Studies on the relationship between earnings management and corporate governance, which impact on the relationship between the agent and the investor and the impacts that this decision may have on results
The relationship between earnings management and corporate governance has been a topic of interest for researchers in accounting and finance. Earnings management refers to using accounting methods to manipulate financial statements to meet certain targets or to present a more favourable picture of a company's financial performance. Corporate governance, on the other hand, refers to the rules, processes, and structures governing a company's relationship with its stakeholders, including shareholders, managers, and other interested parties.
Several studies have investigated the impact of corporate governance on earnings management. For example, some studies have found that companies with stronger governance mechanisms, such as independent boards of directors, are less likely to engage in earnings management. Other studies have focused on the impact of specific governance mechanisms, such as executive compensation, on earnings management.
The relationship between earnings management and the relationship between the agent (management) and the investor (shareholders) is also an important area of research. Studies have shown that earnings management can be used as a tool to signal information to investors about a company's financial performance and that the decision to engage in earnings management may depend on the nature of the relationship between the agent and the investor. For example, companies with a dispersed shareholder base may be more likely to engage in earnings management than those with a concentrated one.
The impact of earnings management on financial results is also an area of interest. While earnings management can present a more favourable picture of a company's financial performance in the short term, it can also have negative consequences in the long term. For example, earnings management can lead to a loss of investor confidence and increase the likelihood of financial restatements or other forms of regulatory action.
Dechow, P., Sloan, R., & Sweeney, A. (1995). Detecting earnings management. Accounting Review, 70(2), 193-225.
Healy, P. M., & Wahlen, J. M. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons, 13(4), 365-383.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 7-26.
Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review, 71(4), 443-465.
Chen, C. J. P., & Jaggi, B. (2000). Association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 19(4-5), 285-310.
These studies suggest that corporate governance mechanisms, such as board composition, can play an important role in deterring or encouraging earnings management behavior.
There have been numerous studies examining the relationship between earnings management and corporate governance. Earnings management is the process by which managers manipulate financial statements to meet or exceed certain financial targets or to present a certain image of the company's performance. Corporate governance, on the other hand, refers to the system of rules, practices, and processes by which a company is directed and controlled.
Some studies have found that firms with weaker corporate governance are more likely to engage in earnings management. For example, a study by Beasley et al. (2000) found that firms with weaker board independence and less effective audit committees were more likely to engage in earnings management.
Other studies have found that certain corporate governance mechanisms can help mitigate the likelihood of earnings management. For example, a study by Dechow et al. (2010) found that firms with more independent boards and stronger audit committees were less likely to engage in earnings management.
Overall, the relationship between earnings management and corporate governance is complex and varies depending on a variety of factors. However, it is generally agreed upon that strong corporate governance can help prevent or reduce the likelihood of earnings management.
La gestión por resultados, trata o mejora la eficacia de una organización, es parte de un proceso o plan estratégico que conduce a buenos resultados.
El gobierno corporativo se refiere a las normas que rigen para contralar y gestionar una empresa. Si estos dos términos o conceptos unimos y el inversor capta o relaciona tendrá buenos resultado.
The relationship between earnings management and Corporate Governance is that of a Company has a maximum level of income in ITS Business management activities,it is expected that UTS Corporate Governance potential Will also increase with the Note: The income earned is truly.Honestly,Good and followed the Principles and Rules of Good Corporate Governance and true in Good income management Governance