Dear David

You make it hard for us mortals to keep up. A laywoman's comment - as although I would so adore being able to help you out for once, I'm sure that I cannot, but I DO try -:

From my [dangerously limited] understanding of disquotational schema - there is no guarantee of truth in (dis)quotational sentences (Quine) as it falls within an utterance (the same would apply to your indexical expression, yet that IS a-priori), but a truth predicate may be explicitly introduced if *satisfaction is defined* in axioms (Tarski): it can be contained, also through proximity and there is consideration of the intention of the speaker and validity of the context of the expression.

However, is there not a strong connection between the 'depth of intuition' or 'conceptual correctness' in axioms, i.e. we need to be able to 'picture' a quotation expression? (Of course, this may relate to your interest NOT being in the intensional expressions).

That being said, I'm unsure about the logic behind your conditional P = "I live in Paris" and Q = "it's raining" (both being *present*).

It may well be that the present indicative "If P then Q" is true - if you live in Paris presently, then it's presently raining. But wouldn't we need to know more of your *co-ordinating conjunctions* before considering grammatical distinctions? Also, isn't there a kind of 'current, a-priori, personal knowledge/experience' in indicative conditions (as opposed to some sort of metaphysical one for subjunctives)?

It seems my answer is more questions :\

You what?

In fact, I'm hoping to flush out a bit of the talent that I'm sure is hiding among the hundreds of silent members - and I can't be bpthered to re-read Davidson.

Alrighty then!!

Anyway, I'm pretty sure I'm correct - and it's become academic. On the other hand, if anyone's done any work on habits...

(No attempts at habit here, other than adorning one)

The problem being that when states (such as "being English", "being happy", "being married" etc) obtain for a certain period, they are exemplified at every instant of that period. If I'm happy all day, I'm happy at precisely 14h42...

But a habit (such as smoking) can obtain at a given instant ("I smoke") while not being exemplified ("I'm not smoking")

Oh I see. But hang on: habits are largely *dispositional* and can't be a 'self-expression' or indicate your *will*, other than being a re-active tendency. It DOES of course share a property with 'will', as *being over time*; yet this is not a definite, as a tendency, picked up at any given instant, CAN also be stopped, at any instant. I think the issue is less about time and more about the depth of 'reflection' and 'repetition'.

Habits have a mindlessness property, in that ongoing reflection is NOT necessary for it to continue; but Will requires this.

So, a habit is a re-active dispositional tendency (is repetitive behaviour) involving no assertive, reflective mental action other than a physical one with an element of [albeit deterministic] freedom.

Whereas a self-expressional tendency (is inherent behaviour) involves constant reflection, mental and no physical action and has an element of not being deterministic or even free, but more 'choice'.

And this of course, has probably nothing whatsoever to do with your problem :/

We can account for dispositions (but remember, a physical disposition is not the same thing as a habit) by one or the other of the following:

1. As "disguised conditionals" (S has the disposition to A iff given a condition C, S would A). Example: "X is fragile" can be understood as "X would break if it were dropped and no other condition intervened to mitigate this disposition"

2. As supervening on the microproperties of S and their putative causal relations. Examples: "being toxic" supervenes on the putative causal effects on organisms of the chemical structure of certain substances; "being a smoker" supervenes on certain physical states of the body. Note that (1) and (2) are not exclusive - rather, (1) would seem to depend upon (2)

3. As "habituals" (see Fara http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dispositions/#2.4 : "An object is disposed to M when C iff it has an intrinsic property in virtue of which it Ms when C"

None of these are entirely satisfactory when modelling human habits. While habits such as walking to work, drinking coffee, or speaking French can be modelled as conditionals, we have more difficultly with a freely elected, voluntarily laintained habit such as smoking - the only general-enough condition we can give for "I smoke" would be "I would smoke if I had both the desire and the opportunity to smoke and no other consideration were to stop me”. But this same condition applies generally to ANY kind of volitional action. I would climb Mount Everest if I had both the desire and the opportunity and no other consideration were to stop me, or become President; yet it is not my habit to climb Mount Everest or to become President.

We *could* argue that being a smoker depends on microproperties of the agent (biochemical tolerance). However, while such properties might *found* the physical habit, it seems unlikely that they found the intuitive model on which natural language depends.

Fara's account strikes me as both interesting and deficient. Interesting, because it integrates the notions of frequency and probability; deficient, because it explains an obscure notion ("disposition") by an even obscurer one ("habit").

Another way of dealing with habits like "I smoke" would be to examine the pragmatic role of such utterances (when do we say "I smoke"?). Pragmatically, “I smoke” is frequently used to identify the speaker as being a member of the class of smokers. If this is the case, we can argue that “I smoke” gives a *disguised state* (“I am a smoker”)

Finally, Hirst's (forthcoming) temporal account returns to the naive explanation given in grammatical analysis: habits are founded not in the immediate present (“now”), but in a present that extends to “around now”. While a state is exemplified at every instant of the period during which it obtains, this is not the case for habits. If John is married, he’s married *now*; however, if he’s a smoker, he isn’t necessarily smoking *now*. The naïve explanation depends on a present that extends to *around now* (as does the frequency-based explanation); that is, on a “non-instantaneous present” which includes both past and future cases of smoking.

Lovely brief David. You will have to forgive my 'out-loud type-thinking', but it's a process you know :\

What about the constant of *change* though? Are we assuming that conditionals/habits and even dispositions and objects are not subject to change? I mean, how is that factored in? Also, what about the *reasons* (would that be 'conditions' in your comment on "...microproperties of the agent..."? ) for the habits/dispositions in the first place? And then of course, even the *change of those reasons*?

COULD the problem of grammatical distinction perhaps be 'masked' by *time* or *exceptional conditions* that make it distinct between a habitual or disposition?

For example, 'I'm disposed to certain habits [like smoking] when I'm frustrated, but my disposition is sometimes masked by appropriateness (e.g. social/psychological) and/or if there is time to express it.' And then of course, that brings me right back to my first question - of satisfying the conditions:

If Natasha is disposed to smoking when frustrated, then if Natasha were in ideal conditions, Natasha would smoke if it were the case that she was frustrated. Of course it might show truth, but it doesnt exactly *prove* that 'I smoke NOW', does it? In order to establish that, wouldn't I need to establish also the *context* in which I *WOULD BE smoking* again?

Relaying your 'iff': Natasha is disposed to smoking when frustrated iff Natasha feels it's appropriate and smokes when frustrated.

[sigh] My brain hurts.

The problem is that you're not a "habitual smoker" in the sense of the analysis - and THAT woiuld seem to mean that you wouldn't make the simple statement "I smoke" but what modify it adverbially to "I smoke when C", where C is some condition. In your case, smoking can be analysd conditionally. I, however, am a smoker in the way one is a drinker, or a doper... I have a voluntarily acquired, voluntarily maintained habit which comports a certain degree of physiological and/or psychological dependence. I don't smoke at any one time because I HAVE to (the habit CAN be controlled), but there is no real reason for smoking at any one time save a physiological effect which augments with the time since my last cigarette. But in real terms, the "condition" in which I will smoke can only be given as "if I have the desire and the opportunty to smoke, and no other consideration stops me" - which is, as I remark, a general condition for any volitional action.

#H1-219. Thread T-sentences (1 page, 11 posts). Ref David Hirst, Jul 9, 2009 5:35 pm.

@*. The term "agent" is very frequently encountered. Somehow i do not like the sound? and is there any word that is a good substitute?

b. And it is interesting: properties and micropropties of agents.[?]. Were these concepts attached to the concept of agent from the beginnings of the idea of the agent, or are these words attached later as the idea grows every day being added to by many people at many places on many times?