps he shoots his grandfather, but the grandfather survives the attack... There are any number of reasons the plot may fail. But fail it would.

Is time travel possible? I know of no metaphysical reason to exclude it. As far as I can see the question is a matter of physics and engineering, not metaphysics.

As I see it there are two fundamentally different ways in which it could operate. On the one hand, one might see it as implying a complete bifurcation of the universe into two time-threads. Alternatively it could involve a single time-thread.

The former case clearly poses certain physical problems... for a new time-thread would seem to violate the laws of conservation of mass and energy... In creating a new time-thread one would seem to be creating a new 'universe.' Where would one get the mass and energy equal to the existing universe to create a new one?

The latter case, of course, may also pose physical problems.

In the former case certain things which might be impossible in the latter case might be quite possible. It might be possible to kill one's grandfather before one's father had been conceived, for example. In the original time-thread, the grandfather would have survived to conceive the father. In the other time-thread he would die.

If a time traveler were to return to his own time frame there would be two (or more) time-threads to which he might return. In the original time-thread, when he returned he might remember killing his grandfather --- but no one else might believe him. In the new time-thread, he would seem to come from nowhere without a father (or mother). People might think of him as a victim of amnesia --- or worse... for again, no one might believe him.

I say there might be more than two time-threads to which a time traveler might return... for if returning causes the universe to bifurcate there would be a third time-thread created. Oh, the possibilities are endless!!

But all that depends on a violation of the conservation of mass and energy.

Bill: "Thus Socrates is present as a historical entity. I am present in the sense that I am typing this message; Midnight tonight is present in the sense that it potentially exists."

DH: "The future is available to us in a very similar way: as an inference from present evidence. "Potentially exists" is confusing as your formulation doesn't make it clear whether you're talking de dicto or de re. If you're talking de dicto, then a short but rather technical argument will show that you're talking about "anticipation"; if you're talking de re I'd challenge you to defend this addition to our ontology (in other words, what do you mean when you say "there are possible entities" using a modally-unmodified existential quantifier?)."

First, thank you both for an engaging view, esp to David for enlightening us on the formal end. I do need to enter a caveat. Bill was correct in his use of 'potentially exists' as a sign for a modality of present reality. Hartshorne himself finally acknowledged that what is 'potential' must be 'real' (his term if I recall correctly) in the sense of 'real qua actual potentiality' (my expression, not his--but he was assuredly relying on Peircean real~thirdness/actual~secondness) that is knowable in the present. To enter a distinction ['de dicto' (sign) v. 'de re' (referent)] is relevant only if there is reason to suppose the failure of a logical nexus. In my view 'potentially exists' as 'de dicto' adequately stands for the referent 'valid probability'. It is nothing to the point to argue 'anticipation', for that term only describes what has been correctly stated in the first place. In fact, what was stated gives 'anticipation' the added nuance of 'expectation'--predicated upon the logic of experience, which is effectively what Hartshorne concluded. All that Bill or Hartshorne are saying, it appears to me, is that a 'valid probability' presupposes the 'reality' of a probability as well as a history of 'actual' probability fulfillment in an ordered continuum in turn presupposing future actualities as per agreement with the legal aspect or 'principle' that defines and characterizes the continuum. It is similar to the kind of argument one can use against Humean skepticism. Where any of this becomes theoretically questionable is where one challenges the stability of law within the referential framework. Peirce questioned the stability of law, but would have allowed a referential framework to get around that issue. Thus, I see no reason to quarrel with Mr. Overcamp's locution.

Moving on, again...

8. The 3D/4D Controversy

As I have said before, I think that one must distinguish the universe seen from a 'god's eye,' eternal view from what men know. As to the latter, I also furthermore distinguish mathematical descriptions from non-mathematical ones. My main interest is with the non-mathematical ones... for it is there that we speak of a 'category' of time.

As I have said before, I take as my model for the 'categories' a point, noted by C. S. Peirce in ***On a New List of Categories***

"I can prescind red from blue, and space from color (as is manifest from the fact that I actually believe there is an uncolored space between my face and the wall); but I cannot prescind color from space, nor red from color."

I can certainly understand space without involving time... as when I think of a body, such as a sphere or a cube. The meaning I ascribe to such concepts does not involve time at all.

That is an oversimplified explanation, however. But it does show that time is categorically separate from space.

Charles:

Thanks for the response!! It has been some time since I had heard from you...

As to potential existence... If substances change at all, it is in virtue of their having natural potencies to become what they are not already. Such potency is not a mere idea, but a dynamic principle within substance itself.

I do not understand the full implications of the distinction between ***de dicto*** and ***de re,*** except to say that I place the emphasis on potency in the thing itself (***re***) and not in propositions about it (***dicto***) but perhaps I am missing David's point completely. Certainly if potency is in the thing itself, then a proposition about the thing might also involve it. But again, I am referring in either case to potency as a natural dynamic and not as a mere description.

Perhaps one could relate the natural potencies of substance to power, the ability to do work. My idea of potency, however, is a bit more general than that. It is certainly related to that of energy.

David:

It looks like I have gone throught the article... How did I do?

Since you are relying on Peirce and David and I are quite familiar with him as well, it will seem wiser to place most if not all technical verbiage in a lingua franca--that is, to use Peircean/Sausserian terms. Thus I suggested 'de dicto' ~ sign and 'de re' ~ referent (not necessarily Peirce's choice but hey, it is general and gets the job done--Peirce could and did go overboard on some matters).

Academic folks sometimes forget that those not tutored in, and consistently fluent with, such terminology, find it distinctly unhelpful when common words are both useful and available. David presumably does nothing without a reason, but I would plead the case of simplicity wherever possible.

Your statement beginning "As to potential existence...." is not only correct, of course, but reflects what I mentioned in the post above, whereat principle or law is what presupposes continuum, which in turn exists as a given or presupposition for rational statements as to prediction. Peirce's entire systematic is an example of just that, and is also why he demanded that it be considered 'dynamic'. This also adds weight to your next summary statement. I should also add that the interjection of questionable formalities leads everyone to be entirely too cautious and inhibits a clear statement of intent--it seems counter-intuitive, but in fact much formal nomenclature clouds, rather than clarifying, for in being specific it opens wormholes of disputation for disputatious sorts--academics deluxe.

Finally, I have lately wondered, Bill, if I originally came across your name in Ransdell's listserve. If so, tell me whether he is still with us--I left the group a long, long time ago (for me) and he hasn't returned recent emails.

CSH

My absence is owing to computer issues and, more recently, login issues here at ResearchGate. And, I am trying desperately to empty a too-full plate. Glad to be back in the fray as it were.

CH: "Finally, I have lately wondered, Bill, if I originally came across your name in Ransdell's listserve. If so, tell me whether he is still with us--I left the group a long, long time ago (for me) and he hasn't returned recent emails."

Yes, I had posted to the Peirce List as [email protected]. I left the list long ago. I understand that Joe retired. Like you, I had tried to contact him but was unable to make the connection.

I make no claim to having been a professional philosopher. I am a mere computer programmer. Programming, however, does sharpen the mind in some ways. Oh, before being a programmer I studied Mathematics at Auburn University. My Master's thesis subject was: ***The Well Ordering Theorem and Related Topics in Set Theory.*** I point that out only to make it clear that I am not completely ignorant of set theory. I do not particularly use it in philosophy --- or at least I separate set theory from the 'categories.'

But I am admittedly ignorant of many of the fine points of philosophical discourse.

One other point... that I do not use symbolic logic is due to the fact that my professors at Auburn's Department of Mathematics insisted on our expressing ourselves in ordinary English. Their reasoning --- aside from the fact that they were teaching mathematics rather than symbolic logic --- was that if a person could not express himself in ordinary English, then he probably did not understand the symbolic logic, either.

I remember one particular Topology class in which the point was driven home... for there were some students who had degrees from other institutions who simply could not express themselves when stripped of the symbolism.

I mention this point only because there are some who have questioned my abilities in that regard. I do in fact, understand symbolic logic --- with its backward E's and upside-down A's. But it is not a natural form of expression to me. Mark it down to a bad education if you will. But that's my story and I am sticking to it...

I learned C. S. Peirce at Auburn from Dr. Bill Davis. I remember studying only two philosophy courses: Pragmatism and American Philosophy. I may have audited another, I am not sure. They were all taught by Dr. Davis whom I greatly admired. All else comes from reading, personal reflection and the Socratic dialog that was so much a feature of Joe Ransdell's PEIRCE-L --- those were the days...

Flippin 'eck -give me some time to catch up!

No problem!!

Thanks for the background, Bill.

Ransdell supported a proposal I prepared for NEH (declined--they thought my resume not sufficiently scholarly--what I had done with my mind was of little concern, apparently).

Being seriously dyslexic I don't get along well with symbols (I prefer emblematic signs far more). Hartshorne never had training--at all that I recall--in formal logic. "I never studied it" was how he phrased it, or very close to that. He learned a smattering in order to answer criticisms phrased in the garble. Okay, that wasn't entirely fair...

He might have fared better with mathematical set theory. One day he blurted out: "How can it be possible to have an empty set?" He meant--there can't logically be. I said nothing as I disagreed, even from a philosophical standpoint. In my theory Secondness logically establishes the set without populating it (which occurs at Fourthness). I leave it to the logicians to prove that incorrect--good luck on that, fellas!!

btw, Bill, I inserted a remark in one of your comments, partly as an experiment. Sort of got the idea it wasn't cricket, but I wanted to respond directly to what you were saying. Apologize if I was out of line.

Reminds me...lots, and I mean LOTS of un- or under-employed philosophy majors go into computer science. Not terribly surprised. And your profs at Auburn were VERY wise in requiring you to back up logic with regular language. Therein is one small point where even David might agree with me as to "language".

Have heard of Davis. In fact, I am going to go to the Peirce shelf and see if he's there. Nope. Maybe met him at Hartshorne's centenarian party at UT.

CSH

Yes, I see that the system now allows one to edit another person's comment. I am not sure I like that feature.

I guess I can change your comments to turn you into a Republican if I cared to do that. Very interesting...

!!

:)

I'd rather spend my time converting people into advocates of the four-fold way, Peirce plus one. It may not readily stand to formal logic but it stands to everything else while confirming the better aspects of all the philosophers i have ever studied including sideshows (no disrespect intended) like Aurobindo and Swedenborg. In fact, I intend to write a basic textbook of general philosophy in which every single concept is set forth in paradigmatic methodology. Anyone who wants to challenge me after that will find it rough going, though there will always be diehards...

Even the Chinese had it pretty right on, before expanding 8 to 64. At eight they were exceedingly close to a full-bodied paradigmatic scheme, if simplistic. The major initial Daoist thinkers each demonstrated--correctly--the four-fold methodology. To this day 8 is a prime magical number in Chinese culture. For number theory it is not merely 2^3 but is a completion number in both the natural and Fibonacci systems. But that risks messing with boiling pots?

CSH

CH: "I'd rather spend my time converting people into advocates of the four-fold way, Peirce plus one."

It sounds interesting. I remember someone posting to PEIRCE-L long ago about a fourth 'category.' At the time that person was sucking up much of the available oxygen. I tried to engage that person in a debate off line, but that went nowhere.

It wasn't you, was it?

CH: "Even the Chinese had it pretty right on, before expanding 8 to 64. At eight they were exceedingly close to a full-bodied paradigmatic scheme, if simplistic. The major initial Daoist thinkers each demonstrated--correctly--the four-fold methodology. To this day 8 is a prime magical number in Chinese culture. For number theory it is not merely 2^3 but is a completion number in both the natural and Fibonacci systems. But that risks messing with boiling pots?"

At times I have taken some interest in the ***I Ching.*** There is a curious way of interpreting it which parallels the DNA code... each of the 64 hexagrams translates into a 'codon.'

The whole concept, of course, requires a certain 'willing suspension of disbelief.'

Wasn't me. Maybe Ben Udall. At least he's the only other person from the list who I knew was in that camp. Who knows. There were two or three who 'sucked oxygen', and two were dismissed from the list before and shortly after my departure. I made two semi-lengthy posts about it to test the waters. People on that list weren't interested so much in the metaphysics as in the logic and other stuff. In fact, I left because I thought too much of the discussion was academic chest pounding. I like to think that philosophy has enough logical muscle to fight real battles. So did Peirce, but you'd never have known it from that list-serve.

I put essentially no credence whatever in the I-Ching. You can find secrets in every structure if all you do is look in with a lively imagination. The developed fours and the eight were excellent representations of what I call 'modal' logic--logic that explains pluralities in terms of unities (composites, amalgams, emergents). What permits rational speculation in wayfaring topics is an adequate methodology. Even though the Chinese were thoroughly mystic they were successful at imitating the requisite logic, but on account of the mystic interest never adapted the logic to more empirical examination. Sankara and Eckehart also thought in four-part paradigms that were to all intents and purposes identical, but again their applications were intransitive. I can demonstrate pretty convincingly--with lots of space--that when people think carefully they generally think paradigmatically, Peirce plus one. Sounds crazy. Not so. Most of this is in series on methodology on SSRN.

Ben told me that he started posting to PEIRCE-L after I dropped off the list --- so it wasn't he. I can't recall much about it, myself. I think it was somehow related to Chinese thought.

I never put credence the ***I Ching*** either. I found it interesting, particularly in the Eight trigrams and the five elements.

I don't see how it all relates to Peirce. I have some knowledge of Ben Udall's 'categories.' I can't imagine how his ideas relate to Peirce, either.

As to my own scheme of 'categories' they relate more closely to Aristotle. Yet I do recognize Peirce's thought at a deeper level --- to me they are transcendental predicates, not categories.

Ben tracked me down like a hound dog tracks down a rabbit. He had seen a minor comment I had written on Wikipedia. I had noted long ago that the classical, Scholastic interpretation of 'state' is so far off the mark that it is simply ludicrous. The reason for that, I believe, is due to the perversely concrete, Latin mind. It is a real shame that Western thought was filtered through such an anti-philosophical lens. The Latins had done their best, I suppose, to overcome the problem. But, from what I understand, even Aquinas studied Aristotle from Latin translations.

Aristotle didn't say much about some of his Categories. All he had said about 'state' were two examples: "shod, armed." Somehow those two examples led them to conclude that 'state' was all about clothing. In fact, the Latin term for 'state' was 'habit,' the same word they use for clothes.

When I first saw that I thought it infinitely funny. But, looking further I saw that to be the common, perhaps universal interpretation.

Eventually, I came to the realization that the four Categories: 'action,' 'affection,' 'position' and 'state' are related to each other through two parallel bifurcations. 'Action' is related to 'affection' as the active voice is related to the passive. 'Position' is a state of rest resulting from an 'action.' 'State' is a state of rest resulting from an 'affection.'

I had made a minor change to Wikipedia reflecting what I believe was Aristotle's original intent.

Ben told me that he had come to the same conclusion. He tracked the change I made down to a certain Wikipedia User, one Sophroniscus. So he made a comment on Sophroniscus' discussion page. Well, I am Sophroniscus. I guess I saw that he had made comments on Wilipedia about Peirce. So I revealed myself as the BugDaddy. And he was familiar with my earlier postings to PEIRCE-L...

Bill - I understand fully about using the symbols - I was trained to do so, though it's been years since I did any serious analysis; so I'm just tring to get my hand back in. Anyway, I'm trained as a logician (and certainly not as a mathematician, to my undying shame), and I've mostly worked in the field that was opened by Frege and Russell ("philosophical logic", if you will). Having set aside the excesses of the Vienna Circle, a lot of early analytic metaphysics concerned the interpretation we can give to an expression having the form "(∃x) Fx" - "to be is to be the value of a bound variable" and all that..

Paradigmatic systems are characterized by synchronous binaries. When accurate they can, in paradigmatic theory, be reducible to elementary 'categories'--the proper use of that term, which makes Aristotle's use in language more akin to the trans. pred., and likewise makes Peirce's use correct (whether he'd have chosen 1stness... or sign... as the true set is unclear, but I would vote the former had I a choice).

Remember when doing word studies of Greek and Latin words that the Anglicized forms very frequently hail back to the original past participles. 'Action' as that having been acted; 'affection' as that having been affected; 'position' as that having been posited, and 'state' and that having been stated.

State is thus one such, the participle of the consistent, persistent acts or affections, either one, not unlike process as the result of consistent actions. Thus, shod/armed: the habit-state of having consistently worn clothes/arms, the clothes/arms-wearing animal, e.g. Or, less the process-orientation: clothed is the state of the man known to or simply wearing clothes, etc. Needless to say, this makes interpretation of classical terms rather contestable.

Now an affectation can be used somewhat as 'accident' is used in logic/metaphysics. It will typically result from internal triggers, where actions respond to external. A position results from action rather as Newton would have it, and a state results from either, but more commonly an affection, say, the affection of feeling the need to be clothed to avoid humiliation. Our 'affectation' is not so different from affection in this interpretation.

With these thoughts in mind let's see what we can deduce from the four categories. Let's see in particular if they are in agreement with Aristotle's signature paradigm, the four causes, which is for him the true set of categories.

Suppose we arrange the semantic equivalents thus: affection arises internally as a firstness; it leads to an action, Peircean secondness, which displaces and so positions an empirical aspect in thirdness, which displays as habit in fourthness. Presto. Congruent with causations, congruent with Peirce except his failure to recognize the final cause, and congruent with early Daoist thought which is likewise reduced to a primary set of categories, as well as congruent with Weiss and myself. BUT NOTE: there are other ways to achieve much the same results, and often the interpretation requires choosing from among the most reasonable possibilities.

This is an example of paradigmatic methodology. Obviously it has to be carefully used, but still this is an example that may be instructive. And where you take different sets of categorical equivalents from the same thinker, you should expect them to reduce to one of them or both to a still more elementary set.

I hope that the remarks in Wikipedia are couched as interpretations.

CSH

(anyway, you chaps seem to be having a lot of fun. Bill - I'll reply to your interrogation about the Markosian article when I get back to the article itself later this week)

So far as what is in Wikipedia... I added my interpretation, but left the older, classical interpretation in place, as well.

Here is what it says, today --- I see my changes, but someone else may have made additional changes...

Position (keisthai, “to lie”). The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an action: ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’. Thus position may be taken as the end point for the corresponding action. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the relative position of the parts of an object (usually a living object), given that the position of the parts is inseparable from the state of rest implied.

State (echein, “to have”). The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an affection (i.e. being acted on): ‘shod’, ‘armed’. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the determination arising from the physical accoutrements of an object: one's shoes, one's arms, etc. Traditionally, this category is also called a habitus (from Latin habere, “to have”).

Action (poiein, "to make” or "to do”). The production of change in some other object.

Affection (paschein, “to suffer” or “to undergo”). The reception of change from some other object. It is also known as passivity. It is clear from the examples Aristotle gave for action and for affection that action is to affection as the active voice is to the passive. Thus for action he gave the example, ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’; for affection, ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized.’ The term is frequently misinterpreted to refer only or mainly to some kind of emotion or passion.

Excellent, thanks for that, Bill

Nothing untoward here, though a full-fledged Greek dictionary would offer typical metaphoric uses.

Under these statements it is easy to indicate that position and affection arise from action, and that state arises from either action or affection. Accordingly, action is prior in all cases. But consider the four causes. Suppose 'thirst' as a formal, then action is efficient or secondness. Find the location/position of water, and fourthness, drinking (the habit when needing to drink in presence of water), the final cause (action, affection, or both?). Recall also Aristotle tended to lump formal and final together as one, as one is another state or condition of the other.

All of a sudden something in the estimation of affection is left to metaphor, and the issue is whether and when the extension is allowable. Absent that, it looks like, solely on account of affection, a paradigmatic examination is difficult if not impossible. And it is never a good idea to force-fit unless simply to gain examples to see what fits and works, etc.

Anyway, it's always an entertaining exercise, and thanks for digging up the wiki definitions.

CSH