Hello Olivier Perru,

The moral merit of Popperian view of establishing the truth of theories and paradigms describing different realities of the world lies in his argument about human nature where he maintains that ‘Toleration is the necessary consequence of realizing our human fallibility: to err is human, and we do it all the time. So let us pardon each other’s follies. This is the first principle of natural right’ (Popper 1994j, 190) . Consequently, as you have very clearly described, inter-subjective testability of observation statements is an objective method of establishing the truth of of the artifacts in what he calls " world three". The principal implication of the rules of objectification is that the scientists should avoid dogmatism since the scientific approach and its continuous evolution requires our tolerance and recognition of refutation versus non-refutation and acceptance. On this basis, the training of students in different scientific domains should emphasize the importance of  reasoned and critical discussion as a necessary component for the development of scientific approaches.

Best regards,

R. Biria

Dear Reza Biria,

Sentences that can not be refuted must be put aside, they are not scientific knowledge.

The sentences that can be refuted are scientific, they are interesting in both variants: if they are refuted, they lead to better new sentences; If the sentences are not refuted by the tests they are subjected, they are trustworthy and can be used in research.

The researcher behaves morally and heroically if he submits his research sentences to the most severe tests he can perform.

Dear Olivier,

As you certainly know, Karl Popper's epistemology revolves around the concepts of conjecture and refutation. In other words, scientific progress consists in positing conjectures, hypotheses or theories and test them in appropriate experimental situations. These conjectures, statements or hypotheses have only scientif value if they can be tested, that is, subject to falsification or refutation.

When this is not the case, we have, say, metaphysical, not scientic, statements  So, if a statement is true by definition, then it does not need to be tested and can never be falsified. Consider the case of  an experiment run to show that Piagetian formal operations appear only after his concrete operations. To run such an experiment would be a puré waste of time. Because formal operations are operations upon concrete operations, then it is true by definition that formal operations only appear after concrete operations and it is not necessary to run an experiment to show that that is the case. This means then while designing a scientific experiment we should be first, say, "students of logic" and only that "students of nature". In my area of expertise, psychology, there are many experiments designed to "test" what is true by definition. Needless to say these experiments are a pure waste of time. Consider the following statement: Tomorrow, it can rain. This is a typical example of a metaphysical statement because it cannot be falsified. In other words, when we say that tomorrow it can rain, then whether it rains or does not rain is always correct just because we say that tomorrow it can rain. In contradistinction, if we said that tomorrow is going to rain, then this statement could be falsified. This would be the case if tomorrow did not rain.

Even though there are epistemologists that do not accept the Popperian epistemology, as is the case of John Laudan and his idea of progressive research programs, such epistemology is widely accepeted by researchers, epistemologists, and philosophers of science.

I hope that I has got your question and that this helps.

Best regards.

Orlando

Mainz, Germany

Dear Perru & readers,

I have studied Popper pretty closely, over many years; and I would say that Popper's emphasis on testability or refutability as a criterion of the scientific standing of a statement or claim is more typical of the experimentalists. They, indeed, are much inclined to ask, "Well, how exactly go your propose to test that?" Rightly so, that is their office, so to speak. They have to construct and run the needed experiments.

The theoreticians, on the other hand, are somewhat more tolerant of investigating ideas which they don't know how to test--on the provision that if their ideas are properly and fully developed, then appropriate experiments will be forthcoming. There is danger in this, since it may lead off into more speculative attitudes. On the other hand, few would seek to forbid theoretical developments involving hypotheses which no one yet knows how to test. For example, no one knows how to test various theories of quantum gravity, say, string theory, though proposals have been made on testing in connection with various alternatives. There is a strong tendency for theories in physics to run off into scientific cosmology and astrophysics looking for relevant evidence.

Readers of this thread may find the following paper of interest:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313993928_Abduction_Competing_Models_and_the_Virtues_of_Hypotheses

Where a clear or comparatively clear problem or anomaly persists, in a given science, then this encourages the theoreticians to attempt to encompass and provide a new answer for it --while preserving as much as possible of established science relevant to the problem or anomaly. It is a merit of any such theoretical approach if it can point to the possibility of empirical tests. The experimentalists look on skeptically. But one may also argue that experiments naturally lag behind, since the technology of experimentation is often adjusted to and enhanced by the prior, or pre-existing and accepted theory.

H.G. Callaway

Chapter Abduction, Competing Models and the Virtues of Hypotheses

To H. G. Gallaway

In my view Popper had it right, his "experimental" approach is more than an option for research, I think it is a must as a touch-down point without which anything goes, i.e. any belief or even hallucination could be considered as a valid scientific theory, which brings up the question of what is science at all.

If science is a methodological branch of thought in the service of research, than (a) validation and (b) experimentation, supply the building blocks. One may contend that a larger degree of freedom than what is suggested by experimentalists is needed for researchers so they can to go beyond the facts and connect the dots and the missing dots :) in a completely unfounded yet plausible way. This idea is fine as long as it relates itself at the end to the known facts, with the caveat that partial facts may be misread so facts should not be taken as ultimate proof, they can be scrutinized for objectivity, definition, confined to circumstances or just given rise by the observation means). To sum it up, in my view unbounded thoughts have a scientific merit as an intermediate stage, and only if they lead, as Popper taught, to a refutable phrasing. Not every hypothesis is a good scientific probe...

Edith Ohri

Home of GT data mining

Mainz, Germany

Dear Ohri and readers,

Emphasizing the undoubted need of empirical and experimental evidence, a point with which I fully agree, you provide a slightly more favorable take on Popper. 

The point remains, however, that there is or can be a more speculative or theoretical aspect to the scientific enterprise where possible approaches are explored and no one yet knows how to test them.

Indeed, getting to the point of proposing empirical tests--a very important merit of any theoretical approach-- may come to depend on first providing a highly developed theoretical framework and development. I recommend, in this connection, some exploration of the field of mathematical physics. Even proposals or suggestions for testing will often have a more speculative character.

As long as major internal problems and anomalies persist, in a given science, the experimentalists (who are entitled to their skepticism), will provide no effective veto over alternative developments of theory. Its more a matter of a living tension in the field.

The question "Is it testable?" sometimes gets the answer, "We don't know, we're working on it."

H.G. Callaway

Unfortunately is undeniable that scientists are thought in dominant paradigms that do not train them to critical reasoning. Popper is today more an ethic of science than a methodology. But this is his major contribution: what Lawrence Boland called "the Socratic Popper."

Mainz, Germany

Dear Zanotti & readers,

I notice that Boland has written on the methodology of economics. Perhaps you'd like to say a bit more about "the Socratic Popper"?

A work of Boland's is available on line:

http://www.sfu.ca/~boland/book5-begin.pdf

Do you believe this work would help bring this question along? It may be of some contemporary interest to consider the testability of theory in economics.

H.G. Callaway

Perhaps this essay could help: http://www.actaphilosophica.it/sites/default/files/pdf/artigas-19982.pdf

There's also the Duhem-Quine problem of asking whether we are refuting a particular proposition or its auxiliaries. Imre Lakatos highlighted of course that we often put a protective belt around our theories to resist refutation, and of course Kuhn wondered was it as simple as one refutation leading to the rejection of a theory. 

Popper seems to have kept to an idea of progression towards some 'truth', but the rationality of reason comes to the fore. That is, why would we choose one paradigm as compared to another, is  it because of 'progress' towards some 'objective truth', or is it that it provides a better model? Leaving the question of the relationship of the model to objective reality still in the air? But perhaps Feyerabend just finished that all off with his 'Against Method'.

All in all there seems to be an issue as to how we can demarcate science, if refutation is placed as the hallmark of scientific approaches, especially if there are theoretical speculations that cannot yet, and may not in the future (?) be falsifiable. We would still like to keep those ideas as being scientific ideas, but if they lie outside testability, then how is it that we epistemologically 'feel' they are scientific, and not otherwise? 

Perhaps the only criteria to demarcate science, after Feyerabend, is critical reasoning, dialogue, but not empirical testability.

Well there you would face intersubjective reasoning - and the problem 

of coherence would come to the fore. Just because lots of people agree on something does not mean it reflects 'reality'? This we've seen with changes in scientific worldviews over time. 

Yes, this a problem, but you can´t avoid it by empirical testing, given the theory laden´s problem. Once you realize that, according to Kuhn, in crisis times there are two paradigms, two theories, that don´t interpret the empirical testing in the same way, you don´t have other option than the critical discussion of the two theories involved.