Is anybody aware of research, writing or thinking within psychology that has explicitly considered mereology and ontology? I would be really grateful for any assistance about these forms of understanding within the discipline. Thanks.
Hope this is of some use for you. Not much was found on this topic:
Formal ontology, common sense and cognitive science. Smith, Barry. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies43.5-6 (Nov-Dec 1995): 641-667.
Between positivism and phenomenology: Brentano's philosophy of science. Weekes, Anderson Harris. ProQuest Information & Learning, Sep 1997.
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Formal structures in the phenomenology of motion. Casati, Roberto. In Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science, edited by Petitot, Jean, Varela, Francisco J., Pachoud, Bernard, Roy, Jean-Michel, 372-384. Stanford University Press, 1999.
Abstract.
Investigates the commonsense picture of and attempts a reconstruction of the dialectic of rest and movement. The starting point is some pretheoretical, prescientific beliefs, such as the belief that the Earth does not move. The authors proceed step by step, by first investigating pure notions of rest and motion and by examining how far we can go in trying to classify intuitive kinds of motion in terms of nonintrinsically spatial or temporal concepts. Space and time are introduced at a further stage, either as examples of reference objects, or by exploiting the theory of localization. The following topics are discussed: the simple logic of movement without space and time, other systems (a system with absolute reference objects, a system with absolute reference objects explicitly assumed, a system in which absolute rest is a consequence of absolute motion, absolute and relative motion), the mereology of movement (weak and strong rigidity, frames, intermediate cases of motion, rotation), going the other way around and introducing regions, and an appendix: A note on Newtonian rest and motion.
Body Mereology. de Vignemont, Frederique; Tsakiris, Manos; Haggard, Patrick. In Human body perception from the inside out: Advances in visual cognition, edited by Knoblich, Günther, Thornton, Ian M., Grosjean, Marc, Shiffrar, Maggie, 147-170. New York, NY, US:Oxford University Press, 2006.
Abstract
The body is made up of parts. This basic assumption is central in most neuroscientific studies of bodily sensation, body representation, and motor action. Yet, the assumption has rarely been considered explicitly. We may indeed ask how the body is internally segmented and how body parts can be defined. That is, how can we sketch the mereology of the body? Mereology (from the Greek meros, meaning "part") is the theory of parthood relations, of the relations of part to whole and the relations of part to part within a whole. Traditionally, it addresses the metaphysical question of the relation between constitution and identity: is the sameness of parts necessary for identity? In this chapter, we will not raise the metaphysical issue of personal identity. Rather, we are interested in the epistemological and phenomenological dimensions of the mereology of the body. Is somesthetic experience linked to body parts, or to the body as a whole? How are those parts to be described, and how do they relate to each other? Can the way I experience my body as a whole be reduced to the way I feel each of my body parts? The simplest scientific approach to bodily experience is a reductive one. We begin by assuming that the phenomenology of the perceiving and acting body is not a primitive fact, but can be analyzed. We approach this analysis by considering how the phenomenology of the body can be broken down into a phenomenology of body parts. This approach allows us to investigate the "embodied self" by reviewing how recent experimental data address three intimately related questions about body mereology: (1) What is the relation between the body parts and the body as a whole? (2) How are the various sources of information from different body parts combined to form a coherent body representation? (3) What is the relation between the body and the self? (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)(chapter)
My PhD was in open-field activity after different kind of learning types in Mus Musculus L in a laboratory. The main study was supposed to be in our aggressive and non-aggressive mouse strains but somehow I was put on a side track. At the same time I studied psychological aftermath of certain conditions (based on childhood traumas:) in Finland, then attitudes towards mental disordered persons in Sweden, then moral distress, stress, resilience and so on with reference to philosophy in nursing science, . In sum: biological psychology, clinical psychology and the like. I have had the preparedness to be interested in many things: Weakness or strength?