Check this link

http://animalfreedom.org/english/column/consciousness.html

Best wishes

Interesting, Khalid. Thanks.

Dear Stanley,

For me, as animals are sentient, they are conscious and like humans, they speak in many ways - sometimes through their eyes, expression and movements, sometimes through sounds.

Likewise a new born baby is conscious - but often only the mother understands what they are communicating!

Warm regards Tina

Tina, I can go along with this-but only to an extent. We need also to question the nature of consciousness-if it involves self-awareness (I assume it does) then this may declassify many animals-may do!

Dear Stanley,

If consciousness depends on Self-awareness, then many or most people cannot be classified as conscious either.

With a smile - tina

Yes, Tina. The thought has often seriously struck me. Do we generalise too much over ourselves as a species, attributing equal properties to each? Because several people are very aware (lets say) that doesn't mean surely that all people (humankind) are? Do we exhibit such properties at different times in our life, sometimes to a considerable degree, sometimes to very little?

Dear Dr Tina Lindhard

Your question is valuable.

From my sense, I think, even without speaking, these animals have their perception and consciousness by which they communicate with each other.

Only mankind have a high level of thinking, perception and consciousness by different way and levels compared with other nations of animals.

Thanks and Regards

I think the communication are not the good way to tell if conciousness exist. Some computers programs have good communication skills, but not setience yet. What you are looking for are in the way by witch sensations and the response to them are developed in those beings. At this point we cannot tell without doubt if those beings have setience (sounds a bit skeptical, I know), but if we low the range we can take some more close to human. Let's take the fight or flight response. Someone could say that's instinctive, but I think that's show the living beings perception of the word that are present for they, even that animals have types of sensors more or less evolved or adapted than humans. Self preservation implies seff perception and are one of the parameters to setience. Maybe we need some measure level for setience,.

My point was and remains how do we perceive consciousness, on such superficial factors for example. There was a film many years ago in which a gardener with limited intelligence became an advisor to the US President by virtue of reflecting back what others wanted to hear or by making vacuous statements that seemed wise. Where do we decide someone has ability rather than appears to, or has consciousness even if they do not have our understanding of the term and its symptoms.

Some autist only show their abilities whem and if the chalenge was set, and some autist do not show self preservation skills. So autistic have a counsiousness that's different from others in matters of perception.

Dear Stanley Wilkin,

Thanks for your question, particularly as my field is to do with consciousness research. I work with a theory called the Six Main Levels of Consciousness by the philosopher Srinivas Arka (2013). The main levels he mentions in humans are 1) M (Mind) – Thinking Mind Consciousness, 2) SM (Subliminal-Mind) – Consciousness, 3) F (Feeling-Mind) – Consciousness, 4) H (Emotional-Heart) – Consciousness, 5) HS (Heart-Soul) – Consciousness and 6) PS (Pure-Self) – Consciousness.

In this theory Arka recognises a level of consciousness to do with the heart which is feeling based. I have researched this level in humans, and I suggest it is also this level that is present in very young children.

In answer to your question I feel a similar level of consciousness could possibly be present in animals as well. Their intuitive abilities are very high like knowing when a tsunami is about to occur. This could happen via resonance between the earth magnetic field and their heart based magnetic field. Animals do communicate between themselves and even between species - sound is one way. In the jungle monkeys will warn other animals of the presence on a predator. Obviously animals do not have a developed Thinking Mind Conscious like humans - although I feel though training and contact with humans, we can enhance this ability in some of them to a certain extent (like primates).

For more about this theory and the research in humans see

https://www.researchgate.net/project/Quantum-Field-Theory-What-are-virtual-particles?replyToId=5a0b281eb53d2fed8ad5c4c7

Warm regards Tina

Thanks, Tina. I tend to think that consciousness is much different to what we imagine. I notice my own consciousness alters from situation to situation, and at its most intense level could be related to identity-points when identity (which requires additional discussion) becomes most visceral, closest to the senses and events connected to them. But it is variable, not continuous or sustained.

Dear @Stanley Wilkin

Yes consciousness is very different from what we imagine, especially when we consider its definition from the Vedic tradition of India. To explore our own consciousness we need to go above or below the thinking mind and the senses. This is easier to do if one has a method, but not impossible.

I needed a method as my thinking mind was very strong. When one goes below the mind using a heart-based method one begins to experience the different levels Arka talks about in his theory although the contents of each level is different in each person.

I feel it is only when more scientists begin to explore their own consciousness and its different levels when science will really progress in their knowledge about this topic.

Warm regards - Tina

Dear @Stanley Wilkin

" I notice my own consciousness alters from situation to situation, and at its most intense level could be related to identity-points when identity (which requires additional discussion) becomes most visceral, closest to the senses and events connected to them. But it is variable, not continuous or sustained".

You are observant and this is a good start. This is still a preliminary level-when our "I-ego awareness" (influenced by Arka's work, this is the aspect of ourselves who does the exploring - but not our full identity) begins to explore its inner dimensions. Being more body-based it can make us more present.

Warm regards Tina

For me, a cow, a pig or a goat are conscious, whether they speak or not.

In Hindu religion, cow is the most worshiped animal.

they will disclose reality and religions may be in trouble

All living things (plants, animals, microbes) are conscious. The degree of consciousness or response to it may vary. The animals you mention speaks in their own way. Sometimes, predators mimic the language of a prey to attract it before preying on it.

I hope I am in line with the aim of the question.

Mustaq, love your comment. Great perception. The Major Abrahamic religions hold that man is the pinnacle, thereby mass extinction of other creatures by human beings. Yes, I know the propaganda books referred to as holy say we have to look after them, but really they mean domesticate, not treat their lives as being as good as ours.

Tina, we separate where our understanding of consciousness is concerned as I see it as an external as well as internal phenomenon. Much other phenomenon can be better understood if we acknowledge this, the power of symbols, the structure of the human environment. I believe we are in error if we simply locate consciousness within ourselves (no, I don't mean outside of ourselves in the form of gods: religion's power comes from its intuitive understanding of this phenomenon).

they do not have to speak. Research has already proved that animals are sentient beings. They "speak" through their expressions in many different ways

Ah, but their vocalisations are narrow-alarm, sex, run....or little more than that. If they could further articulate, than what? If a pig or cow spoke to you in perfect English (for example) would you kill and eat it?

I need to make an addition to the above. Suppose it was not the animal talking but a recording hidden on it either within or outside its body. Would that alter your perception?

If a animal could speak, the first thing that any human will do is take to a TV show. But seriously, we need to adopt a temporal mark to this. Three courses I can think if this comunication (as understand and be understood) are stabilished a long time ago: the humanity will not kill or eat them for good because the mutual help of some kind, or the isolation of one species; they would be exterminated for be different; the humanity would be exterminated. Just talk without comunication may not change anythink.

I tend to agree with you but the perceptions and ideas behind the actions would be different. But, widening the scope of this discussion: Tasmanians were wiped out by British colonisers because they looked different and their lifestyles were different. The British regarded them as animals. Not human. Not the same as them, therefore not deserving of equal treatment. The British regarded them as too primitive to be human, even though they had a language. The trouble was, they didn't know what they were saying. For the ancient Greeks the Persians were the other-barbarians-because they didn't understand their language, and were threatened by their power and the richness of their culture. Another reason why the Tasmanians were annihilated was because they had neither the weapons nor organised forces to fight back. They were few in number. The difference here, such as it is, is direct communication and in the case of the Tasmanians victimhood. In order to prevent annihilation at human hands an animal must be big and powerful, and preferably speak a language or preferably the same language. The last proviso may prevent humans gorging on you.

Dear Stanley,

"Tina, we separate where our understanding of consciousness is concerned as I see it as an external as well as internal phenomenon".

I totally agree with you - Consciousness presents itself through matter and yet at the same time is beyond matter.

Warm regards Tina

I would think there are different level of consciousness.

a cow, a pig or a goat have their consciousness even if they don't speak. But this consciousness level is low.

A good example is that if the individual animal have a notion of "myself". Some apes, when facing a mirror or mirror like (lake, pond), they gradually come to realize that it is himself in the mirror. This is an important step of higher level consciousness.

On the other hand, some dogs, when facing an mirror, become really confused: they see another dog, but cannot smell it.

Dear Dr Wilkin,

If a human being could not speak would we consider him/her to be not conscious?

As a general policy I would say that unless we can prove otherwise all living organisms should be considered conscious.

They don't speak, it doesn't mean they are not conscious. They do their own intra-species communication perfectly.

The question nevertheless concerns perception. Even humans with very low intelligence are granted consciousness because they can speak. If animals could, we would view and treat them differently.

Perhaps I missed the point here. I met someone at university in the states that was convinced that dogs were not conscious. I was deeply unsettled to learn that this same student intended to do research on animals.

Certainly, a talking dog would force the student to reconsider their position.

What is it about our culture that seems to force such a destructive wedge between some precious myth that we have of ourselves and the animals that we share existence with?

c

Yes. Rather than seeing we are no different. Some blame the Abrahamic religions because the evidence shows that stone age hunter gatherers saw animals as equals. I see it as a direct result of the invention of cities, city walls and thereby a dichotomy between city (control, organisation, rules) and country (wildness, uncontrolled, chaos).

Stanley,

The film was 'Being There' - the last film starring Peter Sellers. Shirley Mclaine co-starred.

The Character, Chancy Gardner - whenever asked difficult questions about the economy - always referred to the only thing that he understood - gardening.

Given the last scene (don't worry - no spoilers), it would seem that his idiocy was tempered by the suggestion that he was also a kind of holy innocent!

The film shares a small interesting detail with Clint Eastwards - Play Misty for Me. Eastwood controversially decided to include the whole track of 'First time ever I saw your face'. in the film. It turned out to be a good move and made a star of the singer.

Being there (referring to the main characters first experience of the outside world) is encapsulated in an extended sequence during which an electronic version of Thus Spake Zarathustra is played in full -. Fantastic sequence!

c

I've seen Being There. As Play Misty For Me. Prefered the second, but hey my whole life is directed towards thinking and my entertainment tastes are slightly puerile. Anything silly and I'll watch it.

Try Repo Man - Emilio Estevez/Harry Dean Stanton - wonderful nonsense.

yes, they are conscious but not in a human way. Why do you think they do not speak? Well, they do not speak a human language but there is communication.

"... why ... we don't look harder. ?" The old paradigm was animals are not conscious and they react driven by instinct. The insight that animals also have consciousness is relatively young, so that there is not much knowledge yet.

Stanley Wilkin

RE: "the evidence shows that stone age hunter gatherers saw animals as equals."

Not quite, unless some equals are more edible than others.

I'm going by the cave paintings that are generally seen as sympathetic, almost apologetic towards the animals they kill. Empathy, if you prefer.

Stanley Wilkin

Some empathy maybe, but equality? I think not. Remember the cow in The Restaurant at the End of the Universe by Douglas Adams?

• http://www.sci.fi/~huuhilo/dna2.html

I disagree, Karl, I think early man would have noted the different attributes. One creature had great speed, another stealth, another strength. I believe stone age people would more likely have seen themselves as simply one animal amongst many others. Faced with the size of a mammoth or teeth of a huge lion, would you really consider yourself equal?

being able to speak cannot guarantee consciousness. parrots can speak without being conscious. as a humanistic feature, it is associated with awareness of the socio-cultural context in which a conversational event happens.

Parrots do speak, certainly, but nevertheless the question is about perceptions. Parrots imitate. Supposing one then told you as you were passing that Plato was a brilliant philosopher. You would surely stop out of curiosity. If the parrot then made a statement pertinent to its initial remark, you would begin to wonder. Now the point about our understanding of communication and consciousness is exchange. Supposing you responded to the parrot something about Plato and it responded back to you. Immediately, you would imagine you were talking to a conscious being, even though in fact it might still have been programmed to answer back to expectations of what your remarks would be. If it was a cow (if you are that way inclined )with whom you had such a conversation, would you even think of eating it?

Stanley Wilkin

I assume my answer to 1, your rhetorical question, is supposed to be "no", which contradicts 2. But you are large and contain multitudes. 😘

Dear all,

If we answer the question “If a cow, a pig or a goat could speak, would we consider them conscious?” with yes, then this implies that language is a requirement for consciousness. If we answer it with no, then this does not imply that animals are not conscious, but rather that we don't take language as a requirement for consciousness. So, it seems that we have two questions: A) is language a requirement for consciousness? And B) are animals conscious? One nice feature of A) is that if the answer is yes, then we have answered the initial question, because no species other then homo sapiens has language. To avoid misunderstanding, I take language as a biologically property of an organism which can be used to communicate, but is not to be identified with communication. If this is correct, then it follows that no other animal is conscious, since no other animal has language (sound patterns created by, say, parrots don't count as language by definition).

However, if we answer A) with no, we are thrown back at what I take to be the actual problem: are animals conscious? It is well known that the term 'consciousness' is notoriously hard to define and the debate about this question has produced interesting and rather divers answers (See, for example, the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Animal Consciousness). I lack the confidence to engage into the actual arguments. Instead, I would like to point to one feature that a scientific or philosophical answer to B) should have (as agreed by many), i. e. “a convincing argument [that] will likely also require motivation in terms of a well developed theory of the structure and function of consciousness as a cognitive process [ibid.]”

This feature suggests the one should engage into hard empirical questions about “the structure and function of consciousness as a cognitive process”. In fact, I would like to follow Roger Penrose who takes a stronger position then the one expressed in the above mentioned article. He claims that only if we have a sufficient understanding of the structure and function of consciousness as a cognitive process can we give a convincing argument that answers B). Penrose is well known for his thesis that consciousness understood as a physical process is not within the reach of current physics (Penrose, Shadows of the Mind). If one takes the stronger position, i. e. that we must have an understanding of the actual processes (which seems reasonable to me), then as the above mentioned article states: “[No] amount of arm-chair pondering, conceptual analysis, logic, a priori theory-building, transcendental inference or introspection will tell us whether a platypus, an iguana, or a squid (to take a few examples) enjoy a life of subjective experience.” But rather we need a robust understanding of what is actually going on in the physical world with regard to the actual processes that bring about consciousness. At present, this seems not to be the case.

Best,

Sven Beecken

• https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/
• Penrose, Roger. Shadows of the Mind. Vol. 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Sven, a very good response but again the question regards perception so this involves our consideration of what consciousness is and where it belongs-not necessarily consciousness itself. Its really closer to the A1 argument. nevertheless, it gave me worthwhile information.

Stanley Wilkin

a cow, a pig or a goat can speak!

They communicate under each other but not in human language but in their own language. Communication is an indicator for consciousness and it is not the question whether human language or not.

On the other side it is not a surprising new finding that many animals are conscious so I think your question is a bit misplaced.

Animals can surely communicate, but I think we need to distinguish language from communication. Signals like squawks and squeaks aren't language, nor are bees' waggle dances.

Dear Stanley,

I apologize, I have somehow missed your specification. Still, I don't think that including human perception of consciousness would change my response. The reason is that we don't have a working definition of consciousness, all that we have are several conceptions of consciousness that all seem to depend on our judgement about whether an organism is conscious or not. As long as we are on that level, we might as well regard perception of consciousness as identical with consciousness itself. To explain this a bit: We, as humans, have certain conception of space and time. This conception contradicts the “working definition” of physicists (which is evident from the fact that I, as a non-physicist, have not the slightest idea, that is to say an intuitive understanding, of what physicists mean when they talk about “spacetime”). So, as long as we don't have a comparable relation between our intuitive judgements and a precisely defined concept within the framework of an explanatory theory, the distinction becomes mute. Except, of course, if one is interested in folk psychology, which is a legitimate field of inquiry, but it is certainly an empirical inquiry. Meaning that one has to engage in systematic observation. If this is what your question is about, then I cannot contribute anything, my intuitions are kind of shredded at this point.

So, to give you my answers to your questions: A list of ways (and I presume not an exhaustive one) to see consciousness within the established debate about animal consciousness can be found in the above linked article form the SEoP with the same name in Section 2. Concepts of Consciousness. If we go beyond what one may call “the established debate”, the answer to the question where we look for it seems to be – in general – everywhere (just consider Panpsychism, the view that everything is conscious – I'm not going to touch that one). Why we don't look harder? I don't know, I'm currently trying to understand Penrose's argument that understanding is not computable. This is hard enough for me. Finally, the way we perceive the world seems - in all cases that can be tested - plainly wrong, this is evident from the fact that the natural sciences today don't care about our intuitions. Thus, the way we perceive consciousness has probably little to do with what consciousness actually is.

In conclusion, I don't see any other way then to insist that we need an actual understanding of the processes that underlie consciousness in order to get anywhere.

It might be of some interest what the renowned biologist and pioneer of the neurosciences Sydney Brenner has to say about consciousness (I cite this from memory, but I can find the source if required): He argues that once we get a sufficient understanding of the actual processes behind the phenomenon, the question will disappear!

Best,

Sven Beecken

I don't understand Brenner's point as he seems to think it is simply a mirage. Your views are always welcome, Sven. Can I point you in the direction of another question. Is the universe conscious? I do understand and agree with many of your points, but the symptoms of consciousness-communication, relationship with the environment-do not require understanding per se, if considered experiential.

Dear Stanley and readers,

I should have put more thought into the exposition of Brenner's position. It is a rather interesting view. Unfortunately, I was unable to find anything in writing, so I'm relying on a short account given by him in a Q&A session. Brenner states that “consciousness will never be solved, but it will disappear as a problem.” He gives the following example to illustrate this statement: According to him, biologists in the fifties and sixties had a lively debate about embryological determination vs. embryological differentiation. According to Brenner, the whole debate is now meaningless, because of advances in understanding. He argues that, as science proceeds, the problems are reformulated and, at least sometimes, they get reformulated in a completely different language (i. e. a completely different theory). As a result, the original questions become meaningless. In other words: Brenner argues that the questions about consciousness that are discussed today are simply incorrectly formulated (min. 1:02,1.).

You wrote: “[The] symptoms of consciousness-communication, relationship with the environment-do not require understanding per se, if considered experiential.“

I'm not entirely certain that I understand you correctly. I assume that you are referring to the Penrose argument. If so, I would agree, the phenomena that we can observe, i. e. that (at least some) organisms seem to experience their environment and, in some sense, we ascribe consciousness to them (which includes us as well, be it in the first or third person perspective). This seems indeed rather independent of understanding. Since I'm currently trying to understand Penrose's argument and since it is relevant to my (attempted) answer to your question, I'm going to try to explain how, according to Penrose, understanding relates to consciousness. Naturally, my discussion is rather crude and preliminary, but I try my best.

Penrose argues against functionalism, a position that takes the processes of the brain/mind (including consciousness) as computable processes. He presents essentially an argument that is supposed to show that there are processes in the brain/mind that cannot be represented by touring machines. The argument - as far as I have reconstructed it so far - runs as follows:

The argument seems fine (i. e. one should be able to work out its validity). Now, if we assume that Penrose is right and understanding is not computable, then we run into a problem when we try to look for physical processes that could be a candidate for the processes of the brain/mind, because the processes in nature – as far as we know – are determined (we can represent probability in terms of touring machines). If this is correct, then our current understanding of nature is not sufficient to understand the actual processes of the brain/mind. Now, assuming that consciousness is brought fourth by these unknown processes, Penrose's argument seems to entail that we need to understand these unknown processes in order to understand consciousness. As far as I can tell, this is the gist of the first part of Penrose's overall argument as he presents it in Shadows of the Mind, the second and third part requires physics and biology on a level that is far beyond my reach.

Now to your question: “Is the universe conscious?” Well, according to my own line of reasoning, my answer should better not be based on intuition. So, is there a (rational) way to approach this question? I think that Penrose's argument points in an interesting direction: If the above line of reasoning is correct, then there must be something in the universe that we A) don't understand and B) that is responsible for consciousness. Penrose seems to think that whatever this is, it is deeply embedded in the structure of reality (pp. 411-420, 2.). Accordingly, your question can only be answered if we understand what this is. There is one peculiar aspect of Penrose's reasoning that I would like to take a closer look at. If Penrose is right, then the missing process must be governed by principles that are not determined, because otherwise, they could be computed. It also seems to be the case that they cannot be random, because we can deal with randomness in terms of (computable) probability. So, whatever these principles are, they are neither determined nor random. Noam Chomsky has long argued that this property is precisely what we can observe in language use (he traces this observation back to Descartes and his followers). When I use language, then I can say something that is appropriate to the situation, but is is not caused by the situation, i. e. there is no identifiably internal or external stimuli that cause me to say what I say (pp. 59-60, 3.) This is evident from the fact that I could say whatever I want. On the other hand, what I say is not random, it is (hopefully) appropriate to the situation. In other words, language use seems to be governed by principles that are neither determined nor random.

If this is correct, then it might be the case that language use is actually based on the missing principles searched for by Penrose. So, we might have a connection between language and a property of the universe that we do not (yet?) understand. What this entails – I have no idea.

Best,

Sven Beecken

This is interesting but let me go back to your beginning, as for the moment I remain unconvinced by your belief that language must be either....or, while I understand your A and P conjecture, why is it necessarily an insight? You can still, I would have thought, reached a viable conclusion by concluding that P is not understood by A; why it is not understandable as that alone provides an understanding?

Dear Stanley and readers,

I shall try to explain Penrose's argument in a different way then I have presented it above, that is in a way closer to Penrose's own presentation in Shadow of the Mind (SM). It is my hope that this may suffice to answer Stanley's question. I will not engage in any criticism of the argument (such criticism is certainly necessary, but I refrain from it here for reasons of space). Penrose defends the following thesis:

• “Appropriate physical action of the brain evokes awareness, but this physical action cannot even be properly simulated computationally.” (p. 12, SM)

He argues against what is called strong and weak AI, roughly the view that the mind is computation or can be simulated by means of computation. It is important to note that Penrose does think that this physical action falls in principle within the reach of science. (p. 12, SM) Penrose himself describes his own goal as follows:

“What I have in mind [when saying that the appropriate physical action of the brain that evokes awareness cannot be simulated computationally] rests on certain types of mathematically precise activity that can be proved to be beyond computation. As far as is yet known, no such mathematical activity is needed to describe physical behaviour. Nevertheless, it is a logical possibility. Moreover, it is not just a logical possibility. According to the arguments of this book, something of this general nature must be inherent in physical laws, despite the fact that such things have not yet been encountered in known physics.” (p. 28, SM)

Before I go on, let me clarify some of Penrose's terminology with regard to some key terms such as 'consciousness', 'awareness' and 'understanding'. Penrose assumes that we have an intuitive understanding what they mean and he takes these meanings at face value. He makes three assumptions with regard to the relation of these phenomena:

• “(a) 'intelligence' requires 'understanding'.”
• “(b) 'understanding' requires 'awareness'.”
• “(c) Awareness [is one aspect] of the phenomenon of consciousness.” (pp. 38-39, SM)

Strictly speaking, I only need (b) and (c), I keep the first premise because it might help to understand what Penrose is after. The second and third premises are relevant for the argument: (b) and (c) link understanding to consciousness. We can only understand something if we are aware of it and we can only be aware of something if we are conscious. Furthermore, he takes 'computation' and 'algorithm' as substitutes and discusses them in terms of Touring machines. So far so good, now, how does Penrose wants to show that understanding must be based on principles that are not computable, and hence, that consciousness is not computable? He wants to show that a certain kind of understanding, i. e. mathematical understanding, can be proven not to be computable.

“Once it is shown that certain types of mathematical understanding must elude computational description, then it is established that we can do something non-computational with our minds. This being accepted, it is a natural step to conclude that non-computational action must be present in many other aspects of mental activity.” (p. 51, SM)

He basis his argument on an extremely simplified version of Gödel's famous incompleteness argument which shows that there are true propositions of arithmetic that cannot be proven by any formal system. This much is uncontroversial, Penrose argues that Gödel's result shows something more, it shows “that human understanding and insight cannot be reduced to any set of computational rules. For what he appears to have shown is that no such system of rules can ever be sufficient to prove even those propositions of arithmetic whose truth is accessible, in principle, to human intuition and insight - whence human intuition and insight cannot be reduced to any set of rules.” (p. 65, SM)

To see the kind of propositions Penrose is interested in, consider the following two:

• (F) There is no natural number grater then 3 that is the sum of n square numbers
• (G) There is no odd number that is the sum of n even numbers.

The truth of (F) can be established by a rather complicated argument (first given by Lagrange) while the truth of (G) is obvious. Now, we can set up computational rules depending on the natural numbers such that the computation will stop for a number greater then 3 iff (F) is false and will not stop iff (F) is true. Likewise for (G), the computation will not stop for any number iff (G) is true.

Let us call the relevant computation C(n) and let us define a particular computation C for any number 0, 1, 2, 3, … . So, we have a family of computations C(0), C(1), C(2), C(3), … . In terms of Touring machines, this means that C(n) is the action of a Touring machine on the number n. The question now is: Is it possible that the way mathematicians establish the truth of propositions such as (F) and (G) is itself computable?

Assume some computational procedure A such that if A terminates then we have a demonstration that C(n) does not terminate. Furthermore, we assume that A encapsulates all procedures that are available to a human mathematician. We assume further that A is sound, i. e. if A demonstrates that C(n) does not stop, then – in fact – C(n) does not stop.

In order to establish the result, we need to code the different computations C1, C2, C3, … . We do this by using the list and we refer to the qth computations by Cq. Thus we can represent any computation on a number n by the indices such that C1(n), C2(n), C3(n), … . So, we have assigned a particular ordering to all computations. Hence, the list of all computations is computable, i. e. There is a computation C* that acts on q and n and gives us Cq(n).

What we get from this is a computation A that acts on two numbers q and n and wants to demonstrate that Cq(n) does not terminate. Thus, if A(q,n) stops, then Cq(n) does not stop. If we set q=n then we get: If A(n,n) stops, then Cn(n) does not stop. Since A depends only on one number, C must be an element of the list of all computations that can be performed on n. Suppose it is Ck, then we get A(n,n)=Ck(n). Now, let us examine the case where k=n, we get A(k,k)=Ck(k). We then get the assertion that if A(k,k) stops, then Ck(k) does not stop. By substitution, we find that if Ck(k) stops, then Ck(k) does not stop. Thus, we find that the procedure A cannot demonstrate that Ck(k) does not stop, even if it does not stop. By assumption, if we know that A is sound, then we know that Ck(k) stops. Therefore, we know something that A cannot demonstrate. It follows that A cannot encapsulate our understanding!

Furthermore, we can use our knowledge of A and of its soundness to construct a computation Ck(k) such that we can see will never stop. Therefore, A cannot be a formalization of the procedures available to a mathematician. Thus, we have established Penrose's conclusion:

“Human mathematicians are not using a knowably sound algorithm in order to ascertain mathematical truth.” (p. 76, SM)

This is a fascinating argument that deserves much more care and discussion then I can provide here. The argument then proceeds as follows: By assumption, mathematical understanding is a particular kind of understanding. Thus, the conclusion applies to understanding in general and by assumption to awareness, and hence, it entails that there is something non-computable in consciousness!

It seems to me that one can support Penrose's thesis that there must be something non-computable in the natural world by the Cartesian argument regarding language use (see my previous post). Thus, it seems that there is something in the natural world (in fact, something that lies before our eyes), that is non-computable, i. e. ordinary language use (or, in fact, human action in general).

Best,

Sven Beecken

• Penrose, Roger. Shadows of the Minds, A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness; Oxford University Press; 1994.

I would immediately go against the sharp correlation of understanding and awareness as surely computers understand matters on a number of levels without awareness. They have no 'self' or if they do it is external to them. Computers detect a problem and resolve it without any evidence of consciousness-whatever that is. The programmer or programme represents its consciousness. Where Penrose's overall notion comes in here is the possible quantum level of computation, removed from programme or programmer.

I think again on the second part of your argument, well considered and presented as it is, we have differing views on the nature of understanding as you appear to require an absolute result, the ideal, what understanding what cannot occur remains an understanding. Is your difference semantic-knowing not understand? Knowing is a scientific result, understanding philosophical.

Animals are concious in the way that they can express their needs found in the immediate environment. But if they can speak, consciousness is a reqhirement for speaking. They are even concious when they utter continuous cry to express hunger, thirst or danger. But if we hypothesize that they speak a language, will it be universal to all animals or different?

These animals have their own language & their minds are very conscious too..

If two sets of mathematical problems or not are solved, Wulf, to the observer they are understood as a result occurs. At no point was I suggesting that a computer understood but certainly the appearance of understanding is there. as I said there was no evidence of consciousness, and certainly any awareness, and surely against common conviction the two are not unconditionally entwined,then clearly and hopefully I was inferring something else. Closer in some ways to your own point where I state these things are removed from programme or programmer. I'm not sure, Wulf, why you think I was saying something directly opposite what I said.

My argument stands I think.

Dear Stanley, Wulf and readers,

As I have said, Penrose uses intuitive notions when he talks about phenomena such as human awareness, understanding and consciousness. One can take them as a priory notions. That is to say, we have to start with intuitive notions when trying to get a scientifically robust understanding of some aspect of reality, while we can return to these notions and refine them once we get a better understanding.

Penrose argues against even the possibility that a program can in principle represent consciousness (weak AI). Similarly, he argues that a computer does not understand anything, it just carries out a specific procedure. Penrose tries to show that these procedures are – in principle – not capable even to represent whatever is going on in the human mind when we understand something.

I would like to avoid quarrel over terminology (whether we call computing 'understanding' or not) One way to do this is to be clear on the phenomena: There is the phenomenon that humans are conscious. If we are conscious of something, then we are aware of it. So, consciousness requires awareness. There is also the fact that - at least in some cases – we genuinely do understand things. If we understand something, then we are aware of it. So, understanding requires awareness. It seems to me that these are simply factual descriptions. One would have to show that there is something wrong with the description, i. e. one has to show that the facts stated do not obtain. This is not a matter of view, it is a matter of fact.

With regard to Penrose's use of the Gödel argument, I do agree with your general assessment that, although interesting, I doesn't threaten the foundations of mathematics (as far as I can tell). It had some impact on certain programs in philosophy and logic, but this is a different matter. What is interesting (at least to me) is Penrose's use of the argument with regard to the question: How does the mind actually work? As far as I can tell, this question remains very much open.

Best,

Sven Beecken

My point about computers, completely misunderstood by Wulf, is that understanding is possible without awareness, or apparent understanding, but as I suspect at this point I am not going to get anywhere with this argument as I suggest the confusion of terms continues I won't pursue it. While to go in a different direction, if the appearance of awareness is not awareness, or does not have to be, should the connection between awareness and consciousness be so furiously pursued? If awareness, for example, and consciousness are not convincingly connected at every instance then why should we assume they are connected at any instance? Insisting that they must always be connected is not necessary or helpful to the arguments Sven you are constructing.

Can we assume something else is occurring? That consciousness is not necessarily the force or focus in thought?

Dear Stanley and readers,

I think the question about the connection between awareness and consciousness is rather interesting. Let me try to first explain why I think that Penrose is partially right in connecting human consciousness with awareness and then I try to point to one aspect of the debate that - as far as I can tell – hasn't received proper attention.

Consider again Penrose's target: understanding. If I understand that a certain proposition P is true, then I know that the proposition P is true. If knowledge is true, justified belief, then it is difficult to see how I can know P and not be aware of it. This is because we can have a belief without being aware of it, but it seems hard to see how I can have a justified belief, i. e. how can I give a justification for believing that P is true and not be aware of it? Therefore, as long as we stick to humans, it seems hard to avoid the connection between understanding, awareness and consciousness.

On the other hand, if we take consciousness as the result of some cognitive process (or processes) and we try to understand what that process is, then we might ask if this process might not be in some sense prior to awareness. To explain this a bit: Usually, consciousness is taken as some state or process such that one is in some sense aware, i. e one can introspect. There is a question about the role of preconscious processes, i. e. processes that take place in the mind and that are in principle closed to introspection (hence, one cannot be aware of them). That there are preconscious processes is evident from the fact that we can use language, but we cannot introspect into how we construct the expressions. This point has been made by Chomsky. He conjectures that the discussions around the “hard problem of consciousness” might focus too much on aspects of the mind that are open to introspection. According to Chomsky, the much more interesting (and relevant) aspects are processes that are in some sense preconscious. What seems to be correct is that there is indeed a doctrine in the philosophy of mind that something is in the mind iff it is accessible to introspection (this has been put forth by Searl and probably traces back to Quine and the behaviorist approach to the study of the mind).

However, I do think that the best way to proceed is to regard Penrose's and Chomsky's arguments as part of a research program, i. e. the arguments point in certain directions for inquiry. Whether or not they point in the right directions can only be decided when we actually get somewhere.

Best,

Sven Beecken