Dear Wulf,

Thank you for the long but interesting answer. I 'll be reading it more carefully. Anyhow, thanks! Marc.

The absolutely valid truth is: Nothing can set itself in motion.

(Hence the incomprehensibility of The First Cause.)

Dear Marc Carvallo and readers,

Wulf Rehder has covered a lot of ground. I would like to expand a bit on some of the points he makes. We should distinguish between what is true and what it is for a sentence (proposition or utterance) to be true. The former question is about true sentences, the later question is about the concept or the property of being true. Although your question seems to be about the former, i. e. about what is often called necessary truth, your clarification falls under the later question.

The question of what it is for a sentence to be true is discussed under the label Theories of Truth. This is a long standing debate that took an interesting turn with the development of formal logic and the foundations of mathematics. During the period Rehder refers to, Alfred Tarski introduced the notion of truth into formal systems. This development allowed for a precise analysis of what it is for a syntactic object (a “sentence”) to be true. The basic idea that came out of this can be expressed with the following biconditional:

• (T) A sentence S is true iff the fact that S obtains.

So, the sentence “It is raining.” is true iff it is in fact raining. This idea has gained momentum in recent years under the label Truthmaking (and Metaphysical Grounding). The basic observation is, that - contrary to what (T) states - there is an asymmetry involved. It is not the case that there is an equivalence between sentences and facts, but rather it seems to be the case that the facts “make” the sentences true. So, a sentence S is true because the fact that S obtains and it is not the case that the fact that S obtains because the sentence S is true.

This idea has been intensely debated in recent years and has lead to the development of interesting formal semantic systems. The most advanced proposal that I know of is Kit Fine's Truthmaker Semantics.

This is necessarily a rather rough and ready summary of some of the issues discussed in the general debate about truth. For an interesting and detailed discussion of the debate see, for example, Wolfgang Künne's Conceptions of Truth.

For an overview regarding the framework of Metaphysical Grounding, see, for example, Kelly Trogdon's An Introduction to Grounding. It may be of interest to note that the framework does indeed deal with the possibility of necessary truth about the world, in the sense that it is about the structure of reality.

Best,

Sven Beecken

Fine, Kit. "Truthmaker semantics." A companion to the philosophy of language (2017): 556-577.

Künne, Wolfgang, Conceptions of truth. Oxford University Press, 2003.

Trogdon, Kelly. An Introduction to Grounding, In Hoeltje, Miguel, Benjamin Schnieder, and Alex Steinberg, eds.Varieties of dependence: ontological dependence, grounding,supervenience, response-dependence. Philosophia, 2013.

Dear Marc,

do you want to understand (1) the concept of truth — or are you looking for (2) examples of insights that pass the test of truth universally?

Wulf's answer regards version (1) whereas Martin's is about (2) – although it is not universally accepted. To the contrary, Aristotle regards god to be an unmoved mover. Anyway — what are you looking for?

Kind regards

Wolfgang

Dear Martin, Sven, Wolfgang, and Wulf,

By asking this question I never have expected such worth reading/thinking answers you have given me. I am going to read them seriously. Thanks for them! Marc.

There are some truth that is universally valid while some are not.

From a purely academic point of view, there are some fundamental truths that can be said to be universal under given circumstances.

In reality, the universality of truth remains elusive. This may account for the reasons we are yet to provide adequate answers/solutions to the problems/challenges that mankind finds itself in as it endeavors to define that which is suitable for its being.

Not until this is done, truth shall always remain subjective and relative

Asking questions, and discovering answers, and verifying these answers, seems to be universally true of all people in all times. Given that we are finite creatures, our answers reflect our own temporal nature, and thus, are contingent. However, the process of asking and answering questions remains a constant, so is universal in a sense.

Hello Wulf Rehder, and others. I'm a bit surprised that you're surprised by my answer- a general answer to a general question seems to follow. Not everyone in Religious Studies, or any other area of study, is, or needs to be definitive or dogmatic, although I do consider my answer definitive. Re 1., yes, epistemology and philosophy generally are about asking questions about what we know, and how we know it. Aristotle, however, didn't take into account historicity, nor the methodological developments of modern science, because he was a historical being, and so his work is contingent. Re. 2, yes, people are different and verifying is often disputed and problematic. That's why it tends to be historical and contingent. Your example of Augustine shows development, which is also a sign of contingency. Re 3. I thought that the question posed concerned the possibility of universally valid truth. Contingency, due to temporal/historical reality, is the condition under which all humans operate. All our findings are either contingent, or conditioned by our own historical realities. The fact that we, humans, continue to ask questions, in order to understand our reality, which is historical, suggests that our formulations/responses are also contingent. But the project of asking and answering the questions is a constant, regardless of the specific contexts, functional and dysfunctional, that we do these things within that shape and contextualize our own learnings. That seems to me to be a universal truth, that shifts in formulations, creeds, dogmas, worldviews, do not dislodge or overturn. The truth is that humans ask questions, and continue to do so, seeking understanding of an evolving reality. Re. 4, yes, it leads to metaphysics, but needs to include historical consciousness, and improved methodological perspectives, scientific or becoming scientific, rather than focussing on a static, ahistorical, concept of truth. Which doesn't recognize the nature of contingency, which comes from being human. Thanks for your reflections. Best, Michael George

Thank you both, Wulf and Michael, for the very illuminating answers! Marc.

Dear Wulf Rehder and readers,

You mentioned some interesting examples for non-contingent truth. I think they are worth looking at. Before I do that, I would like to clarify some terminology. I understand a universal truth to be a necessary truth, i. e. a statement of the form “Necessarily, the sentences S is true.” Likewise, the term 'contingent' is usually taken to mean 'actual and not necessary'. So, a contingent truth is a statement of the form “The sentence S is true and it is not the case that necessarily, the sentences S is true.” This fits the interpretation that 'contingent' is synonym to 'temporal/historical reality' (I don't know how to include 'valid', since validity is technically a property of an argument, not a sentence).

Now, with this in place, let us look at two of your your examples:

“Is it a contingency that planets choose ellipses rather than circles as their path around the sun? No. A non-contingent necessity forces them – they have no choice. Is 2+2=4 contingent?”

Let us start with 2+2=4. This is not a contingent truth, since it is necessarily true (as almost) all truth of mathematics and formal logic. The reason is that one can prove that they are true (or that a proof exists). The second example is tricky. Your answer to the question “Is it a contingency that planets choose ellipses rather than circles as their path around the sun?” is: No, because it is necessarily the case that the planets choose elliptical orbits. Given that planets obey laws of nature, this seems to entail that the laws of nature are necessary truth. So, the question becomes something like this: Could the laws of nature be different? I'm not sure, on the one hand, one can argue that the laws of nature could not have been different in order for us (or for anything else) to be here (to exist). So, it seems to be physically necessary that the laws of nature are what they are. On the other hand, the laws of nature don't seem to have the same status as mathematical truth. At least not from an epistemological point of view. We can prove a theorem, but we cannot prove that a law of nature holds.

If this is correct, then we might deal with certain types of necessity. There are, what we may call, at least two types, metaphysical necessity and physical necessity.

It would be interesting to see if one can give an argument that laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. For example, by arguing that there is ultimately only one type of necessity. At the moment, I can't think of such an argument, perhaps someone else has an idea?

Best,

Sven Beecken

Dear Wulf Rehder,

Thank you very much for your interesting answer. The reason why I used a modal framework is simply because that is the standard in contemporary metaphysics. Furthermore, mathematics is basically the only area where most people (in metaphysics) agree that we can have necessary truth, all other examples are somewhat disputed. The argument would be something like this: If one can give a prove that, say, 2+2=4, then one is allowed to apply the necessitation rule. Obviously, this can be (and is) disputed.

As you have pointed out, these issues may bring us far from the question that is discussed here. On the other hand, we have examples for necessary truth. Hence - so far - the answer seems to be: yes. So, we may stray a bit by locking at your very interesting take on the relation between logical truth and truth about the world.

You wrote: “[I]n some crucial way, the elliptic paths are not much different from 2+2=4 according to Peano’s axioms. The “crucial way” is this: Elliptic paths can be derived (i.e. proven) with the help of Newton’s laws. Newton’s three laws are the axioms of classical mechanics, just as Peano’s axioms are the laws for natural numbers. However, Newton’s laws were “contingent” and had to be changed and adjusted for high speeds (relativity) and tiny spaces (quantum theory). Subsequently, in these two areas of “very big” and “very small”, new principles – instead of “axioms” – were established.”

You are certainly right that there is a strong similarity between arithmetic and Newtonian Mechanics because both derive their results by logical deduction. We can subsume both under Einstein's definition of a (physical) theory: “A complete system [of theoretical physics] consists of concepts and basic laws to interrelate those concepts and of consequences to be derived by logical deduction.” (Albert Einstein, On the Method of Theoretical Physics)

Prima facie, it seems that both Newtonian Mechanics and arithmetic satisfy this definition of a theory. We have in both cases the relevant concepts and the respective laws. The difference is that the consequences in case of Newtonian Mechanics must correspond to the observations in order to be true. This is an epistemic problem. We could hypothesize that the consequences derived from the correct laws of physics must correspond to all observations possible. Under this assumption, we could simplify the problem and focus on the laws while counting the consequences as true.

If it is the case that the laws of arithmetic and the laws of Newtonian Mechanics are on a par, then we would have a strong reason to argue that there is in fact no need to distinguish between levels of necessity.

Obviously, the claim that the laws of mathematics and the laws of nature are “on a par” is not trivial and it would indeed go beyond the scope of the question even to try to develop this idea. All I wanted to do is to see if we could find a way not to make a principled distinction between 'true relative to axioms A' and 'true relative to principles B'. It seems to me that this way could be to show that there is no distinction in principle because the underlying structure is the same.

Best,

Sven Beecken

Albert Einstein, On the Method of Theoretical Physics, Philosophy of Science, 1934

Thank you both, Wulf and Sven for the worthwhile discussion (also with Michael George).

I have some unexplainable feeling that: (a) logic and metaphysics, so, philosophy, particularly that of the Christian religion (e.g. both of you mention Augustine, etc.) are coming back into the mainstream science; why should'nt they?; (b) the s.c. 'objective knowledge' is going to achieve its highest mountaintop, at least up to the end of the 21st century; (c) ours is now the time to search after a possible 'subjective knowledge'; there might be signs for it, e.g. the rise of the cognitive science and the consciousness studies (precisely inside the system of the 'objective knowledge'!).

Thanks afterall for the discussion(s). Marc.

Thank you, Valentin, for your interesting answer. I am very interesting on the question: whether there is some scientific method to discover or invent the original state things or human beings, in other words: past events (you mention). Our current scientific method regards only prediction. Is there any scientific method to discover or invent these 'past events'? Something like 'retrodiction' (my own phrase). Your answer could help me in my research project. Thanks, Marc.

Thank you both, Valentin and Wulf, for the discussion. I will reread that once again. Thanks, Marc.

"Time is a register of motions." --Aristotle

No motion, no time; no time, timelessness; timelessness, eternity; immovable, eternal.

"You must therefore first understand the law of nature, and then proceed to the divine law, by which also the natural law has been prescribed." --Porphyry

Everything is in pursuit of happiness; happy is that which realizes its potential in full.

Interesting discussion! Hopefully it does not end in 'time' or about it. Interesting for me because the system constituted of matter/space/time -which according to science as we know it today- is identical to 'objective' reality (see e.g. Wigner) is (according to me): (a) that constitution is hierarchical, starting with matter, and ending with time; (b) time is (in my view) a hybride one in that it is both 'objective' and 'subjective'; (c) in the latter (viz. time as 'subjective'), ruminations on time could possibly contribute to a certain 'subjective knowledge' which up today is very under-researched.

Thanks anyway for the discussion! Marc.

Simply put -- we all need oxygen to breath, on this planet and out in the universe.

Dear Ck and Wulf,

Re: "out in the universe" and "we".

To begin with the latter ("we"): we are human beings, and as such 'subject's, not as the 'universe' which is the 'object' consisting of matter/space/time (see my preceding answer). Well, as 'subject's "we" are able to transgress the boundaries of the 'universe'. Are'nt we? And even to see the far-side of the universe! instead of only the deep space exploration that occurs "out in the universe".

Please check whether my reasoning is correct. Thanks! Marc.

Marc, if the Universe is finite and one, it has no outside, and the boundary is not penetrable.. If the Universe is infinite (then it must be the only Universe), it has no boundary.

The Universe is the phenomenal realm; space and time are its attributes. The source of the phenomenal realm is the noumenal (divine) realm, which does not have space and time attributes: The divine realm is accessible from any point in space at any time: There is no need to travel anywhere: the gate to the divine realm is everywhere and always open, but only for those who are utterly pure.

Thought. Self. Consciousness. Words that allow me to look upon my state of wakefulness. Wether it is illusion that I observe in my self awareness is irrelevant to my being conscious as an entity capable of conceiving such things as, say, the Socratic method of enquiry. The immutable truth is that I exist. Not in order to prove my existence, since proof is merely a concept I am capable of in my wakefulness and not the entity that is awake whatever such an entity may in fact entail; be it a brain in a vat or what directly corresponds to my beliefs as a human being. I suggest it is not possible to move beyond this point of consciousness without learning that consensus and the arbitrariness of word and denotation is the underlying phenomenal truth to be confronted whatever the unknowable noumenonal situation. At best we each, if I may be so bold as to suggest, make our own world picture from experience, each uniquely individual, each different. This is what my self conscious being tells me is how it goes. As for universal truth; Plato was the expert on universals, but there are many ways to look at things in existence after the fact is granted that one exists

A lot has been said in this thread about what truth is, or isn't, or may be, or has been thought to be.

However, I think it remains to be discussed what, in the OP's question, "universally valid" is supposed to mean, and how universality and validity relate to each other when it comes to truths.

Does said universality mean:

Truths which apply to all objects? (Self-identity, perhaps?)

Truths which are valid everywhere in our universe? (As has been mentioned: Laws of nature, perhaps?)

Truth in all possible worlds? (Metaphysically necessary propositions, perhaps?)

Or does it simply mean that any sufficiently specific true statement remains true, no matter the context? (This would certainly hold for metaphysically necessary truths, but not for many empirical laws, which only hold ceteris paribus; but empirical sentences such as "at the time of writing this comment, its author was 37 years old" would qualify. This sentence would remain true at least under under all meaning-preserving conditions.)

In any case: Depending on what is meant by "universally valid", the OP's question might be answered by a resounding "yes", a resounding "of course not!", or a "depends".

Dear Joachim,

By universal I mean the naturalistic universe consisting of matter/space/time. So, no any metaphysics nor modal logic of the possible worlds! because the 'many worlds' of Everett and deWitt which has evolved now to the 'multiverse' is plain naturalistic and is/are never used/applied in modal logic, to the best of my knowledge.

Validity is nothing but the counterpart of reliability in the usual methodology of 'normal' science.

Hopefully this suffices for you to give the right answer. Thank you anyway! Marc.

Dear Marc,

thank you for the clarification!

That would lead me to another question: If your use of "universal" equals "in our universe", and reliable empirical generalizations count as true, I cannot readily see your special reason for wanting to distinguish between "S is true" and "S is universally true".

For example, if we look at different kinds of truths such as the following, what would constitute the difference between their being true and their being "universally true"?

1 + 1 = 2

E = mc²

Non-pathological humans have a liver.

Bachelors are unmarried.

The author of this comment is 37 years old.

Obviously, none of these statements, granted they are true, is simply "true for me" or "true right here". So, what else could you be looking for by pointing to universality in your sense?

Dear Joachim,

Many thanks for your 'another question' which for me is completely understandable. This 'another question' leads me to a lot of questions, a.o. the following: (i) 1+1=2 is true if it is based upon matter/space/time i.e. the 'naturalistic' one I mean, in other words the "universe" you mention. This 'naturalistic' one is the only scientific one we know it today. Why? (ii) however if you could cross or transgress the boundaries of matter/space/time which is not impossible that means which is conceivable, what then? This (ii) is my right question. Please see my (previous) opinion re: the environment of the universe is completely another than that of Mario Bunge. This implies: there is more than only the universe, viz. matter/space/time! Your added answer has uncovered this hidden question.Thank you for it. It leaves the floor open to your other questions.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Carvallo,

How about this:

If there is a number x and and a number y, such that y = x +1, then, y > x.

This is purely hypothetical, of course. It doesn't even say there are any numbers. But it is nonetheless true. No space or time or anything "natural" mentioned here.

Is your point simply that some sort of objection (or apparent objection) can be raised against any claim made --however doubtful or contorted the objection may be? If so, that seems a pretty uninteresting point. It seems more an anthropological or a sociological point rather than anything about the nature of truth.

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Bura & readers,

Notice that the hypothetical mathematical statement in question also says nothing about "ignorance." --or "complete ignorance." It neither asserts nor denies that anyone is ignorant or knowledgeable about anything.

You may argue that various definitions of symbols are needed or presupposed for us to understand the statement in question. But these definitions are not asserted in the statement or in the antecedent of this conditional statement. Of course, we also have to know what "if ...then..." means to understand the statement. But no definition is asserted in the statement itself.

In order to understand any statement, we must of course understand the terms or words of which it is composed. That, as it seems to me, is not an objection to any particular statement. Or, if it is, then it is equally an objection to every statement --which makes the claim about objections trivial. If you broaden the basis of objections indefinitely, then, of course, there will always be an objection. This makes the rejection of the concept of truth too easy.

H.G. Callaway

Yes there is one fundamental truth which is universally valid...that is

"This shall too pass"

Nothing is permanent on this planet Earth....that is the truth.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Bura & readers,

Thanks for your further comment.

Notice however, that commitment to the truth of the suggested mathematical statement does not involve or imply any "formalist stance," though I can certainly imagine that a formalist philosophy would endorse it. Nor does it involve a commitment to behaviorism --though behaviorists may like it, too.

Truth is a semantic concept on the usual accounts, and not purely syntactic. But all such theoretical treatments and elaborations stand way beyond the simple illustration that there are truths. It a paradigm case argument. I'm sure that many other examples would be equally compelling.

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Bura & readers,

Your comments point off in a somewhat different direction.

Briefly, it may be objected that by standard proofs of soundness and completeness, provability and entailment line up in purely formal terms. Whatever can be proven from given premises is entailed, and whatever is entailed can be proven. So, how could there be a reasoned preference of one over the other?

Semantics is only troublesome, where distinct theories involve distinct definitions, or "inference tickets." This gives rise to confusions, because of inattention to the question of which theory is under consideration at a given time and/or the conditions of theory acceptability (which is not a formal matter).

But I don't see that any of these complications need involve a preference for syntactic provability over semantic entailment.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

However, I have long now come to lower my standards and accept without reservation only syntactic provability, as opposed to semantic entailment.

Why this is so -- I try to illustrate here by saying "carried long enough, any argument ends in semantics"

Dear Valentin and all readers,

The last paragraph of your added answer does me feel obliged to answer more extensively. After somewhat vertical thinking (i.e. higher and deeper) and both personal (i.e. my own action) and impersonal (i.e. the thinking happens to me), I come to this belated answer. So my sincere sorry for this belatedness. The answer is summarily as follows.

(i) Qua 'ontological proof': not necessarily the Anselm's ontological argument, nor its translationabilities (which could be many as you like).

(ii) However it might seem to approximate that. Anselm's ontological argument implies (rather strongly!) that God is the highest Subject. In this last case of implication one may subsume my search after a possible 'subjective knowledge' after ageslong (i.e. since the 17th century, beginning with the infamous Galileo affair) shackling science to the 'objective knowledge'.

(iii) The floor is naturally open to your and everybody's answers. For those answers, my thanks in advance! Marc.

Dear Valentin,

Thank you, especially for the last rule of your added answer. I would like to add this: because 'certainty' is essentially distinct from 'truth'. Marc.

“There is no life without death”

Regards

Dr. Kamath Madhusudhana

Dear dr. Kamath Madhusudhana,

Please explain further: (i) what you exactly mean by "There is no life without death"; (ii) what is the connection with my question. Thanks for your further explanation! Marc.

Martin claims

Nothing can set itself in motion.

is an absolutely valid truth

Well I'm going to choose to get up, leave this computer and go to the gym for some more elaborate motions.

Either your statement is false, or I am nothing, or both.

You decide!

(Why are humans so arrogant that they think they can know absolute, valid truths? Even in mathematics truth is delimited by the assumptions of the system of reason (the theory and its logic) involved. Although this conclusion remains controversial - see Platonism and mathematical realism. Ie, the question is mathematics invented or discoverd? If we could know anything as absolute truth wouldn't we be infalliblle gods - at least in part? If there are absolutely valid truths - how can we warrant them beyond all doubt and error and know them as absolutely valid?)

If interested see my: paper "Is mathematics discovered or invented?"

http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/education/research/centres/stem/publications/pmej/pome12/article2.htm

Paul writes,

"Well I'm going to choose to get up, leave this computer and go to the gym for some more elaborate motions."

Yes, 'you' can choose to get up, but that which makes the choice is not that which makes the getting up. A detailed explanation of why nothing can set itself in motion was given by Aristotle (The Metaphysics of Aristotle). If you disagree with Aristotle, write a commentary on The Metaphysics of Aristotle and explain where and why is he wrong.

"Gravity is an incoherent dielectric acceleration [of bodies toward each other]." --Kenneth Lee Wheeler

(Gravity is not a mysterious force. The only difference between gravity and 'magnetic attraction' is the field coherency.)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evSJQRwNTV4

As per my view, there are multiple truths accepted in the market. For example, a man is feeling pain when a niddle cot his skin. And different people started to interpret the truth of that pain...

Materialist person "A" said, the cause of pain is niddle

Empiricist "B" said, the cause of pain is skin

Rationalist "C" said, the cause of pain is brain

Pragmatist "D" said, the cause of pain is eye, and so on.

Here, all of them have true opinion so truth is not Universal but relative to its own ontology.

"opinions may be true or false, knowledge only true" --Algis Uždavinys

Diotima: "a correct opinion comes midway between knowledge and ignorance" Socrates: "yes, that's perfectly true"

@ Martin Klvana: Yes, and the Socratic point is that merely correct opinions do not involve justified beliefs, whereas knowledge is correct opinion that consists of justified beliefs.

But in answer to the original question: wouldn't most mathematical propositions count as universally true or valid? (E.g. "in base 10, 2 + 2 = 4")

Dear all,

Many thanks for all your answers. Reading all your answers I think I 'll go back to school again to learn more of your given answers. Again: many thanks! Marc.

@ Karl Pfeifer: Knowledge transcends opinion, just as wisdom transcends knowledge. The soul is tripartite: doxa (opinion), dianoia (discursive reason), noesis (intellection). The doxastic part is incapable of reasoning. "Justified belief" is an oxymoron.

Diotima: "holding an opinion which is in fact correct, without being able to give a reason for it, is [not] true knowledge"

@ Martin Klvana

You say "knowledge transcends opinion" and quote Dioptoma favorably: "holding an opinion which is in fact correct, without being able to give a reason for it, is [not] true knowledge"

I say "knowledge is correct opinion that consists of justified beliefs"

The transcendence and the reason lies in one's justification.

Some people hold beliefs that are not justified, given the evidence. If you're suggesting belief cannot be chosen, I agree with that; believing is not an action. But beliefs are involved in reasoning; one often reasons on the basis of one's beliefs. Moreover, one can change one's beliefs indirectly by investigating and paying heed to evidence and reasons. Isn't one's belief justified (isn't one justified in holding one's belief) when one has good reasons in support of it?

Karl, while you were writing your answer, i edited mine with "Justified belief" is an oxymoron. The process of reasoning 'transforms' opinion into knowledge. When a dark room is illuminated, it is no longer dark.

You write, "one often reasons on the basis of one's beliefs." i almost agree---i would change 'one often reasons' into 'one reasons.' Without opinion, there is nothing a discursive reasoning can be applied to. Without a dark room, there is no room to be illuminated.

@ Martin Klvana, the process of reasoning in this context is a process of justification as well. When the process is complete, and "the room is no longer dark", the belief/opinion has been justified, no?

Karl, but when the process of reasoning/justification is complete, the belief/opinion ceases to exist, for it has been transformed into knowledge. (That's why i tried to emphasize the transcendence.) Do you agree?

@ Martin Klvana,

RE: belief vs knowledge

No, I don't agree across the board. I might countenance knowledge without belief for some kinds of cases*, but I think ordinary speech allows us to say things like, "not only do I believe that P but I know it for a fact" or "that's not merely my opinion; I know it to be true" which entail that belief/opinion that P and knowledge that P can coexist, whereas "I know that P but I don't believe it" or "I know that P but have no opinion about its truth" are jarringly odd.

_________

* Some of those cases might be where we attribute knowledge to a person who himself doesn't believe he has it, where he doesn't know that he knows.

@ Wulf Rehder

Thanks for your long answer. Diotima's explanation reminded me that a belief may be considered correct in different ways. (1) merely being true, (2) believed in a correct manner, i.e. in accordance with epistemic virtues on the part of the believer, such that the believer is justified in or has justification for the belief, or (3) the belief (proposition believed) itself is justified by some epistemic standard, so there are reasons for it, but the believer doesn't have those reasons and so lacks the epistemic virtues required for knowledge.

As far as I can tell, (3) is what Diotima regards as being wrong to call ignorance. My view is that it could go either way; we need to determine what is going on inside the believer's head. A lucky guess could be compatible with (3) but I would still regard that as ignorance. On the other hand, a perceptual belief arising from a reliable visual mechanism could be regarded as perceptual knowledge even if one can't give reasons.

What about mathematical truths? Like 2+2=4. Is that a universal truth. Gets away from belief, I think.

What a delightful conversation.

Moving beyond intellectual remonstrance, we can resonate with truth through calibrated discernment. This, to a novice requires much focused conscious application - entering the realm of metaphysics, whereas a master is always there in life.

I believe both Socrates and Jesus Christ were such masters.

“No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not the same man.” Heraclitus

Dear Patrick,

Thank you for the river statement of Heraclitus. However, please tell me extensively what is connection of this river statement with my question? Thanks for your answer. Marc.

Patrick W Brown

Too bad Heraclitus didn't reflect on his use of pronouns. Who is the "he" that's not the same as "he" was before?

Here is part of an answer I previously posted on Quora:

Let us consider the idea of persistence through time and tensed existence. I am the same person I was yesterday and I will continue as that person for some time into the future (i.e. until I die, become brain dead, or suffer a severe brain injury that destroys my very personhood). Some of my attributes will change but that’s true of everyone and everything; molecules and electrons come and go, bodies grow, expand, wrinkle, and shrink. Perceptions and thoughts come and go, one after the other, some being forgotten, some misremembered.

Am I the same person I was yesterday? Of course. There hasn’t been a brain transplant, mind-switch, or body-switch so who else would I be? There is enough spatiotemporal and psychological continuity to ensure that it’s still me.

But there is an ambiguity here. We must distinguish between numerical and qualitative identity.

‘Mary and Bill drive the same car’ is ambiguous between 1 and 2:

1 claims numerical identity.

2 claims qualitative identity.

Granted my qualities or attributes change from second to second. So I am not qualitatively the same from second to second. However, it is one and the same being, me, whose qualities have undergone change from then to now, and will change further from now to later. The changes are my changes and no one else’s. So I am numerically the same person whose qualities are not the same now as they were before.

What does “I am not the same person I was before” mean? Note the two occurrences of “I”, which presumable have the same referent or implicit antecedent. Clearly the sentence is not self-contradictory (it doesn’t say I am not I or, replacing the pronoun, Karl Pfeifer is not Karl Pfeifer); so “I am not the same person” must merely mean that something about me is qualitatively different (personality, thoughts, whatnot).

So, although it might be true that only the present exists and therefore I also only exist in the present, this does not establish that it was a different person that existed immediately before or will exist immediately after the present moment.

So Heraclitus's alleged "truth" is either false or else misleadingly worded.

"Christ, you could have made a fortune writing fortune cookies." --Eddie Dean to Roland of Gilead (The Dark Tower: Wizard and Glass by Stephen King)

RE: (A*) We are stepping into the same rivers, and we are not stepping [into the same rivers], we are [who we are], and we are not.

My apologies to Heraclitus. Wulf Rehder

We are stepping into the same rivers -> The rivers we are now stepping into are numerically identical to those we stepped into before.

We are not stepping into the same rivers -> The rivers we are now stepping into are not qualitatively identical to those we stepped into before.

We are who we were -> We are numerically identical to who we were

We are not who we were -> We are not qualitatively identical to who we were

Heraclitus' words demonstrate the early grapple with fluidity in an existential sense. Such a notion does not necessarily deny our existence in either a past or future sense, though it does specifically highlight the present, it also implies both other senses. Therefore, to consider this as an example of a truth is perhaps to misunderstand the point.

Wulf Rehder

Maybe Heraclitus didn't use tense, but aren't different times implied in "stepping twice"? Steps take time, and one can't take two of them at once.

As for the "who am I?" question, well, I can answer saying "I am that guy, but I am not that guy", which can be understood in a couple of ways, one being the backward-looking way: "I was once thus-and-so and now I'm not thus-and-so". To get at the other way let me insert a word: "I am that guy, but I am really not that guy". This can be understood in a non-backward-looking way: "Yes, I am thus-and-so but that's not the authentic me" (accident vs essence, perhaps).

Anyway, this is fun stuff.

". . . if one thing is moving about inside another, which other is also in motion, as when a boat moves through the water of a flowing river, (...) the river as a (...) whole, rather than the flowing water in it at the moment, will be the boat's place."--Aristotle (The Physics, Book IV)

Wulf Rehder

RE: 'No wonder this is vague: there were no clocks to measure the regularity of a linear “flow” of time.'

Even if you discount the many types of sundials, did not the Greeks have clocks and an idea of temporal regularity? Scroll past the 20-odd sundials to get to the other clocks; the proportional ceramic clepsydra, for example, evinces a sophisticated idea of evenly graduated temporal regularity: http://kotsanas.com/gb/exh.php?exhibit=0204001. Moreover, the Antikythera mechanism as an astronomical predictive device would've presupposed linear temporal regularity. And don't we "moderns" also, at rock bottom, understand time in terms of change (cesium atom radiation), even if we typically abstract away from particular changes? I think many ancient Greeks knew precisely what they were trying to measure and they used constrained changes to do so (and weren't deterred by contrived paradoxes).

Time does not exist. Time is a measure of motions relative to a reference motion. That which does not move is eternal, immovable, and timeless: there is no "before time." And this has been known for ages.

Thanks for everything that has been said in this discussion. Marc

Wulf, but "to vibrate" is "to move rapidly to and fro" and "to transit" is "to go across." [Buddha agrees with me.]

Is Quantum Mechanics a Universally valid truth, or are we just discussing things we are interested in now instead of answering the original question?

Skr. saMsAra: worldly illusion; Skr. saMsAraNa: setting in motion. Rest in the phenomenal realm (saMsAra) is impossible: everything is ever-changing, hence the unsatisfactoriness of life . . . Here is one universal truth: every thing, living or non-living, including every single cesium atom, seeks one and one thing only: happiness, and every thing, living or non-living, including every single cesium atom, fails to find it in the fleeting realm of saMsAra.

Om Try-Ambakam Yajaamahe

Sugandhim Pushti-Vardhanam

Urvaarukamiva Bandhanaan

Mrityor-Mukshiya Maamrtaat

(Rg Veda 7.59.12)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4k2Z8EarCM

Martin, I see now that you are a Buddhist. Thanks for the information! Marc.

The truth has always 2 sides, each has 4 interpretations (quantized), makes 8 vertices per problem framework.

Dear Robert,

My answer is a 'back-reply' to your added answer, and runs as follows: Is truth quantitive? Thanks for your answer. Marc.

Yes. it is condensed knowledge measured in density phi. see information integration theory.

Truth is neither quantitative nor qualitative.

"The instructed, noble disciple understands form subject to arising as it really is thus: 'Form is subject to arising.' He understands form subject to vanishing as it really is thus: 'Form is subject to vanishing.' He understands form subject to arising and vanishing as it really is thus: 'Form is subject to arising and vanishing.' He understands feeling . . . perception . . . volitional formations . . . consciousness subject to arising . . . subject to vanishing . . . subject to arising and vanishing as it really is . . . This is called true knowledge, and in this way one has arrived at true knowledge." [Khandhavagga (The Book of the Aggregates), Samyutta Nikaya].

truth is particles and waves. visible and invisible. steered by a pilotwave. the true interpretation of information lies in the configuration of the flux capacitor who generates the projection of our reality construct. truth is determined by the pilotwave, but the interpretation lies within the degrees of freedom of the configuration of our moral values. Mathematically speaking there is true, truth and too good to be true, all in 3 generations.

the quantitative measure is phi (knowledge) the qualitative measure is psi (experience). Both results combined create a quantifiable amount of wisdom.

Truth is not only integration, but also balancing of information. phi measures integration, psi the balacing ( level of consciousness/happiness)

Particles of what? Waves of what?

In any axiomatic system, there are statements that we cannot determine whether they are true or false. Please see the work of Kurt Godel.

Joseph Tham, regarding Gödel's theorem: Yes exactly. That's why the truth has always 2 sides (duality), each has 4 interpretations (quantized), makes 8 vertices per possible problem framework interactions. The truth perfectly describes one reality framework.

To make it more precise: It is a nonsense question to ask for truth, because everything is true and false at the same time. The important questions to ask for is: "under which (of the eight possible) conditions" is a statement true or not.