We know that the eavesdroppers are malicious nodes and they are not supposed to cooperate with the users. If we exploit opportunistic relaying protocol for the destination, can we consider the same protocol for the eavesdropper? If so, then how the CSI of the eavesdropper can be estimated at the relay?
Hi. I hope the following article could help you :
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5683472
Hi. I hope the following article could help you :
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5683472
Find outlines here:
www.researchgate.net/publication/235258407_To_Obtain_or_not_to_Obtain_CSI_in_the_Presence_of_Hybrid_Adversary
www.bing.com/videos/search?q=How+can+we+obtain+the+CSI+of+the+eavesdropper+channel%3f&qpvt=How+can+we+obtain+the+CSI+of+the+eavesdropper+channel%3f&FORM=VDRE
https://people-ece.vse.gmu.edu/~kzeng2/publications/2019/Secure%20Multi-user%20Backscatter%20Communication-Infocom-2019.pdf
In most of the problems in physical layer security, we assume that Eve is passive. Out of four major problems in security viz, 1) confidentiality 2) integrity 3) non-repudiation 4) authentication, most of the physical layer security problems investigate the issue of confidentiality, wherein Eve just tries to decode the information transmitted from transmitter to legitimate receiver (Bob). In that case, the assumption of full CSI is flawed. All such works are just for paper publishing. Imagine that someone is trying to listen to your secret conversation with your friend while hiding behind the door and when you feel the whisper you shout "who is there", do you expect the reply "I'm your enemy and listening to your conversation"!!. The same is the case with the CSI estimation of Eve. Eve is enemy, and you are asking about the identity of Eve, and do you expect that Eve will reply "I'm eve here with channel gain 0.9 and phase pi/4". Now if in any paper it is assumed that you can estimate the CSI of Eve, it means that Eve is active. Even if Eve is active then eve can further deceive by providing a completely wrong estimate of channel state. Recall channel estimation is done by transmitting a known pilot sequence and the receiver sends a feedback signal back to the transmitter. If Eve is active, either it will not respond or send wrong feedback.
You can see these articles:
www.researchgate.net/publication/235258407_To_Obtain_or_not_to_Obtain_CSI_in_the_Presence_of_Hybrid_Adversary.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5683472.
https://news.ucr.edu/articles/2019/01/07/how-block-eavesdropping-wireless-communications
https://repository.kaust.edu.sa/bitstream/handle/10754/621983/07572890.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
I agree with Mr. Shahid Shah that Eve will never send its correct CSI information to the transmitter. In the following case, the transmitter does not have any choice except to make transmission strategies on the basis of CSI of legitimate link, which can prevent eavesdropping attacks. I recommend the following papers to understand, how the PLS technique can be applied against both active and passive eavesdropping attacks.
1. PLS Analysis in an Indoor Heterogeneous VLC/RF Network Based on Known and Unknown CSI | IEEE Journals & Magazine | IEEE Xplore
2. Secure information broadcasting analysis in an indoor VLC system with imperfect CSI - Ambrish - 2021 - IET Communications - Wiley Online Library
Hopefully. this may help
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