Logical fallacies have an element of truth about them; it is just that they are not sound arguments in all circumstances. I agree with H.G. Callaway that reputation of expertise is important, whether that is a peer-reviewed journal with a high ranking, or a professor from a prestigious university writing an article. Reputation can be a guide to likelihood of truth, although it is no guarantee (because the whole community may be wrong, but the strongest arguments that support a conclusion turn out to be false). In my view, heterodoxy is important for the development of any discipline, but insights from experts with orthodox views rightly carry the greatest weight.

A more famous example of a logical fallacy of value is abductive reasoning: if A, B IMPLIES A, therefore B. This is clearly a fallacy; but the truth in it is that there is a causal or explanatory relationship (or constant conjunction) relationship between B and A, then the inference may be valid. In any case B IMPLIES A, A increases the likelihood of B.

Dear Karl Pfeifer and readers,

It doesn’t seem to be the case that any account of origin logically entails the truth or falsity of a proposition, at least not if we restrict 'origin' to humans. One thing that comes to mind is the story about the boy who cried wolf. No matter how many times someone has said something false, this does not entail that s/he will not eventually tell the truth (interestingly, the opposite also holds true).

There is however a reason beyond likelihood that seems to give a principled reason to infer from repeated nonsense the necessity to ignore it: I think it was Timothy Williamson who made the observation that nonsense can be produced much faster then any serious researcher can refute it. So, if one takes the lesson from the boy who called wolf seriously, then it seems to suggest that one cannot dismiss the possibility that someone will eventually tell the truth, even after having lied in all previous cases. Now, if we generalize to any proposition and if we take Williamson seriously, then it seems that the number of propositions that express nonsense can always grow faster then they can be exposed as such.

So, it is not just that it is reasonable to doubt claims based on origin in some (many?) cases, it seems that there are cases where it is necessary to dismiss claims based solely on origin. There is a particular case where someone (who shall not be named) uses this strategy quite cunningly. He claims some nonsense, then the media spends some days to expose it, meanwhile, he has moved on to something else. As a result, he can claim that they are all out to get him, which in turn strengthen his base. This is not a political statement, but rather a “case study” (or the merest sketch thereof).

Best,

Sven Beecken

Some people say that explanations or analyses of moral concepts and judgements in terms of naturally selected traits and dispositions not only commit the genetic fallacy but also the naturalistic fallacy. I think both charges can defused but I don’t yet have a clearly articulated position worked out.

1. Law of Nature state that 'Equality' with respect to opportunity at par in a democracy form of political system

2. Genetics is always driving force and reiterate social system via migration

3. Diversity of various types delivers human performance and equality protect basic rights via social justice, economic justice & political justice

Following!

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pfeifer & readers,

What comes to mind is more or less regular reference to philosophical arguments and positions found, say, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. These sources tend to have a kind of "merit," connected with the reputation of the source and its openness to criticism. At the least, one easily supposes that the articles, arguments and positions reflect some considerable thought and reflection. So, it is also, e.g., with the Britannica--on a more general level. I think many similar examples might be mentioned.

Concerned with some particular question, problem or issue, there are various sources which seem, at least, to have the merit of being good places to start --or perhaps to consider in review one's own thinking. One is not well advised, however, to allow such references to become simple arguments from authority--another kind of informal fallacy.

H.G. Callaway

---you asked---

Are there any circumstances under which an argument based on an idea's or a concept's origin might have merit? Please explain and/or give an example.

Logical fallacies have an element of truth about them; it is just that they are not sound arguments in all circumstances. I agree with H.G. Callaway that reputation of expertise is important, whether that is a peer-reviewed journal with a high ranking, or a professor from a prestigious university writing an article. Reputation can be a guide to likelihood of truth, although it is no guarantee (because the whole community may be wrong, but the strongest arguments that support a conclusion turn out to be false). In my view, heterodoxy is important for the development of any discipline, but insights from experts with orthodox views rightly carry the greatest weight.

A more famous example of a logical fallacy of value is abductive reasoning: if A, B IMPLIES A, therefore B. This is clearly a fallacy; but the truth in it is that there is a causal or explanatory relationship (or constant conjunction) relationship between B and A, then the inference may be valid. In any case B IMPLIES A, A increases the likelihood of B.

H.G. Callaway & Andrew Powell:

There are ambiguities in the notion of a genetic fallacy. Source or origin can refer to a person making a claim. One can unjustifiably accept a claim because it came from a venerated person; obversely, one can unjustifiably dismiss a claim because it came from a despised person. But I do agree that sometimes reputation of a certain sort can legitimately carry some weight. However, I'm more interested in the kind of genetic fallacy that is attributed in order to invalidate an analysis (of a present-day concept) because it invokes a causal or historical origin.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Pfeifer & readers,

There is a version of the "generic fallacy" which arises with some frequency, in evaluation of work which spans some considerable length of time. The tendency I have in mind involves evaluation of an opus on the basis of the origin or background (or perhaps the early works) of the writer or thinker. This involves forced interpretation which views origin and background (sometimes initial works) as sufficient to explain and encompass all subsequent developments of the opus. On the contrary, we sometime need to view later work as more sophisticated.

I think this sometimes arises from the political tendency to criticize general political positions in terms which neglect all internal difference and differentiation. "You're either with us or against us." Prejudice regarding origin or background may then be organized or focused on the basis of an attributed and unreflective stereotypes --say of a background group or of political opponents. This may culminate in simple, unreflective, "guilt" by association.

Of course, one may expect to find a good deal of fallacious argument in heated political debates. That is part of the reason it is important to distinguish political advocacy from cooler and more circumspect political analysis. All denigration or devaluation based on origins or background --or even political groupings--needs to consider that "You cannot tell a book by its cover."

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

The Genetic Fallacy is an informal fallacy of reasoning — viz. one of the so-called fallacies of irrelevance – in which an argument or claim is based on someone's or something's history, origin, or source, i.e. when an idea or argument is either accepted or rejected because of its source, rather than – allegedly – its merit.

Dear Karl Pfeifer ,

It is certainly not sound to reject an argument because of its source, however unfashionable or heterodox that source is. An argument should be taken on its own merits, and tolerance should be shown to errors if they are not essential to the argument. There are thinkers, such as Hermann Grassmann, who found it very difficult to gain acceptance in their lifetimes, because their style was difficult and their reasoning heterodox.

“Some people say that explanations or analyses of moral concepts and judgements in terms of naturally selected traits and dispositions not only commit the genetic fallacy but also the naturalistic fallacy”: Karl Pfeifer. Might we think of Joyce, 2013, for example? (“Moral thinking probably emerged as a human adaptation, but one whose usefulness derived from its capacity to bolster social cohesion rather than its ability to track truths about the world. More concretely, moral judgments might fulfil their adaptive function –e.g., motivating cooperation– even if such judgments are false”.) /// “I think both charges can defused but I don’t yet have a clearly articulated position worked out”: Karl Pfeifer. I totally agree with these words. /// The ability of grasping somebody else’s contents and needs (that is, the called ‘advanced theory of mind’) became adaptive and emerged just in the final stretch of the evolution of primates. Can this indicate that such ability sustains the main truth about human beings? I would like to be able to argue in favour of the affirmative answer, I shall try to do it in the future. Now however I just applaud this Question.

Arguments always allow for some degree of uncertainty due to their need to be interpreted (I am primarily thinking of arguments made in natural language here). Drawing on their origin is one way of "filling in the gaps", so to speak - to assign "speaker intentions" which may not be clear from only considering the argument itself.

Donna Harraway,

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Salustri & readers,

Interesting answer.

What your remarks suggest to me is the role of the authority of tradition in the evaluation or assessment of values and claims concerning values. Since we are all living in various more or less different societies, arising partly from differences in values, the question arises of the authority or value of cultural traditions of values.

The central idea is, I think, that specific values exist in cultural traditions. In consequence, to ignore those traditions in our value claims is a mistake. It is not that traditions have anything like absolute authority. But on the other hand, neither is it a "fallacy" to appeal to one's own specific cultural tradition.

Even in a situation were change, modification or augmentation of cultural values is in question, to make an effective argument for change or modification, one must appeal to the values which one expects to persist through the change. No one on earth is going to simply change all their values, or their crucial and central values simply on the basis of an abstract argument having no substantial relation to the pre-existing values of the people affected.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

So, yes, arguments from authority have a place in society, so long as the society is set up to review, reevaluate, and redefine who is an authority based on best available evidence.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Lipski & readers,

Drawing on the origins of arguments might be viewed as scouting out the "speaker's (or author's) intentions." But we need not take that kind of approach.

One may look to the origin of an argument in the sense of looking for a larger system of thought to which it belongs--and which helps fix the interpretation. After all, if we assume that the value or character of an argument depends on its interpretation --say, the interpretation of its non-logical vocabulary in particular, then an argument is not simply an abstract (or syntactic) structure. Consulting the origin (e.g., a larger text from which the argument is taken), may clarify what is being said.

Consider just the sentence:

(1) John put the money in a bank.

A bank may be a financial institution, of course, but the word has other meanings. If we find (1) in a story of a treasure hunt and buried treasure, then (1) may have to do with a river bank.

In a somewhat similar way, we might ask, e.g., about the meaning of "measurement" in the theory of special or general relativity. What is often remarked, of course, is that observers employing different frames of reference may make different measurements of the same events. Or again, we can ask, what is the meaning of "simultaneity," in Einstein's theories? Since it has a distinctive meaning, it enters into arguments in distinctive ways, and inferences of common sense are often denied.

Einstein's "speaker's intentions" may become quite beside the point.

H.G. Callaway

---you wrote---

Arguments always allow for some degree of uncertainty due to their need to be interpreted (I am primarily thinking of arguments made in natural language here). Drawing on their origin is one way of "filling in the gaps", so to speak - to assign "speaker intentions" which may not be clear from only considering the argument itself.