I do not have access to recordings of or notes taken about lectures or conference discussions on these topics by Dr. Donald Davidson. I took courses from him around 1960. In one course on Mind (if I remember correctly) he argued that if anyone acted without reference to preceding events, personal preferences, or anticipated results, then nobody would say that said person was "free." They would say that the person was demented, not that he was free.

Rather unexpectedly, I found a similar understanding of the matter given in terms of the philosophy of Mencius, and provided with remarkable lucidity in one of a semester of lectures given by Professor Tang Jun-yi during the year that he was the honored guest of the Philosophy Department of National Taiwan University. After the key lecture, I asked him whether he had published on the subject. He said that he indeed had published, but it was during the early years of China's war with Japan, printed somewhere in the western part of China where most scholars had fled, and he had no idea of where any extant copies of that article might be found.

The discussion in its Chinese context was not given in terms of "liberty" or "freedom" or "free choice." The discussion can, however, be illustrated in terms of there being a range of choices that matter in many or most social interactions (and in other contexts as welll), and while there might be some limitations on the probability of success of the several possible choices for action that one might make, none of the limitations would prevent an individual from trying to make them work. (To modify an example from the Mencius, if your father rustled a cow, you could choose to be a good citizen and turn him in to the police, you could be a good son and choose to help him escape capture, or you could pretend to know nothing at all about the theft. Mencius wouldn't even bother with the hypothetical if he didn't believe that any individual who landed in that situation could make a voluntary choice for one of at least those three alternatives.)

I am not sympathetic to your second mode, the definition of freedom in terms of "content." 

"From a content point of view it is a necessary condition of the freedom of the subject that she’ll not only choose independently, but also that she’ll choose the right choice (by some standard or criterion)." I don't think "the right choice" has anything to do with freedom, and neither would Mencius or Tang Jun-yi. 

The complement to the "formal possibility" in the Mencian system is the understanding that people can and generally do have competing motivations (or drive states) that influence them, for purely internal reasons, to have competing impulses to take each of the competing paths. The alternative to suffering something like buyer's remorse lies in learning by experience and introspection to balance the various motivations, or drive conditions so that in retrospect one will not have reason to regret a hasty action.

According to their way of looking at things, in many cases many paths of action might be about equally productive of a desirable outcome, while other courses of action might be rejected without there being much cause for indecision. Whether a chosen course of action turned out to be better or worse would only emerge as the result of a retrospective look at one's life or one's recent path. At that point one might say, "If I'd known I couldn't make it as a physics major, I might have chosen Stanford over Rensselaer Polytech." 

These issues, from the standpoint of a 17th centurey Confucian are discussed in The Preservation of Human Nature by Yan Yuan, available in draft form at http://www.china-learn.info/Philosophy/Philosophy.html

 Sorry to post this hasty response. There appears to be no way to edit an earlier posting on ResearchGate. Too bad. 

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Perelman,

Your question evokes for me familiar themes and relations from scholarly studies related to freedom. But I am not sure that I would want to approach those themes in terms of "form and content." 

Let me think through your proposal for a formal concept. You wrote:

The form of freedom is understood as an independent choice between alternatives. It is a formal notion of freedom because it concentrates on the mere existence of alternatives open for the independent subject to choose from, and disregards the actual and concrete choice that has been made. From a formal point of view, as long as the subject has a wide enough range of alternatives to choose from, and is not forced or coerced in any way to choose (or not to choose) any of the given alternatives, the subject is free, and there is no substantial difference between the different alternatives.

---End quotation

I'm inclined to wonder, in the first place, whether this formal concept is not too broad. What comes to mind in the first place is, say, obsessive behavior. There may be no external coercion, but a person subject to compulsions might not be regarded as free from internal impulse. Or consider a person whose life is at each step freely chosen, but the sequence of actions looks entirely futile and perhaps circular: somewhat like the the children's game of "rock, paper, scissors." First the rock is selected, but paper covers rock, so, you next pick paper; unfortunately, scissors cuts paper, so having selected paper, the next logical choice is scissors. Unfortunately, rock breaks scissors, so you are back to selecting rock. If the person is incapable of getting out of such a circle is that person free? A series of arbitrary choices, it may be argued, does not make a coherent life--though we are often, perhaps, reluctant to interfere. 

This suggests in turn that freedom is not merely a political concept but also a moral concept. And this contrasts, in significant degree with the frequent style of philosophical investigations concerned with the relations between freedom and causality. To conceive of freedom as a moral concept is quite different than wondering about the causes of actions and whether any actions are un-caused --and whether an action which is caused can be free, etc. That idea may bring us around to your concept of "content." 

You wrote:

By contrast, the content element of freedom emphasizes the concrete choice that has actually been made. It regards the content of the choice and evaluates it according to some criterion or principle (e.g. moral, political, utilitarian, etc.). From a content point of view it is a necessary condition of the freedom of the subject that she’ll not only choose independently, but also that she’ll choose the right choice (by some standard or criterion).

---End quotation

Chiefly, I find some difficulty here with the idea that freedom requires "making the right choice." Perhaps it would be more plausible to say something like "making an intelligent choice," in terms of some system of thought in place and motivationally relevant. We don't say that someone is unfree merely by making the wrong choice in any or some particular circumstances. But lack of coherent sequence may suggest lack of freedom. I agree with the comment from Moran, above, who wrote:

if anyone acted without reference to preceding events, personal preferences, or anticipated results, then nobody would say that said person was "free." They would say that the person was demented, not that he was free.

---End quotation

In more general terms, if someone acted this way, we would not even be in a position to coherently interpret the behavior --if it was a matter of a lack of any overall pattern. This, of course, is quite different from thinking that any single incomprehensible or irrational action makes the person unfree. You might apply any of various "talking cures" to the neurotic, but with the truly and throroughly psychotic, you don't get anything in the behavior and speech sufficinet for a coherent interpretation.  

I hope that some of these reflections may prove helpful. 

H.G. Callaway

I think this can help you from a continental perspective. In analytical, Donald Donaldson is the best on this subject indeed.

https://smile.amazon.com/What-Subjectivity-Jean-Paul-Sartre/dp/1784781401/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1479913234&sr=1-1&keywords=sartre+subjectivity

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all, 

My own background here is that I have worked though the theme of freedom in relation to Quine (and Davidson), but also in relation to the thought of the 19th-century American literary philosopher, R.W. Emerson. The present question and thread remind me more of Emerson, and I would like to suggest the following Introduction which I wrote for one of my Emerson editions, The Conduct of Life:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301479259_Introduction_Emerson_on_Creativity_in_Thought_and_Action

A general theme of my Introduction is to draw on Emerson, developing the point that creativity is part of, or belongs to our conception of freedom--this being, of course, a matter of higher cognitive function. But it is also quite ordinary, in another way, and easily connects with the theme of problem solving. When we become able to do something that we could not do before, then this expands the sphere of freedom. I see Emerson as a sophisticated compatibilist. For Emerson, freedom is quite definitely a moral concept, and there is no dichotomy separating the moral from the factual, the "ought" from the "is."

The book itself is widely available from book sellers: 

https://www.amazon.com/Conduct-Life-Ralph-Waldo-Emerson/dp/0761834117

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Conduct-Life-Ralph-Waldo-Emerson/dp/0761834117/ref=asap_bc?ie=UTF8

Comments invited. 

H.G. Callaway 

Chapter Introduction, "Emerson on Creativity in Thought and Action"

According to the ‘process-model’, “having few options (seeing in advance what the decision will be with high certainty, and having all reasons favor the same option) should reduce one’s sense of freedom”. However experimental data refute that prediction. “A decision that produces a good outcome, with preferably little struggle or anguish, maximizes the sense of freedom”. This is in agreement with the ‘result-model’.

Lau, Hiemischa & Baumeister, 2015. 

This might, althoug very slightly, have to do with your issue

Thank you all for your helpful comments. 

First of all I would like to note the context in which I was thinking about the issue at hand. I'm writing a paper on Rousseau's concept of freedom, interpreting it in a broad context of liberal thought and the polemic between negative and positive concepts of freedom. My interpretation of Rousseau also involves an understanding of him as an undeveloped predecessor of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics. Most importantly in this context is his notion of freedom as essentially including the possibility for the alienation of freedom. As you can see the context in which I’m thinking is very much political.

In my view, this idea of the ability of the free agent to alienate his own freedom invokes the form-content distinction roughly described in my question. The state of alienation may be described as a contradiction between the form of freedom and its content. I.e. a state in which an independent choice has been made among alternatives, thus making the choice free from a formal point of view, but the actual content that has been chosen turns out to be a negation of freedom. As one possible example consider Plato’s allegory of the cave, where the inhabitants of the cave, after learning about the truth that shines outside, decide to stay where they are and watch the shadow show on the wall. Rousseau’s entire description of the development of the state of nature into the social state in his discourse on the origins of inequality may be thus understood as a series of free choices made by men in the state of nature, leading them to the alienated and enslaved social state. There is of course much more that may be said on this topic, particularly the vicious circle that is implied by this notion of freedom as essentially related to the possibility of self-alienation.

Moreover, the form-content distinction seems to me to be able to supplement the discussion over a negative versus a positive conception of freedom. Although it is hard to pinpoint what exactly each of those concepts mean, as there are various definitions of them, I think that it is possible to show that a negative conception of freedom is more formalist in comparison to a positive conception which invokes some kind of constraint on the contents of choice. Actually showing this connection between the form-content distinction and the discussion over the two concepts of freedom exceeds my intentions, and perhaps my abilities, for the paper I’m currently working on.

Coming finally to your remarks, I think that my framing of the distinction was a too crude for conveying my thoughts on the matter. I was trying to describe the concept of freedom as consisting of form and content, where the two elements stand in opposition, or even contradiction, to each other on one hand, and are both necessary to a comprehensive conception of freedom on the other. Indeed, my phrasing of the content of free choice was too extreme when I wrote that making the right choice is a necessary condition for being free. My intention is rather that some sort of a general principle for deciding what constitutes a right choice, as well as some knowledge and deliberation of predictable outcomes, are necessary conditions for free choice. I.e. “the right choice” and the various constraints on content were meant to be understood in their broadest possible meaning. It is interesting to note, I think, that Kant’s categorical imperative may be plausibly interpreted as stressing the moral content of a given choice up to the point of completely negating its form, when he says that the will is free only when making the moral decision, thus undermining the freedom of choice of the agent.

To conclude, what interests me is the paradoxical nature of freedom which can be seen when thinking of freedom in terms of form and content. It is paradoxical because when we try to define it in terms of either form or content, which are both necessary to it, we eventually find ourselves negating freedom. If we think of freedom, as most adherents of negative freedom do, chiefly in terms of form, we might end up with arbitrary and unprincipled picking which in turn might lead to self-alienation and enslavement. If, on the other hand, we think of freedom mainly in terms of content, like adherents of positive freedom, we might find ourselves omitting independent choice between alternatives in favor of the one truly right choice.

I hope that this clarifies my intentions. Any further comments are more than welcome.

Dear Ori and others

I am coming late to this discussion because I have been away from my desk for a few weeks, but I would like to recommend the treatment of freedom in Nancy Hirschmann's The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom (Princeton UP, 2003). Feminist theorists are frequently faced with the dilemma you outlined in your initial question: they want to say that some choices do deprive women of their freedom (your content paradigm) even though these decisions appear to be made in conditions of formal liberty. For example, Hirschmann is troubled by the conventional view that we must respect the 'choice' of a  a battered wife to remain with her husband or the 'choice' of a woman to enter prostitution even if she is not trafficked. She writes: 'What is not addressed by most freedom theories is the deeper, more important issue of how the choosing subject is herself constructed by contexts', contexts created by deeper gender inequalities. This is a genuine dilemma for feminist theorists because at the same time they wish to respect the autonomy of women's choices, rather than reduce them to 'false consciousness'. Hirschmann criticises Berlin's positive/negative distinction as inadequate to the problem because it does not allow for the existence of internal barriers, conflicting desires and determination of the will by others.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Perelman, 

Your clarification seemed helpful. Still, even in the political context to which you point, I am still pretty skeptical about the usefulness of the "form-content" division you want to employ.

Admittedly, the negative-positive distinction is suggestive, since negative freedom seems more formal. Thinking of positive freedom seems, in contrast, to run onto lists of objectives or supporting conditions of action or development. But I am inclined to think, in quite practical terms, that any formalism is going to turn out to be a kind of abstraction or statement of a general character of choice: say, to pick a crude example: "You are free if and only if you can do whatever you want in each situation of choice." As a political conception, we would want to reject this as too broad, I suppose. But in any case, we can see that it will only make much sense to someone who is confronted with some particular situations of choice and who has particular preferences. In this way, the "formal" notion seems to implicitly depend on each person supplying some particular "content."  As though to say, "I'm free if I can do A, in situation so-and-so, since A is what I want to do in situation so-and-so." 

But I am generally skeptical of dualisms. For example, we understand the freedom of speech or the freedom of religion, herabouts, by reference to the 1st Amendment; but that is not quite adequate, because there is also the 14th amendment, which extends the Bill of rights against actions of the state governments. But beyond that, there is a long history of court cases deciding on how to apply the abstract statement of the 1st amendment in particular cases. So, we find that you can say what you want, but, in spite of that, you can't shout fire in a crowded theater; again, religious practices are protected, but the courts have ruled over many distinct cases what is to count as a protected religious practice and what does not count. So, I take it that the meaning of the abstract principles of freedom is essentially qualified by much that belongs to particularities of cases, and the details of what is done in those cases. Our understanding of "form"is qualified by the relevant "content."

I don't see, by the way, that these mutual relations of form and content, have the effect of negating freedom. 

H.G. Callaway

in Aquinas' Summa , pars prima , quaestio 82, art. 1 there is the interesting (and not commonsensical)  reflection about the compatibility between human will and necessity:

http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP082.html#FPQ82OUTP

moreover it is worth reading what Augustine wrote about freedom (as related to truth and good choices, and not to whatever choice) :

https://www.monergism.com/thethreshold/articles/onsite/four-fold.html