On what basis do you carry out your very first experiment when building a "completely empirical physics"? I don't think it's going to work. There are too many loose ends when you examine exactly what it is that physics studies. Some of the most recent investigations show that under some circumstances things don't exist unless they are examined. How do you incorporate this into empiricism?

There are those who argue that the leading edge of physics/cosmology (e.g., hyperspatial branes, multiple universes) has crossed the line into quantitative metaphysics. This implies that while it may be possible to rebrand metaphysics, we cannot dispense with it.

However, as you point out, there is a dialog between physics and metaphysics, it is not simply the latter lecturing the former. As physics increasingly acknowledges the limits of CTK, the inherent precision of the scientific program can provide a firmness that is often lacking in purely metaphysical theories. My own metaphysical framework uses the rigor of physics to extend certain philosophical positions well beyond the point where they would otherwise sag under their own speculative weight.

Working Paper Rational Answers from Modal Idealism - Draft

Not sure if this helps, but I have thought of the last revolutions in physics occurring when metaphysical concepts become physical ( empirical) concepts.  Examples include Aristotle's concept of cause 

 Thanks All ! Yes Tony  , I  do agree with you that  an empirical Physics  dispensing altogether with the basic guiding presumptions  is not possible .   An experiment  can only be performed within the framework of a certain  presumed commitments  which themselves can't be directly checked !  But it is curious to note   that how this question engaged  some Physicists as well as philosophers for a long time particularly  from the late 19th  to as far as the 30s of the last century !  This issue was  famously a matter for considerable trouble for Boltzmann  when he was almost alone to  develop his kinetic Theory of Gas . People like Ernst Mach  , Wilhelm Ostwald  on the basis of their empirical bias , were not ready to accept  Kinetic Theory . Things settled a bit after Einstein's paper on  Brownian motion ( 1905 ) . Even after that Logical empiricists continued to develop a logico-empirical reconstruction of Science  particularly under the leadership of Carnap .. until that attempt was shown  barren by many during the thirties of the last century .

                                However , my  question  now  ,  is  , to what extent  we can pursue with these theoretical concepts  -  as part of Reality  or as part of the  theoretical description  developed to make minimal sense of the empirical data  ?

Edward , not only causality  .... , the concept of Individual and Identity are also among the primordial metaphysical concepts  which enter formally into the  Language of Physics . But  Quantum mechanics in its standard form doesn't show  faithfulness to the notion of Individual !

         So the extent of usefulness of the metaphysical  scaffolding is  an issue to be made further sense .

Kevin , I will get back to you after I go through your Paper .

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Gangopadhyay,

A good deal of what goes on under the heading of "metaphysics" in philosophy is historical in character: Recalling the great metaphysical systems of the past. This has its broader use, beyond the philosophers retelling or recounting the history of their discipline, since it facilitates the ability to recognize metaphysics when you see it. 

From the perspective of science, on the other hand, what usually gets characterized as metaphysics is anything that seems completely beyond the possibility of empirical testing or refutation. Whether something is, or is not metaphysical in this sense is not always easy to say. Often, theoretical science is in the position of searching for ways to test theories that seem to be of interest; and in theoretical physics, given the remoteness of the Planck scale, there are many speculative theories which seem worthy of development and that no one yet knows how to test. Maybe some slight tweaking of current theory will result in testable consequences? That is the hope. Meanwhile, others argue vehemently that the speculation has gone too far. 

Regarding metaphysics in the sense that scientists criticize, perhaps the point is that it is possible to fall into it unwittingly. If so, then we might be inclined to think of the matter as something that unfortunately happens from time to time--at which point the scientists have to dig themselves out. But it seems that such falling into metaphysics unintentionally, is not allowed to set a positive precedent for getting into metaphysics anew.

H.G. Callaway 

I do understand your point, dear Debajyoti. However, there is a double with the very word "metaphysics". Rightly understood, meta`physics is about action - contrary to the idea of a real beyond physics. Let's just take a look at Kant, f.. But this is not the core of your invitation.

The distinction between applied and theoretical science is quite dangerous. That is an invention of Modernity. Not before, not afterwards has such a difference been consistent. Theoretical, even speculative aspects have a serious link with empirical ones.

Quite another issue is what you mention about Indian or Chinese philosophies. Here you just get my applause.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Maldonado, 

Another, more philosophical sense of "metaphysics," in contemporary usage is often thought of as a matter of doing "ontology." (I am aware that this word also has another critical and negative usage.)  But I wonder what you make of the use of "ontology" in computer science and related fields. In some ways, this seems to be fairly close to specialized developments of lexicography --detailing the conceptual geography of particular fields of study and the interrelations of concepts. One might say, e.g., that field belong to the contemporary ontology of physics; while species belongs to the ontology of biology. 

By the way, I think that most fully expect that highly theoretical developments in the sciences should maintain some connection to empirical studies and questions. This is a kind of normative judgement. "Theoretical," is of ancient Greek origin, from the Greek theoria, closely related to the Greek "theos" (compare, Latin "deos.") Aristotle treats its as a study of things highest and best. 

In origin, "metaphysics," was simply the title subsequently added to Aristotle's book falling after the Physics (his philosophy of nature) in the standard collections of his works. Aristotle himself called this topic "first philosophy."  "Ontology" is traditionally understood to involve a study and detailing of the (basic) varieties of beings or existing things, and in this way is close to the traditional discipline of enumerating classifications of (the chief) categories of things. Aristotle had another book traditionally titled The Categories. However, it is worth noting too, that the original meaning of "category" is very similar to our logical and grammatical term "predicate."

H.G. Callaway

Dear H. G., you are right, both historically and conceptually, of course.

My own take (if allowed, for this is not exactly Debajyoti's concern), I do not buy the idea of an ontology. Over against the tradition that starts with Parmenides, I rather prefer the hidden and never-taken-into-acount Heraclitus. Thus, the very idea of becoming largely surpasses the idea of an ontology (whether to on hei on, or also to tí en einai - according to Aristotle).

When taken seriously becoming does accept the interplay between praxis and theory (to put it in classical term). (Something we both agree on). 

Dear Deb,

A recent area of the foundations of quantum mechanics is the device-independent formalism, where states are described by measurements represented as "black boxes", given by conditional probabilities for outputs given inputs. We can then ask questions like: do these correlations violate such and such inequality? Is it quantumly realizable? What is its correlation complexity? Thus it seems to me that device-independence can be thought of as physics devoid of metaphysics. The practical reason for doing so is that conclusions drawn in this framework would apply no matter what the ultimate theoretical explanation for the observed phenomena.

Thanks and regard,

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

What seems important for the original question here is that dispensing with metaphysics, in the sense science is prone to criticize, cannot be plausibly equated with having a "completely empirical physics." 

The reason is that physics will continue to bring the historical accomplishments of theory into play. Any successful contemporary approach to problems and empirical investigations and testing brings with it a theoretical framework --already tested and shown to be valid over the range of prior empirical studies and tests.

Before anyone will test a hypothesis, it must somehow plausibly fit into the overall patterns of past theoretical-empirical accomplishments. For example, no one would even have considered Einstein's new theory of gravity if it did not agree with the predictions of Newtonian theory over the very wide range of phenomena which Newtonian theory had successfully encompassed. 

"Allow metaphysics or do without theory" is certainly a false dichotomy. 

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Maldonado, 

You wrote:

When taken seriously becoming does accept the interplay between praxis and theory (to put it in classical term). (Something we both agree on).

---End quotation

Actually, I believe that the usual contrast of Parmenides and Heraclitus is unhelpful and misleading. Both rigid permanence and flighty change can be pretty easily erected into harmful ideologies. What is needed is something like intelligent change (or reform) guided by past accomplishments and present needs. 

"Praxis," I'd suggest, has an unalienable pluralism about it. Good practice in one context often cannot be easily transferred to another. This is especially true of practice in relation to social and political configurations. In contrast to scientific matters, the habits of the heart tend to strongly enter in regarding social and political arrangements. This makes abrupt changes much more difficult than they are in purely scientific contexts.

H.G. Callaway   

Dear Debajyoti, 

My answer is addressing the question you posed as follows:

Does it make sense to think of a completely empirical Physics dispensing altogether with the presiding Metaphysics ?

I have not been able to review all the answers offered, but I have the following to say,

At a certian point in the history of Philosophy, the problem of Metaphysics was put to rest, turning the gains by classic thinkers into some form of dogma. Hume stands out as one of the major opponents of the dogmatic metaphysics. Kant follow suit in the fight against this dogma in his Critique of Pure Knowledge. During the Contemporary period, especially among the British positivist it was already taken for granted that there is no metaphysics, and the only viable method of knowledge remained logic and empirical science. This whole history has to be taken into account when one want to decide whether metaphysics serves to complement empirical Physics or not. In the 21st Century it became apparent that a distinction has to be made between Metaphysics and "dogmatic metaphysics". Alfred North Whitehead in his work, Process and reality makes an effort to revive metaphysics in a new key. This process philosophy is stressing the relatedness between various disciplines, empirical physics included. For him this process requires both experience and speculation. Another author that is critical in this area is Gadamer George, in his book Truth and Method. Actually he considers any exclusion of metaphysics or Natural Science (which includes Physics) as an alienation. Gadamer's Hermeneutics and Whitehead's Process Philosophy create room for Philosophy, Religion and Science concomitantly.

Though there is much more to say about this, especially concerning the partiality of knowledge as it comes from physics, we can expand some other time. Thanks.

It is, indeed, a false dichotomy to separate theory from... huh, metaphysics. Provided, and this is not a minor issue that a clear understanding about "metaphysics" is carried out.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Maldonado, 

Scientific theory must, sooner or later, respond to empirical considerations--or perhaps negatively to the lack of empirical support. When there are good reasons not to expect quick and definitive results --as with the remoteness of the Planck scale, say, then there will be more epistemic license for mathematically formulated speculation, say, as in mathematical physics. Now, will you say the same for metaphysics? If so, then the scientific rejection of metaphysics is reduced to a dispute about the preferred use of a word. 

Excuse my considered doubts about a "clear understanding of metaphysics." I'll settle for advanced and specialized lexicography plus semantics. Recall Wittgenstein, who'd sometimes say, "Don't look for the meaning, look for the use." From that perspective, one reflects that the usage of "metaphysics" is something of a mess.

H.G. Callaway 

I am not sure whether it is possible to develop purely empirical physics without following  implicit metaphysical principles or constraints. Even aesthetical predilections are sometimes involved. Thus for instance some authors find string theory to be beautiful, but others - to be ugly.

Dear All

   Thanks for your responses .!  Indeed  the  dichotomy , as Callaway mentioned is misleading . But  it curious  to note  ,  that how this  'false analogy' engaged  able Physicists  as well as Philosophers for a long time . I just remember a remarkable Book  written by  Heinrich Hertz ( first to experimentally demonstrate  the existence of electromagnetic wave  which confirmed Maxwell's  classical  electromagnetic THEORY  ) - The Principles of Mechanics  presented in a new  form ( published posthumously in 1893 , English translation in  1899  ) . Here he   , motivated by the  ideological  guidance  of Ernst Mach and Kirchhoff  ...  , tried to address the question of  what is a-priori and what is empirical in a Theory .  In fact , they  were trying to sketch an outline of  Empirical Physics .dispensing with Metaphysics !

                                 We know that this attempts were not registered in the subsequent history of developments of Physics  ..  Metaphysics is recalcitrant .

     I am not  proposing any reassessment of this Book  . But  today  - after almost a century of unresolved debate over  the nature of Quantum Reality   , do we have still something  to learn  by retrospecting these attempts ?

 In my opinion  ,  during the  course of  historical development of  Ideas .. ,  irrespective of  their Eastern or Western origin ,  we are sometimes implicitly  suggested to make some  choices between different options  - choices to ensure Growth of knowledge rather  than technical subtlety  .

 Many phases in the history of Ideas can be instantiated  when the  growth of subtlety in the technical details  even for  centuries gradually mask the underlying question of Growth of Knowledge itself  !

                            Shouldn't  we expect  lessons from History to react properly  in these situations  ? Lessons of taking proper stance  . Should we be more critical to the underlying Metaphysics or  would think in terms of some clear experimental  ways of making sense ( as much as possible !) of Metaphysics ?

 Philadelphia, PA

Dear Stefanov, 

Metaphysical assumptions may indeed appear in science unawares or inadvertently, as has been suggested on this thread. It is a different question whether this provides any positive precedent for introducing metaphysics anew. By analogy, political leaders may, on occasion break the law or abuse their power; but a proper judicial system will not recognize this as positive precedent for doing so again. 

You wrote:

I am not sure whether it is possible to develop purely empirical physics without following  implicit metaphysical principles or constraints. Even aesthetical predilections are sometimes involved. Thus for instance some authors find string theory to be beautiful, but others - to be ugly.

---End quotation

My suggested alternative is that science always brings working or pre-established theory into its on-going practice. Regarding aesthetic predilections, that can be a large topic itself. One approach is to regard them not as something arbitrary but as a (somewhat vague) articulation of cognitive requirements of theory. 

You may find my following paper of interest on that approach:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256410914_Abduction_Competing_Models_and_the_Virtues_of_Hypotheses

H.G. Callaway

Chapter Abduction, Competing Models and the Virtues of Hypotheses.

dear Debajyoti,

I am interested in what you mean by:

But Quantum mechanics in its standard form doesn't show faithfulness to the notion of Individual !

QM as I understand it demonstrates beautifully the validity of Leibniz's principle of identity of indiscernibles - the core of a definition of an individual perhaps. Did you have something else in mind?

If you read A. Koyré, Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, it´s clear it´s impossible Physics without Philosophy.

“If you read A. Koyré, Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, it´s clear it´s impossible Physics without Philosophy”

- if a physicist  read those authors and a huge number of other “eminent philosophers” that raised huge number of other own mainstream philosophical  doctrines that differ from the philosophers’ doctrines above [which are different also, though],

but, since any mainstream philosophical doctrine cannot be proved as indeed true and equally cannot be disproved and so all of them – and the above as well, of course,  well co-exist simultaneously,

and (s)he will follow as the doctrines' claims,

then poor physicist  will make in physics nothing at all…

Cheers

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Shevchenko & readers,

Have a look at the following article on Albert Einstein as a Philosopher of Science;

https://www3.nd.edu/~dhoward1/vol58no12p34_40.pdf

This was written some years back by Don Howard. Personally, I have no doubt that Einstein was himself a significant philosopher of science. That alone would seem to make physicists' generalized skepticism about philosophy somewhat doubtful. 

H.G. Callaway

Dear Callaway,

The paper you suggest to read seems as an standard mainstream-philosophical paper when some true believer[s] of a concrete doctrine having no properly based arguments claims,  nonetheless, that this doctrine is something totally true and – since it is philosophical – fundamental; and when to publish such papers in a mainstream journal is enough to mention a number of “eminent”, “famous” , “brilliant”, etc. philosophers, and if in a paper there is the word “Einstein”, such paper has no problems with publishing at all.

Including a lot of passages in this paper relate to that Einstein truly believed in that mainstream- epistemology is very important for scientists, first of all – for physicists; and recommended to learn corresponding philosophical works.

But the epistemology didn’t affect on Einstein himself and, for example [there are a number of other examples, though],  he developed the special relativity theory where from postulates that there is no the absolute  Matter’s spacetime and so all/every inertial reference frames are totally equivalent directly and evidently  follow any number of non-sensical consequences.

Though in this case Einstein “used” the same Poincare statement, but Poincare, claiming the absence of the absolute spacetime,  understood, nonetheless, that this claim isn’t proven and wrote:

“…Again, it would be necessary to have an ether in order that so-called absolute movements should not be their displacements with respect to empty space , but with respect to something concrete. Will this ever be accomplished? I don’t think so and I shall explain why; and yet, it is not absurd, for others have entertained this view…I think that such a hope is illusory; it was none the less interesting to show that a success of this kind would, in certain sense, open to us a new world…”

Cheers

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Shevchenko, 

I would say that the paper I linked to in my last note is a very scholarly paper, chiefly a contribution to the history and philosophy of science --including several lengthy quotations from Einstein on the importance of philosophy. I think you will have to do somewhat better than your brief skeptical comments to cast any serious doubts on its conclusions. 

You will recall, that my aim in pointing out this paper was to question generalized doubts about philosophy, and this point is not put in question by your suggestions about philosophical differences between Einstein and others. 

A chief point in the paper, I take it, is that Einstein's commitment to independence of thought was based in his study of philosophy; and this is contrasted with those attitudes which tend to isolate science and scientific thinkers within spheres of technical detail where they may very well fail to arrive at needed overview and the facility to escape the locally dominant  approaches of their special fields. 

I would emphasize, too, that philosophy definitely benefits from the study of scientific practices. 

H.G. Callaway

Dear Callaway,

Sorry, but I only can next time write here that the mainstream philosophy cannot principally to solve any indeed philosophical problem – either in ontology or in epistemology [and the linked [by you] paper isn’t some exclusion here], when these problems can be rationally analyzed/ studied only in framework of the “The Information as Absolute” https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260930711_the_Information_as_Absolute  conception DOI 10.5281/zenodo.34958

Again about seems utmost simple and evident example – the epistemology. In the mainstream any epistemological problem cannot be principally solved by the evident reason – sciences [and philosophy] study Matter and Consciousness, when both these notions/phenomena have no rational definitions in the mainstream principally – since both of them are some transcendental, and so principally non-cognizable Essences, in both main mainstream philosophical branches – in Materialism and in Idealism. Therefore any attempt to study some properties of concrete material / conscious objects eventually meets with this transcendence and the [non-solvable in the mainstream ] epistemological problems arise a next time.

Nonetheless now there exist seems hundreds of  thousands  of “epistemological” works in the mainstream, which  contain , again, in fact no rational  ideas principally.

When in the informational conception above the principal epistemological problems don’t exist at all – first of all because of the nature of Matter and Consciousness becomes be non-transcendental and so cognizable.  In the conception it is rigorously proven that all what exist in our Universe and outside is/are some informational patterns that are elements of the absolutely fundamental and absolutely infinite “Information” Set, when the systems “Matter” and “Consciousness” are some informational systems, i.e. sub-Sets, also. Thus there is nothing surprising [and no principal obstacles], when some informational system, which has a capability to analyze information, sometimes correctly decode some informational links/ laws/rules, etc. in other informational system, e.g. – in Matter.

So if some epistemological problems appear then they are non-principal and relate only to limitations of concrete humans' analytical capability and of their instruments when they study some external [to the humans] process/phenomenon. But that are seems concrete problems of concrete researches that have rather indirect relation to philosophy; which are solving usually by using well known methods/ criteria  – first of all a theory must not be based on contradictory postulates [must be self-consistent], it must be in accordance with experimental outcomes and from the theory must not follow non-sensical consequences.

A some example - both relativity theories are incorrect by practically all of the criteria above, but there exist now seems hundreds of thousands mainstream-philosophical papers/books/etc. with “philosophical grounding” that they are true…

Cheers

Article the Information as Absolute

Dear Sergey,

You seem to give us a rather dogmatic assertion by fiat that if we consider everything as information all old philosophy becomes redundant. But my understanding is that information is a very complex and slippery concept that generates as much regress as materialism and idealism. My own view is that Leibniz gives the right solution, which was to abandon both materialism and idealism (300 years ago) and recognise that what we really want is dynamism - the conception of the world entirely in terms of dynamic relation. People have subsequently constantly slipped back into materialism or idealism but Leibniz's system does seem to be the sensible approach to the most up to date physics. It resolves all sorts of puzzles about quantum field theory that otherwise bother people. Information systems theory seems to me to be a dead end founded in a new form of naive realism that dynamism avoids.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Shevchenko,

Given your apparent assumptions, I would think you are perfectly entitled to ignore philosophy. The danger of that, though, is that you will end up with a less well informed anti-philosophy --a philosophy still ! Would that I could so neatly resolve all the philosophical questions about science with a single blow!

On the other hand, it may seem to some that you are simply standing off on an accumulation of technical details and claims, taking gratuitous pot-shots at things you little understand: a matter of "dogmatic assertion by fiat," as Edwards has it?   

H.G. Callaway

Have a look at Pierre Duhem's The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory for what physics without metaphysics looks like.

Dear Jonathan,

“…My own view is that Leibniz gives the right solution, which was to abandon both materialism and idealism…[alternative] is dynamism - the conception of the world entirely in terms of dynamic relation”

- it is impossible in the philosophy (and/or in other science, though) to “abandon both materialism and idealism”, an example – the quote above. The “dynamic relation” – what is that? i.e. relations of what and between what? Besides when somebody says about some relations, (s)he should point out - why the relations exist at all.

And at answering on the questions above it becomes be necessary to choose – the relations happen without some external cause- i.e. by some [in the mainstream ontology - transcendental] internal cause, what means that (s)he chooses Materialism; or the relations are formed by some [in the mainstream ontology usually by some transcendental] external cause, what is Idealism.

And – relating to that “…Leibniz's system… resolves all sorts of puzzles about quantum field theory”

- it seems as rather probable that Leibniz didn’t know the physical notions “field” and “quantum”; as well as seems as rather probable that, in spite of the existence  of this system, some puzzles in the QFT are resolved…

Cheers

Dear Callaway,

“…I would think you are perfectly entitled to ignore philosophy…”

- I’m not a professional philosopher, I’m a physicist, so cannot  assert that the “The Information as Absolute” conception ignores the [even the mainstream] philosophy totally; but it modifies the philosophy essentially.

The examples – an example see above in the SS posts, when all epistemological problems, the considering/ studying of which is an essential part/branch of the mainstream, in the conception are reduced to one phrase “the principal epistemological problems don’t exist at all”.

A next fundamental point  - the conception clears the main problem of the ontology – “What is Being and why does Being exist?” – in the conception it is rigorously proven that  all/everything in our Universe and outside is/are some informational patterns that are elements of the absolutely fundamental and absolutely infinite “Information” Set, when for the absolutely fundamental notion/phenomenon “Information” there is no necessity to have some cause to exist – it simply cannot be non-existent.

Thus the cause  of practically all [of mainstream, of course] the philosophy’s flaws, i.e.  – why this science is now in fact only some sort of religion where the number of simultaneously existing doctrines is seems not lesser then of religious sects on Earth – this cause becomes be abandoned because of Being in the conception isn’t transcendental, Being is realization of Information, which is very complex, but, nonetheless, well cognizable notion/phenomenon.

This notion/phenomenon is and will be studied by “usual” sciences, of course, also; but this process with a great probability should be directed by some integral science that will study some problems that aren’t concrete subjects of the usual sciences, and such integral science seems will be the new philosophy that obtains for study indeed fundamental subjects – the phenomenon “Information” and the “Information” Set.

More examples – see the paper “The Information as Absolute”, at least the conclusion.

And in this new philosophy will not be such situations when “[if somebody] will end up with an.. anti-philosophy --a philosophy still !” – as, for example in physics now there cannot be the situation as “an antiphysics – a physics still”…

Cheers

Dear Sergey,

I fear you have missed the point. You only need materialism or idealism if you are still enclosed in the glass jar of presuppositions you mention. Dynamism starts afresh and works without a need for either. It makes use of reasons, which underly causes but have no position in time or space. 

Leibniz understood fields, in terms of arrays of dynamic values in time and space. His analysis of forces in beams shows that. He understood the concept of quantum better than we do now. He actually used the word quantum for a terminology he developed in relation to infinities so did not use it for metaphysics the way QFT does. But he used a word that means exactly the same thing - an indivisible dynamic entity - which was monad. Both just mean unit. He was frustrated by being unable to deduce the complex harmonic oscillations that underly modern dynamic units although he understood that complex numbers somehow had a relation to a deep unenvisageable reality. The best he could think of for individual dynamic units was vortices that did not consist of any particles or stuff - which is not bad at least for orbitals and may be even better for modes occupying extended structures like metal valency electron modes or phonons. 

Moreover, Sergey, you claim that we cannot avoid materialism or idealism yet you also claim to do just that. Put another way I am simply saying that Leibniz understood an 'informational' metaphysics long ago but saw that things were a bit more complicated. Information implies knowledge or significance. To be informed about an electron I need the complicated apparatus that infers that the signal is 'about an electron', which might include further signals about initial conditions or whatever. Leibniz sees that there is a distinction between perception, or if you like the passage of signals, and knowledge, which is the passage of information, which requires a complex inference machine.

And surely information is a relation - the relation of informing.You may say that no 'things' are involved but so does Leibniz. For him all relations are between the dynamic totality and a point of view on the totality. No material, no ideas, just, if you like, signalling, which in certain special cases only can be called informing.

Did anyone mention 'physical "stuff" ', Peter? I doubt any of the discussants would want to bring that in. Not quite sure what point you are making.

Dear Jonathan,

It seems you didn’t read the SS posts on the 3-rd page attentively enough, where some comments to your last posts in fact exist; and so I cannot  add something essential to what is already written; when something inessential seems  would be like as some spam.

Cheers

Dear All

    I am sorry to miss this wonderful discussion as I am away  with remote accessibility ! Hope to catch you soon within a day or two ..

Regards

Debajyoti

Dear Sergey,

I have read and re-read, as I did before. I am not clear what resolves the claim that we cannot break out from materialism and idealism yet you do just that! The received wisdom on historical philosophical views tends to be nonsense so I see no a priori reason to assume it all falls into dud categories.

Dear Jonathan

  Your question about Leibniz is  very  pertinent in  connection of this discussion thread ! However ,  the  justifiable  length of  discussion  about the failure of Individuation and Identity in Quantum mechanics would need much space  than can be expected here .

Anyway , quantum mechanical entities ( more specifically and explicitly Bosons )  are indistinguishable in a strong sense which really leads to the violation of Leibniz's Principle of Identity of indiscernibles (PII ) This was noted by the founding fathers themselves and , Schrodinger  was perhaps the one who talked  much about this issue  particularly during the fag end of his life .. (  plz see , for example ,  his Dublin Lectures '1952 )  ...  Based mainly on his suggestion , a group of Brazilian logicians are engaged , ever since the 90s of the last century ,  in  developing non-standard formal systems  which can capture the sense of quantum non-individuals !

    However , against the standard folklore ( of violation of PII ) , there are also recent claims  to develop ( for example , by Simon Saunders , Fred Muller .. , Adam Caultan ..  20012 -13 ) criteria of  ( regaining ) weak discernibility .

                                  But the issue is very much OPEN . And in my opinion , is one of the most challenging area of future philosophy of science ..

  For a comprehensive  historical as well as formal account of this issue  I would strongly  suggest -

IDENTITY IN PHYSICS   by Steven French and Decio Krause  , Oxford , 2006

    Best

Debajyoti

Ultimately, isn't empirical physics and metaphysics about the same atoms, molecules, and phenomena - called by different names?

can the monad be considered to be a mathematical concept?

Dear Debajyoti,

I am familiar with Simon's piece on Leibniz's PII. I am not that impressed by French. 

To my mind PII is obviously enhanced by quantum theory. The dynamic units of interest should be given their proper technical name - Bose modes. Bosons suggest that there some ethereal billiard balls occupying some particular complex harmonic dance. But surely we are all agreed, as per Feynman's point in one of the first chapters of volume 3, that there is no such thing as 'electron A' or 'photon B' other than an identity in terms of total dynamic history. So for me there are no identical electrons because each 'orbital mode' is unique. We talk of P orbitals in iron atoms but surely a wave equation will require that each mode is a mode in relation not just to one nucleus but in fact to all nuclei in the universe (represented by the field of potentials) even if only one is non-trivial in the way it determines the possible mode. 

Simon adds some neat twists to this in terms of electron pairs but to my mind the basic resilience of PII is hardly in doubt. Leibniz explains why there is no photon A making its way out of a light bulb not yet sure where it will arrive. It is only photon A if it is an indivisible connection from light bulb to photographic emulsion. Any photon that misses the emulsion is by definition photon B or C.

 Inasmuch as metaphysics concerns itself with what is abstract, beyond and beneath the concrete, physical existences studied in physics, including space, time and all other fundamental concepts of physics, it should be given due respect as the origin of physics, and presumably, it will also be the end of physics, looking at the way we are heading with our modern theories of the phenomenal universe.

Dear Stephen, 

There is a common misconception about Descartes and Leibniz and I would like to make sure we keep clear of. Descartes's soul and Leibniz's monad are not 'non-physical' in the sense of being 'outside physics'. For both these philosophers physics, in the broad ontological sense, covered 'why things appear to change' (both also use a narrow sense of the practice of physics, or engineering that does indeed exclude souls and monads). Descartes's soul was part of his dynamic theory but was different from extended matter in not being antitypic (not excluding other things from its domain) and some other features. Descartes cannot produce a theory for how it 'works' but it is not 'non-physical', just non-material. Leibniz reaches that neat conclusion that 'material' simply means aggregate. He sees that antitypic extension cannot be a feature of single dynamic units but is a typical feature of aggregates of such units - in effect it allows you to have both a pushing left and a pushing right the can produce exclusion from the space between. A single push cannot do this. As for Descartes, Leibniz cannot work out the mathematical rules for individual units in quantitative terms so the description of the monad is qualitative. However, I do not think he would have claimed that the monad has no quantitative aspects, just that he could not work them out. An early attempt at the monad for instance gives it a relation of perception to light rays coming from all angles - those angles would be definable quantities.

So I think I agree with Pratibha. Empirical physics and metaphysics are intended to be about the same dynamic units. However, in Leibniz's time people only knew how to study aggregates. For the last 100 years we have realised Leibniz's dream of having math for the individual units - quanta. These are immaterial in the sense that they have, individually, no antitypy, but they are the components of material aggregates that do.

What may still be unclear to many is whether or not quantum theory is metaphysical in the sense of, as Leibniz would say, answering the fundamental question of what is an entity. Many physicists prefer to make the caveat that the modes of excitation of fields we currently see as fundamental may in fact have components. For instance electron spin and charge may be separable. But this does not actually lead to any difficulty in Leibniz's terms because his monads exist in a hierachy covering all scales. So he would be happy for an electron, a proton, a quark, a billiard ball and the earth all to be monads, if he knew how quantum field theory had worked out. At least in the sense that these all instantiate indivisible dynamic modes. The modes for the billiard ball will be acoustic and for earth seismic, but they are still indivisibles. And quantum theory recognises that because they all have de Broglie wavelengths.

Dear Rajat,

I agree. Metaphysics as I see it is really the search for the true axioms on which to build a physics. As such it is an asymptotic endeavour towards a perfect enunciation of the simplest axioms with the richest explanatory power.

That is right Dear Jo. Nice to see your activity after a long time. The less the number of such simplest axioms, the more satisfying it would be. And the least number is one! What is that one simplest axiom, having the greatest explanatory power that would satisfy the physicist as well as the metaphysicist? What would be the form of that axiom-- Mathematical or non-mathematical? These are I think deeper questions to ponder over. 

Best Regards,

“…Hello Pratibha, Let me explain to you what metaphysics is. There are three major problem areas of philosophy…” etc.

 that is rather professional, frank and clear representation – what the mainstream philosophy is, so – though rather clear comments exist already on 3-rd page – seems it is worthwhile to comment the main points of this Stephen’s post. So:

“…The problem of knowledge deals with "what is there?" (ontology)  and "how can I know?" (epistemology)…”

-  both these problems are principally linked – evidently till there is no answer on the first question there cannot be any rational answer on the second one. In the mainstream there is no adequate to the reality answers on the first question – there are two principally different main “answers” in two main mainstream brunches [Materialism and Idealism]: “all that exists are  material somethings” and “all that exists are immaterial ideas”; a huge number of existing [quite naturally, because of principal uncertainty of the main answers] mainstream variations/combinations of these answers are non-principal in this case.

At that – in the mainstream all main notions  in both answers are principally transcendental and thus inevitably  non-cognizable, from what follows that any process [that is studied by some “usual science”] in Matter and consciousness is, in depth non-cognizable also; just therefore in the mainstream thousands  years there exist the epistemological problems [as the ontological,  as well, of course].

Such situation exists because of both -  ontological and epistemological problems [and many others in the mainstream, though] are Meta-mainstream –philosophical problems and cannot be [the thousands  years of attempts show that clearly] solved in the mainstream;

they can be understandable/rationally analyzed only in the “The Information as Absolute” conception, where it is rigorously proven that all/everything what exist in our Universe [that consists of 3 main sub-systems “Matter”, “Alive”, and “Consciousness”] is/are some informational patterns/systems of patterns that are elements of the absolutely fundamental and absolutely infinite “Information” Set [which is very complex and paradoxical, but, nonetheless, isn’t transcendental and so can be rationally studied]; where our Universe is some practically infinitesimal sub-Set.

Including, for example, in the conception becomes be possible clearly separate three sub-sub-Sets above, first of all – “Matter” and “Consciousness”, from what it becomes be possible to transform in fact senseless mainstream straggle between Materialism and Idealism in some rational discussion;  from the conception follows that  all epistemology becomes be reduced to one phrase “there are no principal epistemological problems at all” , etc.

- more see the SS posts  on the 3-rd page here and the link to the paper “The Information as Absolute” in a post.

Cheers

Sergey, I frankly like very much your concept of 

"our Universe [that consists of 3 main sub-systems “Matter”, “Alive”, and “Consciousness”] is/are some informational patterns/systems of patterns that are elements of the absolutely fundamental and absolutely infinite “Information” Set

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all, 

Coming back to this question after some reflection, it struck me that the following paper of mine might be of interest to readers of this thread:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263855767_Sidney_Hook_The_Metaphysics_of_Pragmatism

The puzzles of the "metaphysics of pragmatism" are similar and parallel to the questions under discussion here. A similar skepticism of metaphysics has persisted in the pragmatic tradition, although the tradition has also repeatedly produced its own metaphysics. 

This paper originally appeared as my review of a re-issue of Sidney Hook's 1927 dissertation, written at Columbia University under John Dewey. In consequence, it focuses on history of American philosophy. Still it also ventures some conclusions. Both "ontology" and the relationship of  metaphysics to logical analysis are topics of interest in the review.

H.G. Callaway 

Article Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Gangopadhyay & readers,

Let me return to the opening question:

Does it make sense to think of a completely empirical Physics dispensing altogether with the presiding Metaphysics? 

---End quotation

I suspect that in order to have much chance of answering this question in a plausible way, we first have to know what the "presiding metaphysics" is supposed to be doing for us --or for physics. If someone could tell us how any metaphysics is supposed to help, then that might put us in a position to say whether it is indeed somehow needed or --on the other hand whether it can be "dispensed with." But if we have no idea how metaphysics is supposed to help, then it seems a somewhat odd question to ask whether its needed. 

BTW: if it is claimed that everything is information, then that sounds very much like metaphysics to me. 

Webster's says:

Full Definition of metaphysics

1a (1) :  a division of philosophy that is concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and being and that includes ontology, cosmology, and often epistemology (2) :  ontology 2b :  abstract philosophical studies :  a study of what is outside objective experience

---End quotation

H.G. Callaway

Dear Callaway,

Webster gives rather applicable definition of metaphysics – nearly to the Stephen’s one above, though the last seems more relevant – because of more concrete; so to explain why/how  the mainstream principal problems can be/ are resolved, or, at least rationally analyzed  [only in the informational  conception]  for me [in the posts above] was very convenient.

As  to concrete this thread’s question – the answer seems understandable also:  it is impossible to develop any science, including physics, without metaphysics – if it is non-mainstream, of course. Any science indeed, first of  all,  is some empirical study of the external to human events and processes, but eventually, in depth, any science meets “metaphysical” questions, for physics, for example, that are definitions of Meta-physical notions/phenomena “Space”, “Time”,  “Matter”.  And “Consciousness” as well, since without understanding  what is consciousness it is impossible to solve any fundamental – and actual in a concrete science, including physics,  epistemological problem – and, provided the understanding, it turns out that such problems are principally simple and the solution is one phrase in the SS posts  above;  but this solution is outside natural sciences. .

The next example when non-understanding - what the notions “Space” and “Time” are, by authors of the relativity theories resulted in self-inconsistence of the theories; when postulating of “relativistic Matter’s spacetime transformations” – as “space contraction”, “time dilation”, “spacetime curvature”, etc. has no relation to the reality also.

Physics studies Matter, when philosophical, or, seems here better – metaphysical,  problems are , or at least should be,  outside concrete material problems, though must, of course, eventually have concrete applications in natural sciences. As an example – in your Webster’s definition it seems there is the mistake “[metaphysics] …includes ontology, cosmology” – the cosmology is a branch of physics; but the definition will be correct if be as “…includes ontology, cosmogony”; just  the cosmogony is indeed metaphysical brunch – and seems the main point in the struggle Materialism/Idealism; when eventually a solution of this problem in metaphysics could, of course, be well applicable in cosmology.

Etc.- there can be presented a lot of other examples that don’t confirm the calling for “to dispense with. metaphysics” a number of examples – see https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273777630_The_Informational_Conception_and_Basic_Physics

Cheers

Article The Informational Conception and Basic Physics

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Shevchenko,

Thanks for your reply. 

It will perhaps help to distinguish, as is typical within the academic discipline of philosophy, between history and systematic approaches to metaphysics --or to metaphysics and epistemology, which are usually studied together. Anyone trained in philosophy knows the history of metaphysical systems of thought and variations on the traditional themes of materialism, idealism, dualism, atomism, holism, etc. It is quite another matter to attempt contemporary metaphysical systems of thought--though there are people in philosophy who do so. 

What has this to do with physics? Well, as may fairly be emphasized, when physics takes up difficult questions on the edge of scientific comprehension, or even before that point on occasion, it runs up against or produces theories which have some resemblance to traditional, metaphysical account of particular topics: "What is space? What is time? What is matter? What is causality?, etc. In addition, the proposals made in mathematical physics are often speculative in the sense that no sufficient means are yet available for empirical testing. 

However, in doing physics, the resemblances to metaphysical systems are accidental in an important sense; and it is not the case that physics aims for theories which are incapable of empirical testing or that emulate traditional metaphysical claims and systems. In fact, one of the possible benefits of philosophical sophistication to physical inquiry, is that the philosophers have a great catalog of metaphysical systems of the past and therefore tend to be aware of how they have gone wrong. The history of metaphysics (whatever else it may be) can be viewed as a history of pitfalls to scientific thought.

There is, of course, in the history of metaphysical systems also a history of cosmological systems. But, again, contemporary physical cosmology does not aim to emulate these traditional systems of cosmology. Nor does it aim to produce new metaphysical systems--in the sense of systems beyond the possibility of empirical testing. In spite of that, unsophisticated theorizing may fall into various ancient traps of thought and perhaps, in that way, produce metaphysics without intending to do so? That is certainly one way to look at the relation of science to philosophy. 

H.G. Callaway

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Gangopadhyay & readers,

Let me return to the opening question:

Does it make sense to think of a completely empirical Physics dispensing altogether with the presiding Metaphysics? 

---End quotation

I suspect that in order to have much chance of answering this question in a plausible way, we first have to know what the "presiding metaphysics" is supposed to be doing for us --or for physics. If someone could tell us how any metaphysics is supposed to help, then that might put us in a position to say whether it is indeed somehow needed or --on the other hand whether it can be "dispensed with." But if we have no idea how metaphysics is supposed to help, then it seems a somewhat odd question to ask whether its needed. 

BTW: if it is claimed that everything is information, then that sounds very much like metaphysics to me. 

Webster's says:

Full Definition of metaphysics

1a (1) :  a division of philosophy that is concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and being and that includes ontology, cosmology, and often epistemology (2) :  ontology 2b :  abstract philosophical studies :  a study of what is outside objective experience

---End quotation

H.G. Callaway

Sergey, your concepts are very interesting, I downloaded your papers.

H.G. Callaway,

Do you think there are dimensions of our solar system / universe that are indiscernible using scientific instruments or using the senses of sight, hearing, and so on?  Based on your response, I'd like to respond.

Pratibha Gramann

Dina,

Well, I would like to hope that the papers will be interesting also.

Cheers

When and where is the conference that is coming up?

Pratibha

Philadelphia, PA

Dear Gramann,

Thanks for your question--though I a not sure that answering it will be very helpful in clarifying the relation of science and metaphysics.

You asked:

Do you think there are dimensions of our solar system / universe that are indiscernible using scientific instruments or using the senses of sight, hearing, and so on?  Based on your response, I'd like to respond.

---End quotation

Its the word "dimensions" in this question which seems to me to introduce some doubt regarding the meaning of the question. Perhaps, you would be just as happy to ask about "things," "processes," "parameters." etc.? --in formulating the question?

My first inclination, in any case, is to emphasize that the category of scientific instruments is quite open; and we cannot say before hand, and in general, comprehensive and definitive terms what sorts of things scientific instruments may eventually allow us to discern. Because of that, I suppose that the question you pose may actually be less interesting than you suppose it to be? 

Going back, say, 40 years or so, maybe 50, and there were no scientific instruments capable of detecting neutrinos. But now there are such devices. When the neutrino was first postulated, it was thought to be a kind of thing that could never be detected. What does this tell us about your question? 

Or perhaps the intent of your question is to ask whether I, personally, reject reductive materialism or physicalism? If so, then the answer is "Yes." See my writings on scientific and disciplinary pluralism. There may be any number of things in the world "undreamt of in our philosophy." Still my approach to questions about science is a methodological (not a dogmatic) naturalism. 

I hope I am getting at your question. 

H.G. Callaway

If metaphysics is considered as most general interpretations of empirical physics, QM and QFT are physical theories without a well-defined metaphysical interpretation.  Feynman was a physics genius but unfortunately was a strong advocate for the idea that any metaphysical interpretation of QM / QFT is futile.  Which is a shame as broad concepts can come in pretty handy!  In contrast Relativity has both physical component (Lorentz transformations, gravitational corrections) and metaphysical components (unification of space and time, unification of spacetime and gravitational field); and string theory is purely metaphysical at this point.

Edward, why would unificationof space and time and gravitational field be a metaphysical component?

Hi Dina - I guess I consider it a metaphysical statement as it is a broad interpretation of the relativity of motion in not only inertial but accelerating reference frames within General Relativity.  I think Loop Quantum Gravity in turn attempts to describe spacetime / gravitational field in terms of empirical physics in the form of spin networks.  I've always thought this is how revolutions occur in physics - metaphysical assertions of previous theories being reinterpreted as physical concepts (which in turn have a new metaphysical interpretation).  But these are certainly only my musings on these topics!

“…QM and QFT are physical theories without a well-defined metaphysical interpretation…”

that is so; and

“…In contrast Relativity has both physical component (Lorentz transformations, gravitational corrections) and metaphysical components (unification of space and time, unification of spacetime and gravitational field)…”

is so as well, since relates to mainstream metaphysics.

But the last quote above is correct only in sense that,

 though  in this case mainstream metaphysics had/has practically no relations to the “unification of space and time, unification of spacetime and gravitational field”. This unification was made by Minkowski and further by Einstein without any concrete references to some metaphysical base and all the mainstream’s role here was (and is till now), in fact, only repetition the main postulates of the authors;

- in the mainstream-philosophy indeed now exist a big number of schools,  doctrines, etc. where these physical postulates are “studied” as some metaphysical subjects; Einstein is claimed as outstanding philosopher, etc.

And such situation in mainstream in this case was/is quite natural – the notions/phenomena “Space” and “Time” are Meta- mainstream -physical and Meta-mainstream-philosophical notions/phenomena and so they cannot be properly defined/rationally analyzed in physics and the mainstream. The existent mainstream’s result is well known – in the relativity theories and further in the philosophy it was postulated that real Matter’s spacetime is pseudoEuclidian/pseudoRiemannian manifold with imaginary either 3D space or 1D time; that the spacetime indeed really becomes be transformed in different reference frames and by some “mass”, etc.

When  seems rather evident that these postulates have no relation to the reality – nobody observed till now imaginary  space or time, “contracted space”, “dilated time”, etc.; as well there are no any rational grounds to claim such assertions in philosophy –  but the mainstream without any doubts adopted these  evidently questionable relativistic claims as some truth.

In the reality the Mata-notions/phenomena “Space” and “Time” can be, and are, properly defined only in the “the Information as Absolute” conception (see the links in the SS post on 3-rd and 6-th pages) and are fundamental Rules/Possibilities that act in every informational system, including in the system “Matter”, which is studied by physics. As the possibilities for material objects/systems of objects to exist and  to change/evolve,  they form [5]4D absolute Euclidian spacetime - [5]4D absolute Euclidian “empty container”, where all dimensions are independent on each other and any of the dimensions and the spacetime as a whole by any means cannot be transformed by anything that is placed inside,  including by the  gravity [gravity is only one of four fundamental forces in Matter, something like the EM force]; etc.

More – see the links.

Cheers