Dear Jenn,

IMO these kinds of findings definitely belong to the EC literature.

Perhaps more interesting however is to see how different EC 'strands' judge this finding. Sorry for my long answer I always try to be short.. and fail.

EC people with a background in 'standard', naturalistic, empirical science (cognitive neuroscience, mostly) would probably think this to be a nice illustration of how the physical properties of the *physical body* (physical-mechanical constraints) directly impact 'the way we think' (in a non-trivial way). Hence, cognition is embodied. It could help to argue against 'functionalism', the classic idea that the *implementation* of a cognitive process in a physical machine (the brain) is in some way 'trivial', one can always design another physical machine that does the same cognitive thing, and so the 'embodiment' of cognition (the fact that it is realized by a body and brain) is not what really matters to cognition. Rizzollati could counter functionalism saying that  the physical embodiment directly impacts cognitive content. There are 'in between' arguments within this group of people: Andy Clark is a strong proponent of the idea that physical constraints of the body can become part of the cognitive system (see his Being There book) but at the same time still holds on to functionalism (See a paper called "Pressing the Flesh..  ..")

Another strand in EC literature has roots in phenomenology. Phenomenologists, I guess, would be less enthousiastic about this finding as such: what does it really say? In their view talking about embodiment has nothing directly to do with the "physical machine that is our body", embodiment concerns our 'lived body', the sphere of interactivity that is defined by our action-perception couplings. Mistaking the lived body for the physical body is precisely what science (including cognitive science) did wrong. Even 'the world' is 'enacted' through our 'being in the world' and this entanglement of mind-body-world is what embodiment is all about. I guess when it comes to analysing the embodiment of our 'being' they are generally indifferent to empirical findings from the sciences. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty does continously refer to neurological cases to guide his analysis.

Then there's a group of modern philosophers who explicitly try to reconcile naturalism/science with phenomenology. I guess Noe and Evan Thompson are part of that group. I am curious to know how they can account for the strategy of taking empirical facts on brains to be a proof for a phenomenological insight, or the reverse. If you have ideas on this let me know thanks!

Then there is the ecological psychologists, followers of James Gibson. Gibson had no interest in phenomenology, to my knowledge, but his ideas on affordances and perception-action couplings are often used to explain or make concrete ideas put forward in phenomenological analysis (I just did so myself I realize, see also the work of Rietveld). Their theories however are in some way more 'physics' than 'psychology', and in any case strongly anti-cognitivistic/anti-mentalistic and often very mathemetical, and in that sense I should think that the Rizzolati findings could be of interest to the ecological psychologists. The point is just that they would need to understand the finding more specifically in terms of what it means for their theories of perception-action coupling in order to make the finding interesting. They would regard the superficial and less informative claim that 'because' there is a correlation between eye-mechanics and attention, therefore cognition 'is embodied', with the same kind of indifference as the phenomenologists.

What do you think?

https://www.google.nl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CC0QFjAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.uoguelph.ca%2F~abailey%2FResources%2FClark%25202007.pdf&ei=sTutVNmOCMO3OKK0gIgM&usg=AFQjCNGfMlwuaQxYKGOzqVc3F34k0qVVFg&sig2=p54ajyiW-dwWUVErIvtEAA&bvm=bv.83134100,d.ZWU

Your first sentence finishes with the phrase "rather than higher-level cognition". As the sentence read in its entirety doesn't actually present a completed argument, I'll assume you meant "attention is governed by oculomotor limitations rather than by higher-level cognition", which is how I understand Rizzolati et al's thesis (recalling it off the top of my head). It would be good to know, before chiming in: have I interpreted you correctly?

I tried to clarify the statements and theory a bit more in the description. Your interpretation of the previous description was right. I am wondering if this theory is similar to embodied cognition. I am not very familiar with the embodied cognition field but I know it's a highly debated topic within cognitive sciences.

Jenn

Rizzolati has worked with Gallese, who is a strong EmbCog advocate, and has in turn worked with Lakoff, who works with Mark Johnson - they co-authored 'philosophy in the flesh'. There are several strands of embodied cognition, some more radical than others. I reecommend Chemero - Radical Embodied Cognitive Science as a good (Gibsonian) read. Varela Thompson and Rosch were early pioneers with Embodied Mind. I also recommend Noe and Oregan's sensorimotor account of vision - see attached.

SP

BTW all, the paper is on RG here:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/19586574_Reorienting_attention_across_the_horizontal_and_vertical_meridians_evidence_in_favor_of_a_premotor_theory_of_attention

Article Reorienting attention across the horizontal and vertical mer...

Thanks for the references Simon! I was able to find more information about embodied cognition so I could think of it more clearly. It's been a while since I've read O'Regan and Noe (didn't realize it until a couple pages in) but it's still a great read on perception.

Dear Jenn,

IMO these kinds of findings definitely belong to the EC literature.

Perhaps more interesting however is to see how different EC 'strands' judge this finding. Sorry for my long answer I always try to be short.. and fail.

EC people with a background in 'standard', naturalistic, empirical science (cognitive neuroscience, mostly) would probably think this to be a nice illustration of how the physical properties of the *physical body* (physical-mechanical constraints) directly impact 'the way we think' (in a non-trivial way). Hence, cognition is embodied. It could help to argue against 'functionalism', the classic idea that the *implementation* of a cognitive process in a physical machine (the brain) is in some way 'trivial', one can always design another physical machine that does the same cognitive thing, and so the 'embodiment' of cognition (the fact that it is realized by a body and brain) is not what really matters to cognition. Rizzollati could counter functionalism saying that  the physical embodiment directly impacts cognitive content. There are 'in between' arguments within this group of people: Andy Clark is a strong proponent of the idea that physical constraints of the body can become part of the cognitive system (see his Being There book) but at the same time still holds on to functionalism (See a paper called "Pressing the Flesh..  ..")

Another strand in EC literature has roots in phenomenology. Phenomenologists, I guess, would be less enthousiastic about this finding as such: what does it really say? In their view talking about embodiment has nothing directly to do with the "physical machine that is our body", embodiment concerns our 'lived body', the sphere of interactivity that is defined by our action-perception couplings. Mistaking the lived body for the physical body is precisely what science (including cognitive science) did wrong. Even 'the world' is 'enacted' through our 'being in the world' and this entanglement of mind-body-world is what embodiment is all about. I guess when it comes to analysing the embodiment of our 'being' they are generally indifferent to empirical findings from the sciences. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty does continously refer to neurological cases to guide his analysis.

Then there's a group of modern philosophers who explicitly try to reconcile naturalism/science with phenomenology. I guess Noe and Evan Thompson are part of that group. I am curious to know how they can account for the strategy of taking empirical facts on brains to be a proof for a phenomenological insight, or the reverse. If you have ideas on this let me know thanks!

Then there is the ecological psychologists, followers of James Gibson. Gibson had no interest in phenomenology, to my knowledge, but his ideas on affordances and perception-action couplings are often used to explain or make concrete ideas put forward in phenomenological analysis (I just did so myself I realize, see also the work of Rietveld). Their theories however are in some way more 'physics' than 'psychology', and in any case strongly anti-cognitivistic/anti-mentalistic and often very mathemetical, and in that sense I should think that the Rizzolati findings could be of interest to the ecological psychologists. The point is just that they would need to understand the finding more specifically in terms of what it means for their theories of perception-action coupling in order to make the finding interesting. They would regard the superficial and less informative claim that 'because' there is a correlation between eye-mechanics and attention, therefore cognition 'is embodied', with the same kind of indifference as the phenomenologists.

What do you think?

https://www.google.nl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CC0QFjAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.uoguelph.ca%2F~abailey%2FResources%2FClark%25202007.pdf&ei=sTutVNmOCMO3OKK0gIgM&usg=AFQjCNGfMlwuaQxYKGOzqVc3F34k0qVVFg&sig2=p54ajyiW-dwWUVErIvtEAA&bvm=bv.83134100,d.ZWU

Hi Jenn,

For a detailed overview, you might find the page linked to below ("Embodied Cognition" from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) valuable. The best and clearest  entry-level book I've come across  describing the concept of embodied cognition is Antonio Damasio's wonderful Self Comes to Mind. You could then go on to Gerald Edelman's more intellectually demanding Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, which develops the thesis that embodied neural processes are subject to Darwinian natural selection. Also well worth exploring is William James (1890), in which the original fhesis of embodied psychological processes is promulgated.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/embodcog/

Jelle

thankyou for 'fleshing out' my previous note :) In my defence I am working with two broken wrists at the moment. Your breakdown of the EC scene is much the way I would put it. I do want to encourage you, and Jenn, to look at Chemero's book, which I think moves ecological psychology along, while justifying 'radical embodied cognitive science' - essentially by 'outing ' closet Cartesians, and Cartesianisms, lurking in EC circles - Clark for one. Along with Noe and Thompson, I enjoy Wheeler and  Di Paolo - their discussions of the relation between EM and EC are particularly useful.

Meantime, I often come back to Merleau Ponty" The body is our general medium for having a world" . This is as profound a synopsis of the EC project as I know. For a good discussion of the implications of this, I have always enjoyed Dreyfus' paper found here

- http://www.focusing.org/apm_papers/dreyfus2.html

I would encourage you, Jenn, to read it if you do not know it already.

Simon

Hi Jenn,

Just to add to the fantastic responses that have already been given to this question, I would agree that Rizzolatti et al.'s view of attention is embodied. Any theory that considers the body or the sensory-motor areas of the nervous system as primary constraints on cognition is inherently embodied.

For a kind of this theory is embodied if....guide, see Wilson (2003).

Best wishes,

Brandon

Article Six Views of Embodied Cognition