In general BSL III is always recommended, but since HIV is not known to be aerosol transmitted, BSL II safety procedures should be followed strictly, if BSL III is not available. however, HIV may be transmitted through respiratory mucous membrane, personal protective equipment such as gloves, lab coat, face mask and a safety goggle must be used, in case of working in a BSL II facility.
Any objections ? except perhaps having to absolve a special course....or higher costs for implementation? .....
In Europe (at least in Austria) you would not be allowed to do such work - neither in BSL-2 or - for sure - in BSL-3 without proper (personal and lab) certification by state or local government.
I know and understand how hard it is to
i) get a functioning BSL-3 - and how difficult it is adhering to GLP and
ii) can (but don't want to) imagine the (also personal) consequences if you - by chance and / or accidentally! - harm anybody, including yourself!
And yes, one should be careful, in the Lab generally, especially when working with virus load (be it hum. diseased tissue, vesicle fluids etc. or experimental material). Best regards, Wolfgang
I will suggest the interested readers to go through page 223 of "Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories" 5th Edition - HHS publication no. (CDC) 21-1112 downoladable from CDC website.
ok....at least BSL-3 attitude / practice in a BSL-2 Lab....
Just for convenience: excerpt of pp.222-223, reference from CDC's "Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories" 5th Edition :
Laboratory Safety and Containment Recommendations
HIV has been isolated from blood, semen, saliva, tears, urine, CSF, amniotic fluid, breast milk, cervical secretion, and tissues of infected persons and experimentally infected nonhuman primates.86
Although the risk of occupationally-acquired HIV is primarily through exposure to infected blood, it is also prudent to wear gloves when manipulating other body fluids such as feces, saliva, urine, tears, sweat, vomitus, and human breast milk. This also reduces the potential for exposure to other microorganisms that may cause other types of infections.
In the laboratory, virus should be presumed to be present in all blood or clinical specimens contaminated with blood, in any unfixed tissue or organ (other than intact skin) from a human (living or dead), in HIV cultures, in all materials derived from HIV cultures, and in/on all equipment and devices coming into
direct contact with any of these materials.
SIV has been isolated from blood, CSF, and a variety of tissues of infected nonhuman primates. Limited data exist on the concentration of virus in semen, saliva, cervical secretions, urine, breast milk, and amniotic fluid. Virus should be presumed to be present in all SIV cultures, in animals experimentally infected
or inoculated with SIV, in all materials derived from SIV cultures, and in/on all equipment and devices coming into direct contact with any of these materials.87
The skin (especially when scratches, cuts, abrasions, dermatitis, or other lesions are present) and mucous membranes of the eye, nose, and mouth
should be considered as potential pathways for entry of these retroviruses during laboratory activities. It is unknown whether infection can occur via the respiratory tract. The need for using sharps in the laboratory should be evaluated. Needles, sharp instruments, broken glass, and other sharp objects must be carefully handled and properly discarded. Care must be taken to avoid spilling and splashing infected cell-culture liquid and other potentially infected materials.85
BSL-2 practices, containment equipment, and facilities are recommended
for activities involving blood-contaminated clinical specimens, body fluids and tissues. HTLV-1 and HTLV-2 should also be handled at this level. Activities such as producing research-laboratory-scale quantities of HIV or SIV, manipulating concentrated virus preparations, and conducting procedures that may produce droplets or aerosols, are performed in a BSL-2 facility, using BSL-3 practices. Activities involving large-scale volumes or preparation of concentrated HIV or
SIV are conducted at BSL-3. ABSL-2 is appropriate for NHP and other animals infected with HIV or SIV. Human serum from any source that is used as a control or reagent in a test procedure should be handled at BSL-2.
In addition to the aforementioned recommendations, persons working with HIV, SIV, or other bloodborne pathogens should consult the OSHA Bloodborne Pathogen Standard.88 Questions related to interpretation of this Standard should be directed to federal, regional or state OSHA offices.
Special Issues
It is recommended that all institutions establish written policies regarding the management of laboratory exposure to HIV and SIV, including treatment and prophylaxis protocols. (See Section VII.)
The risk associated with retroviral vector systems can vary significantly, especially lentiviral vectors. Because the risk associated with each gene transfer system can vary, no specific guideline can be offered other than to have all gene transfer protocols reviewed by an IBC.
HIV-1-ⅢB is wt virus,and has ability to replicate and infect CD4+ cells.I think it's dangrous.But someone told me it is a weak virus.I see paper said that this strain is replicated millions of times.But very rare lab can reach BSL3 may beacus of high cost.
Thank you for all your discussion and safty knowlege sharing.